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The purpose of this research is to make proposals to the World Trade Organization (i.e., the WTO) 
rules to address the problem of granting advantages to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). SOEs tend 
to receive various advantages, including financial advantages, monopolies and exclusive, 
regulatory advantages and so on, leading to economic concerns. The problem is typical in the 
context of China. However, current WTO rules are not sufficient to address the problem of SOEs 
receiving various advantages.  
 
The dissertation makes recommendations to improve them. It makes three types of proposals, i.e., 
trade remedies proposals, trade rules proposals, and competition rules proposals. It assesses these 
proposals in terms of the possibility of implementing them, particularly the political willingness 
of WTO Members to accept these proposals. Lastly, I lay out the framework for the competition 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 The Theoretical Framework  
 
This dissertation examines the problems of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) receiving various 
advantages from governments, and explores ways to solve the problems within the WTO 
framework by making recommendations, after analyzing the inadequacy of the WTO rules in this 
regard.  
 
Chapter one examines the global presence of SOEs, broadly describes the problem to be addressed-
--the various advantages granted to SOEs, and explains why it is a problem from an historical and 
an economic perspective.    First, I begin with a general overview of the presence of state capitalism 
globally, and the various advantages granted to SOEs, including financial advantages, monopolies 
and exclusive rights, regulatory advantages and other advantages. By examining SOEs’ 
international activities, I find that SOEs are becoming more involved in international trade. I point 
out the severity of the problem of SOEs getting various advantages from their governments, and 
associated concerns which have arisen in the international community in this regard.  Second, I 
examine the role of SOEs from an historical perspective. I trace the history of SOEs in the world 
economy and explain how the grant of advantages to SOEs has been perceived as more problematic 
over time. The presence of SOEs and grants of various advantages to them helped expand foreign 
markets before the 19th century. Due to interdependence and globalization since the Industrial 
Revolution, however, the presence of SOEs and grants of advantages to them have been gradually 
perceived as more problematic.  Third, I explain why the existence of SOEs and their receipt of 
advantages are problematic from an economic perspective. I go through different economic 
theories underlying international trade and explain how grants of advantages to SOEs threaten to 
prevent achievement of the gains that those theories predict would result from international trade.  
 
Chapter two examines the extent, nature, and effect of advantages granted to SOEs by looking at 
the problem of SOEs in the context of China.    First, this Chapter begins with a general overview 
of the presence of SOEs in China and then looks at the extent to which SOEs are present in several 
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industries that are considered as key industries, such as the coal, civil aviation, petroleum and 
petrochemical, shipping building, telecommunications, automotive, steel, non-ferrous metals, 
machinery and equipment, and information technology sectors. In particular, it considers the extent 
to which Chinese SOEs get various advantages from the Chinese Government in the above 
industries and sectors.    Second, I describe the nature of the advantages granted to SOEs in China 
by pointing out that SOEs are givers of advantages, such as capital and inputs. I describe the nature 
of financial advantages, the nature of advantages of monopolies and exclusive rights, and the 
nature of regulatory advantages in favor of SOEs.   Third, I lay out the trade effects of advantages 
granted to Chinese SOEs. In particular, I consider the importance of the facts that China is a large 
trader and that Chinese SOEs play a significant role in international trade. This has caused concern 
at the international level regarding the grants of advantages and the behavior of SOEs.    Last, I 
explain why there is little domestic incentive in China to deal with the problems from the 
perspectives of political economy theory, history and ideology. Hence, international rules are 
needed to deal with the problems. 
 
Chapter Three examines the existing WTO rules addressing the problem and their weaknesses 
from a normative perspective. First, this Chapter examines the current WTO rules that are relevant 
to address the various advantages granted to SOEs and special rules that are applicable to China.       
Second, I explore potential ways to maximize existing WTO rules in order to solve the problem. 
Unfortunately, each potential way within the current WTO framework has weaknesses. I examine: 
i) the deficiency of rules regarding financial advantages granted to SOEs, such as the problem of 
SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs, the problem of upstream subsidies in the context of 
Chinese SOEs, privatization of SOEs, and the elements of “specificity” and “benchmark prices” 
for the situation of SOEs; ii) the deficiency of rules regarding advantages of monopolies and 
exclusive rights granted to SOEs in that the WTO allows the grants of monopolies and exclusive 
rights, and the regulation of the behavior of SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights is 
inadequate in respect of discriminatory behavior, behavior not based on commercial considerations 
and anti-competitive behavior; iii) the inadequacy in rules regarding regulatory advantages granted 
to SOEs, particularly with respect to export restraints that favor SOEs; and iv) the inadequacy in 
Members’ compliance with the notification and transparency requirements. Hence, I point out the 
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deficiency of existing WTO rules dealing with the problem, i.e., some issues that are not caught 
or disciplined by these rules.    
 
Chapter Four puts forth my proposals for WTO rules to address the problems and the assessments 
of these proposals. First, proposals will be made respectively regarding the structure of separating 
rules disciplining SOEs receiving advantages from those that discipline POEs receiving 
advantages, and the coverage of rules applicable to trade in goods, trade in services, and trade 
related-investment. Three kinds of suggestions will be made, one is the trade remedies suggestion, 
one is the other trade rules suggestion, and the last one is the competition law elements suggestion.  
 
In Chapter Five, first, I assess the possibilities of these proposals from the perspective of the WTO 
in general as an appropriate forum to implement proposals, i.e., the capacity of the WTO to adopt 
proposals dealing with state ownership, regulation of monopolies or exclusive rights, embodiment 
of competition rules, etc.; and the deficiency and difficulties of other forums (such as bilateral 
investment agreements or free trade agreements) in addressing the problems. Second, I assess the 
practical technical ways to embrace these proposals through aggressive interpretation of current 
WTO rules, through revising current WTO rules, or through negotiating a new set of rules. Last, I 
analyze the political willingness of WTO members to accept those proposals.  
1.2 The Methodological Approaches 
 
My essential methodological approach is the doctrinal approach. It is largely applied in Chapter 
Three in the legal analysis of existing WTO rules to demonstrate that they are not sufficient to 
address the problem of SOEs getting various advantages. I analyze rules in the Agreement on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, rules regarding state-trading enterprises, and other 
relevant trade rules within the WTO agreements from the perspectives of textual interpretation, 
context interpretation, and purposive interpretation, as well as looking at supplemental documents 
and the negotiating history of the WTO rules. In addition, case analysis is applied by examining 
cases decided by panels and the Appellate Body.  
 
In analyzing why grants of advantages to SOEs are problematic, I use the historical approach. 
Historically, the phenomenon of having SOEs and giving advantages to SOEs has changed from 
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having been perceived as non-problematic in times of an isolated world, i.e., little commercial 
trade among nations, to problematic in times of globalization and interdependence among nations. 
First, I look at the phenomenon of SOEs in a larger historical context, considering the relationship 
between governments and commercial enterprises in general, and the extent to which SOEs were 
established and granted advantages. Second, I find three factors historically contributed to the 
establishments of SOEs and granting advantages to them: one is the wish to promote domestic 
social and economic development; one is the underlying political philosophy of some governments, 
especially those adhering to Marxist theory, that governments should have the predominant or 
exclusive role in society or in some industries; and the last factor is a desire to compete more 
efficiently in global markets. Over time, the second factor has largely transformed into either the 
first or third factor due to the collapse of Communism and the growth of market-oriented economic 
reforms. 
 
In analyzing why grants of advantages to SOEs are problematic, I also use the economic approach. 
First, I go through different economic theories, including the comparative advantage theory and 
the new trade theories, to explain why international trade is good in that it increases world welfare 
and efficiency. Second, I examine different economic arguments and theories, including the terms 
of trade argument, the strategic trade argument, and the political economic theory to explain why 
international trade agreements are good and are necessary to avoid negative externalities and trade 
wars. Last, I explain how grants of advantages to SOEs undermine international trade and 
international trade agreements from two perspectives, one is related to world welfare effects, and 
the other is related to undermining the benefits obtained from international trade agreements.  
 
In describing the presence of Chinese SOEs and the extent of advantages they get from the Chinese 
Government, I use the empirical approach to collect information through looking at annual reports 
from 2007 to 2014 of top Chinese SOEs which are publicly-traded on stock exchanges. In the coal, 
civil aviation, petroleum and petrochemical, shipping building, telecommunications, automotive, 
steel, non-ferrous metals, machinery and equipment, and information technology industries, I give 
examples of major SOEs; their dominance or significant presence; their monopoly/oligopoly status, 
which is also related to advantages of monopolies and exclusive rights SOEs enjoy by law or in 
fact; the financial advantages they get; and the regulatory advantages they enjoy.   
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I use the comparative approach in Chapter four in recommending proposals for the WTO. In light 
of the European Union rules and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement in terms of their 
methods of solving the problem of SOEs receiving various advantages, I come up with detailed 
proposals for the WTO.   
1.3 Literature Review and My Contribution 
 
There are several ways to regulate SOEs receiving advantages. First, one could regulate SOEs per 
se: i.e., the permissibility of SOEs; second, the behavior of SOEs could be regulated in general; 
third, the behavior of SOEs could be regulated to the extent that they receive advantages; and 
fourth, various advantages that are granted to SOEs could be regulated. There are two dimensions 
that can be provided to examine the whole picture, one is the international trade law dimension, 
and the other is the competition law dimension. There are three kinds of fora where the problems 
can be discussed, i.e., at the national level, at the regional level, and at the international level 
(including BITs/FTAs). Two kinds of law can be evaluated, i.e., one is soft law, and the other is 
hard law. This dissertation focuses only on the third and fourth issues primarily from an 
international trade perspective, particularly within the WTO, which is hard law, and a little bit 
from the competition law perspective. This is partially due to the limited content that can be 
covered by this dissertation. Also, my premise is that the existence of SOEs per se is not the 
essential problem, rather, the underlying problems are (i) the disproportionate granting of 
advantages to SOEs (compared to POEs) and (ii) the behavior of SOEs to the extent that they 
receive advantages. In addition, by focusing only on certain advantages as far as SOEs are 
concerned, political resistance from countries with significant presence of SOEs can be reduced.  
 
As of one or two years ago, the literature on SOEs recognized that the receipt of advantages by 
SOEs is a problem, but the literature did not present a thorough legal analysis of the problems and 
did not propose detailed solutions. Most legal analyses were about enterprises receiving 
advantages from governments in general, without a further distinction between receipts of 
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advantages by SOEs and receipts of advantages by POEs.1 They pointed out the severe nature of 
the problem and briefly outlined the relevant rules covering international trade, investment and 
competition.2 Even if some recommendations were given, these recommendations were merely 
general.  Nevertheless, new developments took place in literature in the last one or two years due 
to the issue of SOEs drawing more attention and concerns.  
 
Recent developments in literature have begun to fill the two gaps in some degree, but not 
comprehensively. With respect to legal analysis tailored to SOEs, in analyzing whether there is a 
need to regulate competitive advantages enjoyed by SOEs solely because of their state ownership, 
one recent article points out the difference between SOEs and POEs in terms of objectives, 
characteristics, decision-making and accountability.3 This dissertation analyzes the need to address 
the competitive advantages enjoyed by SOEs from historical and economic perspectives. With 
regard to legal analysis, recent literature also analyses whether SOEs are public bodies or not, and 
the implications of different standards of “public bodies” for Chinese SOEs,4 and criticizes the 
method of interpretation by the AB at the WTO regarding the term “public body” and its flaws.5 
It mainly focuses on the legal status of SOEs within the WTO. My legal analysis pushes the current 
WTO rules to their limit, and analyzes whether different approaches might be utilized within the 
WTO rules to solve the problem of SOEs giving advantages to others SOEs.  My proposal 
regarding the definition of “public body” is based on my legal analysis which combines the factors 
of “meaningful control” and “monopolistic/dominant market power”. The latest literature also 
                                                      
1 Aaron Cosbey and Petros C. Mavroidis. “A turquoise mess: green subsidies, blue industrial policy and renewable 
energy: the case for redrafting the subsidies agreement of the WTO.” 17 Journal of International Economic Law 
(2014): 11-47. 
2 Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (Jan. 11, 2014): 409-448. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377797 ; The existing literature talks about the 
weaknesses of rules in general regarding subsidies and state trading, without specifically targeting or detailing 
advantages granted to SOEs. Hence, there is a mismatch or gap between the current rules and the reality of the problem 
of SOEs receiving various advantages from governments.  
3 Ines Willemyns, “Disciplines on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are We Moving in the 
Right Direction?.” 19(3) Journal of International Economic Law (2016): 657-680. 
4 Ru Ding, “‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise,” 48 (1) Journal of World Trade 167 (2014).  
Dukgeun Ahn, “United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China,” 
105 (4) American Journal of International Law (2011), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1864025  
Tegan Brink, “What Is a ‘Public Body’ for the Purpose of Determining a Subsidy after the Appellate Body Ruling in 
US – AD/CVD?,” 6 Global Trade and Customs Journal (2011): 313–315. 
5 Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre & Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement”, 
46 (5) Journal of World Trade (2012): 979-1016, pp. 1001-1015.  
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analyzes the weaknesses of GATT Article XVII in addressing SOEs’ behavior.6  However, the 
issue of grants of monopolies and exclusive rights are not addressed by current literature, and I 
analyze how current WTO rules can be used to attack the grants of monopolies and exclusive rights 
to SOEs, and the deficiencies in those rules. One recent article talks about export cartels as far as 
state-driven exports through SOEs are concerned. However, it only discusses the problem in the 
context of applying domestic competition laws of the importing country, and implies that from an 
antitrust perspective, export cartels involving SOEs pose a challenge for antitrust regimes.7 The 
type of regulatory advantages enjoyed by SOEs are not analyzed from a legal perspective within 
the WTO framework in detail, and no proposals are put forth by current literature in this regard. 
One article examines the deficiency in disciplining the telecommunications sector within the WTO, 
but it is about the telecommunications sector in general, rather than SOEs in this sector in particular, 
and about focusing on limitations on FOEs, rather than advantages to SOEs.8 Recent literature also 
examines how China’s Protocol of Accession has not been effective at solving concerns about 
Chinese SOEs, and the limitations in using the WTO as a vehicle to promote economic reform.9 
However, it is about SOEs in general, rather than different types of advantages associated with 
SOEs.  My legal analysis also points out that the legal analysis of current WTO rules as applied to 
situations of SOEs in the context of advantages is different from the legal analysis as applied to 
situations of POEs in the context of advantages. Such differences challenge the ability of current 
WTO rules to address the problem of advantages granted to SOEs.  
 
Recent literature also looks at the non-transparency of SOEs in that little information can be 
obtained through subsidiaries bodies within the WTO, and the current mega-regional negotiations 
                                                      
6 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, “How will TPP and TTIP Change the WTO System?.” 18 Journal 
of International Economic Law (2015): 679-696. 
7 Marek Martyniszyn, “Export cartels: Is it legal to target your neighbor? Analysis in light of recent case law.” 15(1) 
Journal of International Economic Law (2012): 181-222. Andrea Mastromatteo, “WTO and SOEs: Overview of 
Article XVII and related provisions of the GATT 1994,” Working paper for the Columbia Law School, Trade Seminar 
Series, Fall 2016, State-Owned Enterprises in China: Trade and Competition Issues.  
8 Tania Voon and Andrew Mitchell, “Open for Business? China’s Telecommunications Service Market and the WTO.” 
13(2) Journal of international economic law (2010): 321-378. 
9 Philip I. Levy, “The Treatment of Chinese SOEs in China’s WTO Protocol of Accession,” Working Paper, November 
2, 2016. There exists literature talking about the relationship in general between Accession Protocols and the WTO 
Agreements, see Julia Y. Qin, “Mind the Gap: Navigating Between the WTO Agreement and Its Accession Protocols,” 
Wayne State University Law School Legal Studies Research Paper Series, No. 2016-05, in M. Elsig, B. Hoekman & 
J. Pauwelyn, eds., The World Trade Organization: Past Performance and Ongoing Challenges,  
http://www.ssrn.com/link/Wayne-State-U-LEG.html  
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can do little to help improve SOE transparency due to limitation of their rules and lack of 
institutional support. One author calls for more transparency of Chinese SOEs and proposes a 
Reference Paper, inscribed in the Schedules of participating Members.10 However, the key point 
lies in the lack of regulations specific to SOEs at the WTO, leading to poor transparency of SOEs. 
Hence, mere procedural provisions are not enough, and substantive provisions should be proposed. 
Regarding the information, I did my empirical finding by looking at ten industries to find various 
advantages granted to giant SOEs, and summarized the nature of each type of advantage.  
 
An earlier piece of literature talks about subsidies associated with SOEs in the context of 
privatization, which, however, has less significance in the current Chinese economy. It also talks 
about subsidization in the context of STEs which are in competitive markets with POEs. It looked 
at subsidies granted to SOEs from the viewpoint of why subsidies were granted. It perceived the 
special challenge as “how to balance the need of China to use subsidies in furthering its SOE 
reform on the one hand, and the need to protect the trade interests of other members from adverse 
effects of such subsidies on the other hand.”11 However, the challenge nowadays is more about 
competitive advantages granted SOEs and their behavior afterwards. The author also argued that 
China’s Accession Protocol regarding “specificity” applied to SOEs lacks an economic rational, 
and contended that subsidies to SOEs are not more trade-distorting than subsidies to POEs. My 
assertion is different from that due to my analysis that trade-distorting effects of advantages 
associated with SOEs are more severe from an economic perspective, and the behavior after SOEs 
receiving advantages is of more concern as compared to POEs.  
 
With respect to recommendations specific to SOEs, the newest and latest literature12, relying on 
the TPP Agreement, and FTAs signed by the U.S., and doing legal analysis of current BITs, FTAs 
and the TPP Agreement regarding SOEs, looks at the whole picture, and put forth proposals of 
                                                      
10 Robert Wolfe, “Sunshine over Shanghai: Can the WTO illuminate the murky world of Chinese SOEs?” Paper 
prepared for the seminar on “Sate Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in China: Trade and Competition Issues”, Columbia 
Law School, November 21, 2016.  
11 Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China 
Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863-919, p. 882.  
12 Julien Sylvestre Fleury and Jean-Michel Marcoux, “The US Shaping of State-Owned Enterprise Disciplines in the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership.” 19 Journal of International Economic Law (2016): 445-465; Ines Willemyns, “Disciplines 
on State-Owned Enterprises in International Economic Law: Are We Moving in the Right Direction?.” 19(3) Journal 
of International Economic Law (2016): 657-680. 
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disciplining SOEs in general from a norm development perspective.13 The authors propose norms 
specific to SOEs, covering the definition of SOEs, the scope and exclusions of SOEs, acting in 
accordance with commercial considerations, non-discriminatory treatment, non-commercial 
assistance, domestic courts and administrative bodies, exceptions, transparency, and dispute 
settlement. However, their proposal regarding non-commercial assistance is not in detail. My 
proposal is mainly about non-commercial assistance, particularly the monopolies and exclusive 
rights granted to SOEs. Current literature doesn’t analyze or go in detail about different kinds/types 
of advantages in legal analysis and proposals; i.e., proposals talk about all advantages in general 
without distinction among different types of advantages. In addition, they didn’t analyze how the 
new norms can be implemented, through which forum, and whether norms can be internationalized. 
My contribution lies in, putting forth three different suggestions, analyzing how my suggestions 
can be realized pragmatically, particularly in the framework of the WTO, analyzing why other 
forums do not work so well, and assessing them from political and legal technical perspectives. I 
look for solutions within the WTO framework, which is more pragmatic.  
 
Last, my dissertation is a systematic analysis tailored to the problem of various advantages granted 
to SOEs and their behavior afterwards. My contribution is the detailed analysis of the inadequacy 








                                                      
13 From a norm development perspective, at the very beginning, only one country adopts a new norm. Afterwards, if 
many more countries adopt the norm, there is a process of socialization. Finally, the norm life cycle concludes with a 
process of internationalization.  
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Chapter 2: The Global Presence of SOEs and the Problem of SOEs 
Receiving Advantages  
 
The focus of this dissertation is the treatment by governments of their state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). This Chapter broadly describes the problem to be addressed, i.e., the various advantages 
granted to SOEs, and explains why it is a problem from an historical and an economic perspective. 
In addition, it explains why governments grant advantages to SOEs. It is important to examine the 
problem from these different perspectives to provide a context for the analysis of current legal 
rules and possible proposals to improve them.  
 
In Section I, I begin with a general overview of the presence of state capitalism globally and its 
involvement in international trade. Then I point out the problems that arise when SOEs receive 
various advantages from their governments, and associated concerns arising in the international 
community. These advantages can be categorized into financial advantages, monopolies and 
exclusive rights, regulatory advantages and others. Also, this section will describe the scope of my 
dissertation from the aspect of subjects (SOEs, not SWFs), types of advantages, fields (trade, not 
investment), and concerns (economic, not political).  In Section II, I trace the history of SOEs and 
explain how the grant of advantages to SOEs has been perceived as more problematic over time. I 
also look at the phenomenon of SOEs in a larger context, considering the relationship between 
governments and commercial enterprises in general, and the extent to which SOEs have been 
established and granted advantages. In Section III, I explain why the existence of SOEs is a 
problem from an economic perspective. I go through different economic theories underlying 
international trade and explain how grants of advantages to SOEs threaten to prevent achievement 
of the gains that those theories predict would result from international trade. I then explain whether 
there is a need to regulate the various advantages granted to SOEs at the international level and 
whether potential exceptions should be recognized. Last, I conclude.  
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2.1 The Presence of SOEs Globally and the Grants of Advantages to SOEs  
2.1.1 State Sector Globally  
 
State capitalism 14  is omnipresent in the global economy. 15  There are various forms of state 
capitalism, including SOEs, SWFs and so on. My focus, however, is mainly SOEs. Looking at the 
data and information about SOEs’ number, size, sector distribution and country distribution, it can 




                                                      
14 There is an extensive literature that analyzes state capitalism, including its definitions, its various forms, whether 
the state capitalism is a good economic model, and its impact on nations and the global trading system. Bremmer 
distinguishes state capitalism from command economies and free market economies. The state functions as the leading 
economic actor and uses markets primarily for political gain. The state uses SOEs and SWFs, or selects POEs to 
maximize the state’s profits. The ultimate motive is not economically maximizing growth but politically maximizing 
the state’s power and the leadership’s chances of survival. See Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age,” 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, Iss. 3 (May/Jun 2009): 40. https://www.scribd.com/doc/89651394/Bremmer-State-
Capitalism-Comes-of-Age; Musacchio and Lazzarini describe state capitalism as being the “widespread influence of 
the government in the economy, either by owning majority or minority equity positions in companies and/or through 
the provision of subsidized credit and/or other privileges to private companies”. See Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. 
Lazzarini, Reinventing State Capitalism: Leviathan in Business, Brazil and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, April 2014), 12; See Also “The Rise of State Capitalism,” Emerging-Market Multinationals, The 
Economist, Jan 21st, 2012. http://www.economist.com/node/21543160; “The Visible Hand,” Special Report: State 
Capitalism, The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012.  
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931; Ian Bremmer, “State Capitalism Comes of Age: The End of the Free 
Market?” Essay, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2009 Issue. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2009-05-01/state-capitalism-comes-age;  
Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, “Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their Implications 
for Economic Performance” (working paper 12-108, Harvard Business School, June 4, 2012), 2. 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-108.pdf ; Murray N. Rothbard, “A Future of Peace and 
Capitalism,” in Modern Political Economy, ed. James H. Weaver (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1973), 419-430; Michael 
M. Du, “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law,” 63 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly 409, 
409-448 (2014).  
15 An investigation of the world’s largest 2000 public companies (Forbes Global 2000) reveals that more than 10% of 
these firms are majority state-owned. See Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy 
Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 9. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en ; for more information about state capitalism in general, see World Bank, 
“Bureaucrats in Business,” World Bank Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995), 29; OECD 
Corporate Affairs Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, “SOEs Operating Abroad: An 
Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-border 
Operations of SOEs” (Paris: OECD), 3. https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-
ownedenterprises/44215438.pdf  ; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World (US 
Government Printing Office, November 2008), 10-11. www.dni.gov/nic/NIC_2025_project.html     
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(1) The Definition of SOEs  
 
State investment is present in the global economy through the forms of state fully-owned 
enterprises, state-controlled enterprises, enterprises with minority state ownership, sovereign 
wealth funds (SWFs),16 public pension funds, reserve funds, life insurance funds and so on.17 The 
reason that I narrow my focus to SOEs is that, first, this dissertation doesn’t deal with the 
international financial system, which includes SWFs and other funds. 18  Second, I focus on 
enterprises that produce goods and services rather than entities that merely have capital investment. 
SWFs usually do not produce goods or services, but rather invest in other entities. Third, it is rare 
for governments to grant monopolies and regulatory advantages to SWFs.19 Even if states give 
financial advantages to SWFs, these advantages are used to acquire investments. Advantages 
granted to SWFs have different effects from advantages directly granted to SOEs that produce 
goods or services.20 Last, states tend to pursue political goals through SWFs rather than economic 
goals.21 Hence, my focus is on SOEs that buy or sell goods or services, rather than stocks or bonds. 
 
                                                      
16 For a definition of sovereign wealth funds, see “What is a SWF? About Sovereign Wealth Funds,” Sovereign Wealth 
Fund Institute (SWFI). http://www.swfinstitute.org/sovereign-wealth-fund/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016); International 
Monetary Fund, “Sovereign Wealth Funds---A Work Agenda,” Prepared by the Monetary and Capital Markets and 
Policy Development and Review Departments in Collaboration with other departments, Approved by Mark Allen and 
Jaime Caruana (Feb. 29, 2008), 5. http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2008/022908.pdf ; Kathryn Gordon and 
David Gaukrodger, “Foreign Government-Controlled Investors and Host Country Investment Policies: OECD 
Perspectives” in Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions, eds., Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E. Sachs, and 
Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 496, 497.  The situation of controlling a 
fund/enterprise by holding a minority shares as part of SWF is different from governmental controlling an enterprise 
through a minority shares. The latter is rare in the context of China.     
17  Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, “Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their 
Implications for Economic Performance” (working paper 12-108, Harvard Business School, June 4, 2012), 2. 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-108.pdf  
18 For a discussion regarding the distinction between international trade and international finance (international capital 
markets), see Michael Gadbaw, “Systemic Regulation of Global Trade and Finance: A Tale of Two Systems,” in 
International Law in Financial Regulation and Monetary Affairs, eds., Tomas Cottier, John Jackson and Rosa Lastra 
(UK: Oxford University Press, Jan. 2013). See also Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, 
International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition (Pearson Education, 2012), 1-7.   
19 Robert Loring Allen, “State Trading and Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems 256-275, 264 
(Spring 1959).  
20 Hong Li, “China Investment Corporation: A Perspective on Accountability,” 43 (4) International Lawyer 1495 
(2009).  
21  Aldo Musacchio and Sergio G. Lazzarini, “Leviathan in Business: Varieties of State Capitalism and Their 
Implications for Economic Performance” (working paper 12-108, Harvard Business School, June 4, 2012), 2. 
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/12-108.pdf  
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As to which enterprises I look at, I apply two criteria similar to the ones used by the World Bank.22 
One criteria is whether the enterprise in question has business operations, such as producing goods 
or services; and the other is whether the enterprise is controlled by the state through majority 
ownership, management, or other means. 23  Hence, my focus is on government-controlled 
commercial enterprises (SOEs) that produce goods or services.24  
 
(2) SOEs in the Global Economy  
 
There are some data sources about the significant presence of SOEs in the global economy. They 
use different methods for the purpose of estimation. One method uses a sample of world’s largest 
firms and their subsidiaries as a base, and then counts the number of SOEs in that base.25 Some 
sources count the number of SOEs in the Forbes Global 2000 list, which is approximately 200 on 
average.26 Overall, the number of large SOEs is increasing, comprising 10% of world’s 2000 
largest companies.27 That estimate is for the year of 2011. I did my own count of the number of 
SOEs in the Top 10 companies globally from 2000 to 2015. (See Table 1 below).  
 
 
                                                      
22 There might be some deviations across different definitions of SOEs. The definition that SOEs are “government 
owned or government controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from selling goods and 
services”, is used by the World Bank in its research report. See World Bank, “Bureaucrats in Business,” World Bank 
Policy Research Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995), 26.  
23 The state might also exert de facto control over a firm through holding a minority share such as a golden share or 
any other specific enabling legislation, see Max Büge, Matias Egeland, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Monika 
Sztajerowska, “State-owned Enterprises in the Global Economy: Reason for Concern?” VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal, 
May 2, 2013. http://voxeu.org/article/state-owned-enterprises-global-economy-reason-concern  
24 I focus on these SOEs that are controlled by governments. As for some measures that governments may adopt or 
use to control the behavior of enterprises, such as threats, connections among governmental officials and managers in 
enterprises (for instance, they all come from the same educational institutes and the elites), etc., such influence or 
control is less powerful and indirect as compared to the direct and powerful influence over the enterprises through 
ownership.   
25 See Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy 
Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013). http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en  
26 There were 204 SOEs in the year 2010-2011 out of 2000 largest companies listed on Forbes Global, see Grzegorz 
Kwiatkowski and Pawel Augustynowicz, “State-owned Enterprises in the Global Economy-Analysis Based on 
Fortune Global 500 List,” (Conference Paper, Management, Knowledge and Learning Joint International Conference 
2015, held by Managing Intellectual Capital and Innovation for Sustainable and Inclusive Society, 27-29 May 2015, 
Bari Italy), 1740. http://www.toknowpress.net/ISBN/978-961-6914-13-0/papers/ML15-353.pdf   
27 Max Büge, Matias Egeland, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Monika Sztajerowska, “State-owned Enterprises in the 
Global Economy: Reason for Concern?” VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal, May 2, 2013.  
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Table 1 The Number of SOEs in the Top 10 Companies Globally 
Year 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2015 
Number of 
SOEs 
1 1 1 0 0 3 4 3 5 
Nationality 
of the SOEs 




  China US (Fannie Mae) 
China 3 
China China 
Data sources: Forbes, Fortune, and my calculations.28 
 
Apart from the number of SOEs, the size and weight of SOEs in the global economy also signals 
the pervasive presence of SOEs. Therefore, the second method uses the value of SOEs of some 
countries relevant to their GDP and labor/employment. (See Table 2 below).29 However, the data 
only encompasses OECD countries and emerging countries. In addition, the data about Brazil, 
China, India and Russia was collected in 2008. Many changes have taken place since 2008.  
Table 2 SOEs Share of GDP and Employment in OECD and Emerging Countries in 2008 
 OECD countries  China (2008) Russia (2008) India (2008) Brazil (2008) 




1/3 1/3 13% 10% 




1/3 1/3 6% 10% 
 
The third method selects a sample of the 2000 largest global companies as the database, and then 
calculates the weighted average of SOE shares of sales, assets and market values. The 204 SOEs 
account for 10% of sales in the sample of the 2000 largest companies, and 11% of market value 
correspondingly. With respect to the distribution of SOEs by sector, the top sectors with high 
presence of SOEs are mining, civil engineering, transportation, petroleum and natural gas, as 
                                                      
28 My calculation is based on databases such as Fortune (Fortune Global 500), Forbes (Forbes Global 2000), Orbis, 
World Development Indicator by World Banks. For instance, there was no SOE among the top 10 firms of the Fortune 
Global 500 list in 2005. However, there were three SOEs among the top 10 in 2013, all of which were Chinese SOEs, 
i.e., Sinopec Group, China National Petroleum and State Grid. See “Global 500: the tope 10,” Fortune, 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2013/full_list/ (accessed September 2, 2016) 
29 See Hans Christiansen, “The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries”, OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, No. 5, (OECD Publishing, 2011); OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Assets, “The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Economy: An Initial Review of the 
Evidence,” DAF/CA/PRIV (2008) 9, 18 Nov. 2008; OECD Working Group on Privatisation and Corporate 
Governance of State Owned Assets, “State-Owned Enterprises in India,” DAF/CA/PRIV/RD(2008)15, 18 Nov. 2008;  
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shown in Table 3.30 Sector distribution varies depending on the country in which SOEs are located. 
In OECD countries, top sectors with high presence of SOEs are providers of electricity, gas and 
steam, and the manufacturers of tobacco, as shown in Table 4 below, while in emerging countries, 
top sectors with high presence of SOEs are mainly the natural resources, manufacturing, financial 
and telecommunication sectors, as shown in Table 5.31  
Table 3 Top Sectors with High Presence of SOEs Globally in 2011 




Land transport and 
transport via pipeline 
Mining of coal 
and lignite  
Extraction of crude 
petroleum and gas 
SOEs shares % 42.7 40.8 40.3 35.1 34.1 
 
Table 4 Top Sectors with High Presence of SOEs in OECD Countries in 2011 
Sectors Provision of electricity, 
gas and steam 
Manufacture of 
tobacco  




SOEs share % 18.3 15 11.7 6.7 6.7 
 

































































































































































































































With respect to the distribution of SOEs by country, there is information about SOEs among 150 
publicly traded companies by country. 32  The top ten countries with highest “country SOEs 
                                                      
30 Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, 
No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en  
31  OECD, “Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises: A Survey of OECD Countries” (Paris: OECD 
Publishing, 2005); Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD 
Trade Policy Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en   
32 Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, 
No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 22-25.  
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shares”33 are China, followed by United Arab Emirates, Russia and Indonesia. Seven out of ten 
are emerging countries or developing countries, as shown in Table 6.34 Taking the proposed TPP 
Agreement as an example, some Members of the TPP Agreement have SOEs, such as Vietnam, 
New Zealand, Singapore and Chile.35 Thus, it can be inferred that even in the absence of China, 
the presence of SOEs in the global economy is still significant. Hence, the problem is not only a 
Chinese one, but rather a universal one.  
Table 6 Top Countries with High "Country SOEs Shares" in 2011 
Name of the 
country 
China  The United 
Arab Emirates 
Russia Indonesia Malaysia Saudi 
Arabia 
India Brazil Norway Thailand 
Country 
SOEs shares  






Yes Yes Yes  
No 




The presence of SOEs in OECD countries is quite different from that in emerging countries. The 
difference can be observed from aspects of the sectors they are in, their size, and their weight in 
the economy.36  In OECD countries, most data also counts enterprises with golden shares held by 
the government as SOEs.37 While in emerging countries, databases usually exclude enterprises 
with golden shares held by the government as SOEs.38 SOEs were declining due to privatization, 
particularly in OECD countries over the past decades. In contrast, the extent and scope of 
privatization is less in emerging countries, and the retreat of SOEs has slowed down in some 
                                                      
33 Country SOEs shares (CSS) is a weighted average of SOE shares of sales, assets and market values among country’s 
top ten companies. See Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD 
Trade Policy Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en   
34 Data comes from Forbes, World Development Indicator by World Banks, Orbis database, Forbes Global 2000, and 
my calculation.  
35 William Krist and Kent HugHes, “Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” Wilson Center: Trade 
and Development, Dec. 4, 2012,  https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/negotiations-for-trans-pacific-
partnership-agreement; Ian F. Fergusson, Mark A. McMinimy and Brock R. Williams, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 7-5700  R42694 (20 Mar. 2015), 43, 
in its footnote 116 quoting “Economist Intelligence Unit,” Vietnam Country Report, (Mar. 2012), 12.  
36  Hans Christiansen, “The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries” OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, No. 5, (OECD Publishing, Paris, 2011), 7-8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg54cwps0s3-
en 
37 Id., at 72. 
Max Büge, Matias Egeland, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Monika Sztajerowska, “State-owned Enterprises in the Global 
Economy: Reason for Concern?” VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal, May 2, 2013.  
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countries.39 For instance, evidence can be found that the oil and energy sector are monopolized by 
SOEs in the Middle East, and the strategic industries are dominated by SOEs in countries such as 
Russia, Brazil, China, and Vietnam.40 Nowadays, the model of state capitalism has been embraced 
by many countries, such as China, Russia, Brazil and South Africa.41 
 
Other sources of information are scarcer. State-backed companies account for 80% of the value of 
China’s stock market and 62% of Russia’s.42 Taking the oil and energy sector for an example, 
there are national oil companies that are Middle Eastern SOEs (Dubai), Russian SOEs (Gazprom), 
Chinese SOEs, and Brazilian SOEs, some of which are publicly traded with their governments 
remaining as the majority shareholders.43 The world’s ten biggest oil-and-gas firms, measured by 
reserves, are all SOEs.44 Nationalization in recently years in Latin America is also worthy of 
attention.45  
 
In short, whatever the measure used, it is clear that SOEs are pervasive globally.  
 
2.1.2 SOEs Receive Various Advantages from Their Governments 
 
The various advantages granted to SOEs by governments can be categorized into three types, i.e., 
financial advantages, monopolies and exclusive rights, and regulatory and other advantages.46 The 
                                                      
39  Hans Christiansen, “The Size and Composition of the SOE Sector in OECD Countries”, OECD Corporate 
Governance Working Papers, No. 5, (OECD Publishing, 2011), 3. Jeremy Schwartz, “Emerging Markets and State-
Owned Enterprises,” NASDAQ, Dec. 05, 2014. http://www.nasdaq.com/article/emerging-markets-and-state-owned-
enterprises-cm420401  
40 Keith Bradsher, “Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Potential Impact Weighed in Asia and U.S.” International Business, 
New York Times, July 8, 2015.   
41  “The Rise of State Capitalism,” Emerging-Market Multinationals, The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012. 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543160 ; Sprenger, “The Role of State Owned Enterprises in the Russian 
Economy,” (paper written for the OECD Roundtable on Corporate Governance of SOEs. 2008).   
42 “The Rise of State Capitalism,” Emerging-Market Multinationals, The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012. 
43 Seven out of the 10 largest oil companies are state owned, they are Saudi Aramco, Gazprom (Russia), National 
Iranian Oil Company, Rosneft (Russia), PetroChina, Pemex (Mexico), Kuwait Petroleum Company. 
http://www.forbes.com/pictures/mef45miid/1-saudi-aramco/ 
44 “The Rise of State Capitalism,” Emerging-Market Multinationals, The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012.  
45  “Nationalization in Latin America”, Infographic, The Globe and Mail, Jul. 11, 2012.  
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources/nationalization-in-latin-
america/article4409002/ ; John Paul Rathbone, “Latin American Nationalization Dominoes,” Blogs.ft.com, May 2, 
2012. http://blogs.ft.com/the-world/2012/05/latin-american-nationalisation-dominoes/ 
46  For a general discussion on special privileges enjoyed by SOEs, see Richard R. Geddes, “Case Studies of 
Anticompetitive SOE Behavior,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
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three categories of advantages or benefits have something in common, i.e., they all put SOEs in a 
better position from an economic perspective. The reason for the categorization is that advantages 
granted in different forms may result from different policy choices and have distinct characteristics, 
and hence are worthy of different treatments.  
 
(1) Financial Advantages 
 
The financial advantages granted to SOEs can be divided into government expenditures and 
government revenues foregone. These advantages have following forms: 47  1) direct money 
transfers to SOEs; 2) provision of goods or services at below-market prices to SOEs, for instance, 
SOEs may be given privileged access to government-owned or controlled natural resources, land, 
or rights of way; 3) financing and guarantees from the government, such as credit, below-market 
interest rates, and state guarantees for loans taken out by SOEs through banks, particularly SOBs. 
State guarantees for loans by SOEs means that the government assumes the risk of default on the 
loan, rather than the bank, which in turn means that the bank can offer the borrower more favorable 
lending terms, such as a lower rate of interest; 4) the fact that state holds shares in SOEs gives 
SOEs the advantage of captive equity insofar as state capital in SOEs is locked in. SOEs are not 
fully exposed to market takeover pressure as the transfer of state shares requires the prior approval 
of the state;48 favorable dividend policy lowers dividend payout ratios and thus lowers the cost of 
capital of SOEs. To that end, SOEs can generate losses in a long period of time without the fear of 
going bankrupt, so they may engage in anti-competitive behavior, such as below-cost pricing; and 
5) tax forgone in that taxes otherwise owed by SOEs are not collected by the government.49 
 
                                                      
Enterprises, eds., Richard R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004); OECD Policy Roundtables on “Competition, 
State Aids and Subsidies,” in the OECD Global Forum on Competition 2010, DAF/COMP/GF(2010)5, (May 19, 
2011), 17. 
47 Capobianco, A. and H. Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy 
Options”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1 (OECD Publishing, 2011), 5-7. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg9xfgjdhg6-en ; OECD, “State Owned Enterprises and the Principle of Competitive 
Neutrality,” Policy Roundtables, DAF/COMP(2009)37, (OECD, 2009), 36-37.  
48 For instance, the transfer of shares of Chinese SOEs that will affect the state’s control over the entity, needs approval 
from the SASAC or its local office, see the legal document, Measures for Supervision and Management of State 
Assets, Article 7, June 24, 2016. [Qiye Guoyou Zichan Jiaoyi Jiandu Guanli Banfa].  
49 For more information about grants of advantages granted to SOEs in detail, see Richard R. Geddes, “Case Studies 
of Anticompetitive SOE Behavior,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
Enterprises, eds., Richard R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 28-34.  
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(2) Monopolies and Exclusive Rights Advantages  
 
SOEs may be given different kinds of monopoly and exclusive rights, such as production or 
exploitation permits, production quotas, distribution rights, export rights or import rights. 50 
Commonly, the exclusive export or import rights are associated with state trading, which usually 
means that the state has control over trade with foreigners in terms of importation and exportation 
varying in the degree of government control (through ownership, control, licensing).51 These rights 
are given to a limited number of SOEs, making these SOEs not fully exposed to market pressure 
by limiting market entry of POEs and FOEs. Monopolies and exclusive rights can also be given to 
SOEs by law or in fact. Even if there are no explicit laws prohibiting POEs/FOEs from entering a 
particular sector or market, the government may give SOEs monopolies through issuing permits 
only to SOEs in fact. Also, monopolies and exclusive rights provide SOEs with above-normal 
profits.52  
 
(3) Regulatory and Other Advantages 
 
The regulatory advantages that may favor SOEs include border measures, regulatory measures, 
and price control, such as i) import barriers, export taxes and other types of export restrictions; ii) 
deregulation of SOEs in the fields of labor, environment, product safety standards; exemption of 
SOEs from domestic anti-trust laws, bankruptcy laws, competition laws explicitly; iii) government 
may exert price control to give price supports to SOEs through policies that raise prices 
artificially.53  Although the above situations may be found in law explicitly, some other situations 
may also give SOEs regulatory advantages where the law on its face doesn’t distinguish between 
SOEs and POEs/FOEs, while in practice, there is selective enforcement of the above regulatory 
                                                      
50 Geddes, Ibid. 
51 Edmond M. Ianni, “State Trading: Its Nature and International Treatment,” 5 Nw. J. Int'l L. & Bus. 46, 4 (1983-
1984).  
52  OECD, “State Owned Enterprises and the Principle of Competitive Neutrality,” Policy Roundtables, 
DAF/COMP(2009)37, (OECD, 2009), 7-12, 35-37.  
53 “State-Owned Enterprises: Correcting A 21st Century Market Distortion,” Coalition of Services Industries & U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce’s Global Regulatory Cooperation Project (Feb. 22, 2011), 2-3. 
http://209.61.243.105/SOEpaperfinalfeb222011.pdf ; Capobianco, A. and H. Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality 
and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy Options”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1 
(OECD Publishing, 2011), 6-7.  
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laws in favor of SOEs, such as forgone corrupt conduct by SOEs;54  and iv) other advantages 
granted to SOEs may be in the form of information asymmetries between SOEs on one hand, and 
POEs and FOEs on the other hand; SOEs having more bargaining power from a psychological 
perspective; SOEs enjoying favorable regulatory environment; SOEs having the power of eminent 
domain, etc. 55  These “other” advantages will not be my focus because of the difficulty in 
quantification. 
2.1.3 SOEs’ International Activities  
 
SOEs are expanding into global markets by trading in goods and services nowadays, rather than 
merely operating in domestic markets.56 Trade activities of SOEs and their effects are significant 
in: i) the domestic market where SOEs are in competition with imported goods or cross-border 
services, ii) import markets where SOEs are exporting goods and services in competition with 
local business, and iii) third country markets. Countries with high SOEs shares in their economies 
are engaging in international trade actively.57 The majority of large SOEs are active in international 
trade.58 SOEs in emerging countries, particularly China, are more likely to engage in international 
trade than SOEs in OECD countries.59 Previous research obtained data about SOEs shares of each 
country and trade shares of each country, and then calculated trade shares of SOEs, and the same 
approach is applied to estimate trade shares of SOEs in each sector by looking at SOEs shares and 
trade share of each sector, as shown in Table 7 and Table 8.60  
 
                                                      
54 Daniel Chow, “How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing 
Business in China and Other Countries,” (Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 307, Oct. 5, 2015), 
2-7.  
55  The Postal Service in U.S. has the power of eminent domain. See Richard R. Geddes, “Case Studies of 
Anticompetitive SOE Behavior,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and Public 
Enterprises, eds., Richard R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 34.  
56 Max Büge, Matias Egeland, Przemyslaw Kowalski and Monika Sztajerowska, “State-owned Enterprises in the 
Global Economy: Reason for Concern?” VOX: CEPR’s Policy Portal, May 2, 2013.  
57  Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, 
No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 30-33.  
58 Kowalski, Ibid.   
59 Hejing Chen and John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” 
the Centre for International Governance Innovation, CIGI Papers No. 48 (Oct. 2014), 12. 
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/no.48.pdf  
60 World Trade Organization, “International Trade Statistics 2015, Special Focus: World Trade and the WTO: 1995-
2014.” https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf ; Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned 
Enterprises: Trade Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 
31.  
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Table 7 SOEs Shares of Each Country and Trade Shares of Each Country (2010) 
 China Eight countries with the 
highest SOE shares 




10% of world merchandise exports 20 % of world trade Estimate:  
19% of the value of global exports of 
goods and services 
 
Table 8 Sectors with SOEs Shares and Trade Share of Each Sector 














Mining support service 
activities;  
 
mining of coal and lignite;  
 
extraction of crude 
petroleum and natural gas;  
 
electricity, gas, steam  






















20% 35% 42%; 35%; 34%; 27%; 15% 53% 20% 
Trade 
shares  
12% 60% Combined: 7.5% of the 
value of world exports 
21% of world 
service trade 
20% of world 
service trade 
7% of world 
service trade 
 
SOEs also make investments actively nowadays, such as green field investments and mergers and 
acquisitions, as compared to decades ago.61 SOEs’ investments can be found in the domestic 
market where SOEs are in competition with foreign investors, the foreign market where 
subsidiaries of SOEs are making investments in competition with local business and investors from 
third countries. State-backed firms accounted for a third of the emerging world’s foreign direct 
investments in 2003-10.62 However, trade volume and value of SOEs in the international market 
are more significant than establishing subsidiaries of SOEs in foreign market, as shown in Table 
                                                      
61 Kathryn Gordon and David Gaukrodger, “Foreign Government-Controlled Investors and Host Country Investment 
Policies: OECD Perspectives” in Sovereign Investment: Concerns and Policy Reactions, eds., Karl P Sauvant, Lisa E. 
Sachs, and Wouter P.F. Schmit Jongbloed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 496-498; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action 
Plan, UN Doc., UN Symbol: UNCTAD/WIR/2014, Sales No. E.14.II.D.1, (2014), 9. 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf  
62“The Rise of State Capitalism,” Emerging-Market Multinationals, The Economist, Jan 21st, 2012.  
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9.63 For instance, the data showed that although SOEs are active in domestic markets and SOEs 
are active traders in global markets, fewer foreign subsidiaries are established by SOEs than are 
formed by private companies.64     
Table 9 Value of Estimated FDI by SOEs from 2007-2013 




9% 12% 16% 11% 10% 11% 12% 
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross- border M&As database for M&As and information 
from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets for greenfield projects.  
Note: Estimated FDI is the sum of greenfield investments and M&As. 65 
  
The reason for my focus on international trade and trade related-investment, excluding merely 
investment, is that the international trade effects of SOEs are more significant than their investment 
effects. Also, the separation of legal regimes for trade on one hand, and the investment and 
financial areas on the other hand, has long existed.66 Meanwhile, trade in agriculture will not be 
analyzed in my dissertation as trade in agricultural products practically accounts for only a small 
fraction of the value of world trade.67 (Also, agricultural issues are covered by separate rules in the 
WTO). My focus will be on the trade effects of granting various advantages to SOEs in the 
international context in order to assess relevant rules in the WTO and put forward proposals to 
solve the problem. 
                                                      
63  Nicola Bellini, “The Decline of State-Owned Enterprise and the New Foundations of the State-Industry 
Relationship,” in The Rise and Fall of State-Owned Enterprise in the Western World, Pier Angelo Toninelli 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 42.  
64 Data sources comes from Forbes Global 2000 and Orbis. See Kowalski, P. et al., “State-Owned Enterprises: Trade 
Effects and Policy Implications”, OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 147 (OECD Publishing, 2013), 36. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k4869ckqk7l-en  
65 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World investment Report 2014: Investing in 
the SDGs: An Action Plan, UN Doc., UN Symbol: UNCTAD/WIR/2014, Sales No. E.14.II.D.1, (2014), 21, chapter 
1. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2014_en.pdf  
66 “International Trade Law and International Investment Law: Complexity and Coherence: Remarks by Mélida 
Hodgson,” Proceedings of the Annual Meeting, American Society of International Law, 108 American Society of 
International Law (2014): 251-51.   
67 World exports of agricultural products accounted for a small portion in the world trade in 2015, see World Trade 
Organization, “International Trade Statistics 2015, Special Focus: World Trade and the WTO: 1995-2014.” (2015), 1 
(the chart). https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2015_e/its2015_e.pdf   
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2.1.4 Concerns Arising from SOEs  
 
Political concerns in relation to SOEs arise frequently. Literature also addresses economic warfare, 
which relates to economic attempts to enhance military and political positions.68 Two dimensions 
can be observed. First, there is always suspicion about the political motives of granting advantages 
to SOEs.69 For instance, by having state monopolies of oil production and exportation through 
SOEs, an oil exporting country is able to export less oil to a country that is politically unfriendly. 
State-trading nations may threaten to stop purchasing or selling unless some political concessions 
are made, while nations with private traders can seldom direct and shift trade readily.70 Second, 
there is suspicion that SOEs that receive advantages may be used to pursue political objectives, 
rather than commercial objectives.71 SOEs may follow a political agenda in exchange for obtaining 
advantages from their governments.  
  
The economic concerns relating to SOEs merit more attention.72 There is perception that the state 
capitalism is a threat to market capitalism in general.73 SOEs usually receive advantages from the 
government solely based on government ownership or control, rather than based on their 
performance or efficiency. 74  There are two kinds of economic concerns. One is that giving 
                                                      
68 “Economic warfare is defined as the conscious attempt to enhance the relative economic, military, and political 
position of a country through foreign economic relations.” See Robert Loring Allen, State Trading and Economic 
Warfare, 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256-275, 259. 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol24/iss2/3  
69 OECD Corporate Affairs Division, Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, “SOEs Operating Abroad: An 
Application of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance of State-Owned Enterprises to the Cross-border 
Operations of SOEs” (Paris: OECD), para. 6.  
https://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/44215438.pdf   
70 Robert Loring Allen, “State Trading and Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 
256-275, 263-264.  
71 There are three forms of political advantages obtained from economic warfare: respectability and status; alliances 
or support of other countries; and takeover of another country. See Robert Loring Allen, State Trading and Economic 
Warfare, 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256-275, 262.  
72 Economic warfare generally falls into five categories: (1) guaranteeing sources of supply, (2) guaranteeing markets, 
(3) improving the terms of trade, (4) denial of respectability and status, and (5) economic takeover. See Robert Loring 
Allen, State Trading and Economic Warfare, 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256-275, 261.  
For information about the impact of SOEs in trade, see Madanmohan Ghosh and John Whalley, “State-owned 
Enterprises, Shirking and Trade Liberalization” (NBER Working Paper Series, Working Paper 7696. May 2000) 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w7696  
73 Abdul Ghafoor Awan, “State Versus Free Market Capitalism: A Comparative Analysis,” 6(1) Journal of Economics 
and Sustainable Development (2015): 171.  
74 Capobianco, A. and H. Christiansen, “Competitive Neutrality and State-Owned Enterprises: Challenges and Policy 
Options”, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers, No. 1 (OECD Publishing, 2011), 3.  
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advantages per se constitutes a concern, and the other is that the behavior of SOEs to the extent 
that they receive advantages constitutes a concern.75 The first kind of economic concern relates to 
distortion of global markets, negatively affecting other countries, unfair competition, 
contamination of a level playing field and so on. The second kind of economic concern relates to 
the SOEs’ anti-competitive activities like low pricing, avoiding restrictions on below-cost pricing, 
cross-subsidization, which includes advantages received at home leading to “unfair” advantages 
abroad, or monopolistic advantages in one business leading to advantages in a non-monopolistic 
(competitive) sector.76 SOEs are more likely to engage in the above anti-competitive behavior after 
they receive advantages. This is because the success of the manager of an SOE is measured more 
by the scale and scope of the SOE’s operations than by the profit. The SOEs’ operational scale and 
scope of their activities are more likely to be expanded following anti-competitive behavior. 
Receiving more advantages can provide opportunity and resources for SOEs to engage in anti-
competitive behavior.  Hence, lacking the pressure of takeover threats from capital markets, SOEs 
are more likely to engage in anti-competitive behavior after receiving advantages.77 (The economic 
concern is also associated with the size of trading partner, and this concern will be addressed in 
Chapter Two relating to China, which is a large trader.)78  
 
The reason that I focus on the economic concerns rather than the political concerns is that, first, 
politics are beyond technical legal analysis. Second, it is hard to demonstrate or find out the 
political goals involved in giving advantages to SOEs. Third, the purpose of international trade 
law is to address international trade issues, rather than addressing political issues. In particular, the 
WTO ought not try to be a forum for solving political matters.79    
                                                      
75 Sara Sultan Balbuena, Concerns Related to the Internationalisation of State-Owned Enterprises: Perspective from 
Regulators, Government Owners and the Broader Business Community, OECD Corporate Governance Working Paper 
No.19, (Paris: OECD Publishing, Apr. 6, 2016), 23-38.  
76 See Robert Loring Allen, “State Trading and Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 
1959): 256-275, 263-5; Kenneth C. Baseman, “Open Entry Costs and Cross-Subsidization in Regulated Markets,” in: 
Gary Fromm eds., Studies in Public Regulation (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1981), 329-370; Timothy J. Brennan, 
“Cross-Subsidization and Cost Misallocation by Regulated Monopolies,” 2(1) Journal of Regulatory Economics, 
(March 1990): 37-51.  
77 David E. M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, “Anticompetitive Behavior by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives 
and Capabilities,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and Public Enterprises, eds., Richard 
R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 7-14.  
78 A nation may use its the large-trader position and that of the debtor. See Robert Loring Allen, “State Trading and 
Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256-275, 263,  
79 For example, GATT Article XXI’s security exception is rarely invoked by the WTO Members out of the recognition 
that political issues should be solved elsewhere.  
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2.1.5 Summary of Section 2.1  
 
This section described the problem to be examined and my specific focuses in this dissertation. 
This section defined the scope of the dissertation to focus on the SOEs that have operation of 
producing goods or services, and that are controlled by governments. This section examined the 
global presence of SOEs by looking at different data sources and information,80 and found that the 
presence of SOEs in the global economy is still significant, particularly in the emerging countries. 
These SOEs usually receive various kinds of advantages, such as financial advantages, monopolies 
and exclusive rights advantages, regulatory advantages, etc. The dissertation only focuses on 
financial advantages, monopolies and exclusive rights advantages, and regulatory advantages 
granted to SOEs. International activities of SOEs are intensive in terms of trade and investment. 
This dissertation will only focus on the aspects of trade and trade-related investment, excluding 
merely investment by SOEs. Specifically, it is related to the following situations, where SOEs are 
in competition with imports in the domestic market, where SOEs are in competition with foreign 
investment in the domestic market, where SOEs export to foreign markets, and SOEs make trade-
related investment in foreign markets. A variety of concerns arise in those situations above when 
SOEs receive advantages. This dissertation will only address economic concerns, rather than 
political concerns.   
 
2.2 The History of SOEs in the World Economy  
 
In this Section I examine the issue of having SOEs and giving them advantages in a larger context, 
which is the relationship between governments and commercial enterprises. Three potential factors 
may explain why states establish SOEs and give advantages to them. The first factor is the wish to 
achieve domestic social and economic objectives through the tool of SOEs; the second factor is 
                                                      
80 From the data in previous literature, several minor issues merit attention. First, different institutions and studies use 
different definitions of SOEs as their basis for calculating the weight of SOEs in the global economy. Second, when 
there is no direct data about a particular item, for instance, the SOEs’ share of trade, several sub-data sets could be 
used to calculate approximate figures. Third, no general data and statistics exist for the totality of advantages granted 
to SOEs, except for data about subsidies in a particular sector, such as subsidies given to the automobile, steel industry, 
agriculture, fishing, etc., or data about a particular type of advantage, such as energy subsidies, export subsidies, 
environmental subsidies, and R&D subsidies. Unsystematic information and examples about the financial advantage 
granted to a specific SOE can be found.  
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the underlying political philosophy of some governments, especially those adhering to Marxist 
theory, that governments should have the predominant or exclusive role in society or in some 
industries; and the last factor is a desire to compete more efficiently in the global market. The 
second factor has nowadays largely transformed into either the first or third factor due to the 
collapse of Communism and the growth of market-oriented economic reforms; the last factor 
works in two opposing ways. On the one hand, state presence may be designed for expanding 
regional and global markets, and on the other hand, the state presence may be used to protect 
domestic industries in the domestic market from competition of foreign competitors. Historically, 
the phenomenon of having SOEs and giving advantages to SOEs has changed from having been 
perceived as non-problematic in times of an insular world, i.e., little commercial trade among 
nations, to problematic in times of globalization and interdependence among nations.81 
 
In this section, I will first examine the establishment of SOEs and grants of monopolies and 
regulatory advantages to enterprises before the 19th century, and the reasons for the phenomenon 
not being perceived as problematic. Then I will examine in the recent history, the extent of 
presence of SOEs and their receipt of advantages, and the reasons why the phenomenon gradually 
became problematic. Thus, reactions, such as privatization took place. Finally, I will examine 
regulations that may solve the problems of SOEs and their receiving advantages, respectively in 
the early GATT, in the integration of the European Community, and in the recent TPP negotiations 
and other FTAs negotiations.     
2.2.1 Expanding Foreign Markets Before the 19th Century  
 
(1) A Broader Context of Granting Monopolies and Regulatory Advantages to Enterprises  
 
Beginning from the 16th century with the discovery of the New World, in order to explore the 
Southern Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the UK, the Netherlands and other traditional European 
                                                      
81 An insular world means that there is little commercial trade among nations, and nations are less interdependent. A 
world of interdependence means that “various economies in the world relate to one another to an increasing extent in 
such a way that economic forces, or conditions that develop in one economy are transmitted rapidly to others.” See 
John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1990), 83; John H. 
Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 
8-11.  
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nations chartered several companies.82 Although the governments owned no shares or owned 
partial shares, they had indirect control of the chartered companies or at least had some connections 
with the chartered companies.83 Governments gave these companies monopolies in respect of 
carrying on a particular trade with a foreign nation or in a foreign market, and the regulatory 
authority to control that trade in foreign markets, in order to assist them in competition with foreign 
companies. 84 Most of these enterprises ceased to exist at the expiration of their durations, for 
instance, a period of a single voyage. 85 Of those enterprises continuing to exist, the privileges and 
monopolies granted to them by the government were withdrawn, and most of them went bankrupt 
after losing those monopolies.86 Examples can be found in the Royal African Company, which 
was granted a monopoly over English trade with West Africa in 1660. 87The English India 
Company was chartered by British in 1600 and was granted a monopoly and privileges over the 
Asian trade and India trade,88 and was granted regulatory power and acquired the civil rights of 
administration in 1764. 89  The French East India Company was funded as the joint stock 
corporation in 1619 with the King funding one fifth of investment of the company. It was granted 
a 50-year monopoly over French trade in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.90    
 
 
                                                      
82  Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher & Robert Lee Wolff, A History of Civilization, 3rd edition, Volume 1 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 550-54; Samuel Williston, “The History of the Law of Business 
Corporations before 1800,” 2(3) Harvard Law Review (Oct 15, 1888): 105-124, 109; Before 15th century, it was more 
about the expansion of territory. Colonization began after the Great Discoveries overseas in 1492, and colonialism 
was operated as a joint public-private venture by England, France, Netherland. See Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global 
History ( 2005 ,RoutledgeLondon: ), 3.      
83 Venkatesh Rao, “A Brief History of the Corporation: 1600 to 2100,” Ribbon Farm: Experiments in Refactored 
Perception, June 8, 2011, http://www.ribbonfarm.com/2011/06/08/a-brief-history-of-the-corporation-1600-to-2100/  
84 Samuel Williston, “The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800,” 2 (3) Harvard Law Review (Oct 
15, 1888): 105-124, 114.  
85 Venkatesh Rao, ibid.  
86 Samuel Williston, “The History of the Law of Business Corporations before 1800,” 2 (3) Harvard Law Review (Oct 
15, 1888): 105-124, 111.  
87 Crane Brinton, John B. Christopher and Robert Lee Wolff, A History of Civilization, 3rd edition, Volume 1 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 562-64.  
88 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: 15th -18th Century, Volume II, The Wheels of Commerce, Translation 
from the French by Siân Reynolds, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982-1984), 449-50.   
89 The Government of India Act 1858, formally dissolved the company, ruling powers over India transferring to the 
British Crown, see “India Rebellion of 1857,” New World Encyclopedia, 
http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Indian_Rebellion_of_1857  
90 Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism: 15th -18th Century, Volume II, The Wheels of Commerce, Translation 
from the French by Siân Reynolds, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982-1984), 446, 455.  
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(2) Reasons for Not Being Perceived as Problematic  
 
Grants of the above advantages (monopoly or exclusive rights over trade, resources mining, land, 
ports, and regulatory power) were not perceived as a problem before the 19th century. First, this is 
probably due to the fact that governments were still at the early stages of exploring foreign markets, 
and the competition was more among states than competition among companies. Nations competed 
with one another by all available tools, such as the model of chartering companies partly equipped 
with sovereign rights. 91  The exploration of these new markets and foreign natural resources 
required a large enterprise with privileges from governments. In addition, granting monopoly 
power is particularly important in expanding markets in foreign nations since it can guarantee no 
competition from companies of its own nationality, and hence it can generate increased profits to 
make large investments. 92  In a nutshell, western countries used the strong ties between the 
government and such enterprises to expand foreign markets.  
 
Second, the trade between the mother countries and the colonies was on a very small scale with 
small trade volume and trade value during the colonial expansion of the 16th and 17th centuries, 
much different from the situation since the Industrial Revolution.93 The commodities being traded 
were largely primary products. The Spanish obtained gold and silver from mines in Africa and 
Latin America, and the Portuguese obtained huge markups as trade intermediaries. Later, European 
powers, primarily the English, French and the Dutch, traded silk, foods, spice, pepper, cotton, 
coffee and tea from Asia, copper and slaves from Africa, precious metals from Americas, and 
afterwards they traded furs from Canada, tobacco and cotton from Virginia and sugar from 
Caribbean and Brazil.94 
 
Third, a large percentage of these companies went out of such businesses, or ceased to exist due 
to bankruptcy, liquidation, or handing control over the colonies to their mother countries, or 
                                                      
91  Benedikt Stuchtey,“Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450–1950,” in: European History Online (EGO), (Mainz, 
Germany: the Institute of European History, Jan. 24, 2011), 11. http://www.ieg-ego.eu/stuchteyb-2010-en. 
92 Marc Ferro, Colonization: A Global History (London: Routledge, 2005), 54.  
93 Id., at 16.  
94  Benedikt Stuchtey,“Colonialism and Imperialism, 1450–1950,” in: European History Online (EGO), (Mainz, 
Germany: the Institute of European History, Jan. 24, 2011), 10-11. Other countries following the model of British, 
Netherland, and France, are Sweden, Denmark, Scotland, Austria, Brandenburg-Prussia and Poland. See Fernand 
Braudel, A History of Civilizations, translated by Richard Mayne (New York: Penguin Books, 1995). 
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handing control to local governments after the independence of colonies. Last, non-competitive 
markets were the norm at that time since it was before the idea of free markets developed.95  
 
In a nutshell, in order to explore foreign markets before the 19th century, European countries 
largely gave companies monopolies to carry out trade in foreign markets or trade with foreign 
nations. This was not perceived as problematic due to the fact that nations engaged in competition 
in expanding foreign markets, the limited amount of trade, and disappearance of these enterprises 
that had been granted monopolies or regulatory advantages.    
2.2.2 Perceived as a Problem due to Interdependence and Globalization Since the Industrial 
Revolution  
 
This section will first, describe the different extent of state involvement in trade through the forms 
of SOEs and STEs, (including through grants of monopolies and exclusive rights, and grants of 
financial and regulatory advantages), in different countries---OECD countries, developing 
countries and communist countries---with different purposes respectively. Second, this section will 
explain why the existence of SOEs and grants of various advantages have been perceived as 
problematic in light of three factors. Last, it will examine reactions to the perceived problem by 
looking at the privatization waves, and the decline in state trading and grant of advantages.  
   
(1) Different Extent of SOEs and the Grants of Advantages to Them  
a. Capitalist (OECD) Countries: State trading, Nationalization, Grants of Advantages 
 
Beginning in the late 19th century,96 and throughout the 20th century, particularly after WWI, many 
OECD countries established STEs with monopoly or exclusive rights in exportation, importation 
and distribution to promote exportation and control importation, and the involvement in 
                                                      
95 The theory of free market had not developed until 1776 when Adam Smith wrote the book An Inquiry into the 
Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.  
96 Particularly since the Second Industrial Revolution, which is generally dated between 1870 and 1914 up to the start 
of World War. See Ryan Engelman, “The Second Industrial Revolution: 1870-1914,” U.S. History Scene, 
http://ushistoryscene.com/article/second-industrial-revolution/ 
 30 
international trade of STEs was prevalent.97 Canada, New Zealand, Australia, European nations, 
Argentina, Japan and other countries established STEs, which were wholly owned by the state or 
given monopoly privileges by the state, especially in the agriculture sector, such as the right to 
export sugar and butter, trade grain, and import alcoholic beverages, tobacco and silk.98 Most STEs, 
the majority of which were SOEs, had significant roles as exporters in the agricultural sector in 
the 1990s.99 Two of the major exporting STEs, the Canadian Wheat Board and the Australian 
Wheat Board, accounted for more than 30 percent of world wheat exports from 1992-1995.100 
 
A nationalization wave widely occurred and spread in 1960s, 70s and 80s in the UK and 
continental Europe for the purpose of controlling production and supply and gaining economies of 
large scale.101 For instance, during the post-war period, most of the UK’s major strategic heavy 
                                                      
97 John N. Hazard, “State Trading in History and Theory,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 243-
255, 244; M. M. Kostecki, “State Trading in Industrialized and Developing Countries,” 12(3) Journal of World Trade 
Law (May/June 1978): 201; M. M. Kostecki, “State Trading in Agricultural Products by the Advanced Countries,” in 
State Trading in International Markets: Theory and Practice of Industrialized and Developing Countries, ed. M. M. 
Kostecki, 22-54 (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), 27.  
98 Julian M. Alston and Richard Gray, “State Trading versus Export Subsidies: The Case of Canadian Wheat,” Journal 
of Agricultural and Resource Economics 25(1):51-67 (July 2000): 65-6; M. M. Kostecki, “State Trading by the 
Advanced and Developing Countries: The Background,” in State Trading in International Markets: Theory and 
Practice of Industrialized and Developing Countries, ed. M. M. Kostecki, 6-21 (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982). For 
instance, crown corporations in Canada accounted for 15.7 percent of corporate assets and 11 percent of GNP in 
Canada at the end of 20th century, such as The Canadian Wheat Board, which had export monopoly. See D. Wayne 
Taylor, Business and Government Relations: Partners in the 1990s (Gage Educational Publishing Company, 1991), 
97. The Canadian provincial liquor boards had monopolies on the importation, distribution, and sale of alcoholic 
beverages. See Nuri T. Jazairi, “The Impact of Privatizing the Liquor Control Board of Ontario (1994)”, Report 
prepared for the Ontario Liquor Boards Employees’ Union, (1994), 1-14; The Australian Wheat Board created in the 
late 1930s, had control over the exportation of wheat. The New Zealand Dairy Board had the control of exporting 
almost all New Zealand dairy products since 1923. See “International Agriculture and Trade Reports: Agriculture in 
the WTO,” Economic Research Service/USDA, WRS-98-4/December 1998, 45; Japan Food Agency had import 
monopolies on wheat, rice and barley. See International Agriculture and Trade Reports: Agriculture in the WTO, 
Economic Research Service/USDA, WRS-98-4/December 1998, 46; Livestock Products Marketing Organization, an 
SOE in South Korea, purchased 90% of Korea’s beef imports in 1993. See Ibid. The Federal Wheat Administration in 
Switzerland purchased domestic wheat and had an import monopoly for bread flour in the 1970s. See Special 
distribution by “Agriculture” sub-group on grains in multilateral trade negotiations, document on international trade 
in grains, addendum, Switzerland, MTN/GR/W/8/Rev.1/Add.7, Jan. 26, 1976.  
99 K. Ackerman, P. Dixit, and M. Simone, “State Trading Enterprises: Their Role in World Markets,” in U.S. 
Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Agricultural Outlook (June 1997), 11-12.  (its Table 1.  STE 
Agricultural Exporters Dominate in the WTO List) 
100 Id., at 11. The chief dairy export STE, the New Zealand Dairy Board, handled about 30 percent of world dairy 
product exports in 1999. See Karen Z. Ackerman and Praveen M. Dixit, “An Introduction to State Trading in 
Agriculture,” Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture. 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 783. (October 1999), 6. 
101 Burton W. Folsom, ed. The Industrial Revolution and Free Trade (Foundation for Economic Education, 1996), 4; 
France in the post-war period expanded the nationalized sectors, such as tobacco sales, postal, national rail and 
telecommunications services, and nationalized most banks and automobile manufacturers in 1945, a mining company, 
an electricity company and a gas company in 1946. See David H. Pinkney, “Nationalization of Key Industries and 
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industries and public utilities were nationalized, such as the Bank of England, the coal industry, 
central electricity generating, the railways and transport, the steel industry, and local gas supply.102 
Nationalization occasionally occurred in other OECD countries. 103  Various advantages were 
granted in order to promote exportation, such as those provided to the softwood lumber industry, 
steel industry, cultural industry, and fishing industry in Canada.104 Particularly since 1970s, non-
trade barriers increased, and can be found in export subsidies in the U.S to the agriculture sector, 
and in the low cost of capital in Japan to key industries, like electric power, shipping, coal, steel, 
automobile, television sets, computer memory chips, aircraft, and most other high-tech industries 
in the late 20th century.105 
b. Developing Countries: STEs, Nationalization, Grants of Advantages, Import Substitution 
 
After independence, out of the need for domestic social and economic development, countries in 
Latin American and Africa established STEs and SOEs and gave advantages to them. Their 
purposes included operating natural monopolies by states, building the national defense industry, 
solving social issues such as unemployment, increasing governmental revenue from monopolistic 
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SOEs that could make large profits from their monopolistic status.106 Developing countries in 
Latin America, Africa and Asia used STEs as the single channel for importation of some 
products.107 Taking the mineral markets as an example, state trading was prominent in developing 
countries in copper, tin, bauxite, and iron ore, following the nationalization of mineral firms.108 As 
of 1976, state trading in copper comprised 39 percent of global production, and two of the four 
largest firms were SOEs in Zaire and Zambia. 109  Nationalization occurred in Latin America 
starting in the 1940s.110 Argentina nationalized Central Bank of Argentina, natural gas, telephone 
network, radio networks, railways, petroleum, Buenos Aires Metro and electric utilities in 1940s 
and 1950s, re-nationalized postal service, water utility, pension funds, airline, gas and petroleum 
in the 21st century.111 In the 1970s, OPEC countries took control of their domestic petroleum 
industries, and nationalization occurred on a large scale.112  
 
The grants of advantages and establishment of SOEs were also instruments of the import 
substitution policy in Latin America and other developing countries, such as India and Pakistan.113 
The import substitution policy, which refers to the establishment of domestic production facilities 
to manufacture goods that were formerly imported, began in the post-World War II era, reached 
its height particularly in 1950s and 1960s and lasted until 1980s.114 In the beginning of 20th century, 
Latin America exported mainly primary products and imported industrial products. Hence, in order 
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to have self-sufficiency, economic independence and industrialization, they used import 
substitution as a policy tool, through various means such as tariffs, import quotas, subsidized 
government loans from state owned banks, and nationalization in heavy industries such as the steel 
industry.115    
c. Communist Countries: Nationalization of all Industries and State Trading  
 
In communist countries, the prevailing political philosophy held that the state should play a 
predominant or exclusive role in society or certain sectors of the economy. They viewed public 
ownership as a political end. 116 Accordingly, the Soviet Union, Eastern European countries, China 
and Vietnam heavily used SOEs, STEs and policies relating to export promotion. During the World 
Wars and the post-war periods, the emergence of state economies and waves of nationalizations in 
communist countries, led to centrally planned economies, such as Soviet Union.117In COMECON 
countries,118 the state controlled all foreign trade through STEs, and most COMECON members 
imported oil and natural gas from the Soviet Union in exchange for industrial and farm products.119 
Indeed, the notion of “giving advantages to enterprises from the government” doesn’t exist in a 
centrally planned economy since all assets are owned by the state.  
 
After the collapse of communist countries, state trading and grants of advantages to SOEs were 
still pervasive. In 1992-1993, up to 70 percent of exports outside the former Soviet Union were 
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controlled by STEs.120 Although the countries in Eastern Europe made a transition towards market-
oriented economies, these former Soviet Union allies had SOEs and gave advantages to SOEs 
widely during the economic transition period.121 The main privileges granted to these STEs were 
exemption from export taxes, priority access to oil export pipelines, preferential provision of 
export quotas and licenses, etc. Some of these privileges were abolished after 1995 while some 
privileges remain, such as the exclusive right to sell Russia’s raw natural diamonds remains in the 
Company named Diamonds of Russia-Sakha, and the monopolies for the exportation of natural 
gas and oil pipelines remain in Gazprom and Transneft companies, all of which are SOEs.122  
 
(2) Why did SOEs and Grants of Advantages Become Problematic?  
 
Three factors can explain why the existence of SOEs and grants of advantages became problematic 
over time. One factor is increased international trade, one factor is related to efficiency from an 
internal performance perspective, and another factor is the ideas and values about the role that 
government should play in the economy.  
a. Increased International Trade  
 
International trade became more common during the Industrial Revolution. The Industrial 
Revolution beginning in 1764, led to the creation of factories with power-driven machines that 
replaced hand manual production.123 This led to specialization and mass production in industries, 
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such as clothes, textiles, steel and iron.124  Mass manufactures needed raw materials at lower costs 
for mass production of industrial products, and competed for markets in which to sell their products. 
As for inputs, the need to import raw materials at low prices arose for manufacturers, who found 
prices of inputs in the domestic market were artificially high due to protectionist tariffs.125 As for 
outputs, mass production of goods at cheap prices satisfied the needs of domestic consumption. 
Surplus, however, occurred due to the large capacity of the production facilities.126 Hence, to sell 
the goods, the need to expand foreign markets arose. In addition to that, maritime transportation 
with the help of steam-powered ships, telegraphs, telephones, railroads, and other technologies, 
became faster and cheaper, making it easier for importation and exportation.127 The 2nd Industrial 
Revolution amplified it.128 Therefore, international trade of many goods beyond raw materials, 
gold and minerals, inevitably became more common. 
 
The growth of trade was reinforced by mercantilistic practices, which promoted exportation 
through means such as giving financial advantages, monopolies, and other privileges to companies. 
Mercantilistic practices reached their height in the Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.129 Nations dominated by the idea of mercantilism valued gold or money as representing 
the wealth of a nation.130 Hence, by discouraging imports, they could save the nation’s wealth, and 
the imposition of high tariffs could also raise tax revenue for the state. By the promotion of exports, 
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they could obtain gold/money.131 In terms of promotion of exportation, subsidies, privileges and 
monopolies were given to companies favored by the state.132 Particularly strong producers could 
persuade the government to facilitate importation of raw materials for their inputs, to restrict 
importation of finished goods, and to promote the exportation of their finished goods.133   
 
Increased international trade can partially contribute to the explanation that why the existence of 
SOEs and grants of advantages became problematic. Trade increased among developed countries, 
and developing countries were also becoming more involved in international trade. The promotion 
of exports through the existence of SOEs and STEs, and the grants of advantages, affected trading 
partners and led to international tensions and trade wars. Hence, the existence of SOEs and grants 
of advantages became problematic for international trade. 134  Nations that had undergone 
privatization worried about unfair competition from foreign SOEs. Large multinational 
corporations, for example, in 1970s, negatively affected by SOEs or STEs or grants of advantages 
in international trade, advocated for privatization and reduced trade barriers. Political and 
economic concerns arose when these SOEs from communist countries expanded into global 
markets. The Soviet Union had some trade with the European countries, such as exportation from 
the Soviet Union of oil and national gas to Western countries.135 Economic concern arose when 
these SOEs dumped goods in other countries at lower prices. For instance, the Soviet Union sold 
lumber or coal at dumping prices in foreign markets.136 Political and military concerns arose from 
economic issues when, for instance, after WWII and in the period of Cold War, the Soviet Union 
used state trading for political purposes.137  
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b. Inefficient Performance of SOEs and the Government Bonds Markets   
 
One other reason that can explain why SOEs and grants of advantages became problematic is 
related to the efficiency issue from an internal perspective.138 Due to reduced profits of SOEs, loss-
making SOEs became burdens on governmental budgets, leading to privatization.139 Literature 
exists describing inefficient SOEs and explaining why SOEs run into difficulties theoretically and 
empirically.140 Poor performance of SOEs was associated with protection from competition in the 
product and capital markets, and no negative consequences arose from SOEs’ inefficient behavior. 
The government would cover their loses with grants of advantages. 141  There is political 
interference in operating decisions and potential conflicts between the government's role as an 
owner of an enterprise and as a regulator.142  A number of studies and surveys provide evidence 
that privatization generally leads to improved performance through examining the net welfare 
change in terms of gains and losses to governments, buyers, consumers, workers, and others.143 
The government bond markets were not blooming, generating less yields for governments, making 
the governmental budgets more constrained.144  
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c. Changed Western Ideology  
 
The ideas and values about the role that government should play in economies can also explain 
why SOEs and grants of advantages became problematic. In the first decades of the Industrial 
Revolution, the ideas of mercantilism gave way to the idea of laisez-faire, which means that the 
economy should be free from governmental intervention.145 The ideas of free trade and private 
enterprises began around 1760s from the statement of William Blackstone about a man’s natural 
liberty,146 and then Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations in 1776 “applied the idea of natural 
liberty to the nation state”. Smith argued that the market mechanism worked through the invisible 
hand in which each individual pursues its own interest, and public interests could also be achieved. 
The idea of free trade and limited government won the battle of ideas in the 19th century.147 In 
practice, the value of free trade and open markets was also recognized by states to some degree in 
the 18th century. Most Europe and North America nations, and the colonies of the British Empire, 
had adopted market economies through the 19th century.148 In the early 20th century, particularly 
Keynes’s theory in the aftermath of the Depression, the idea that state should play an important 
role in economies emerged, leading to the enlargement of the role of the state in the economy.149 
However, in the1970s and 80s, ideology changed again that the private sector should play the 
major role in the economy while the role of SOEs should be restricted. Grants of advantages were 
perceived as governmental intervention with the economy and the existence of SOEs was 
perceived as the direct participation of governments in the economy. Hence, they were contrary to 
the idea that the private sector should be the major player in the economy while the government 
should restrain from intervention or participation in the economy.   
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(3) Reactions to the Problem  
a. Privatization Waves 
 
A privatization wave occurred in the late 20th century in the UK, European countries, North 
America, Australia, New Zealand and other OECD countries. For instance, in the UK, the 
privatization wave occurred in major strategic heavy industries and public utilities from 1979-
1990. 150  The privatization wave also occurred in Taiwan, Singapore and other countries in 
1970s.151 A privatization wave in Latin America, in Africa, and in Asia countries other than the 
communist countries occurred in 1980s and 1990s.152 The privatization wave expanded further in 
the 1990s, encompassing the countries emerging from former communist countries after collapse 
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of the communist regime. 153  An extensive literature and data exist about the intensity of 
privatization from 1980-1991.154  
b. Reduction of the Number of STEs and the Grants of Advantages  
 
The number of STEs is decreasing, and the transparency of STEs and SOEs has increased relatively. 
In 2015, 20 Members reported a total of 77 agriculture exporting STEs, among which China, 
Colombia and India accounted for 69% of the total, with China accounting for 25 agriculture 
exporting STEs as the number one.155 Australia had over time reformed its agricultural trade 
policies and the number of STEs had declined from 9 in 1995 to 7 by 2004 and further down to 4 
by 2006 and solely 1 by 2012.156 Special commitments were made by the former communist 
countries, such as Bulgaria, Mongolia, China and Russia, in their accession to the GATT or WTO 
regarding the activities of SOEs and advantages granted to SOEs. 157  Russia promised in its 
accession that Gazprom would be notified as an STE in accordance with Article XVII of the GATT 
1994, and promised to be transparent.158 Russia has promised to reform the regulatory system for 
natural gas exports. For instance, Gazprom no longer has an exclusive right to export liquefied 
natural gas.159   
 
The number of monopoly rights held by SOEs also declined largely due to withdrawal of such 
rights or the privatization of SOEs by governments. For instance, regarding telecommunications 
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1, 17-36 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 33.  
158 The Working Party Report of Russia’s accession to the WTO, para. 88.  
159 Minutes of the Meeting of the Working party on State Trading Enterprises, June 25, 2015, G/STR/M/27, paras. 26 
and 28.  
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in the European Countries, the number of exclusive rights on terminal equipment declined from 
thirty-five to three from 1988 to 1991, in pursuance to the EU Commission’s directive. 160 In 
Taiwan, the monopoly in telecommunications was eliminated in 1996, and SOEs in the petroleum 
industry gave up monopoly rights over the extraction of oil and upstream processing of oil after 
Taiwan’s accession to the WTO in 2002.161 The monopoly was broken up in the process of 
privatization to ensure that large monopolies and oligopolies were not sold intact.162 For instance, 
East Germany started out with 6100 firms to privatize. A year later, it had 9000 companies to 
privatize. The increase resulted from the breakup of monopolies.163 When Brazil sold off its 
telecommunications giant, it divided it into 12 different line and cellular companies. 164 Hence, 
monopoly power was reduced and competition increased.  
 
Grants of financial advantages in European countries have reduced largely.165 European countries 
were moving towards a single and integrated market, which required that all enterprises within EU 
were operating in a level playing field, that SOEs should not have unfair competitive advantages 
merely because of their state ownership. Over the long term, subsidies are on a downward trend, 
since they are down from nearly 1 percent of EU GDP in the 1990s to 0.5 percent of EU GDP in 
the period of 2004-2008.166   
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(4) Summary  
 
In a nutshell, the extent of SOEs and grants of advantages to them are different across capitalist 
countries, developing countries, and communist countries, in the forms of state trading, 
nationalization, subsidies, giving monopolies or exclusive rights, import substitution, etc. Due to 
interdependence among nations and increased trade, SOEs’ inefficient performance became a 
burden for governments, and changed western ideology that governments should be restrained 
from interference with economies, grants of advantages to SOEs have been perceived as 
problematic. Hence, privatizations waves occurred along with reduction of subsidies, the number 
of STEs, etc. Nevertheless, the presence of SOEs and SOEs’ receipt of advantages are still 
pervasive in emerging countries, such as China, which will be explained in chapter two.  
 
2.2.3 SOEs Have Been Perceived as a Problem Targeted by Regulations 
 
As trade and economies became more interconnected, concerns about SOEs and their effects on 
trade grew. Consequently, regulations such as GATT and EU rules came out. No regulations 
regarding granting advantages to enterprises existed before the 19th century at the international 
level. In the late 19th century, countries unilaterally used countervailing duties laws against 
advantages granted by governments to enterprises, particularly SOEs. 167  The U.S.’s original 
countervailing duty statute can be found in the Tariff Act of 1897.168 Apart from that, regional 
efforts in European countries and the international efforts such as the early GATT developed rules 
more or less disciplining SOEs and grants of advantages, as well as the TPP Agreement and recent 
efforts in FTAs negotiations initiated by the U.S.  
 
(1) Global Efforts: Early GATT  
 
Advantages granted to SOEs could be partially caught by rules regarding state trading and 
subsidies in GATT 1947. State trading and subsidies were perceived as problematic in early GATT. 
                                                      
167 John F. Coyle, “The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation in the Modern Era” 51 Columbia Journal of 
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This is because first, state trading and subsidies could constitute trade barriers. Second, subsidies 
and state trading could undermine negotiated tariff commitments under the GATT. 169 Third, the 
GATT was based on assumptions that international trade was to be conducted primarily by private 
firms, not by state enterprises and government intervention was to be limited.170 Hence rules were 
made to limit subsidies and conform state trading to market conditions in the early GATT.171 Last, 
since the GATT was established on the assumption of the market economy in its Contracting 
Parties,172 the rules regarding state trading and subsidies were negotiated with the market economy 
kept in mind. However, the state trading and subsidies in non-market economies might present 
challenges for these rules. Hence, additional commitments were made for non-market economies 
in their accession to the GATT.  
a. Rules Regarding Subsidies (Financial Advantages) 
 
With respect to financial advantages granted to SOEs, the early GATT rules regarding subsidies 
disciplined them to some extent over the time.  In 1943, delegations from the UK and the U.S. met 
in Washington to discuss postwar economic issues, and agreed that barriers to international trade 
should be reduced as much as politically possible. “On subsidies, the U.S. position was that export 
subsidies could not be abolished unless other countries restricted their use of domestic subsidies. 
The British took a more relaxed view of domestic subsidies but wanted to reign in export 
subsidies.” 173  In 1944, the U.S. State Department-led interagency group completed a draft 
convention, i.e., “Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy”, which provided rules 
regarding subsidies that both export and domestic subsidies should be prohibited, except 
transitional export subsidies and for products in chromic world surplus.174   
                                                      
169 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
157-161. 
170 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2008), 24-5. 
171 U.S. “Proposals for Expansion of World Trade and Employment”, 1945, for consideration by an International 
Conference on Trade and Employment. US Dep’t of State, Press Release of 6 Dec. 1945, 13 US Dep’t of State Bulletin 
912-929 (1945). US Dep’t of State, Publication No. 2411 (Commercial Policy Series No. 79, 1945).  
172 At the time of 1947, all the Contracting Parties of the GATT were market economies. The U.S.S.R refused to attend 
negotiations.  
173 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
58-62.  
174  “Articles of Agreement for a Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy,” Harry Hawkins’s 
Executive Committee on Economic Foreign Policy (Oct. 1944); See Michael Franczak, “Multilateralism with an 
American Face: The United States, Great Britain, and the Formation of the Postwar Economic Order, 1941-1947,” A 
 44 
 
In 1945, the British loan negotiations were held in Washington (U.S. loan to Britain), the Anglo-
American negotiators agreed to discuss five key issues: tariffs and preferences, subsidies, state 
trading, exchange controls, and cartels.175  On subsidies, the U.S. planned to phase out domestic 
(agricultural) subsidies, but wanted to preserve export subsidies. The United Kingdom wanted to 
keep domestic agricultural subsidies but abolish all export subsidies.176 In the final text, the two 
sides agreed that “members should undertake not to take any action which would result in the sale 
of a product in export markets at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the like 
product to buyers in the home market within three years of an agreement, with a special provision 
for commodities in surplus.”177   
 
Developing countries focused on employment, and emphasized using the instruments of import 
control measures for the purpose of domestic economic development and full employment. Hence, 
compromises were made that less stringent rules on subsidies could be exchanged for much stricter 
rules on import control measures. Thus, subsidies were more tolerated than import control 
measures, resulting in less stringent rules on subsidies. 178 Nevertheless, from looking at the history 
of the GATT, rules became more stringent as time passed.  
 
The first preparatory meeting was held in London (the London Conference) in 1946.179  Article 30 
of the London Draft, similar to the U.S.’s proposal,180 reflects the first multilateral regulation of 
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subsidies with a bifurcated approach that export subsidies were in principle prohibited with some 
exceptions; other trade-affecting subsidies were subject to loose disciplines, mainly procedural 
requirements.181 The New York Conference reproduced the London Draft, and rules regarding 
export subsidies providing that export subsidies shall be abolished within three years from the 
advent of the ITO, were included in NY Draft ITO Charter, but not in NY Draft of GATT.182 The 
ITO Charter (the Havana Charter), which didn’t came into force, provided notification and 
discussion obligations for trade-affecting subsidies, and prohibition of export subsidies with 
exceptions for primary commodities.183 
 
In the 1947 Geneva Conference, the Geneva draft GATT Article XVI, originally consisted of only 
one paragraph (XVI:1) without incorporation of substantive obligations regarding export 
subsidies.184 Article XVI:1 of GATT 1947 provided the reporting and discussion obligations, and 
no definition of subsidies was given.185 Article VI of GATT 1947 authorized importing parties to 
use countervailing duties on imported goods up to the amount of the subsidy. 186 Article III:8 
provided that subsidies were exceptions to the national treatment obligation. Article II:4 was also 
applicable. Meanwhile, non-violation complaints under GATT article XXIII:1(b) could be resorted 
to through claims that subsidization by other Contracting Parities had nullified the benefits of tariff 
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concessions.187 At the time of 1948, no contracting parties were centrally planned economies. 188 
Hence, it was reasonable that no reference were made to subsidies granted to SOEs.  
 
In the 1954-55 review session, given the divergence among developed countries, and between 
developed and developing countries, a final compromise was made that additional disciplines 
would be imposed on export subsidies only and would not amount to a total ban.189 It took the 
form of the additional paragraphs 2 through 5 to Article XVI, with distinction between “primary” 
and “non-primary” products.190 Article XVI:3 provided export subsidies on primary products were 
allowed unless they resulted in a contracting party having more than equitable share of world 
export trade in that product. 191  Article XVI:4 provided that export subsidies on non-primary 
products were prohibited if these subsidies would reduce the sales price on the export market below 
the sales price on the domestic market, which was a bi-level pricing test.192 Only 17 countries 
accepted the these changes. 193  Developing countries objected to the differential treatment of 
primary and other goods.194  
 
The Tokyo Round negotiation (1973-9) generated the Subsidies Code.195 Track I of the Subsidies 
Code allowed imposition of CVDs subject to a material injury test, but it lacked the definition of 
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“subsidy” in the context of national CVDs rules.196 Track II prohibited export subsidies regarding 
non-primary goods without the bi-level pricing test found in Article XVI of GATT. It also included  
a list of practices entitled “illustrative list of export subsidies” in the annex.197 It also provided 
loose disciplines on domestic subsidies that affect goods in international trade.198 It addressed the 
subject factor of subsidy, which shall be deemed to include subsidies granted by any government 
or any public body. 199  Agriculture was left out. 200  However, the Subsidies Code bound the 
signatories to that code in ways that superseded GATT Article XVI. Nevertheless, it was a 
plurilateral agreement, and only 24 contracting parties accepted it.201  
b. Rules Regarding State Trading (Monopolies and Exclusive rights)  
 
With respect to monopolies or exclusive rights granted to SOEs, GATT rules regarding STEs 
disciplined them to some extent over the time. In 1943, the meeting between the UK and U.S. 
discussed cartels and restrictive business practice, and U.S. was opposed to any monopolistic 
behavior, while the UK advocated a case-by-case policy with respect to monopolistic practices.202 
In 1944, the “Proposed Multilateral Convention on Commercial Policy” by the U.S. provided that 
state trading should guarantee equality of treatment, and aimed “to lay down fair rules of trade, 
with reference to government monopolies and state trading, including trade between countries 
where private enterprise prevails and those where foreign trade is managed by the state”, as well 
as provisions on restrictive business practices.203 “On state trading, the UK officials emphasized 
                                                      
196 Article 1 and 6 of the Subsidies Code; John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), chapter 11.  
197 Article 9 of the Subsidies Code and Annex; John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of 
International Economic Relations, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), chapter 11.  
198 Article 8 of the Subsidies Code.  
199 “In this Agreement, the term ‘subsidies’ shall be deemed to include subsidies granted by any government or any 
public body within the territory of a signatory…(omitted)” See footnote 1 on page 18 of The Agreement on 
Interpretation and Application of Article VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the 
Subsidies Code).  
200  Robert O’ Brien, Subsidy Regulation and State Transformation in North America, the GATT and the EU 
(Basingstoke, Hampshire, England: Macmillan Press, 1997), 114.  
201 Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures: Balancing Policy Space and 
Legal Constraints (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 46.  
202 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
60.  
203 United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1944. General: 
economic and social matters, Volume II, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1944,  http://digicoll.library.wisc.edu/cgi-
bin/FRUS/FRUS-idx?type=header&id=FRUS.FRUS1944v02&isize=M  FRUS (1944 II, 71, 72,87). 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1944v02/reference/frus.frus1944v02.i0005.pdf 
 48 
strongly their desire to avoid having any words hostile to state trading.”204 In 1945, during the 
British loan negotiations in Washington, the Anglo-American negotiators agreed to discuss five 
key issues, among which was state trading and cartels, and “there was no major difference in view 
with regard to state trading.”205 On cartels, the United States and the UK kept their contrary 
positions as in 1943.206 Ultimately, the United States essentially accepted the U.K. position.207 
 
In the London Conference, Article 32 of London Draft dealt with state monopolies of individual 
products, and Article 33 dealt with the extraordinary case of complete state monopolies of import 
trade.208 The New York Conference added a provision on mark up prices, which was proposed by 
the U.S., that provided “The charging by a state enterprise of different prices for its sales of a 
product in different markets, domestic or foreign, is not precluded by the provision of the Article, 
provided that such different prices are charged for commercial reasons.” 209 It remains in Article 
XVII of the GATT.210 Article 32 and 33 of the New York Draft dealt with monopolies of individual 
products, and expansion of trade by state monopolies. In the Geneva Conference, Czechoslovakia, 
already a communist state, proposed that GATT would not be reserved to market economies 
only.211 Nevertheless, the conference restated that STEs should not base their decisions on political 
considerations. The Havana Conference made no change of substance in this regard. The review 
session didn’t lead to any meaningful change.212  
                                                      
204 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
80. 
205 Foreign Relations of the United States diplomatic papers, Volume 6, FRUS (1945, VI, 138), (1945),138.  
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945v06/reference/frus.frus1945v06.i0005.pdf ; the British account in 
Documents of British Policy Overseas (DBPO) (III, 181‐183). http://diplomatic-documents.org/editions/united-
kingdom (need login in) 
206 United States Department of State, Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, 1945. The British 
Commonwealth, the Far East, Volume VI, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945 (FRUS 1945 VI, 144). 
http://images.library.wisc.edu/FRUS/EFacs/1945v06/reference/frus.frus1945v06.i0005.pdf 
207 Id., at 144; Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University 
Press, 2008), 106. 
208 Report of the First Session of the London Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Employment" (London Draft) (UN Document E/PC/T/33), October 1946,  
209 In the footnote, paragraph 1 (e), Article 31, Report of the Drafting Committee of the Preparatory Committee of the 
UN Conference on Trade and Employment, UN Document E/PC/T/34 (Lake Success, NY, 5 Mar. 1947)  (New York 
Draft) https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/1946_50.htm  https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/92290038.pdf 
210 The Interpretative Note Ad Art. XVII of GATT.  
211 Petros C. Mavroidis, The Regulation of International Trade: Volume 1: GATT (The MIT Press, 2015), 401.  
212 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
157-161. 
 49 
c. Rules Regarding Regulatory Advantages 
 
With respect to regulatory advantages granted to SOEs, a non-discrimination principle was 
applicable. With respect the various advantages granted to SOEs in communist countries, 
additional commitments were made upon their accessions into the GATT. The dispute settlement 
procedures in Article XXII and XXIII regarding legal remedies for “nullification or impairment” 
of GATT rules, had been used for the settlement of disputes involving STEs.213  
 
Overall, the GATT rules were fairly limited in their effect on STEs and subsidies.  
 
(2) Regional Efforts: the European Community Developed Relevant Competition Rules 
a. Rules Developed in the Integration of a Single Market  
 
The existence of SOEs and grants of advantages (monopolies, exclusive rights, financial 
advantages, and regulatory advantages) threaten the goal of “a single market” pursued by European 
countries in the process of integration.214 Hence, in integrating markets in the European countries, 
SOEs and grants of various advantages came to be partially caught by the competition rules 
regarding state aid and state undertakings with exclusive rights, as well as other rules that may be 
applicable.215  
 
The Treaty of Paris in 1951 established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which 
aimed to create a common market for coal and steel in member states.216 The ECSC had authority 
over the production, prices, importation and exportation of coal and steel. The Treaty prohibited 
discriminatory pricing and unfair competitive practices so as to promote free competition. Hence, 
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any conduct that could distort free competition and threaten ECSC goals would be disciplined, like 
concentrations and abuses of dominant positions. Behavior of SOEs and the grants of advantages 
would be disciplined to the extent that they undermined free competition in the coal and steel 
industries, e.g., affecting the production or price, restricting competition and so on. The Treaty of 
Rome in 1957, creating the European Economic Community (EEC), aimed to create a common 
market and a custom union, by the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital.217 The 
Treaty prohibited state aids with exceptions and had provisions regarding public undertakings.218 
Afterwards, the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht (TEC), establishing the European Union, further 
developed the rules regarding subsidies and public undertakings, by revising Articles 92 and 94 
about state aid.219 The Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 (TFEU) incorporated the above rules.    
(b) Detailed Rules Disciplining Different Aspects 
 
With respect of the existence of SOEs, Article 345 of TFEU provides for the neutrality of property 
ownership.220 Hence, the existence of SOEs is allowed.  
 
With respect to financial advantages granted to SOEs, under the competition rules, state aid is 
prohibited unless authorized.221 Article 107 (1) captures any provision of state resources in any 
form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings 
or the production of certain goods.222 Article 107(2) lists forms of aid that “shall be compatible” 
with the internal market, automatically allowing three kinds of state aids.223 Article 107 (3) sets 
circumstances under which state aid may be authorized.224 Article 108 sets forth procedures for 
notifications and provides that state aid must not be put into effect until authorized by the EU 
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Commission.225 If a Member State grants illegal aid, it must recover it from the recipient, with 
potential exceptions.226 Hence, financial advantages granted to SOEs are subject to rules regarding 
state aid.    
 
With respect to monopolies or exclusive rights granted to SOEs, they can be caught by Article 106 
on public undertakings granted special or exclusive rights and Article 37 on state monopolies of a 
commercial character.227 First, in terms of applicability, SOEs generally can be deemed to be 
public undertakings, caught by Article 106 given that the scope of public undertakings, as defined 
in Article 106, is broad. Public undertakings under Article 106 are defined as any entity that carries 
out economic activities, where the state exercises some degree of control through holding the 
majority of the share capital or of the votes or having the right to appoint the majority of the seats 
in the executive organ of the entity.228 Even if SOEs fall outside the scope of public undertakings, 
Article 106 is still applicable if special or exclusive rights are granted to SOEs. Article 37 can 
cover grants of monopolies to SOEs as long as these SOEs are commercial.  
 
Second, in terms of whether grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs are allowed or not, 
they are allowed under the treaty provisions as articulated in Article 37 and Article 106 of the 
TFEU in respect of trade in goods. Under Article 37, it seems that the treaty provision allows the 
existence/grants of monopolies to SOEs since the obligation of “adjustment” is only limited to 
non-discrimination.229 Nevertheless, case law interpreted those provisions more widely than as 
merely prohibiting discrimination, and the decisions varied in this regard depending on the type of 
                                                      
225 Article 108 of TFEU. 
226 See George Bermann, Roger Goebel, William Davey and Eleanor Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union 
Law, 3rd edition (West Academic Publishing, 2010),1085; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies 
and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas 
Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 
(University of Michigan Press, 1998), 165.  
227 Article 106 of TFEU (ex Article 86 TEC, ex article 90 Treaty of Rome).  
228 The ECJ confirmed the Commission’s decision that any undertaking over which the public authorities directly or 
indirectly exercise a dominant influence is a public undertaking. See France, Italy and United Kingdom v. 
Commission, joint cases 188 to 190/88, ECR 1982 p. 2545, ECLI:EU:C:1982:257, Judgement of July 6, 1982, at 26.  
Commission Directive 80/723 O.J. 1980 L 197/35; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public 
Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of 
Michigan Press, 1998), 164.  
229 Article 37 of TFEU (ex Article 31 TEC) 
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monopolies.230 Under Article 106, the practice by the Commission and some case law suggest that 
the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights may be inconsistent with Article 106, based on the 
combination of Article 106 (1) with other provisions in the Treaty, given that Article 106 (1) refers 
to other provisions in the Treaty. Hence, combining Article 106 (1) with competition rules, such 
as the prohibition on abuses of dominant position by an undertaking or undertakings (Article 102 
of TFEU), it has been held that the grants of exclusive rights or monopolies were inconsistent with 
Article 106 if the grant of an exclusive right can inevitably induce the undertaking to abuse its 
dominant position, even in the absence of actual abusive behavior.231 As for the combination of 
Article 106(1) with Articles 34 & 35 on free movement of goods, Members may be held to violate 
Article 106 in cases where the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights of importation or 
exportation constitute a restriction of trade in goods with effects equivalent to those of quantitative 
restrictions. 232 Hence, the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights may be challenged in respect 
of trade in goods. In respect of trade in services, grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs 
are allowed under Article 106. Nevertheless, the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs 
in services may be challenged in the case of the combination of Article 106 with Article 56 on free 
movement of services, if it is found that it constitutes a restriction on trade in services.233 
 
                                                      
230 For instance, it has been seen how import monopolies are contrary to Article 37. See Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC 
Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading in the Twenty-
First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade 
Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 169. 
231Article 102 of TFEU (ex Article 82 TEC); United Brads Company en United Brands Continentaal BV tegen 
Commissie van de Europese Gemeenschappen. European Court Reports 1978-00207, (United Brands [1978] ECR 
207), ECLI identifier: ECLI:EU:C:1978:22, Feb. 02, 1978. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/NL/ALL/?uri=CELEX:61976CJ0027 ; Petros C. Mavroidis and Patrick A. Messerlin, “Has Article 90 ECT 
Prejudged the Status of Property Ownership?” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 345-360 (University of 
Michigan Press, 1998), 351; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any 
Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of Michigan Press, 
1998), 171.  
232 Article 34 (ex Article 28 TEC); Article 35 (ex Article 29 TEC).  Andre Sapir, “The Role of Articles 37 and 90 ECT 
in the Integration of EC Markets: The Case of Utilities,” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas 
Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 231-244 
(University of Michigan Press, 1998), 237; Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public 
Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and 
Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of 
Michigan Press, 1998), 169.  
233 Article 56 of TFEU, ex article 49 of TEC; Elliniki Radiophonia Tileorassi [1991] ECR I-2925; M. Kerf, “The 
Impact of EC Law on Public Service Concessions,” 18 World Competition 85 (1995): 101. 
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Third, with respect to the obligations imposed on SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights, 
competition rules, non-discrimination rules and free movement rules are applicable.234 Last, with 
respect to the obligations imposed on the states that give monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs, 
states should not breach their commitments under competition rules, free movement rules and non-
discrimination rules through the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs.235   
 
Article 106 (2) provides a limited derogation in a situation where the application of the Treaty 
would obstruct the performance of the special task assigned to the undertaking. This derogation is 
interpreted restrictively by the ECJ.236 From examining the case law, if grants of monopolies or 
exclusive rights are found to be violating free movement rules, the exception in Article 106 (2) is 
not available, while if grants of monopolies are found to be violating Article 37, Article 106 (2) is 
available.237 
 
With respect to other regulatory advantages granted to SOEs, competition rules, non-
discriminatory rules and free movement rules may be applicable.  
 
(3) Other Regional Efforts Recently (the TPP Agreement) 
 
Quite recently, because Chinese SOEs have received various advantages and are actively engaging 
in regional and international markets, concerns arise in regional rules negotiations, particularly the 
U.S., which pushed hard on rules on SOEs on the TPP negotiations.238 In the TPP negotiations, 
                                                      
234 Id., at 167.  
235 Andre Sapir, “The Role of Articles 37 and 90 ECT in the Integration of EC Markets: The Case of Utilities,” in 
State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 231-244 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 237.  
236 The principle of proportionality would be applied to the invocation of such exemption, such that the task granted 
would be impossible to carry out if the Treaty applied, not merely more difficult to carry out.  See Jacques H.J. 
Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” in State Trading 
in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The 
World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 165-6.   
237 Judgment of the Court of 10 July 1984, Campus Oil Limited and others v. Minister for Industry and Energy and 
others, Campus Oil [1984] ECR 2742, at 19, Case 72/83. European Court Reports 1984 -02727, ECLI identifier: 
ECLI:EU:C:1984:256, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A61983CJ0072 ;  Bourgeois, 
id., at 169-70.  
238 The U.S. industry wants rules in a TPP agreement to ensure that SOEs do not “nullify or impair” market access in 
the party’s home market, the markets of other TPP countries, or in third-country markets.  See Ian F. Fergusson, Mark 
A. McMinimy and Brock R. Williams, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Negotiations and Issues for Congress,” 
Congressional Research Service, 7-5700 www.crs.gov R42694, March 20, 2015.  
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there were proposals from its members about disciplines on SOEs receiving various advantages.239 
Ultimately, the TPP was concluded with a chapter on SOEs. 240  This chapter has provisions 
regarding non-commercial assistance to SOEs or given by SOEs; obligations imposed on SOEs’ 
behavior, such as non-discriminatory treatment and the requirement to act in light of commercial 
considerations; transparency of SOEs; designated monopolies, particularly state monopolies; and 
various exceptions and long transitional periods. These rules were drafted with an eye on Chinese 
SOEs although China was not a party to the TPP negotiations.241     
 
The U.S. also wants to incorporate detailed SOEs rules in future FTAs as well. For instance, the 
U.S. announced its intent to renegotiate the NAFTA, and listed objectives for this renegotiation.242 
Among many things, one objective in the list concerns state-owned and controlled enterprises, 
including the definition of SOEs, ensuring the behavior of SOEs accords with non-discriminatory 
treatment and with the requirement to make decisions based on commercial considerations, 
ensuring additional subsidy disciplines on SOEs, transparency requirements, overcoming 
evidentiary problems associated with litigation on SOEs, etc.243   
These objectives in the NAFTA renegotiation are similar to the objectives and provisions in the 
                                                      
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf ; William Krist, edited with an introduction by Kent HugHes, 
“Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,” Program on America and the Global Economy Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, ISBN: 978-1-938027-08-6. 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/PAGE_TPP_REPORT.pdf 
239 The U.S.’s proposals and position can be found in Office of the United States Trade Representative, “State-Owned 
Enterprises and Competition Policy: SOEs: Leveling the Playing field for American Workers through Fair 
Competition”. https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-chapter-chapter-
negotiating-7  ; For a general discussion about SOEs in the context of TPP Agreement Negotiations, see Tsuyoshi 
Kawase, “Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Rulemaking to Regulate Stat-Owned Enterprises”, 29 July 2014, 
http://voxeu.org/article/trans-pacific-partnership-negotiations-and-rulemaking-regulate-state-owned-enterprises  
240 Chapter 17 of the TPP Agreement. 
241 Keith Bradsher, “International Business: Trans-Pacific Partnership’s Potential Impact Weighed in Asia and U.S.”, 
New York Times, July 8, 2015 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/business/international/trans-pacific-partnerships-potential-impact-weighed-in-
asia-and-us.html?_r=0  ; Tuong Lai, “What Vietnam Must Now Do,”, New York Times (The Opinion Pages), translated 
by Nguyen Trung Truc from the Vietnamese, April 6, 2015. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/opinion/what-vietnam-must-now-do.html 
242  See Office of the United States Trade Representative, “USTR: Trump Administration Announces Intent to 
Renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement,” U.S.T.R. Press Release, May 2017, https://ustr.gov/about-
us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2017/may/ustr-trump-administration-announces 
243 See Office of the United States Trade Representative, “Summary of Objective for the NAFTA Renegotiation,” July 
17, 2017, p. 11, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/NAFTAObjectives.pdf ; Although Article 1503 
of NAFTA touches SOEs, it leaves much to the hand of the WTO rules. The TPP Agreement may divert some attention 
from the WTO to elsewhere. 
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TPP Agreement. Hence, it is possible that these provisions and rules on SOEs in the TPP 
Agreement and the U.S.’s other FTAs will be implemented in the future. 
(4) Summary  
 
As trade and economies became more interconnected, concerns about SOEs and their effects on 
trade grew. Consequently, attempts to regulate SOEs were developed by GATT and the EU to a 
limited degree. Early on, GATT developed subsidies rules, which could be used to regulate SOEs 
receiving financial advantages, and developed state trading rules, which could discipline SOEs 
receiving monopolies or exclusive rights to some degree.  In the integration of the European 
Community, competition rules regarding state aid could tackle the problem of SOEs receiving 
financial advantages. Rules on public undertakings are also relevant for SOEs receiving 
monopolies or exclusive rights. Recently, the United States has pushed for inclusion of detailed 
rules on SOEs in the TPP and in the planned NAFTA renegotiations.  
2.2.4 Summary of Section 2.2 
 
Historically, the phenomenon of having SOEs and giving advantages to SOEs has changed from 
having been perceived as non-problematic in times of an insular world, to problematic in times of 
globalization and interdependence among nations. After the Industrial Revolution, the extent of 
state involvement in economies became more intensive, ranging from establishing STEs, 
nationalization and subsidization to import substitution, across capitalist countries, developing 
countries and communist countries. SOEs and grants of advantages have been gradually perceived 
as problematic, due to increased international trade to the extent that SOEs, STEs and the grants 
of advantages led to international tensions and generated economic and political concerns; 
inefficient performance of SOEs and grants of advantages to them became burdens on 
governmental budgets; and the ideas and values of laisez-faire which has been embraced by 
Western countries along with their former colonies in practice.  
 
Afterwards, privatization waves occurred worldwide. In addition, the number of STEs declined, 
the grants of subsidies were largely reduced, and governments withdrew the grants of monopolies 
to SOEs. The problem was also targeted by regulations. Early GATT developed rules on subsidies 
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and state trading that can be utilized to tackle the problem. Regional efforts in European countries 
also discipline SOEs and grants of advantages to them to some extent, such as competition rules 
in the European countries in their integration. Recent efforts can be found in that the United States 
has pushed for inclusion of detailed rules on SOEs in the TPP and in the planned NAFTA 
renegotiations. It is anticipated that rules on SOEs will be pushed for in U.S.’s future FTA 
negotiations.  
 
2.3 Economic Analyses  
 
In this Section, I explain why there is a need to discipline the various advantages granted to SOEs 
from an economic perspective. I proceed with the theories underlying international trade, and 
international trade agreements. Then, I explain how the operation of SOEs, particularly the grants 
of various advantages to SOEs and the behavior of SOEs, reduces global welfare and efficiency 
by distorting efficient allocation of resources and undermine the market access commitments made 
by countries.  
2.3.1 International Trade Increases National and World Welfare/Efficiency 
(1) The Comparative Advantage Theory 
 
The theory of comparative advantage explains why nations trade with one another and why trade 
is mutually beneficial. It developed from the concept of absolute advantage and has different 
models.  Adam Smith thought that trade is based on absolute advantage, which means that one 
nation would be more efficient than another in producing one commodity but less efficient than 
the other nation in producing a second commodity.244 Such trade is good for both two countries if 
they trade with one another.245 This is because the output of both commodities will rise due to the 
division of labor. Each country can gain from trade and the world wealth is enhanced due to 
                                                      
244 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 28.  
245 With the assumption of a model of two-nation. Matthias Herdegen, Principles of International Economic Law 
(Oxford University Press, 2013), 14; John H. Jackson, William J.  Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations, Cases, Materials and Text, 5th edition (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2008), 21; 
Paul A. Samuelson, Economics, 9th edition (McGraw Hill, 1973), 692.  
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efficiency and specialization.246 Adam Smith thought that the source of national wealth was human 
labor, and hence, the concept of absolute advantage is based on the division of labor and 
specialization, corresponding to the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, during which time, 
specialization and division of labor developed not only in a factory and in a nation, but also at an 
international level in the global world for foreign trade.247 Adam Smith advocated a policy of 
laisse-faire, i.e., as little government interference with the economic system as possible, with only 
a few exceptions such as national defense.248  
 
The Ricardian Model based on comparative advantage explains that even if a country doesn’t have 
an absolute disadvantage in producing any commodity, for instance, one country is more efficient 
and productive in producing all products, it can nevertheless gain from specialization and trade, as 
well as the whole world.249 In the Ricardian Model, trade between two countries can benefit both 
countries if each country exports the goods in which it has a comparative advantage. A country 
has a comparative advantage in producing a commodity if the opportunity cost of producing that 
commodity in terms of other commodities is lower in that country than it is in the other country. 
The opportunity cost means “the cost of a commodity is the amount of a second commodity that 
must be given up to release just enough resources to produce on additional unit of the first 
commodity.”250  The Ricardian Model is based on trade in a one-factor world, and it used labor 
productivity as the measure of opportunity cost.251 The difference in relative commodity prices 
between two nations is evidence of the difference in the productivity of labor among nations.252 
The labor productivity derives from the labor theory of value, which holds that the value or price 
                                                      
246 Burton W. Folsom, ed. The Industrial Revolution and Free Trade (Foundation for Economic Education, 1996), 1-
3; Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations (1776).  
247 Folsom, id., 20-1; Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Book IV, Ch.2, 
414 (1776, repr. Modern Library edn., 1937); Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, fifth edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 26-30.  
248 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 29. 
249 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2008), 6.    
250 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 37.  
251 The classis work is David Ricardo, On the Principle of Political Economy, and Taxation (London: John Murray, 
1817); Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th 
edition (Pearson Education, 2012), 24-27. 
252 Krugman, i.d., at 34; Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-
Hall, 1995), 109; John Stuart Mill, The Principles of Political Economy: with some of their applications to social 
philosophy (1848), Book III; Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1995), 31, 33; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 6; David Ricardo, On the Principle of Political Economy, and Taxation (London: John Murray, 1817).  
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of a commodity depends exclusively on the amount of labor needed for producing the commodity. 
However, labor is not the only factor of production, and labor is not homogeneous.253  
 
The Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) Model uses two nations, two commodities and two factors of 
production (labor and capital) (two-factor economy), with several assumptions.254 The H-O Model 
examines the basis for comparative advantage and the effect that trade has on factor earnings in 
the two nations. According to the H-O theorem, international trade is largely based on differences 
in countries’ resources.255 “A nation will export the commodity whose production requires the 
intensive use of the nation’s relatively abundant and cheap factor and import the commodity whose 
production requires the intensive use of the nation’s relatively scarce and expensive factor.”256 
Hence, it is beneficial trade in a sense that “the owners of a country’s abundant factors gain from 
trade, but the owners of scarce factors lose. However, there are still gains from trade in the limited 
sense that the winners could compensate the losers, and everyone would be better off.”257 Trade 
acts as a substitute for the international mobility of factors of production in its effect on factor 
prices. 258 Relative factor prices should converge as a result of trade.259 International trade causes 
real wages of labor to fall in a capital-abundant and labor scarce nation. In that case, the loss that 
trade causes to labor is less than the gain received by owners of capital.260  
 
                                                      
253 Salvatore, i.d., at 36-37, 109. Under the model with constant opportunity costs, both nations specialize completely 
in production of the commodity of their comparative advantage, i.e., produce only that commodity. Under the model 
with increasing opportunity costs, which means that the nation must give up more and more of one commodity to 
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at 110-111.  
255 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 80-81. 
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259 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 91-93, 97.  
260 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 129.  
Redistribution policy of taxes on owners of capital and subsidies to labor can make both classes of factors of 
production benefit from international trade., Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 120. 
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(2) The New Trade Theories 
 
Helpman, Krugman, Lancaster and others developed intra-industry trade models after 1979. They 
explain that intra-industry trade, which is an exchange of differentiated products of the same 
industry or broad product group, is based on economies of scale in production, and mutually 
beneficial trade can take place even when the two nations are identical in every respect. 261 
Increasing returns (economies of scale) means that output grows proportionately more than the 
increase in inputs or factors of production.262 The internal economies of scale means that the 
efficiency of a firm increased by expanding the size of the firm while external economies of scale 
means that the efficiency of firms increased by having a larger industry, even though each firm is 
the same size as before. Economies of scale coming from increasing returns, makes it advantageous 
for each country to specialize in the production of only a limited range of goods and services.263 
Hence, such international trade benefits both countries.  
 
In a nutshell, the foregoing theories explain why nations trade and the effects of trade, and 
demonstrate that each nation gains from trade and world welfare increases as a whole. The 
comparative advantage theory predicts that each country gains from trade in different products, 
and the new trade theories based on economies of scale predict that each country gains from intra-
industry trade, i.e., differentiated products in the same industry. Under both theories, world welfare 
increases from these trades. Each theory is applicable with some limitations. The comparative 
advantage theory (e.g., the H-O factor endowments model) is most appropriate to explain trade in 
completely different products, while the new trade theories based on economies of scale and 
differentiated products are most appropriate to explain intra-industry trade.264 Thus, “while trade 
based on comparative advantage is likely to be larger when the difference in factor endowments 
among nations is greater, intra-industry trade is likely to be larger among economies of similar 
size and factor proportions.”265 
                                                      
261 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 158.  
262 Ibid.   
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2.3.2 International Trade Agreements Avoid Negative Externalities and Trade Wars 
(1) Why Don’t Countries Adopt Free Trade Policies  
 
Trade is a non-zero-sum game in which each country will get benefits if trade is not restricted.266 
However, countries do erect trade barriers even though free trade is beneficial for each country 
and the whole world. One explanation is that nations tend use power to extract greater gains from 
trade at the expense of their trading partners, based on the terms of trade argument or the strategic 
trade argument.267 The other explanation is political in that nations tend to have trade barriers 
regardless of whether it leads to the welfare of the nation increasing or decreasing, based on 
political economy theory.  
a. The Terms of Trade Argument and the Strategic Trade Argument  
 
In a perfect competition model, a nation may impose restrictive trade policies if its terms of trade 
improve, and hence extract greater gains from trade.268 However, restrictive trade policies have 
protection costs or deadweight loss, which should be balanced against benefits obtained from 
improved terms of trade.269 Hence, depending on the net effect of these two opposing forces 
(protection cost and terms of trade), its welfare can increase, decrease, or remain unchanged.270 
Taking tariffs as an example, when a large nation imposes a tariff, its terms of trade improve since 
a tariff by a large nation lowers foreign export prices, while the volume of trade declines. 
Nevertheless, a large nation can increase its welfare by imposing an optimum tariff, given that the 
gains from improved terms of trade outweigh its protection costs.271 Literature also demonstrates 
                                                      
266 Non-zero-sum game means that both parties to the game can gain. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading 
System at Risk (Princeton University Press, 1991), 52.  
267 Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton University Press, 1991), 52.  
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 61 
the effects of import quotas,272 voluntary export restraint,273 and export taxes274 on the welfare of 
the nation imposing these measures, as shown below in Table 10.  
Table 10 Effects of Trade Policies 
Note: under perfect competition model: the world market and domestic market are all perfect competition) 275 
 Tariff Export subsidy Import quota Voluntary export restraint 
Producer surplus Increases Increases Increases Increases 
Consumer surplus Falls Falls Falls Falls 
Government revenue Increases Falls No change (rents to 
license holders) 
No change (rents to 
foreigners) 
Overall national 
welfare (terms of 
trade needs to be 
considered against 
the protection costs) 
Ambiguous (falls for 
small country)  




In an imperfect competition model with increasing returns, countries choose protectionist policies 
to increase national welfare at the expense of their trading partners, according to the strategic trade 
argument.276 The economics examines the effects of subsidization of domestic firms, subsidization 
of the exports of these firms, and imposing tariffs on imports from the foreign rivals of domestic 
firms, in an imperfect competition model, where there is monopoly or oligopolies domestically, 
and imperfect competition in the world market with oligopolistic competition among domestic and 
                                                      
Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition (Pearson Education, 2012), 225; 
Dominick Salvatore (edited), Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 32-3. 
272 Salvatore, id., at 258-30.  
273 Voluntary export restraints have equivalent economic effects of import quotas, except that they are administered 
by the exporting country, and so the revenue effect or monopoly profits are captured by foreign exporters. See 
Salvatore, id., at 260-261. VER producers a loss for the importing country, see Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld 
and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition (Pearson Education, 2012), 208.  
274 Export taxes create government revenue, while depressing domestic prices, reducing output and increasing 
consumption. If the country is large enough to have some market power, the world price will typically rise and 
foreigners will bear some of the burden of the tax. It may increase national welfare provided that the tax is kept 
sufficiently small. See Ryan Scholefield and James Gaisford, “Export Taxes: How They Work and Why They Are 
Used,” in Handbook on International Trade Policy, eds., William A. Kerr and James D. Gaisford (Edward Elgar Press, 
2007), 237.  
275 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 211 (table 9-1). 
276 Imperfect competition is where firms can influence the prices of their products and they can sell more only by 
reducing their price. This type of competition is an inevitable outcome when there are economies of scale at the level 
of the firm. Oligopoly is where several firms are large enough to affect prices, but none has an uncontested monopoly. 
See Krugman, id., at156, 159.  
 62 
foreign firms in international markets. For instance, export subsidy benefits the home firm at the 
expense of the foreign firm, confirming to the Brander-Spencer model based on the strategic trade 
argument.277 The national welfare of the subsidizing nation will increase as long as benefits can 
outweigh the cost of subsidies to the government.  
b. Political Economy Theory (Public Choice Theory) 
 
Political economy theory explains why a country restricts trade regardless of its national welfare 
increasing or decreasing. Mancur Olson pointed out that “political activity on behalf of a group is 
a public good” that benefits all members of the group, not just the individual who performs the 
activity, and policies that impose large losses in total, but small losses on any individual, may not 
face any effective opposition.278 Therefore, the problem of free riders and a collective action 
occurs in political arena insofar as it is in the interests of the group as a whole to press for favorable 
policies, rather than an individual’ interest to do so.279 Well-organized and financed special interest 
groups can overcome the problem of collective action and free riders, and are more likely to lobby 
for policies that favor them and impose costs on mass individuals, such as export subsidies that 
favor domestic producers and disadvantage domestic consumers, who are not well-organized. In 
addition, public choice theory suggests that political officials pursue their self-interests, such as 
maximizing chances of reelection and campaign contributions, rather than the welfare of voters.280 
Hence, politicians can trade off policies favoring special interest groups at the expense of the 
national welfare as a whole for political contributions from them.281 This theory explains why 
exporting industries in the exporting country and the producing industries in the importing country 
are better organized and better financed than domestic consumers in lobbying government for 
giving export subsidies and imposing countervailing duties.282  
                                                      
277 Jonathan Eaton & Gene M. Grossman, Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly, in Jagdish Bhagwati, 
International Trade, 2nd edition (1987),161-79; Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 294-296.  
278 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 229-32; Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and The Theory of 
Groups (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965), 9-22.  
279 Olson, id., at 11.  
280 Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman, “Protection for Sale,” 84(4) The American Economic Review (Sept. 1994): 
833-850, 848; Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” 1 Economic Perspective (1987): 131-144, 141.  
281 Grossman, id., 848. 
282 For more about the lobbying activities, which are referred as unproductive profit-seeking, see Jagdish Bhagwati, 
Writing on International Economics, ed. by V. M. Balasubramanyam, (1997), 8-9, 134-51. 
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(2) International Trade Agreements Are Needed and Beneficial   
 
The above section explains that nations rarely voluntarily or unilaterally adopt free trade policies. 
Hence, international trade agreements are needed: i) to secure gains from trade even if unilateral 
protection doesn’t adversely affect trading partners while world welfare decreases, or ii) to avoid 
negative externalities of unilateral protectionist measures, or iii) to avoid a trade war, which makes 
world welfare worse off.283 
 
International trade agreements are needed to secure gains from trade and avoid situations where 
although there are no negative externalities to trading partners, the welfare of the country imposing 
restrictive trade policies declines and, consequently, so does overall world welfare.284 For instance, 
if a small country, which cannot affect world prices, imposes a tariff, it will reduce its welfare as 
well as world welfare, since there are no gains from its terms of trade in light of its inability to 
drive down foreign export prices. This occurs because tariffs reduce consumer surplus and increase 
producer surplus or rent, but incur the protection cost or deadweight loss since tariffs distort 
incentives of producers and consumer, which is an efficiency loss.285  
 
International trade agreements are needed to avoid negative externalities caused by unilateral 
behavior of nations. Negative externality means that a unilateral measure by a nation may 
negatively affect others, leading to inefficiency in the absence of international cooperation.286 For 
                                                      
283 With respect to the theory of trade agreements, except for the traditional economic approach, the other one is the 
political-economy approach, that the government faces political constraints when setting trade policy, (political 
motivations); and another one is the commitment approach that stresses the difficulty governments may face in making 
policy commitments to the private sector, in a sense that trade agreements can help governments stick to the 
agreements when facing pressure from domestic interest groups asking for protection. See Kyle Bagwell and Robert 
W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (The MIT, 2002), 7, 13-42, 165. 
284 Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton University Press, 1991), 32-3. 
285 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 201-202. The Stolper-Samuelson Theorem explains that imposition of a tariff increases 
the price of a commodity, and raises the return of earnings of the factor used intensively in the production of the 
commodity. Thus, the real return to the nation’s scarce factor of production will rise with the imposition of a tariff. A 
small nation as a whole is harmed by the tariff, while the nation’s scarce factor benefits at the expense of the nation’s 
abundant factor. The latter is larger than the former. See Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 225-6, 232-236.  
286 Eric Poser and Alan Sykes, Economic Foundations of International Law (The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2013), 13-14.  
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instance, negative externalities come from countries’ pursuit of terms-of-trade gains, or strategic 
trade policies.287  
 
International trade agreements are needed to avoid a trade war, in which situation world welfare 
would be reduced.288 The situation faced by governments is similar to the prisoner’s dilemma in 
the game theory. (Shown in the Table 11 below). Literature exists analyzing the model of two 
countries with two policy options: protection or free trade. Each government would choose 
protection if it could take the other country’s policy as given. Even though each government acting 
individually would be better off with protection, they would be even better off if both choose free 
trade which has mutual gains, and they would be worse off if both refrain from free trade since 
there is a trade war.289 In the real world, countries are free to determine economic relations with 
other countries under customary international law. Hence, a need arises to coordinate through 
international agreements to refrain from protectionism, to address the prisoner dilemma problem 
and to avoid trade wars.290 For instance, even if a nation gains from a tariff, the terms-of-trade 
benefits to it represents a loss to its trading partners,291 who are likely to retaliate with a tariff of 
their own. In the end, both nations are likely to lose.292 The retaliation of trading partners will 
reduce the volume of trade still further. They may engage in a trade war and end up losing the 
gains from trade.293   
 
                                                      
287 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (The MIT, 2002), 16-8, 135.  
288 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 116-117.  
289 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (The MIT, 2002), 133-5.  
290 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 235-6; John H. Jackson, William J.  Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of 
International Economic Relations, Cases, Materials and Text, 5th edition (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2008), 51;  
Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” 1 Economic Perspective (1987):131-144, 141. Matthias Herdegen, Principles 
of International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, 2013), 13. 
291 The trading partner’s welfare declines since it has a lower volume of trade and deteriorating terms of trade.  
292 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 244-6.  
293 Id., at 238-9; Although one country’s protection doesn’t justify another’s, nations retaliate in reality. “Protection 
by a trading partner lowers the real income both of the partner and at home. The microeconomic effects of trade 
barriers are argued to be welfare losses and departures from Pareto optimality.” See Dominick Salvatore (edited), 
Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 18-9, 67, 99. 
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Table 11 Prisoner Dilemma in Trade 
Note: taking the U.S. and China as an example294 
U.S.                                 China            Free trade                 Protection 
Free trade 10 10 -10 20 
Protection  20 -10 -5 -5 
 
2.3.3 The Grants of Advantages to SOEs Reduce World Welfare and Undermine 
International Trade Agreements  
(1) Grants of Financial Advantages and Regulatory Advantages to SOEs and Behavior Afterwards 
a. World Welfare Effects 
a) In a Perfect Competitive Market Model 
 
The welfare of subsidizing nation decreases more in situation of giving financial advantages to 
SOEs 
Some literature demonstrates that under the condition of a perfectly competitive market in 
international trade, subsidies--no matter whether they are export subsidies or production subsidies-
-are inefficient and welfare diminishing regardless whether the country granting subsidies is a 
large or small one, as shown in the Table 12 below.295 The subsidizing nations all suffer from the 






                                                      
294 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 235 (table 10-3 about the problem of trade warfare).  
295 In a perfect market closed to international trade, production subsidies expand output, reduce the price, and create a 
welfare loss since resources are allocated inefficiently. See WTO, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the Links 
between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO (WTO, 2006), 55. 
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Table 12 The Effects of Subsidies in a Perfect Competitive Market in International Trade 






















Small  Fall Increase Increase  Unchanged  Increase  Loss (for 
sure) 












Increase Fall  Loss (for 
sure) 
Large   Fall Increase  Fall Fall  Increase  Loss 
(Note: a small country is a price taker while a large country can affect world prices.) 
 
In a perfect competitive market, in regard to export subsidies granted by a small country, it has the 
effect of expanding output and exports. An export subsidy gives producers an incentive to export 
given that it will be more profitable to sell abroad than at home unless the price at home is higher, 
leading to domestic prices increasing. 296 The higher price of the commodity in the domestic 
markets benefits producers while it harms consumers in the subsidizing nation. Overall, the 
domestic producers gain less than the sum of the loss of domestic consumers and the cost of the 
subsidy to the subsidizing nation’s taxpayers, and hence, the subsidizing nation incurs a protection 
cost or deadweight loss as a result of the export subsidies. This is a loss resulting from the export 
subsidies’ distorting effects on incentives of consumers and producers. The same analysis applies 
to the case of a large country granting export subsidies, incurring a deadweight loss (protection 
cost).  
 
In a perfect competitive market, production subsidies, particularly market price supports that keep 
domestic prices above world price levels, provide incentives for producers to supply more and 
                                                      
296 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 203-204. 
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consumers to consume less. This distortion in production, i.e., to produce more, and consumption, 
i.e., to consume less, leads to a loss in economic welfare.297 It is true for both a large country and 
a small country.   With respect to a small country granting production subsidies, such as subsidies 
to reduce the costs of domestic producers, and subsidies to increase output of domestic production, 
other than market price supports, government revenue falls due to the costs of subsidies. Domestic 
output increases. Domestic price, which is fixed to the world price, remains unchanged, since the 
world prices are unaffected. The result is an expansion in domestic output at the expense of imports. 
A welfare loss occurs since the additional domestic output would cost less to source from the world 
market. Hence, domestic output adjusts in response to the subsidy intervention rather than the 
world price, leading to inefficiencies.298  With respect to a large country granting production 
subsidies other than market price supports, they increase domestic production, or reduce the costs 
of domestic producers. In light of a large country’s capacity to affect world prices, production 
subsidies in this regard cause the world price to fall. Welfare effects for the exporter country are 
an increase in consumer surplus and an increase in producer surplus, but these increases are not 
large enough to cover the cost to taxpayers of the production subsidy.299 Therefore, it is a loss to 
the subsidizing nation’s welfare.  
 
The above analysis, based on POEs, demonstrates that in a perfect competitive market, welfare of 
the subsidizing nation decreases. It is also applicable to the case of granting advantages to SOEs. 
What’s more, the welfare of subsidizing nation decreases more in situation of giving financial 
advantages to SOEs due to their behavior afterwards in light of their objectives of revenue 
maximization and expansion of scale. First, SOEs are more likely to expand output 
disproportionally than POEs after receiving subsidies, leading to more efficiency loss (deadweight 
loss) due to much more distortion of incentives to consume and produce. This occurs because the 
objectives of SOEs and the incentives of managers of SOEs are less likely to be profits 
maximization, but rather expanding the size of the operations, and the scale and scope of their 
                                                      
297 Karl D. Meilke and John Cranfield, “Production Subsidies,” in Handbook on International Trade Policy, eds., 
William A. Kerr and James D. Gaisford (Edward Elgar Press, 2007), 292.  
298 WTO, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the links between subsidies, trade and the WTO (WTO, 2006), 56.   
299 Karl D. Meilke and John Cranfield, “Production Subsidies,” in Handbook on International Trade Policy, eds., 
William A. Kerr and James D. Gaisford (Edward Elgar Press, 2007), 292-297.  
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activities.300 Second, given that promotions of SOEs’ managers are related more to the size of the 
SOE and SOEs discount the costs of expanding output, SOEs will be more likely to set below-
costs prices after receiving subsidies in order to expand the size of their operations, and hence 
drive efficient competitors out of the market, particularly if customer demand for some products 
is sensitive to price.301 
 
The welfare of the importing nation will decrease if financial advantages are granted to SOEs by 
a large country 
In a perfect competitive market, the welfare of the importing nation will decline as a result of a 
decrease in producer surplus or remain unchanged facing export subsidies or production subsidies 
given by a small country. In a perfect competitive market, the welfare of the importing nation will 
increase facing export subsidies or production subsidies given by a large country. This is because 
the extent to which subsidies distort international markets depends on whether the subsidizer is 
large country with respect to its ability to affect world prices.302 With respect to a large country 
granting export subsidies, they drive down world prices. Consumers in foreign countries benefit 
from lower world prices, foreign producers are net losers since they have to compete with the 
lower prices. Overall, however, the importing country is better off, since the increased benefit to 
consumers offsets the loss to the producers. With respect to a large country granting production 
subsidies, there is a reduction in the world price. Producers of competing products will have to 
compete against the subsidized exporters at the lower price, whereas consumers of the cheaper 
imports will benefit. Therefore, countries that are net importers of the subsidized product could 
gain overall from subsidies.303  
 
However, in a situation of subsidies granted by a large country to SOEs, the welfare of the 
importing nation may not increase, but rather decrease in the long term. As compared to POEs, 
                                                      
300 “SOEs would focus more on revenues instead of profit, and revenue often serves as a convenient proxy for scale.” 
See David E. M. Sappington and J. Gregory Sidak, “Anticompetitive Behavior by State-Owned Enterprises: Incentives 
and Capabilities,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and Public Enterprises, eds., Richard 
R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 7.  
301 It is more likely to occur if the SOEs emphasize revenue or if customer demand for some of their products is 
sensitive to price. See David E. M. Sappington, id., at 8.  
302 James Rude, “Direct and Indirect Export Subsidies,” in Handbook on International Trade Policy, eds., William A. 
Kerr and James D. Gaisford (UK: Edward Elgar Press, 2007), 282-291.  
303 WTO, World Trade Report 2006: Exploring the Links between Subsidies, Trade and the WTO (WTO, 2006), 5.  
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SOEs after receiving subsidies, are more likely to succeed in predatory pricing, obtaining market 
shares abroad, and extracting monopoly rent by raising prices. First, governments have control 
over SOEs in the decision-making of these SOEs after they obtain the dominant market power in 
the importing country. “A single relatively powerful economic national government can more 
easily ‘succeed’”, thus, predatory intent is likely to be achieved.304 Second, SOEs, after receiving 
subsidies, have more incentives to set below-costs prices, or predatory prices to expand the size of 
operation, which is their primarily objective internally.305 To that end, the welfare of the importing 
country would decrease in the long term.  
 
World Welfare will not likely to increase if SOEs receive financial advantages from a large country  
World welfare will decrease in cases where subsidies are granted by a small country to POEs. 
World welfare will decrease more in cases where subsidies granted by a small country to SOEs. 
However, it is uncertain from the current literature whether overall world efficiency/welfare 
increases or decreases in the case of a large country granting export subsidies or production 
subsidies.306 Nevertheless, the extent of the above uncertainty decreases in cases of granting 





                                                      
304 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 283.  
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Table 13 Welfare Effects of Giving Advantages to POEs and SOEs in A Perfect Competitive Market 
In a perfect competitive 
market 
Welfare of subsidizing 
nation  
Welfare of importing nation World welfare 
Give advantages to POEs by 
a small country  
Decrease  (Decrease or unchanged)  Decrease  
Give advantages to POEs by 
a large country  
Decrease  Increase  Not sure (uncertainty) 
Give advantages to SOEs by 
a small country  
Decrease more  (Decrease or unchanged)  Decrease more  
Give advantages to SOEs by 
a large country  
Decrease more Not likely to increase  More likely to decrease 
(uncertainty is reduced) 
 
b) In an Imperfect Competitive Market Model  
 
In an imperfect competition model with excess returns, according to the strategic trade 
argument,307 governments may use export subsidies to shift these excess returns from foreign to 
domestic firms, raising the profits of domestic firms by more than the amount of the subsidy. To 
that end, governments adopt strategic trade policies to shift excess returns from foreign to domestic 
firms. However, these export subsidies raise national income at the expense of trading partners, 
generating negative externalities, which will invoke retaliation and lead to competitive 
subsidization/trade wars. In addition, excessive subsidization or over subsidization is common 
empirically and theoretically in light of the domestic political process and structure.308 Excessive 
subsidization is more likely to face retaliation from trading partners.309  To that end, every nation 
will be worse off, and so will world welfare. (See Table 14 below.) 
  
In the situation where SOEs are present in an imperfect competitive market, first, due to SOEs’ 
strong lobbing power in light of their relationship with governments, governments are more likely 
                                                      
307 The classic example of strategic trade argument is the Brander-Spencer analysis with the example of Boeing and 
Airbus. There were new developments in international trade theory since 1970s, emphasizing increasing returns and 
imperfect competition, The new view of international trade holds that trade is to an important degree driven by 
economies of scale rather than comparative advantage, and that international markets are typically imperfectly 
competitive, see Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” 1 Economic Perspective (1987): 131-144, 132.  
308 Warren F. Schwartz & Eugene W. Harper, Jr., The Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade 70 
Mich.L.Rev. (1972): 831.  
309 Gary C. Hufbauer & Joanna Shelton Erb, Subsidies in International Trade 5–6 (1984), Institute for International 
Economics. See also D. Wallace, F. Loftus and V. Krikorian, Interface Three: Legal Treatment of Domestic Subsidies 
(Washington, D.C.: International Law Institute, 1984).  
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to adopt strategic trade policies, for instance, give subsidies to SOEs who are the 
monopolies/oligopolies as opposed to giving subsidies to POEs, who are monopolies/oligopolies 
in order to shift excess returns from foreign firms to SOEs. Second, SOEs are more likely to receive 
excessive advantages than POEs in the imperfect competition market due to SOEs’ stronger 
lobbying power. Strategic trade policies adopted by governments benefiting SOEs, particularly 
excessive advantages, may invoke retaliation easily based on evidence found that in the situation 
of financial advantages granted to SOEs, more complaints would arise from foreign companies, 
complaining to their governments asking for certain actions, which may include retaliatory 
subsidization.310 Third, the strategic trade policies only work under certain conditions, including 
that the sector involved should have increasing returns and profits above the normal return, 
imperfect competition, restriction on market entry by other domestic players, economics of scale 
in the industries and so on.311 If any condition is missing, it is less likely to shift and enjoy excess 
returns. 312 Conditions mentioned above are typical for SOEs. POEs may be less inclined to enter 
new markets, or to expand their sales in existing markets practically, if they know that their foreign 
rivals are SOEs. Last, it appears that even if conditions required by the strategic trade theory are 
not met, governments nevertheless create conditions for SOEs through regulatory measures 
dictating market structure, granting monopolies and exclusive rights to SOEs, and restricting 
market entry into some industries to guarantee SOEs’ control over the market. Governments are 
more likely to create these conditions so as to adopt and make effective strategic trade policies in 




                                                      
310 European Chamber, “European Business in China: Position Paper (2015/2016),” European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China (2016). Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT: Law and International Economic Organization (Chicago: 
University of Chicago, 1977), 136; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 216. 
311 James Brander, “Rationales for Strategic Trade and Industrial Policy,” in Strategic Trade Policy and the New 
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312 Katherine Baylis, “Unfair Subsidies & Countervailing Duties,” in Handbook on International Trade Policy, eds., 
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Table 14 Welfare Effects of Giving Advantages to POEs and SOEs in an Imperfect Competitive Market 
In an imperfect competitive market  Welfare of subsidizing 
nation  
Welfare of 
importing nation  
World welfare 
Give financial advantages to POEs Increase at the expense of 
trading partners 
Decrease  Decrease as a result of 
trade wars 
Give financial advantages to SOEs 
more likely to have strategic trade 
policies 
Increase at the expense of 
trading partners 
Decrease  Decrease as a result of 
trade wars 
(more likely to invoke 
retaliation) 
 
In addition, granting advantages to SOEs modifies the comparative advantage in the H-O model 
with perfect competition. The theory of comparative advantage assumes market-determined 
comparative advantage, and hence advocates that government should refrain from intervening in 
the market. However, in reality, almost all governmental measures affect resource allocation and 
hence affect the factor endowments that make up comparative advantage. 313  Any advantage 
granted by governments to SOEs solely out of state ownership alters comparative advantage in a 
sense that the comparative advantage is distorted, created, or shaped by governmental grants.314 
This alteration of comparative advantage has greater distorting effects when advantages are 
granted to SOEs that might not survive on the basis of market forces alone.315 Models suggest that 
SOEs are not efficient performers, and empirical evidence shows that the performance of SOEs is 
25% less efficient than that of POEs in terms of costs.316 Hence, grants of advantages to SOEs 
distort efficient resource allocation by allowing inefficient SOEs to continue production in an 
inefficient way and driving competitive efficient producers out of the market.317 Furthermore, a 
disagreement arises over the possibility of distinguishing efficient grants of advantages from 
inefficient grants of advantages, 318 given the difficulty of calculating the sum of producer and 
                                                      
313 Dominick Salvatore (edited), Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge England: Cambridge University Press, 
1993), 39-40; John H. Jackson, William J.  Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic 
Relations, Cases, Materials and Text, 5th edition (St. Paul, MN: Thomson/West, 2008), 15-20; Andreas F. Lowenfeld, 
International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2008), 8.  
314 Salvatore, id., at 39-40.  
315 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law, 2nd edition (Oxford University Press, 2008), 216.    
316 Stephen J.K. Walters, Enterprises, Government and the Public (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1993), 104. 
317 Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 (1) J. Law & Econ. (1960). Resources will be employed in producing the 
subsidized goods rather than other goods of greater real value. See Warren Schwartz and Eugene Harper, The 
Regulation of Subsidies Affecting International Trade, 70 Mich. L. Rev. (1972): 831, 840. 
318 Alan, Sykes, “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, Law and Economics,” 
Research Paper Series Paper No. 380.  
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consumer surplus, and government revenue. 319 There is also overlap between consumers and 
firms/producers.320 Nonetheless, the possibility of not being able to distinguish efficient grants of 
advantages from non-efficient grants of advantages cannot be a justification for not disciplining 
grants of advantages to SOEs in the first place.  
 
c) Empirical Evidence  
 
Here are some empirical findings in literature. With respect to welfare, I try to find the effect of 
giving advantages to SOEs as compared to POEs. I take subsidies as an example in the category 
of financial advantages. Theoretically, first, I need to demonstrate that subsidies given to POEs 
reduce world welfare. Secondly, I need to demonstrate that subsidies given to SOEs reduce world 
welfare in a greater degree.  
 
However, literature and empirical evidence are not complete. First, the above analysis is more 
theoretically about the welfare effects of subsidies given to all enterprises, or assuming POEs, in 
a perfect market and an imperfect market. However, the empirical evidence is inconsistent.     
 
With respect to the relationship between subsidies and exports, it is generally positive related.321 
However, the empirical evidence on the relationship remains ambiguous. One study conducted a 
panel data empirical analysis over 1990–2011 for 140 countries to understand the relationship 
between their overall budgetary subsidies and aggregate merchandise export inclination. It finds 
that overall budgetary supports in all countries, irrespective of their income level, are positively 
related with aggregate merchandise export expressed as a percentage of GDP.322 One empirical 
piece of literature examined export policies in Turkey during the period from the late 1970s to the 
                                                      
319 John H. Jackson, William J.  Davey and Alan O. Sykes, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, 
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mid-1990s. It found that in the short term, export subsidies contribute significantly to the 
explanation of export supply with correct signs. But in the long term, export subsidies turn out to 
have a negative effect on export supply.323 Additional examples can also be found, particularly 
regarding China’s increased exports correlating to its export subsidies. One research finds that 
production subsidies leads to an increase in the level of exports in China.324 Another piece of 
literature sheds light upon the causal nexus between production-related subsidies and exports by 
using a Portuguese longitudinal database (1996-2003). Its empirical result seems to prove the 
theoretical predictions: subsidies generate a rise in the wage premium of exporters and an increase 
in the relative size of the export sector, even if there is no impact of subsidies is found in the 
capacity of transforming domestic firms into new exporters.325 
 
Now imagine a situation in which we examine the welfare effects of trade among three countries. 
Country A is an exporter, and the exports are subsidized by the central government. Country B 
imports A’s exports. Country C also exports to B but those exports to B (and other countries) are 
not subsidized. With respect to the welfare of a third country like C, one empirical report is about 
the effects of European farm export subsidies on the Australian economy, which also exports wheat 
and dairy. It finds that i) consumers in Australia (Country C) will be hit by rising inflation and 
rising interest rates; ii) wheat and dairy farmers will be forced off the land; iii) commodity prices 
would be slashed; iv) GDP would fall; v) exchange rates would fall due to lower export revenue; 
and vi) unemployment rises.326 Therefore, the welfare of Australia, as a third country that also 
exports, decreases.  
With respect to the welfare of the exporting country, the targeted importing country, and non-
targeted importers, one empirical report finds that use of export subsidies in the world wheat 
market has caused substantial changes in the behavior of importing and exporting countries. The 
                                                      
323 It is explained that the temporary positive effect of subsidies becomes negative in the long-run due to uncertainty 
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export performance: The case of turkey, Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (1997), retrieved from 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/1698307047?accountid=14553 
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analysis uses three exporting countries and two importing countries. Exporting countries lose 
welfare and subsidized importing countries gain welfare when both targeted and general export 
subsidies are used. Non-targeted importers welfare remains constant when targeted export 
subsidies are used because they are ineligible for export subsidies.327 One paper has analyzed the 
impact of the U.S. subsidy policy for soybeans on Brazilian production and trade of soybean and 
soybean products, and finds that this subsidy is causing damage to Brazilian producers and 
exporters.328 
There are no theories directly talking about the possibility that subsidies given to SOEs cause net 
damages to world welfare. Even the extensive literature on strategic trade policy ignores state 
ownership and typically proceeds from the assumption that firms are profit-maximizing 
oligopolies. Empirical evidence is lacking in this regard, and even the theoretical relationship 
between subsidized exports and world welfare is unclear.  
Nevertheless, there exists some academic literature about the relationship among government 
shares, welfare, and trade policies. The literature examined the effects of the degree of state 
ownership on optimal trade policy, which covers domestic exports, export taxes, and tariffs that 
apply to all types of enterprises;329 one piece discusses the influence of state ownership on optimal 
export taxes, and demonstrates that the degree of state ownership affects neither the level of 
socially optimal export levels nor welfare nor the level of optimal trade taxes. 330  One piece 
examined the effects of privatization on social welfare of the nation that undergoes privatization. 
Other literature relates to the negative effects of state shares or subsidies on the performance of 
the enterprises with respect to efficiency and incentives, although some exceptions are in existence. 
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One article talked about the effects of subsidies given to a mixed oligopoly, and found that 
subsidies given to a mixed oligopoly contribute to overall efficiency.331 
In addition, there exists extensive literature about the difference between POEs and SOEs. One 
survey done by interviews reported that the disadvantages to an SOE of following all the objectives 
that governmental policies impose on the SOE may be greater than whatever advantages (including 
those of governmental subsidization of exports) being an SOE may confer.332 
 
Therefore, I try to make an analogy and utilize relevant pieces of literature, to fill the vacuum 
regarding effects of subsidies given to SOEs on world welfare. Based on differences among POEs 
and SOEs in all aspects, the literature and empirical evidence regarding POEs receiving subsidies 
may apply partially if not completely to situations where SOEs are given subsidies. I made 
inference from theories regarding POEs receiving advantages to SOEs receiving advantages as in 
the economic section above. However, this is not perfect because the method is analogy by 
comparison and contrast, and inference. Furthermore, empirical evidence is either lacking or 
scattered or contrary to one another.    
 
Further study will be needed to fill the vacuum regarding welfare effects of subsidies given to 
SOEs as opposed to POEs.  
 
b. Undermine International Trade Agreements  
 
Grants of production subsidies to the import-competing industries are similar to tariffs, hence, may 
undermine tariffs commitments made in international trade agreements. Previous literature 
demonstrates that grants of financial advantages to import-competing goods that are subject to 
tariff commitments, and grants of advantages to services, which are subject to specific 
commitments, can defeat the commitments already made under the WTO Agreements since the 
effects of these advantages are similar to tariffs. The import-competing firms that receive 
                                                      
331 White, M.D. “Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization” 53(2) Economics Letters (Nov. 1996), 189-195.  
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advantages can lower marginal costs, and hence tend to reduce their prices, resulting in imported 
goods lowering their prices in order to remain competitive. 333  These advantages affect the 
imported goods to the extent that imports may be reduced due to inability to reduce prices of 
imported goods as opposed to subsidized domestic goods, having the equivalent effects of 
tariffs.334  With respect to export subsidies, they may pose a threat to negotiated market access 
agreements to the extent that an importing nation may fear the remaining level of protection will 
be overcome by future export subsidies.335  
 
The analysis above is applicable to grants of advantages to SOEs in import-competing industries 
or exporting industries, in a sense that they defeat market access commitments. In addition, SOEs 
are more likely to receive more advantages with less transparency in various forms, making it more 
easy to circumvent commitments countries made in international trade agreements. Behavior of 
SOEs after receiving advantages are more likely to circumvent other obligations countries made 
such as the non-discriminatory obligations, in light of the tendency of SOEs’ behavior to be 
influenced by governments.   
 
(2) Grants of Monopolies or Exclusive Rights to SOEs and Behavior Afterwards 
a. World Welfare Effects 
 
General welfare reducing effects of monopolies or exclusive rights  
Literature demonstrates that in general monopolies or exclusive rights put restrictions on the free 
movement of factors of production, restrictions on the competition for factors of production, and 
restrictions on the entry.336 “The efficiency consequences of monopoly is deadweight loss and 
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rent-seeking”.337 This is because “monopoly reduces the incentive of a firm to innovate and to 
minimize its costs.”338   Literature exists examining the welfare effects of granting different types 
of monopolies and exclusive rights.  With respect to monopolies or exclusive rights of import or 
export, McCorriston and Maclaren, using the model of STEs, conclude that the precise welfare 
effect is related to the nature of the exclusive rights.  They find that removing exclusive rights of 
import can leads to increases in consumer surplus, producer surplus, profits and overall social 
welfare. They find that removing exclusive rights of export can generate gains to the country that 
previously had state trading for exportation, as well as countries that compete in the importing 
region, while the importing region loses welfare because home country exports less than it does 
with the STE.339    With respect to monopolies or exclusive rights on production or distribution, 
literature concludes that the control over the supply or the price has the effect of reducing welfare, 
given that production is not decided by the price, resulting in inefficient allocation of resources.340 
Some literature proves in a two-country model of monopolies in both countries, where domestic 
monopolies in a large country can take advantage of market power in the domestic and 
international markets, that eliminating all monopolies in both countries under trade, would 
certainly raise world welfare, although it may leave one country worse off. 341   
 
The welfare reducing effect of granting domestic monopolies/exclusive rights can be enhanced by 
the absence of international trade. Some literature believes that in a model where there is free trade 
between two nations and perfect competition globally, even if a firm is the only producer of a good 
in a country, i.e., the domestic production monopoly in one country, it will have little ability to 
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raise prices if there are many foreign suppliers and free trade, since the domestic monopolist has 
to face competition from imports. Therefore, with free trade, grants of monopolies to a domestic 
firm would not likely affect world welfare.342 However, the reality is not entirely free trade. Thus, 
literature examines a model where there is a domestic monopoly or oligopolies, perfect 
competition outside the nation, and non-free trade policies, such as tariffs, import quotas, 
production subsidies, or export subsidies. It finds that non-free trade policies can protect the 
monopoly and enhance the monopoly’s power, further reducing welfare. For instance, suppose a 
country imports a good and its import-competing production is controlled by only one firm. The 
tariff raises the domestic price as well as the output of the domestic industry, while it reduces 
imports. Hence, the tariff allows the monopolist to raise its price. To that end, a monopoly is 
protected by a tariff. Base on the same reason, a domestic monopoly is also protected by an import 
quota since no matter how high the domestic price is, imports cannot exceed the quota level.343  
 
In the context of monopolies and exclusive rights granted to SOEs 
The above analysis is applicable to SOEs with exclusive rights of import, export, production or 
distribution. Apart from that, the welfare reducing effect is more severe for SOEs receiving 
monopolies or exclusive rights. First, there is enhanced welfare reducing effects of monopolies in 
combination with non-free trade policies, such as subsidies. In comparison with the situation where 
POEs are granted monopolies and exclusive rights, there is more enhanced welfare reducing 
effects in situation where SOEs are granted monopolies and exclusive rights, given that SOEs after 
receiving monopolies or exclusive rights are more likely to receive subsidies. Both POEs and SOEs 
after receiving monopolies and exclusive rights are likely to lobby for protection and benefit most 
from it.344 Despite that, SOEs that have been granted monopolies and exclusive rights are more 
likely to lobby for more advantages than POEs since SOEs are special interest groups that have a 
more powerful lobbying capacity than POEs, in light of their ownership and relationship with the 
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government, and the countervailing power against these monopolistic or oligopolistic SOEs are 
weak.345  
 
Second, there is difference between oligopolies granted to SOEs and granted to POEs in terms of 
the likelihood of succeeding in collusive behavior. Collusive behavior among SOEs is likely to 
succeed, given that it is easier for SOE blocs with such monopolies or exclusive rights to form a 
cartel for the purpose of non-competition out of their common controller, i.e., the state. In contrast, 
the member of a private cartel finds it hard to agree not to compete in every dimension, such as 
collusive pricing or non-price competition.346 Last, in terms of price discriminatory practice by the 
monopolies,347 SOEs with monopolies tend to price discriminate (higher prices for the domestic 
market and lower prices for foreign markets), charge lower prices, or engage in dumping or 
predatory dumping, due to the objective to pursue revenue maximization.348 In addition, some 
research finds that SOEs are not problematic in terms of efficiency if they are operating in a 
competitive market.349 In other words, SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights are problematic 
since the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights turn perfect competition into imperfect 
competition, i.e., switch a competitive market into a non-competitive market.350   
b. Undermine International Trade Agreements  
 
Literature exists referring to state-trading monopolies as “another instrument through which a 
government can control the volume of trade”.351 Research comparing state trading and private 
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trading found that competitive private traders have the freedom to choose, guided by the profit 
motive, which is either limited or non-existent under state trading.352 State trading is more likely 
to exploit monopoly power in trade.353 “State trading confers bargaining power far beyond that 
which a private-trading nation possesses in its trade, reaping more economic rewards than private 
traders.”354   
 
With respect to importing state trading, literature found that in the case of an STE, which is a 
monopolist trader in the domestic market of a single homogeneous commodity, the STE may lower 
the buying price of imports compared to the free-trade market solution. 355  McCorriston and 
MacLaren’s research model uses STEs with exclusive rights to purchase from domestic producers 
and import, and sell as a single agency to domestic consumers. If the STE has the objective of 
maximizing producer surplus, the STE will be like a tariff since the level of imports will be lowered 
compared to the private firm benchmark, while if the STE has the objective of maximizing 
consumer surplus, the STE will be like an import subsidy. They found that trade effect differs as 
the nature of the exclusive rights varies by examining four scenarios.356 In general, literature and 
empirical research prove the import-reducing effect of STEs with exclusive rights to imports.357 
State trading on import affects importation, with equivalent effects to a tariff, and will undermine 
tariff concessions. 358   With respect to exporting state trading, literature found that in the case of 
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a STE, which is a monopolist trader in the domestic market of a single homogeneous commodity, 
the STE may raise the selling price of exports compared to the free-trade market solution, 
equivalent to export taxes.359 McCorriston and Maclaren analyzes the case of the exporting STE, 
which can price discriminate between the home and foreign market. 360 Given that the STE’s 
objective is to maximize the producer surplus of its input suppliers, it would be expected that, 
compared with the benchmark (a single commercial firm), the STE will sell less domestically and 
export more and hence be equivalent to an export subsidy.361  
 
The above economic analysis demonstrate that state trading may undermine international trade 
agreements about tariffs, export taxes, export subsidies, and the non-discrimination principle. It is 
also applicable to SOEs receiving monopolies or exclusive rights to export or import. What’s more, 
it is easier for governments to use the tools of SOEs, and the tool of giving monopolies and 
exclusive rights to SOEs, rather than POEs, to circumvent nations’ obligations in trade agreements 
regarding tariffs, export taxes, export subsidies, and non-discrimination, given that the behavior of 
SOEs is less transparent.362 Furthermore, the obligation of commercial considerations in decision-
making without influence from the government is more likely to be broken when monopolies or 
exclusive rights are granted to SOEs than granted to POEs. This is because of the differences in 
the degree of control over the entity in question. The government has more control over SOEs with 
regard to production, price setting, importation and exportation, and can direct SOEs if monopolies 
and exclusive rights are granted to SOEs, as compared to POEs, who have their own profit-
maximization as a priority and that may be in conflict with the government’s directions and 
                                                      
Oils, and Foodstuffs Import and Export Company (COFCO), McCorriston and MacLaren (2010) measured COFCO’s 
tariff equivalent for wheat imports.  
359 M. M. Kostecki, “State Trading by the Advanced and Developing Countries: The Background,” in State Trading 
in International Markets: Theory and Practice of Industrialized and Developing Countries, ed. M. M. Kostecki, 6-21 
(UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), 6.  
360  Steve McCorriston and Donald Maclaren, “Trade and Welfare Effects of State Trading Enterprises,” Paper 
prepared for presentation at the XIth Congress of the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural Economists), The 
Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System (Copenhagen, Denmark, August 24-27, 2005), 7-8. 
361 The size of the distortion created by the STE depends upon the benchmark, and the greater the number of firms 
that would replace it, the smaller is the distortion. See Steve McCorriston & Donald Maclaren, id, at 8 and 9.  
362  See Alan Sykes, “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective,” Law and 
Economics Research Paper Series Paper No. 38; P.J. Lloyd, “State Trading and the Theory of International Trade,” in 
State Trading in International Markets: Theory and Practice of Industrialized and Developing Countries, ed. M. M. 
Kostecki, 117-141 (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 1982), 117-37. 
 83 
policies. Thus, in cases of conflicts, POEs are more likely to pursue their own interests than 
SOEs.363  
 
(3) Justifications May Work Weakly in cases of Granting Advantages to SOEs 
 
The underlying rationale for establishing SOEs, granting monopolies and exclusive rights to 
SOEs,364 having state trading, 365  and granting various advantages to SOEs, can be examined from 
major two perspectives, i.e., economic rationale and non-economic rationale. The economic 
rationale includes correction of market failure, where prices cannot properly measure marginal 
social costs and benefits due to externalities. When the externalities are taken into account, 
divergent opinions arise in the calculation of overall efficiency, which might be enhanced, such as 
by grants of financial advantages for R&D, for the protection of environment and natural resources, 
for the development of infant industry and etc.366 Non-economic reasons include redistribution, 
national security, development goals, ideology of central planning economies, food security, 
stability, and so on. Some distributional justifications can be transferred into efficiency analysis 
by putting distributional objectives into preferences. For instance, the employment objective can 
be analyzed as a public good. Grants of advantages to POEs are more likely to be related to 
economic rationales, while grants of advantages to SOEs are more likely to be related to non-
economic rationales.   
 
For all justifications mentioned above, the following should be examined. First, whether the 
measure at issue (establishment of SOEs, grants of monopolies and exclusive rights, grants of 
advantages) is the best way to achieve the anticipated goals. 367 For example, if a domestic market 
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failure occurs, a trade policy response is at most a second-best option, since a new distortion is 
created. Domestic market failures should be corrected by domestic policies aimed directly at the 
problems’ sources. For instance, trade subsidies are inferior to an optimum tax-cum-subsidy policy 
since trade subsidies are like tariffs that are directed at foreign trade whereas the problem to be 
tackled is one of domestic distortion.368  Redistributing income can be best achieved by using 
lump-sum transfers, which do not change the optimal allocation of resources in the economy.369 
Second, grants of advantages also have costs including costs to taxpayers, administrative costs and 
other unintended consequences. Third, whether there are any alternative methods that can better 
achieve goals, such as using social security systems to address the unemployment issue or using 
other means to address layoffs caused by bankrupted SOEs. Last, it is hard to diagnose market 
failure well enough to prescribe policy. 370  It is not easy to identify the right industries or 
activities.371 A variety of the non-economic arguments are essentially disguising governments’ 
attempt to expand exports and market shares.    
 
Some justifications, although they work well for advantages granted to POEs in general, work 
weakly in the situation of grants of advantages to SOEs as opposed to POEs since most of 
advantages granted to SOEs are solely due to the state ownership or state control.  
2.3.4 Summary 
 
This section explains the need to regulate SOEs receiving advantages from an economic 
perspective. According to the theory of comparative advantage and new trade theories, it is 
efficient for the world to engage in international trade. However, individual nations may not pursue 
free trade policies if left to choose for themselves. They may attempt to maximize their own 
national welfare at the expense of trading partners. Such unilateral measures may risk retaliation 
and lead to trade wars, making world welfare worse off. To prevent the sort of prisoner dilemma 
problems that uncoordinated national behavior presents, in practice, nations have agreed to 
                                                      
368 Jagdish Bhagwati, Writings on International Economics (V. M. Balasubramanyam, eds.,1997), 86-87.  
369 Lump sum transfers should be designed so potential recipients cannot modify their behavior to affect who gets the 
transfer or the size of the transfer. See Karl D. Meilke and John Cranfield, “Production Subsidies,” in Handbook on 
International Trade Policy, eds., William A. Kerr and James D. Gaisford (Edward Elgar Press, 2007).  
370 Paul R. Krugman, Maurice Obstfeld and Marc J. Melitz, International Economics: Theory and Policy, 9th edition 
(Pearson Education, 2012), 226-227.  
371 Id., at 272-273.   
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facilitate trade by reducing trade barriers, through multilateral commitments to provide market 
access. However, the operation of SOEs, particularly the grants of various advantages to SOEs and 
the behavior of SOEs reduce global welfare and efficiency by distorting efficient allocation of 
resources, and undermining the market access commitments made by countries.  
 
2.4 Conclusion of Chapter One 
 
This Chapter defines the scope of the dissertation, which is to deal with the problem of granting 
advantages to SOEs that produce goods or services in global markets. Although the presence of 
SOEs in OECD countries is declining, there is a significant presence of SOEs in the global 
economy, particularly in the emerging countries, such as China, Russia, Brazil, India, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, etc. SOEs typically receive financial advantages, monopolies and exclusive rights, 
regulatory advantages, and other advantages. The advantages granted to SOEs are usually given 
in a less transparent way, in more various forms, and in more quantity than those granted to POEs. 
SOEs are more actively involved in global markets as compared to decades ago, particularly in 
international trade. Concerns have arisen that grants of various advantages to SOEs which are 
active in global markets may generate negative effects, specifically economic concerns relating to 
the grants of advantages per se and the behavior of SOEs that have been granted advantages. These 
economic concerns are my focus rather than complicated political concerns.  
 
Historically, the phenomenon of having SOEs and giving advantages to SOEs has changed from 
having been perceived as non-problematic in times of an isolated world, to problematic in times 
of globalization and interdependence among nations. SOEs were established after the discovery of 
New World in about 1500. These entities were granted monopolies over trade, natural resources, 
lands, ports, and regulatory power over the colonies for the purpose of expanding foreign markets. 
This phenomenon was not perceived as problematic due to the desire to expand foreign markets 
by powerful countries, the fact that relatively little trade was involved, the limited life span of 
many of these companies, and the idea of mercantilism practiced largely by each nation.    
 
After the Industrial Revolution, the extent of state involvement in economies became more 
intensive. Capitalist countries established STEs, particularly in the agricultural sector, to promote 
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exportation and limit importation particularly after WWI, and a nationalization wave occurred after 
1960s in European countries, and also occasionally occurred in North America and other OECD 
countries. Various advantages, particularly export subsidies were granted to promote exportation 
of many agricultural commodities and manufactured products by European countries, the U.S. and 
Japan. Developing countries wanted to achieve domestic social and economic development after 
independence, and hence, they used STEs for importation and exportation of a wide range of 
products, such as raw materials and natural resources. Nationalization occurred to a great degree 
in the third world, such as Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The establishment of SOEs and grants 
of advantages were also used to implement import substitution policies in Latin America, India 
and Pakistan to reduce imports of industrial products. Out of the communist political philosophy, 
communist countries nationalized almost all industries, and controlled over all trading with 
foreigners. In these centrally-planned economies, all assets were owned and granted by the state. 
After the collapse of communist countries, state trading and grants of advantages to SOEs were 
still pervasive and remain to date.  
 
In light of increased international trade due to globalization and interdependence, SOEs, STEs and 
the grants of advantages led to international tensions, negatively affected large multinational 
corporations, and generated economic and political concerns. Inefficient performance of SOEs and 
grants of advantages to them became burdens on governmental budgets rather than helping 
government revenues. SOEs and grants of advantages were either direct participation of 
governments or intervention in the economy, contrary to the idea and value of laisez-faire which 
trumps mercantilism, and has been embraced by Western countries along with their former 
colonies in practice.  
 
SOEs and grants of advantages have been gradually perceived as problematic. Therefore, to solve 
the problem, privatization waves occurred worldwide beginning in the 1970s, starting in the 
European countries, North America, other OECD countries, and then spread to Latin America, 
Africa, Asia, and former communist countries. In addition, the number of STEs declined, the grants 
of subsidies were largely reduced, and governments withdrew the grants of monopolies to SOEs, 
particularly in the European countries in their moving to a single and integrated market, and in 
countries with their accession to the GATT or WTO. The problem was also targeted by regulations. 
 87 
No particular regulations regarding granting advantages to enterprises existed before the 19th 
century at the international level. In the late 19th century, countries unilaterally used countervailing 
duties laws against advantages granted by governments to enterprises, particularly SOEs. Regional 
efforts in European countries and the international efforts such as the early GATT developed rules 
more or less disciplining SOEs and grants of advantages, such as competition rules in the European 
countries in their integration, and subsidy rules and state trading rules in the early GATT. In 
addition, recent efforts can be found in the TPP negotiations where rules on SOEs are concluded. 
The U.S. has pushed the inclusion of rules on SOEs in the TPP and its planned NAFTA 
renegotiation, and will likely to do the same in its future FTA negotiations.  
 
From the economic perspective, different economic theories, including the comparative advantage 
theory and the new trade theories, explain that international trade is beneficial for each nation and 
the whole world in terms of increasing welfare and efficiency. The comparative advantage theory 
predicts that each country gains from trading in different products in which the country has 
comparative advantage, and the new trade theories based on economies of scale predicts that each 
country gains from intra-industry trade, i.e., differentiated products in the same industry. Under 
both theories, world welfare increases from these trades. To that end, international trade is 
beneficial for increasing welfare of each country and the world.  
 
However, countries in reality usually do not adopt the free trade policy, but rather some trade 
restrictive policies. It is probably due to nations’ motive to maximize their national welfare and to 
extract greater gains from trade at the expense of their trading partners as predicted by the terms 
of trade and strategic trade arguments. It is also probably due to the fact that self-interested 
politicians are influenced by lobbying activities of special interest groups pressing for trade 
restrictive policies that even may decrease the national welfare. Hence, international trade 
agreements are needed: i) to secure gains from trade even if unilateral protection doesn’t adversely 
affect trading partners while world welfare decreases, or ii) to avoid negative externalities of 
unilateral protectionist measures, or iii) to avoid a trade war, which makes world welfare worse 
off. Given that grants of advantages to SOEs undermine international trade and international trade 
agreements in that they reduce more world welfare, and generate negative externalities, lead to 
trade wars, and hence undermine the benefits obtained from international trade agreements, in light 
 88 
of some facts that SOEs are more capable to and are more likely to conduct anti-competitive 
behavior after receiving advantages, and SOEs’ stronger lobbying power, grants of advantages to 
SOEs should be disciplined in the eyes of economists. Some justifications and exceptions work 
particularly weakly when applied to the cases of granting advantages to SOEs.  
 
After examining the problem of SOE receiving various advantages in a global sense currently, the 
history of the problem, and the economic concerns underlying it, I will turn to focus on the issue 
in the context of China to figure out the uniqueness regarding the extent, nature, and trade effect 
of advantages given to Chinese SOEs, as well as why there is little incentive for China to deal with 



















Chapter 3: The Extent, Nature, and Effect of Advantages Granted to 
Chinese SOEs 
 
This Chapter examines the problem of SOEs in the context of China. In particular, it considers the 
extent to which Chinese SOEs receive various advantages from the Chinese Government. In 
Section I, I begin with a general overview of the presence of SOEs in China and then look at the 
extent to which SOEs are present in several industries that are considered as key industries. In each 
industry, I give examples of major SOEs; their dominance or significant presence; their 
monopoly/oligopoly status, which is also related to advantages of monopolies and exclusive rights 
SOEs enjoy by law or in fact; the financial advantages they receive; and the regulatory advantages 
they enjoy.  
 
In Section II, I describe the nature of the advantages granted to SOEs in China. In Section III, I lay 
out the trade effects of advantages granted to Chinese SOEs. In particular, I consider the 
importance of the facts that China is a large trader and that Chinese SOEs play a significant role 
in international trade. This has caused concern at the international level regarding the grants of 
advantages and the behavior of SOEs. Last, I explain in Section IV why there is little incentive for 
China to deal with the problems based on a political economy analysis and on historical and 
ideological factors.  
3.1 The Extent of Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs    
3.1.1 General Description of SOEs in China  
 
China was once a command economy.372 Despite reforms and efforts to transition to a market 
economy, China nevertheless still practices state capitalism in many sectors.373 The number of 
                                                      
372 A command economy is one that has centrally planning economy and state-led resource allocation. See Paul R. 
Gregory, “The Stalinist Command Economy,” The Annual of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
Vol. 507, Privatizing and Marketizing Socialism, 18-25 (Jan., 1990): 18; Valery Lazarev and Paul R. Gregory, “The 
Wheels of A Command Economy: Allocating Soviet Vehicles,” (A Research Funded by Grants from the Hoover 
Institution and from the National Science Foundation, Oct. 2001): introduction. http://www.uh.edu/~vlazarev/ehr.pdf   
373 “Melding the power of the state with the power of capitalism, state-owned and state-controlled enterprises continue 
to control the commanding heights of the Chinese economy.” See Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State 
Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (Jan. 11, 2014), 409-448. 
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SOEs in China varies according to different definitions, and the structure of state capitalism is 
complex. This structure is mainly composed of two aspects. One is the State‐Owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (hereinafter the SASACs),374 
which is in charge of SOEs. The other is the investment and financial entities owned by Central 
Huijin Corp., which is a subsidiary of China Investment Corporation, a sovereign wealth fund,  
directly owned by the Ministry of Finance of China. On behalf of the state, there is one National 
SASAC holding shares of central SOEs, and local SASACs holding shares of local SOEs,375 
primarily in the following industries: military, petroleum and petrochemicals, steel, electricity, 
machinery and equipment, telecommunications, civilian airline and transportation, shipping, 
constructing, investment, and new technology. 376 Meanwhile, there is mix among SOEs owned by 
SASACs and financial and investment entities owned by Central Huijin Corp., with the emergence 
of cross shares holding.377  
 
Compared to the historical state presence in the economy during its command-economy period, 
the number of SOEs has been reduced dramatically since the 1979 reform. In terms of central 
SOEs, the National SASAC, when established in 2003, had 196 central SOEs. The figure was 129 
in 2009, 123 in 2010, 120 in 2011, 114 in 2013, 110 in 2015, and 106 in 2016.378 As for SOEs in 
totality, there were nearly 120,000 SOEs in 2003, while there were 109,000 SOEs in total in 
                                                      
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377797 ; Ronald J. Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt, “Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate 
Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism” Stanford University Law and Economics Olin 
Working Paper No. 355, and Columbia University Law and Economics Working Paper No. 328 (2008): 2. 
http://law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/258673/doc/slspublic/Gilson%20Sovereign%20Wealth.pdf ; Xi Li, 
Xuewen Liu and Yong Wang, “A Model of China’s State Capitalism,” HKUST IEMS Working Paper N. 2015-12 
(Feb. 2015), 2. http://iems.ust.hk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/IEMSWP2015-12.pdf   
374 The SASACs were created by the State Council in March, 2003 based on “The Plan for Restructuring the State 
Council”, which was adopted at the 1st session of the 10th National People’s Congress in 2003. See Decision of the 
First Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress on the Plan for Restructuring the State Council, March 03, 
2003, English version http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=6695&CGid=    
375 There are 112 central SOEs, last update/accessed on Sept. 7, 2016, see a list of central SOEs on the website of the 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council, 
http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html    
376 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 35-9. 
377 Id., at 36.    
378 For a list of central SOEs on the website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html 
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2013.379 The shrinking number is partially the result of an effort to consolidate SOEs into national 
champions. SOEs have largely withdrawn from competitive industries. 
  
Nevertheless, SOEs still dominate the Chinese economy. 380  Furthermore, the retreat of state 
capitalism has slowed recently. 381 Different sources of statistics and research have different 
estimates of the significance of SOEs in the Chinese economy. One research paper overviews state 
capitalism in China by different indicators, including gross output value and value added, fixed 
investment, employment and wages, taxes or revenues, share of labor, and comparison of central 
SOEs and local SOEs through assets, profits and revenues.382 It found that the SOE sector in China 
accounts for nearly 40 percent of China’s economy at least.383  For instance, from the indicator of 
tax revenues contributed by SOEs, the share was 48 percent in 2009.384 In 2014, tax revenue 
contributed by SOEs was more than 50%.385 An OECD study, using data from 2006, estimated 
that SOEs account for 29.7% of GDP, 40% of fixed investment and employ 40% of the urban labor 
force in China.386 A report by the World Bank in 2012 showed that the share of SOEs in China’s 
                                                      
379 “Operation Report of SOEs Subject to the National SASAC in 2013,” SASAC’s Statistical and Assessment agency, 
August 8, 2014. http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n86302/n326735/n326745/c1327899/content.html 
380 Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China 
Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863-919; Shang-Jin Wei and Tao Wang, “The 
Siamese Twins: Do State-Owned Banks Favor State-Owned Enterprises in China?” 8(1) China Economic Review 
Volume (1997): 19-29; Hejing Chen & John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective 
Trade Negotiations,” Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014).  
381 In China, there is a perceived phenomenon described as ‘the state advances, the private (sector) retreats’ (guo jin 
min tui) in recent years. FAN Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, “Chapter 16: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the 
Chinese Economy,” China US Focus, 4. http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-
Chapter+16.pdf  
382 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011): 11-20.  
383 If the output of urban collective enterprises and the government-run proportion of township-village enterprises 
(TVEs refer to the location of the enterprises) are considered, the broadly defined state sector likely surpasses 50 
percent. See id., at 6. 
384 The China Statistical Yearbook (CSY) 2009.  
385 Yajie Wang, “Experts: Tax contributed by SOEs Accounts More than Half of the Total Tax in China”, NBD, Jan. 
05, 2015. http://money.163.com/15/0105/00/AF5I5HND00253B0H.html 
386  Junyeop Lee, “State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence,” Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, OECD Occasional Paper (2009), 15. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/42095493.pdf  
Other estimates are higher, ranging from 30 to 40 percent or even above 50 percent of China’s economy depending 
on how the state sector is defined. See DL Scissors, “State-owned Enterprises in China”: Testimony before the US- 
China Economic and Security Review Commission (2011). 
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economic output was 45%.387 In spite of the decline, SOEs account for about 50% of total bank 
credit and 40 % of total industrial corporate assets in 2015.388 
 
Taking the example of stock exchanges in China, SOEs have established numerous subsidiaries.389 
For example, a single central SOE has 116 subsidiaries in China alone.390 The parent SOE usually 
has several subsidiaries listed on stock exchanges. Different data sources estimate differently the 
extent of the presence of SOEs on stock exchanges in China. Almost 50% of listed companies on 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange are SOEs’ subsidiaries.391 In 2010, among 1700 publicly traded 
enterprises on stock exchanges (A-shares392) in China, there were 992 SOEs, accounting for 60% 
of the total.393 At the end of September 2011, 1,047 SOEs were listed on the exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen, accounting for 44.7% of companies listed.394 There are 42 SOEs on the Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange (H-shares395).396 SOEs constitute 80 percent of the value of the Chinese stock 
market in 2011.397 Central SOEs’ listed subsidiaries represent around one-third of the entire value 
of the Chinese domestic stock exchanges.398  
                                                      
387 “World Bank Reported that Chinese SOEs account for 45% of China’s economy, and the Presence of Chinese 
SOEs Should be Reduced,” Sina, Feb. 24, 2012.  
http://finance.sina.com.cn/china/20120224/151211448532.shtml  
388 International Monetary Fund, The People’s Republic of China: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 16/271 
(Washington D.C.: IMF, Aug. 2016), 38. 
389 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 26. 
390 A review of the D&B® Family Tree for the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC) 
391 Also See top ten enterprise by market capitalization on the Shanghai Exchanges in 2002, 2007, 2015 by assets.   
392 A-Shares refer to shares in mainland China-based companies that trade on Chinese stock exchanges such as the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, based on the RMB currency. A-shares are generally 
only available for purchase by mainland citizens. See A-Shares, INVESTOPEDIA, available at 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/a/a-shares.asp  
393 Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. 
http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html 
394 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary, pp. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114 and 121. 
395 H-Shares refer to a share of a company incorporated in the Chinese mainland that is listed on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange or other foreign exchange. H-shares are still regulated by Chinese law, but they are denominated in Hong 
Kong dollars and trade the same as other equities on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. See H-Shares, Investopedia, 
available at http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hshares.asp 
396 For a list of SOEs publicly traded on Hong Kong Stock Exchange, see “Stocks, SOEs shares,” QUAMNET,   
http://www.quamnet.com/learninglist.action?articleId=1145367 
397 Adrian Wooldridge, “The Visible Hand”, The Economist (Jan 21, 2012).  
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931 ; See Also U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2011 
Report to Congress (Nov. 2011) 40. 
398  Mikael Mattlin, “Chinese Strategic State-Owned Enterprises and Ownership Control,” Brussels Institute of 
Contemporary China Studies: Research Project: Asia Paper, 4 (6) BICCS Asia Paper (2010), 9. 
 93 
 
The dominance of central SOEs is worthy of attention. Although the number of central SOEs 
controlled by the National SASAC has declined over the years, central SOEs are expanding in 
strategic and pillar industries, with increasing monopolistic powers. Many central SOEs are world 
champions. “Although not large in number, the size and importance of central SOEs to the national 
economy in many respects surpass that of all the other SOEs combined.”399 In 2009, central SOEs 
accounted for roughly 40% of total non-financial SOE assets, 60% of total SOEs’ sales and over 
70% of total SOEs’ profits.400 The Chinese Government is the biggest shareholder in China’s 150 
largest companies.401 SOEs account for 85% of the top 500 Chinese enterprises.402 In 2013, 95 
Chinese firms appeared on the list of Fortune Global 500, compared with 79 in 2012, 69 in 2011, 
54 in 2010 and 13 in 2003, and 77 of the 95 firms on the list are SOEs.403  
3.1.2 The Extent of Advantages Granted to SOEs by Sectors   
 
This section gives an account of the presence of SOEs in different sectors, along with the extent 
of advantages granted to Chinese SOEs by sector. I picked ten sectors using the criteria of 
categorization based on Chinese industrial policies and whether the sector has significant 
international trade effects.  I collected information on companies generally from the following 
sources: (i) annual reports of companies which are listed on stock exchanges; (ii) China Statistic 
Yearbooks; (iii) articles and books; (iv) reports from international organizations, such as the WTO, 
World Bank, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD); (v) reports 
from research institutes and think tanks; (vi) data from database and magazines, such as Forbes; 
                                                      
http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/electronicreport/downloads/volume_4/business_case_viability/BC1_Research_Ma
terial/AsiaPaper4.pdf  
399 Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly (Jan. 11, 2014): 409-448, 10. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2377797 
400 Yh Deng et al., “Monetary and Fiscal Stimuli, Ownership Structure, and China’s Housing Market” NBER Working 
Paper 16871, (2011), 21 <http://www.nber.org/papers/w16871>.  
401 Adrian Wooldridge, “The Visible Hand”, The Economist (Jan 21, 2012).  
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931 ; See also United States-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 2011 Report to Congress (Nov. 2011) 40. 
402 Top 500 Chinese enterprises, POEs account for 15%.  




and (vii) governmental reports at national level, such as reports from bureaus of China, the U.S. 
and the EU.    
 
It should be admitted that some data may not be the latest or newest and some data is missing. This 
is partially due to the following reasons: (i) international organizations and research institutes do 
not issue reports on the same topic annually. Instead, once one report has been produced, the same 
topic may not be reported in the following years; (ii) data about SOEs and advantages they receive 
is not always available in China; (iii) the situation of granting advantages to SOEs in China is 
relatively complex, and what I found is only a glimpse of the whole picture. It should be admitted 
that there is difficulty in finding the complete information regarding advantages granted to Chinese 
SOEs and POEs. I have tried to collect the most recent data as best I could. 
 
The categorization of sectors into strategic sectors and pillar sectors is practiced by China.404 The 
state maintains sole ownership or absolute control over the strategic industries and a strong control 
over the pillar industries.405 In strategic industries, from the aspects of shares of revenue, output, 
investments and markets, it appears that the visible share of the state exceeds 60 percent. Because 
the state may indirectly control other firms, the true level of state control is likely higher, but this 
could not be documented.406 Literature finds that with the exception of autos and steel, the visible 
state revenue shares in the pillar industries are well below 50 percent. Still, there continue to be 
prominent SOEs in the pillar industry sectors.407   
  
I give examples of SOEs in each industry receiving various advantages as opposed to POEs, after 
                                                      
404 There are various standards for categorizing industries into the strategic sector, and the standards are adjusted over 
the time. On December 5, 2006, the SASAC chairman designated 7 industries (defense, electric power and grid, 
petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping) to be strategic. 
405  Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing 
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission 
(Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart , 15 Feb. 2012), 1; Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International 
Economic Law: 863-919; Strong control reflects an ownership share of 30‐to‐50 percent. See “China’s Industrial 
Policy and Its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers, and the American Economy: Testimony of Terrence P. Stewart, 
(2009); The State Council's General Office Circular on the Guidance Opinions about Promoting the Adjustment of 
State-owned Assets and the Restructuring of State owned Enterprise (Guo Ban Fa 2006/97); Section 2.2 of the State 
Council Circular on Deepening the Reform of Economic Regime in 2010. 
406 Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-
China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44-48. 
407 Ibid. 
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a brief introduction of the history of SOEs in each sector.408 In my empirical findings about SOEs, 
my focus is on the SOEs that are active in global markets.409 My findings are only a piece of the 
big picture since only a few well-performing subsidiaries of SOE groups are publicly listed on 
stock exchanges.410 I picked representative SOEs in each industry. I looked at the annual financial 
reports from 2007 to 2014 of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, Shenzheng Stock 
Exchange, HongKong Stock Exchange, Security and Exchange Commission (NYSE), and Taiwan 
Stock Exchange. These companies either have exports or are import-competing companies. Hence, 
they have impacts on international trade. Then I identified whether a company is an SOE or POE 
by looking at the top ten shareholders in the report. I looked at “non-operating income, government 
subsidies, or government grants,” to find out financial advantages. “Other income” is not covered 
in the analysis since it is difficult to figure out what this “other income” exactly refers to.411 I also 
looked at the interest rates to see if they are particularly low. The comparison between advantages 
granted to SOEs and POEs takes into account the factor of annual revenues. I looked at the top 
500 Chinese POEs, most of which are not publicly traded companies.  
 
(1) Traditional Strategic Industries 
a. The Coal Industry 
 
Since the 1979 reform, the coal industry has experienced a diversity of ownership and 
decentralization, going from a predominance of SOEs to localization. From 1979 to 1987, there 
was growth of the non-state sector, such as rural collectives and individual small-scale coal 
mines.412 Due to the shortages in state output, privately-owned coal mines accounted for three-
                                                      
408 I exclude defense industry and power industry, which usually have no international trade effects.  
409 “SOEs” here do not cover rural cooperative organizations.  
410 It is because that a parent SOE may have numerous subsidiary companies, one or a couple of which may be listed 
publicly on Stock Exchanges. However, the information regarding unlisted parent SOE and its unlisted subsidiaries is 
largely unavailable, and hence, they are not included in my findings. That’s the reason why my findings are only a 
piece of the big picture.  
411 I only look at “subsidies, government grants”, and occasionally use the column of “other income/revenue/gains” 
to serve as a substitute. For instance, China Mobile said that its subsidies from the government were included in the 
“other income”, which didn’t specify the detailed information.   
412 Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 
1996), 200-43 (Chapter 6).  
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quarters of the total growth of coal output over 1979-87.413 It led to the policy of letting local 
government manage the coal industry rather than the central government, which no longer issues 
production plans for producing coal.414   
 
However, since the 1990s, and particularly after the large-scale restructuring and consolidation in 
2009 and 2010 in light of many coal mine accidents, with the closing down of a lot of small and 
mid-sized private mining firms and their mergers with SOEs, SOEs in the coal industry regained a 
predominance. 415  This can be shown from the list of major SOEs and their percentage of 
contribution to industry revenue and output.416 The total SOE share of coal output is nearly 60 
percent in 2010.417 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited (an SOE), as the top one among all 
publicly traded companies globally, produces and sells coal, generates electricity, and operates 
railways, seaports, and airlines. Its energy and transportation businesses are primarily used for 
serving the coal business.418 Except for a couple of central SOEs, most SOEs in the coal industry 
are controlled by local governments and dominate in their corresponding districts. 419  This 
corresponds to my empirical findings, which find that there are no privately-owned coal companies 
listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange nor the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (small and medium sized 
board). Most coal companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange are local SOEs. It suggests 
that SOEs enjoy in fact dominance.  
 
SOEs in the coal industry receive advantages as follows. Subsidies may be granted after 
privatization to the POE that purchased the SOE. For instance, Sundiro Holding (Xindazhou), a 
POE, mainly operated an automobiles business before 2006. Then it purchased an SOE (Wujiu 
Group----Five Nine Group) at the end of 2006. The coal business has become its major business 
                                                      
413 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319.  [Lv Zheng, Huang Sujian Zhubian, Zhongguo 
Guoyou Qiye Gaige Sanshinian Yanjiu, Jingji Guanli Chuganshe]. 
414 Id., at 319.  
415 FAN Gang and Nicholas C. Hope, “Chapter 16: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy,” 
China US Focus, 4. http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf   
416 China Statistical Yearbook 1999 and 2012. In the mining and washing of coal, SOEs presence: Number of firms 
decreased from 49.5% to 11.5%, Gross industrial output decreased from 81.9% to 53.6%, total assets from 92.7% in 
1998 to 94.7% in 2011.   
417 National Bureau of Statistics data; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises 
and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44-48.  
418 China Shenhua Energy Company Limited’s annual financial report to Shanghai Stock Exchange.    
419 China National Coal Group Corp. (ChinaCoal) China Coal Technology & Engineering Group Corp. (CCTEG).  
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since 2007. It also continued with other businesses as minor businesses.420 No subsidies were 
granted to it before 2007, while it received subsidies from 2008 to 2014. There are no explanations 
for the subsidies it received in 2008 and 2009 in its financial reports.421 It raises suspicions about 
whether the subsidies were related to the privatization of the SOE, i.e., part of its assets were 
previously state-owned.422  In 2010, it received subsidies related to the SOE it purchased given 
that the SOE before privatization got compensation for its purchase of a bond issued by the state.423 
This compensation continued since the bond has not expired yet. Meanwhile, it received subsidies 
in the form of financial transfer of money.424 In 2011 and 2012, the major part of subsidies granted 
to it was related to a previous SOE (Wujiu Group), i.e., subsidies for its state bond and shutting 
down one mine.425 (This case is similar to the case of Hai’er, which is a POE that purchased an 
SOE due to privatization. It also received significant subsidies.)   
 
Taking Pinding Shan Tian AN Coal Ltd. (an SOE)426 as an example, it received subsidies for 
upgrading one of its mines,427 subsidies for a project undertaken by it to develop an automatic 
intelligent control system and equipment for exploring for coal. 428 But it was unknown how 
Pinding Shan got the project in the first place. It also got compensation for supporting the steel 
industry by providing coal at lower prices.429 In 2005, Pingding Shan Tian AN Coal was exempted 
by a local government from resource taxes in an amount of about RMB 4.8 million.430  
                                                      
420  Other businesses include auto-motors, logistics transportation, production of electric motors and housing 
management. (I looked at the specific information regarding coal business for the operation income). See Sundiro 
Holding’s financial report of 2008 from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board. 
421 Sundiro Holding’s financial reports from 2007 to 2014 from the Shenzhen Stock Exchange main board.  
422 It said that it had no subsidies in its 2009 financial report while it said that in the previous period (2009) it received 
subsidies in its 2010 financial report. Hence, I used the 2010 financial report and didn’t find the reason for 
government’s granting subsidies. See Id. 
423 Usually purchasing state bonds would be an obligation imposed on SOEs.  
424 From a legal perspective, it is specific, while regarding whether the tax refund is a form of reward (I am not sure 
what rewards here refer to), and whether it is specific or not, it is not clear.  
425  There were several mines forced to shut down by the government in 2011, in Inter Mongolia.  
http://www.coalchina.org.cn/page/info.jsp?id=58638 
426 PingDing Shan Tian An Coal Co. Ltd is an SOE with state shares of 56.12% in 2014 shown in its financial report 
of 2014 from Shanghai Security Exchange Board.  
427 Subsidies were granted for updating Chaochuang Mine and updating Tianzhuang Mile, both of which belong to 
Pinding Shan Tian An Coal Ltd. From a legal perspective, subsidies were specific for this company since subsidies 
were specifically for this project.  
428 The gross subsidies of Pinding Shan were RMB 75.44 million from 2008-2014.  
429 The steel industry needs significant coal used to produce energy for production and processing steel. The coal 
industry provides coal at lower prices pursuant to the national policy of encouraging/supporting the steel industry, 
then the state compensates/subsidizes coal companies. 
430 Due to the state ownership of natural resources, the state would usually grant enterprises the right to explore natural 
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Taking China Coal Energy Company Limited (an SOE)431 as an example, it received subsidies for 
a specific project of producing equipment used for mining. Such subsidies can affect the 
production capacity of SOEs. 
Table 15 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Coal Industry From 2007 to 2014 









































































































Company Lid.  
SOE (90%) 248,360  601 
432













POE 590 7 2 3 2 1 0.21 0.63 0 17 
Note: Sundiro Holding (Xindazhou) received more subsidies than China Coal Energy Company in light of the ratio 
of gross subsidies to their revenues. It might be that some information of granting financial advantages to SOEs are 
not open to the public as such that what I found was only a portion of the whole financial advantages granted to SOEs. 
For instance, I only looked at “subsidies”, rather than “other incomes”, of which the information is lacking about what 
precisely the content is under the item of “other incomes”. Nevertheless, given that SOEs dominate the sector, most 
of the beneficiaries from subsidies are SOEs.  
 
SOEs in the coal industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for transporting 
coal used for generating electricity or producing steel. There are different kinds of coal for different 
usages. Coking coal is the input for producing steel, and the thermal coal is primarily used for 
                                                      
resources and impose taxes on them as the resource tax. From a legal perspective, it was specific for this company 
since the title of legal document in question explicitly refers to Pingding Shan Tian An Coal Ltd. 
431 China National Coal Group owned China Coal Energy Company Limited, which is trade on the Shanghai and the 
Hongkong Security Exchange. But the financial information released to the Shanghai Stock Exchange is different 
from the information released to the HK Stock Exchange regarding subsidies (government grants), I looked at the 
assets and other items, and assume it is the same company with same assets. The difference may be due to different 
accounting standards. Other subsidies are given with no available information.   
432  I estimated the amount of subsidies according to its annual report 2014 which said that non-operational income 
was 925 billion RMB in 2014, and 556 billion RMB in 2013. The main reason for the growth of non-operational 
income was increased subsidization from the government.  
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generating electricity and energy.433 67.1% of energy (electricity) is generated from coal in China. 
50% of coal is used for generating electricity and utilities, and 18.7% of coal is used for producing 
steel, and the remaining amounts are used for heavy industry and manufacturing industry.434 The 
transportation costs account for almost half of the coal prices. 435 Transporting coal by road is too 
expensive and is limited by capacity. Railways are a better way for transporting coal, especially 
the express railways. However, governmental policies favor SOEs in getting access to railways 
and the express railways (non-stops) are almost exclusively used by SOEs.  
 
In summary, SOEs dominate the coal industry after the consolidation strategy. Financial 
advantages granted to the coal industry are intensive, both to SOEs and large POEs. Nevertheless, 
given that SOEs dominate the sector, most of the beneficiaries from subsidies are SOEs. In addition, 
SOEs in the coal industry receive advantages through getting better access to railways which are 
operated by SOEs.       
b. The Civil Aviation Sector  
 
Advantages of monopoly and exclusive rights enjoyed by SOEs in the civilian airline and 
associated industries can be shown as follows. The history of airline reform shows that the civilian 
airline was transferred from being under the control of military and administrative agencies to 
being under the control of SOEs.436 From 1987 to 2006, the airline industry was entirely controlled 
by six giant SOEs, including three SOEs in charge of air transportation, and the remaining three 
in charge of services associated with airlines.437 Beginning in 2006, POEs are allowed to enter the 
airline industry. However, SOEs still dominate. Among 46 airlines in China in 2013, there are 36 
state-owned airlines. 438  The top SOEs account for three-quarters of the airline industry’s 
                                                      
433 “What Makes China Turn to A Large Importer of Coal from a Large Export of Coal Overnight”, accessed Sept. 15 
2016. https://www.zhihu.com/question/19994194/answer/26855727 
434  Id.  
435 “SOEs in the Coal Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal 
(an SOE) makes profits at the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html 
436 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008). 
437 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 122-210. 
438 In 2013, there were 46 airlines for air transportation, among which 36 were SOEs and 10 were POEs.  
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revenues.439 For instance, China Southern, China Eastern, and Shanghai Air accounted for 71 
percent of the Chinese airline services market.440   
 
The aviation fuel supply is solely monopolized by one SOE, namely, China National Aviation Fuel 
Corp., which sells aviation fuel at prices which are 50-100% higher than the world prices. China 
Aviation Suppliers Holding Company, which is an SOE, monopolizes the supply of aircraft to 
Chinese airline companies.441  
 
Regulatory advantages can be found from the pricing policy maintained by the government. 
Although the Chinese Government has relaxed price control in monopolistic industries, such as 
the airline industry, switching from government-set prices to government-guided prices with a 
flexible range of 10%, it still retains a certain degree of price control.442  Other advantages may 
include the fact that the key flights routes are still mainly controlled by SOEs.  
 
Financial advantages given to SOE airlines include specific subsidies to specific airlines (a 
particular SOE) for its particular flights. Eastern Airlines received subsidies for certain flights, for 
refunds of money paid for the construction of airport facilities, and financial transfer of money 
from the treasury, and a specific subsidies program particularly for Eastern Airlines, and other 
subsidies with no explanation given. Similar subsidies were also given to Southern Airlines and 
Hainan Airlines, which is a POE.  However, the amount of money varies to a great degree, even 
taking account into the difference in their revenues. The amount of subsidies given to Hainan 
Airlines (a POE), is less than other SOEs from 2007 to 2014.443 (See Table 16 below). As for 
                                                      
439 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44-48. Table V‐3: Top SOE share of 
revenues in China’s air transportation sector, 2009.  
440 During the first three quarters of 2009, China Southern had a market share of 30 percent, compared to 19 percent 
for China Eastern and 17 percent for Air China. Shanghai Air, owned by China Eastern, held 5 percent of the market.  
441 Relaxing entry into the civilian airlines in terms of domestic flights routes, the legal document “Regulations on 
Permitting of Domestic Flight Routes in China’s Civilian Aviation” [中国民用航空国内航线经营许可规定] March 
20, 2006. for a Chinese version available at 
http://www.chinalawindex.cn/lawdb/detail/ef329fe49d5946bcb85ddf07ff10ef93 ;“The Nature, Performance, and 
Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 122-210. 
442 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008). 
443 2007-2014 Financial reports of Hainan Airlines, Eastern Airlines, Southern Airlines,  
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capital injection, for instance, a large inflow was received by China Southern in the form of a 
capital injection from its SOE parent, the China Southern Airlines Holding Corporation.444 China 
Southern, as well as China Eastern, has been increasing debt from state-owned banks. 445  In 
addition,  China Southern Airlines Company Limited continued to benefit from tax preferences in 
2010.446  
Table 16 Subsidies Received by Eastern Airlines, Southern Airlines and Hainan Airlines from 2007 to 2014  
(Unit: million RMB)  
















89,746 3,627 2,369 1,720 1,061 659 1,288 405 488 11,616 
Southern 
Airlines 
SOE 53% 81,852 1,728 1,176 1,258 828 553 1,869 901 329 8,642 
Hainan 
Airlines 
POE 36,044 504 362 460 333 208 493 139 43 2,543 
 
In summary, in the civil airline and associated industries, most financial advantages granted to 
SOEs were specifically targeted for them. SOEs received disproportionally more financial 
advantages than POEs. SOEs maintain a predominant position. SOEs also enjoy regulatory 
advantages through the government’s price control.    
c. The Petroleum and Petrochemical Sector   
 
The petroleum and petrochemical sector was previously operated by energy administrative 
agencies. In the 1980s, SOEs, such as China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and China 
                                                      
Eastern Airlines: operation income: 8974 in 2014, gross subsidies 11,616 from 2007-2014; Southern Airlines: 
operation income 8158 in 2014, gross subsidies 8642 from 2007-2014; Hainan Airlines: operation income 3604 in 
2014, gross subsidies 2542 from 2007-2014. Subsidies are not corresponding to the size of the company.  
444 Form 20‐F of China Southern Airline Corporation Limited in 2010 and 2011.  
Xinhua News Agency, “China Southern Airlines likely to receive capital injection of the amount of 1.5 billion RMB," 
22 Feb. 2010.  
445 Agricultural Bank of China. ABC Signed the Bank‐Enterprise Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement 
with China Southern Airlines. Beijing, June 11, 2011. 
446 A review of the SEC filings of the five firms (Aluminum Corporation of China Limited (Chalco), China Petroleum 
& Chemical Corporation (Sinopec Corp.), China Southern Airlines Company Limited, China Telecom Corp. Limited, 
CNOOC Limited) indicates that they continued to benefit from tax preferences in 2010, though the benefit is being 
phased out.  Nargiza Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” US- 
China Economic & Security Review Commission, USCC Staff Research Report (Washington: March 30, 2011), 19-
24.  
 102 
Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec group), 447  separated from the energy 
administrative agencies, and lost regulatory power later. State ownership accounts for 
approximately three-quarters of output in the petroleum and petrochemical sector.448 The state 
accounted for 78 percent of fixed asset investment in 2009.449 As for monopolistic industries like 
petroleum, although some subsidiaries became publicly traded companies out of the need for 
capital, 450 the parent company is wholly owned by the State.  
 
Vertically integrated monopolies can be found in the petroleum industry.  China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC)451 was established by the state in 1982 to take charge of overseas 
investment in oil fields in relation to offshore exploration and processing. CNPC and Sinopec 
Group are both vertically integrated monopolies with different focuses. Sinopec Group is in charge 
of exportation and importation of oil and oil related products, and primarily focuses on processing 
crude oil and chemical products. CNPC primarily focuses on exploration. CNPC and Sinopec 
Group became giant corporate groups, with integration of upstream and downstream sectors, 
including extraction, production, processing, distribution of crude oil and processed oil from the 
upstream all the way to downstream sectors. They are central SOEs, subject to central government 
control. Local SOEs were gradually integrated into these two giants. The two giant SOEs, CNPC 
and Sinopec Group, along with CNOOC, enjoy monopolies as follows:  
(i) The three SOEs (CNPC, Sinopec Group, and CNOOC) are in absolute control of crude 
oil exploration. POEs are only allowed to explore for crude oil in coordination with the 
three SOEs, and 20% of the crude oil discovered by POEs shall be given to CNPC for 
free, and the remaining 80% shall be sold to CNPC at prices set by CNPC. 
                                                      
447 CNPC is the parent company of PetroChina, and Sinopec Group is the parent company of Sinopec Ltd. Each of 
them has subsidies. CNPPC has CNOOC Limited and China Oilfield Services.   
448 It is based on data from the China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association.  
449 Table V‐5: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s petroleum and petrochemical industry, 2010 in Usha C.V. Haley 
and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford 
Uni. Press, 2013).  
450 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008).  
451 CNOOC: HKES is a Hong Kong-listed firm 70 percent owned by an unlisted parent company, whose shares are 
owned by the central governmental agency, SASAC.  
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(ii) All wholesale distribution of processed oil (gasoline, Kerosene, Diesel) is required to 
be handled by CNPC and Sinopec Group.452 It is like a marketing board.  
(iii) Transportation of oil requires permission from CNPC and Sinopec Group, which are 
authorized to request the railways to provide transportation. 453 It is subject to the 
discretion of CNPC and Sinopec regarding giving permission. It indicates that POEs 
have to bear extra costs of applying for the permission. Furthermore, without 
permission, POEs have no choice but to transport processed oil by road, which costs 
more than transportation by railway, while processed oil of SOEs can be easily 
transported by rail. It is one form of regulatory advantages granted to SOEs.454 
(iv) Crude oil can be imported by STEs and non-STEs. There are five STEs that import 
crude oil and they are all SOEs. There are 22 non-STEs that import crude oil, half of 
which are subsidiaries of SOEs, such as CNPC and Sinopec Group. Enterprises that 
have the right to import crude oil, still need to deal with CNPC and Sinopec Group, 
otherwise the crude oil cannot pass customs and cannot be transported by railways. the 
amount of crude oil that can be imported by non-state trading enterprises is limited 
subject to approval.455 
(v) All imported crude oil can only be sold to CNPC and Sinopec Group for processing, 
despite the fact that the crude oil processing is not monopolized by CNPC and Sinopec 
Group.  
(vi) In the production and processing of crude oil, although POEs are allowed to process 
oil, these POEs can only buy crude oil from the three SOEs (CNPC, Sinopec Group 
and CNOOC), and can sell processed oil only to CNPC and Sinopec.456     
                                                      
452 “Opinions Regarding Regulating Small Refineries and the Distribution of Crude Oil and Processed Oil” (the so 
called Doc. No. 38) [Guangyu Qingli Zhengdun Xiaolianyouchang he Guifang Yuanyou Chengpingyou Liutong 
Zhixu de Yijian], issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission of the P.R.C. in 1998.  
453 “Notifications Regarding Regulating the Distribution of Oil”, The Ministry of Railway, 2003/150, 2003 [关于加
强石油运输管理的通知] 
454 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 122-210.  
455 “Regulation of the PRC on the Administration of the Import and Export of Goods,” Issued by the State Council 
Jan 1st, 2002, [Huowu Jinchukou Guanli Tiaoli] 
http://oilsyggs.mofcom.gov.cn/article/gjzcfg/shangwubu/201310/72621_1.html  
456 “Opinions Regarding Regulating Small Refineries and the Distribution of Crude Oil and Processed Oil” (the so-
called Doc. No. 38), issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission of the P.R.C. in 1998.  
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(vii) Although POEs are allowed to process crude oil and to sell processed oil at retail, the 
number of POEs in the petroleum sector is declining rapidly.457 
Regulatory advantages may be found in pricing control although price control has been relaxed 
relatively over the time. For instance, the prices of crude oil and processed oil have gradually 
switched from government-set prices to government-guided prices, under which SOEs can set 
prices within the range decided by the government.458 After 2008, the two giant SOEs enjoyed 
monopolistic profits since the guided prices for domestic sales of oil were set higher than world 
prices.  
 
Financial advantages enjoyed by SOEs can be found as follows. Taking Sinopec as an example, in 
March 2008, Sinopec received a subsidy of $1.74 billion, which was included as part of the 
company’s revenues for 2007 and 2008.459  All the subsidies in 2008 and 2007 were granted for 
the price difference between crude oil and processed oil since the price of processed oil was higher 
than the price of crude oil, and for Sinopec’s supply of processed oil to meet domestic market 
demand.460 No explanations were given for the subsidies in 2009 and 2010. Subsidies in 2012 and 
2011 were cash grants and tax refunds with conditions unknown to the public that Sinopec needed 
to meet.461  Subsidies in 2013 and 2014 were cash grants and tax refunds (other than income tax 
refunds) without conditions.462 Sinopec Corp received a subsidy of RMB 50.9 billion in 2008 to 
cover losses caused by the government’s price control on fuels, which prevented Sinopec from 
raising retail prices as global crude oil prices increased.463  Sinopec Corp. enjoyed tax refunds of 
                                                      
457 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 83-101. 
458 “Reform Proposals on the Pricing of Crude oil”[Yuanyou Chengpingyou Jiage Gaige Fang’an], Former NDRC, 
1998/52, 1998. It gives 5% of discretion to the 2 SOEs regarding pricing. After May 2009, it is 8% of discretion. The 
price of refined oil is capped under the guided “ceiling price” decided by NDRC. Pricing for gas is also under 
government “guidance”. The current pricing mechanism for onshore natural gas is “cost plus” to determine “the 
benchmark ex-factory price” of gas, which is adjusted once a year. There are no relevant rules on the ex-factory price 
of offshore natural gas. See Interim Administration Measures for Oil Prices (Fa Gai Jia Ge 2009/1198).  
459 “Interfax. 2008a”, China Energy Report Weekly, March 20-26.  
460 Annual report of 2008 and 2007 of Sinopec.  
461 Sinopec’s Annul Financial Report 2011. 
462 Sinopec’s Annul Financial Report 2013. 
463 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4. Citing FN 75.  
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about RMB 1.5 billion in 2010.464 In 2015, Sinopec received subsidies of about RMB 500 billion, 
ranking at the top among all companies getting subsidies.465    
 
Taking PetroChina as an example, in 2008, PetroChina announced that its profits for the year were 
mostly from government subsidies and import-tax rebates.466 PetroChina received subsidies of 
about RMB 15,700 million for supplying crude oil and processed oil to meet domestic demand.467 
No explanations were given for the subsidies in 2010 and 2009. PetroChina in 2014 and 2013, 
2012 and 2011 received subsidies for its gas input, which was imported from abroad at a price 
higher than the domestic price designated by the state. This subsidy remains from Jan 1st, 2011 to 
the end of 2020.468  In 2015, PetroChina received subsidies of around RMB 480 billion, ranking 
second among all companies getting subsidies. 469  
 
Taking CNOOC as an example, the Chinese Government has helped CNOOC to acquire contracts 
to control foreign-energy reserves, and CNOOC heavily relies on subsidized financing from the 
SASAC.470     
 





                                                      
464 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 78-84. 
465 Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. 
http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html ; “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: 
each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the top one,” Vision Times, April 27, 2016.  
http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307 
466 “Interfax. 2008b”, China Energy Report Weekly, August 28-September 3.  
467 Annul Financial Report 2008 of PetroChina, released to Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
468 Annual report of CNOOC.  
469 “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the top one,” 
Vision Times, April 27, 2016.  http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307 
470 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 32.  
471 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
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Table 17 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industry from 2007 to 2014 
(Unit: million RMB) 
Name of the 
company 
Sinopec Ltd. (a subsidiary of Sinopec Group) PetroChina (a subsidiary of CNPC) 
SOE or POE SOE SOE 87% 
Revenue in 2014 2,825,914 2,282,962  
Subsidies in 2014 3,165 10,931 
Subsidies in 2013 2,368 10,347 
2012 2,926 9,406 
2011 1,497 6,734 
2010 1,300 1,599 
2009 1,042 1,097 
2008 50,342 16,914 
2007 33,790 1,197 
Gross subsidies 96,430 58,225 
 
In summary, in the petroleum and petrochemical sector, three giant SOEs are granted absolute 
monopolies with only a minor portion of the market open to POEs. The three SOEs monopolize 
vertically. Large financial advantages were granted to the three SOEs, particularly two of them 
each year. Most of the financial advantages were granted to the giant SOEs with no reasons given 
or with titles specifically tailored to them. POEs almost never got any financial advantages from 
the government. SOEs also enjoy monopolistic profits along with regulatory advantages from the 
government’s price control.    
d. The Shipping and Shipbuilding Industry  
 
In the shipping and shipbuilding industry, data suggests that the top three SOEs accounted for 61 
percent of revenues.472 Investment data indicates the state sector accounted for approximately 
three‐quarters of urban fixed investment in 2009 in the shipping and shipbuilding industry.473 For 
instance, China Ocean Shipping Group (COSCO Group), an SOE, has 8 subsidiaries listed on 
stock exchanges in Hongkong, Shanghai, Singapore, Shenzheng, and so on. 474  China State 
                                                      
472 Data is obtained from the firm Datamonitor.  
473 Table V‐6: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s shipping industry, 2010 in Usha C.V. Haley and George T. 
Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 
2013).  
474 See the association of the Shipping Industry  
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Shipbuilding Corporation (hereinafter CSSC Group), an SOE, has three listed companies and other 
subsidiaries that are not publicly traded.475  
 
SOEs receive a lot more financial advantages than POEs. Yangzijiang Shipbuilding Holdings, 
which is a POE listed on the Taiwang Stock Exchange, received subsidies less than SOEs like 
COSCO Shipping Ltd., and China CSSC Holdings Limited, taking into account their operational 
income. (See Table 18 below.) 
 
In the shipping industry, the government imposes the concentration strategy to solve the 
overcapacity, resulting in four large SOEs focusing on the different businesses of shipping 
containers, port business, financial services for shipping, and gas/oil shipping.476  
 
Table 18 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Ship and Shipbuilding Sector from 2007 to 2014  
(Unit: million RMB)  
Name of the company CSSC Holdings COSCO Shipping Co., Ltd. Yangzijiang Shipbuilding 
Holdings 
SOE or POE SOE 62% SOE 51% POE 
Revenue in 2014 28,324 7,663 15,354 
Subsidies in 2014 160 192 275 
Subsidies in 2013 611 2.7 321 
2012 129 1.9 326 
2011 154 16 0 
2010 171 3.7 0 
2009 275 9.2 6.7 
2008 412 700 0 
2007 190 0 0 
Gross subsidies 2,102 926 929 
 
                                                      
http://www.cansi.org.cn/index.php/Information/detail?id=363 
475 “China State Shipbuilding Corp.”, Global Security Org.,   
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/cssc.htm  See the website of the company, available at 
http://www.cssc.net.cn/en/  
476 Xiaofeng Zhang & Xiaoyu Ren, “Realization of Ten Experiments in SOE Reform, and the Steel and Other Six 
Industries will Face New Opportunities”, Finance China, Feb 27, 2016. 
http://finance.china.com.cn/stock/zqyw/20160227/3603626.shtml 
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In summary, SOEs dominate the shipping and shipbuilding sector. SOEs received more financial 
advantages than POEs.  
e. The Telecommunications Sector  
 
The telecommunications sector was previously operated by administrative agencies. Prior to 1993, 
all public telecommunications networks and services in Mainland China were controlled and 
operated by the state through the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. China Telecom was 
separated from the administrative agency of the telecommunications department in 1995. After 
1994, a couple of SOEs were established in exclusive control of all businesses relating to 
telecommunications. Through mergers and restructuring, the number of SOEs increased to seven 
in 1999 and then reduced to six in 2002, and then to four giant SOEs in 2005.477 The three top 
SOEs (China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom) account for more than 95 percent of 
revenues in the telecommunications sector, and China Mobile alone had market share of 62.1% at 
the end of 2014.478  
 
SOEs are monopolies in law or in fact. Licenses are required by law to provide telecommunications 
services, which are composed of two categories, i.e., basic telecommunications business and value-
added telecommunications business. In terms of the basic telecommunications business, in 
addition to a high threshold of capital, it is required by law that state ownership (state-owned equity 
or shares) shall not be less than 51% in the enterprise providing the basic telecommunications 
business.479 It grants monopolies or oligopolies to SOEs for the basic telecommunications business 
by law. Hence, China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom are monopolies granted by the 
law since individuals are prohibited by law from entering the business of basic 
telecommunications.480 In terms of the value-added telecommunications business, although there 
                                                      
477 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319.  
478 Annual Report of China Mobile Limited, 20-F Form (2014). 
http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php 
479 Article 7, 8, and 10 of “Regulation on Telecommunications of the People's Republic of China,” Decree of the State 
Council of the P.R.C (No. 291), adopted at the 31st regular meeting of the State Council on September 20, 2000.  
a Chinese version http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1146557/n1146619/c4860613/content.html 
for an English version,  
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=1667 
480 Although there is a little bit relaxation recently in the telecommunication sector in that POEs can contract with 
SOEs to retail sell some packages of services products through outsourcing, both China Telecom and China Unicom 
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is no requirement of state ownership in this regard, a license is required and the threshold for 
getting the license is high for POEs to meet, resulting in de facto monopolies or oligopolies by 
SOEs in the value-added telecommunications business.  
 
The SOEs benefit from regulatory advantages in that price control remains. Formerly, the 
government regulated prices in the form of government-set prices. Over the time, regulated prices 
switched into the government-guided prices that allow SOEs to set prices within the designated 
range. Although the range of discretion is becoming larger and some market prices are allowed for 
certain services over the time, the monopolistic SOEs enjoy monopolistic profits.  
 
Significant financial advantages were granted to the monopolistic SOEs.481 (See Table 19 below). 
For instance, China Telecom enjoyed taxes foregone of about RMB 47 million in 2010.482 No 
comparison of financial advantages granted to SOEs with that to POEs could be made due to the 
legal monopolistic status of SOEs in the telecommunications sector.  
 
Table 19 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Telecommunications Sector from 2007 to 2014 


















288,571 271 239 123 118 112 141 63 4,055 5,123 
China 
Mobile  
SOE 641,448 582 471 331 310 417 73 312 413 2,909 
 
In summary, SOEs are granted monopolies by law in the basic telecommunications services, and 
SOEs enjoy in fact monopolies or oligopolies in the value-added telecommunications services. 
Hence, the top three SOEs are almost in absolute control of the telecommunications service sector. 
                                                      
are full-service telecommunications services providers exclusively. See China Mobile’s Form 20 F (2014) filed to the 
U.S. Security Exchange Commission.  
481 Form 20 F of China mobile limited filed to the U.S. Security Exchange Commission.   
  http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1117795/000119312514158810/d711555d20f.htm 
482 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 78-84.  
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The top three SOEs enjoy significant financial advantages. In additions, the top three SOEs benefit 
from monopolistic profits due to regulatory advantages such as governmental price control policies.  
 
(2) Pillar Industries 
 
In China, the pillar industries are defined based on the following criteria: i) the degree of an 
industry’s contribution to the national defense, ii) the degree of an industry’s contribution to job 
creation, iii) whether the industry involves technology acquisition and innovation, and iv) the 
extent of an industry’s competitive advantage.483 The list of industries designated as the pillar 
industries may vary over the time. Fifteen industries were designated as pillar industries 
promulgated in China’s Tenth and Eleventh Five-Year Plans.484 Among the pillar industries, the 
state maintains a controlling stake in key enterprises, usually SOEs.485  China maintains a policy 
to develop advanced machinery manufacturing, optimize natural-resources processing, and 
upgrade consumer goods industries.486 The Government continues to employ measures to “guide” 
resources into certain sectors of the economy, through granting various advantages.  
 
a. The Automotive Industry 
 
The top SOEs---the so called the “big four” Chinese automakers, namely Shanghai Automotive 
Industry Corporation (hereinafter SAIC), 487  Chang’an motors, First Auto Works Group 
                                                      
483 Individual provinces also have their own SASACs and may designate their own pillar industries for provincial 
development apart from the central list. George Haley, “State-owned enterprises: Vehicles of industrial policy 
implementation”, Expert testimony to U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission’s Hearing “China’s 
Industrial Policy and Its Impact on U.S. Companies, Workers and the American Economy,” Washington, DC, March 
24, 2009.   
484 The pillar industries are 1) aerospace, 2) autos and auto parts, 3) banking and insurance, 4) biotechnology, 5) 
computer chip design and manufacture, 6) computing and computer hardware, 7) information technology, 8) iron and 
steel, 9) logistics, shipping, and storage, 10) machinery and mechanical equipment, excluding “general machinery 
basic components” and “food‐processing and packaging machinery” industries. 11) oil and petrochemicals, 12) 
software, 13) telecommunications and telecom equipment, 14) utilities and power equipment, and 15) wholesaling 
and retailing.   
485 SASAC Guiding Opinion issued on December 5, 2006.  
486 Chapter 9 of China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015). 
487  SAIC is China’s largest automaker by sales. A Fortune Global 100 company (60th largest in the world) 
http://500q.jigouba.cn/i/i/c.html 
 111 
(hereinafter FAW)488 and Dongfeng Motors---dominate the automotive sector, accounting for 
approximately 75% of China’s automotive production in 2010.489 Local governments also own 
lots of local SOEs in the automotive industry.490 Privately-owned automotive companies are far 
smaller than the SOEs. For instance, SG Automotive Group is a listed POE on the stock exchange 
with revenues of RMB 4 billion in 2014 for the whole corporate group. In contrast, the revenues 
of SAIC Ltd., which is merely one subsidiary of the SAIC group (an SOE) to be publicly traded 
on the stock exchange, were RMB 563 billion in 2014. Industry restructuring through mergers and 
acquisitions in the automobile industry is encouraged and supported by the government.491   
 
As for the auto-parts industry,492 it previously remained highly fragmented with at least 20,000 
companies, with SOEs accounting for 4 percent and POEs accounting for 44 percent. A merger 
and consolidation strategy began in 1980s. For instance, large-scale SOEs integrated the input 
factories with processing factories, and integrated upstream sectors with downstream sectors in the 
auto industry in 1981. 493  Hence, large SOEs are vertically integrated auto groups and 
conglomerates. SOEs, like SAIC, First Auto Works (FAW) Group, and Dongfeng Motors also 
became dominant in the auto-parts sector.  
 
Both POEs and SOEs received significant financial advantages in the automobile and auto-parts 
sectors. POEs received subsidies from local governments. 494 (See Table 20 below). The value of 
subsidies made available to auto and auto parts manufacturers in China between 2009 and 2011 
                                                      
488 FAW has three publicly traded subsidiaries: FAW Car Company, Tianjin FAW Xiali Automobile Co Ltd., and 
Changchun FAWAY Automobile Components Co Ltd.  
489 Data is from the China Association of Automobile Manufacturers; it is about 52% in 2014, see China-Britain 
Business Council, “Report: The Automotive Market in China,” 2015 EU SME Centre, (2015), 13.   
http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_sector_report_-_the_automotive_market_in_china_update_-
_may_2015.pdf   
490 For instance, Anhui provincial government owns Chery, the Liaoning provincial government owns Brilliance 
Automotive, Xiaoshan municipal government partially owns the Wanxiang Group. Shanghai car companies and 
Nanjing car companies are municipally owned. Independent Auto-parts companies: Wanxiang, Chery and Geely, 
491 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary, pp. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121. 
492 Auto parts include those used by original equipment manufacturers and aftermarket parts. Original equipment parts 
go into the assembly of new motor vehicles. 
493 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 65.  
494 The examples I found was SOEs, like SAIC, Dongfeng, and POEs, like Geely, Liaoning SG Automotive Group.  
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was at least 1 billion dollars. 495 Advantages include export subsidies promoting exports of autos 
and auto parts. In the face of the global economic recession, an Industry Revitalization Plan for 
the Automotive Sector was adopted for the period 2009-2011. Consumers in rural areas received 
financial assistance when they purchased new vehicles.496 In 2009, the central government started 
to provide lump sum grants to consumers who bought new energy-saving or new-energy cars listed 
in a promotion catalogue.497  
Local governments gave financial advantages to promote the purchase of products of local state-
owned autos and auto-parts companies. For example, in July 2012, as China’s auto sales declined, 
two Chinese cities, Chongqing and Changchun, started giving subsidies of around RMB 3000-
7000 for each purchase of autos produced by local state-owned auto companies so that the 
companies could continue to expand. Some cash grants are only available to one particular SOE. 
For example, Chongqing’s subsidy is only for Chongqing Chang’an Automobile Co. and 
Changchun’s subsidy is only for FAW.498   
Regulatory advantages can be found in that an automobile import licence is required, and the 







                                                      
495  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: WTO Case Challenging Chinese Subsidies,” 2012. 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/september/wto-case-challenging-chinese-
subsidies  
496 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121.    
497 Lump sum grants ranging from RMB 3,000 to 60,000 are granted depending on the model of cars. See Ministry of 
Finance, NDRC and MIIT, Circular/Notification on “The Project of Energy Saving Products Benefiting Consumers 
in respect of Energy-Saving Cars”, 2010/219, effective May 26, 2010. 
498 From a legal perspective, these subsidies are SOEs specific. See J. Yang, “Why Cities’ Subsidies Will Hurt 
Domestic Automakers in the Long Run?” Automotive News China, August 24, 2012.  
499 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121. 
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Table 20 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Auto Industry from 2007 to 2014 
(Unit: million RMB)  









2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Gross 
subsidies 
Dongfeng Motor SOE 17,471 31 78 330 26 47 100 51 13 676 
SAIC Motor Corp. Ltd. SOE 
81% 
563,346 2,672 1,390 762 328 105 226 80 12 5,574 
Geely Automobile 
Holdings Ltd. 
POE 3,963 898 800 870 877 640 216 203 0 4,505 
SG Automotive Group 
Co., Ltd 
POE 4,057 240 111 276 49 24 18 18 8 744 
Note: POEs in the table seem to receive more subsidies than SOEs taking into account the ratio of subsidies to revenues. 
It is partially because that local governments give significant subsidies to their local auto companies, including POEs. 
Except from that, it might also be that some information of granting financial advantages to SOEs are not open to the 
public as such that what I found was only a portion of the whole financial advantages granted to SOEs. Nevertheless, 
given that SOEs dominate the sector, most of the beneficiaries from subsidies are SOEs. 
 
In summary, SOEs dominate the automobile industry, as well as the auto-parts industry. Both 
POEs and SOEs receive significant financial advantages in the automobile and auto-parts sectors. 
Local governments play a significant role in giving subsidies in this regard. Importation of 
automobiles and used auto-parts is strictly restricted, which benefits both SOEs and domestic 
POEs. Nevertheless, given that SOEs dominate the sector, most of the beneficiaries from financial 
advantages and regulatory advantages are SOEs. 
b. The Steel Industry  
 
In pursuance of its consolidation strategy in the steel industry, the Chinese Government has chosen 
Bao-Steel, Beijing Shou-Steel, Tangshan Iron and Steel, Anben-Steel, and Wu-Steel as leaders.500 
The central and provincial governments hold majority interests in almost every major Chinese 
steel producer. Eight of the ten largest Chinese steel companies are 100 percent owned or 
controlled by the Chinese Government, and 19 of the top 20 steel companies are majority owned 
                                                      
500 George Haley, “Overview of China’s pillar and strategic industries,” Expert testimony to U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission’s hearing, “the Extent of the Government’s Control of China’s Economy, and Its 
Impact on the United States,” May 25, 2007.   
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or controlled by the government. In terms of production, 91% of the production of the top 20 steel 
companies is produced by SOEs.501 SOEs were responsible for 64 percent of gross output in the 
“smelting and pressing of ferrous metals” industry in 2009 and 50 percent of urban fixed asset 
investments in relation to steel.502 In 2010, 35% of the gross output of the iron and steel subsector 
was contributed by SOEs.503 The government shut down many small-and-medium sized firms, and 
there are now only a few small-and-medium sized POEs in existence in the steel industry.504    
 
The steel industry as a whole receives significant financial advantages. Research has found that 
energy subsidies (coal, natural gas, and electricity) to the Chinese steel industry from 2000-
2007,505 fell in 2002 and 2003, immediately after China joined the WTO. However, the subsidies 
surged in 2004, and have continued to grow since then, corresponding to China’s rise as the largest 
producer and exporter of steel in the world.506 Sha-Steel (a POE) received subsidies for its R&D, 
and cash grants specifically for it without explanations.507 Even the small companies expressed 
confidence in their ability to obtain financing, including financial advantages from the state.  
 
The largest SOEs in the steel industry, such as Bao-Steel, Wu-Steel and An-Steel have the central 
government’s support for their operations and expansion. Research has found that the leading 
Chinese steel producers, all of which are SOEs, received more than RMB 393 billion in 
                                                      
501 Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed 
Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel 
Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and 
the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA), (July 2007), 10.  
http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/fm14037.pdf  
502 Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2009.  
503 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012.  
504 Joint Announcement by MIIT and NEA (MIIT Announcement 2011/36) on 29 October 2011. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n13138101/n13138118/14323368.html. 
505 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013).  
506 Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed 
Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel 
Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and 
the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA), (July 2007).  
507 Annual Financial Report of Jiangsu Shagang Group Co., Ltd. 
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subsidies.508 The subsidies include RMB 130.9 billion in preferential loans and directed credit,509 
and RMB 141 billion in equity infusions and/or debt-for-equity swap. At least 37 Chinese steel 
companies including all the major producers, have benefited from land-use discounts totaling 
RMB 38.9 billion, since SOEs enjoy land-use rights at no charges or at as little as US$ 0.02 per 
square foot.510 SOEs benefited from government-mandated mergers as the Chinese Government 
directed the consolidation of the steel industry in China by permitting acquisitions at little or no 
cost. For example, in May 2007, Bao-Steel, China’s second largest steel producer, received a 48.5 
percent stake in Xinjiang, worth more than RMB 6 million, at no cost. 
 
To take another example of subsidization, Wuhan Iron and Steel Ltd. (one subsidiary of Wu-Steel) 
received subsidies from 2007 to 2014 in the form of cash grants, subsidies for interest on loans, 
subsidies for environmental friendly projects and resource-saving projects, and subsidies for 
specific steel construction projects. Inner Mongolia Steel (an SOE) received similar subsidies in 
addition to tax refunds, subsidies for its construction of a building, partial refunds of land-use fees, 
and subsidies for electricity costs.  
 
In addition to financial advantages from the central government, local governments support local 
SOEs, providing financial advantages to build or to keep their steel industries for the purpose of 
getting profits and taxes, and ensuring access to raw materials.511  
 
SOEs also benefit from regulatory advantages.512 Small-and-medium sized privately-owned steel 
producers are forced to shut down. For instance, the Steel Industry Revitalization Plan set the goal 
of closing down enterprises with smaller production capacity or out of date equipment, through 
the revocation of permits and licences concerning production, safety, the use of sewage, or 
                                                      
508 Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed 
Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel 
Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and 
the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA), (July 2007), 25.  
http://www.wileyrein.com/resources/documents/fm14037.pdf  
509 Id.  
510 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary.  
511 Directorate for Science Technology and Industry Steel Committee 2006.  
512  Trade Policy Review: China, Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Executive Summary, 
WT/TPR/S/264. 
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suspension of power supplies. 513  Regulations also limited the number of approvals for new 
investment in the steel sector so as to strictly control new production capacity. 
The steel industry also receives benefits flowing from other sectors. There are three types of such 
benefits: i) SOEs in the coal industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for 
transporting coal used for generating electricity, the steel industry receive better deals from the 
electricity companies for purchasing electricity directly rather than on-grid electricity; ii) SOEs in 
the coal industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for transporting coal 
used for producing steel; 514and iii) the coal industry also got compensation specifically for 
supporting the steel industry by providing coal at lower prices, examples can be found in Pinding 
Shan Tian AN Coal Ltd. (an SOE).  
 
Meanwhile, in 2016, the government announced that Bao-Steel and Wu-Steel will restructure and 
merge, another 12 central SOEs will be required to exit the coal industry, targeting 7 giant SOEs 








                                                      
513 For details see MIIT Circular on the Implementation Plan for Elimination of Backward Production Capacity 
(2011/46, 26 Jan. 2011). Joint Announcement by MIIT and NEA (MIIT Announcement 2011/36) on 29 October 2011. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n13138101/n13138118/14323368.html. 
514 “Railway authority in Ha’er bing Province adopted policy to secure that coal is transported to markets in order to 
reduce pressure from high demand for electricity nationwide,” June 11, 2016.  http://nlhw.bgzxv.com/gjzj/9262.html ; 
“The Ministry of Railways stated that railways will undertake the task of transportation for coal as long as there are 
markets demanding for coal,” China News, July 2, 2016. http://alt.823veyo.com/fctkzc/3236.html ; “SOEs in the Coal 
Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal (an SOE) makes 
profits at the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html “The Railway Department Guarantees the Transportation of 
Coal,” Guangming Newspaper, Nov. 19, 2011.  
http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2011-11/10/nw.D110000gmrb_20111110_6-10.htm  
515  “The Reform of the Steel and Coal industry focuses on becoming stronger and larger”, July 21, 2016, 
http://www.cnwnews.com/html/biz/cn_sypl/20160721/816015.html 
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Table 21 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Steel Industry from 2007 to 2014  


















99,373 340 227 345 30 33 29 57 22 1,082 
BaoSteel SOE  
51% 




POE 10,308 9 10 44 35 2 0.11 1 5 106 
  
In summary, benefiting from government assisted mergers and acquisitions, large SOEs along with 
a dozen of SOEs dominate the steel industry. The whole steel industry benefits from the various 
advantages granted by the government, such as land-use discounts, and electricity fees discounts. 
Giant central SOEs receive financial advantages both from the central and local governments, and 
local SOEs receive significant financial advantages from local governments. Nevertheless, most 
beneficiaries of various advantages are SOEs in light of SOEs’ dominant presence in the steel 
industry.    
c. The Non-ferrous Metals Sector 
 
The non‐ferrous metals sector was transformed from one with diversity of ownership to one 
dominated by SOEs. The state sector accounted for 45 percent of gross output of non‐ferrous 
metals in 2009 and 32 percent of fixed urban investment in non‐ferrous metals.516 Due to the 
consolidation strategy, the central government maintains control over the non-ferrous metals 
industry through three groups of SOEs, including Aluminum Corporation of China Limited 
(hereinafter Chalco) and China Nonferrous Metal Mining Group (hereinafter CNMC).517 Chalco 
alone is said to hold a 25 percent market share in the domestic production of aluminum, plus an 
additional six percent gained from selling aluminum produced by other companies.518 Other major 
                                                      
516 Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2009.  
517 There are three groups of SOEs in non-ferrous metals sector. One is Guangshen Group, one is Wukuang Group 
and another is SOEs doing research and are subject to SASAC.   
518 Su Aik Lim, “Fitch Affirms Chalco at ‘BBB+’ ” Outlook Stable, Hong Kong, June 1, 2011. 
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SOEs, such as China Minmetals Corporation, play a role in the aluminum sector as well.519 After 
consolidation, the rare earths sector is in fact controlled by six giant SOEs, through production or 
exploitation permits, production or extraction quotas, and the shutting down privately-owned 
small-scale enterprises.520 
 
SOEs receive more financial advantages than POEs, taking into account their revenues. Chalco 
received subsidies for its electricity costs in the amount of RMB 518 million, 545 million and 560 
million in 2014, 2013 and 2012, accounting for two third of all subsidies it received during the 
respective years. In addition, it received a subsidy targeted only for its development, and subsidies 
related to R&D and environmental issues. Chalco’s balance sheet indicates that the firm saved 
RMB 37 million in 2010, and benefitted from RMB 92.4 million in tax credits for purchasing 
certain domestic equipment in 2008, though this program was abolished in a response to a WTO 
investigation into China’s tax regime. 521  
 
China Non-ferrous Metal Industry’s Foreign Engineering and Construction Co. Ltd. (an SOE) 
received subsidies for its electricity costs in 2014 and 2013, and subsidies for export insurance in 
2010. Sichuan Honda, an SOE, received subsidies in the amount of RMB 9 million and RMB 0.7 
million for its electricity costs in 2014 and 2013, and benefited from foregone taxes on its right to 
use land in 2011, equivalent to the amount of RMB 1 million.522 There are subsidies for imported 





                                                      
519 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44-48. 
520 From the list of companies who are eligible to enter this industry of rare earths, they are mainly SOEs.  
521 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 78-84. 
522 The above data are from annual reports of the enterprise which is publicly traded on stock exchanges.  
523 Here is several example of companies that received subsidies for imported goods: Sichuan Hongda, Zhejiang 
Hailiang Co., Ltd, Aluminum Corporation of China Limited, China Nonferrous Metal Industry's Foreign Engineering 
And Construction Co., Ltd. 
 119 
Table 22 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Non-Ferrous Metals Sector from 2007 to 2014  
(Unit: million RMB)   










2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 Gross 
subsidies 
Aluminum Corp. of 
China Ltd. (ADR) 














18,224 71 118 27 12 34 37 20 9 329 
Hailiang Co. Ltd. POE 12,061 16 7 12 30 46 39 13 11 174 
 
In summary, several giant SOEs indeed enjoy monopolies in fact in sub-sectors of non-ferrous 
metals, due to the consolidation and concentration strategy. SOEs receive disproportionally more 
financial advantages than POEs. Subsidies for electricity fees are one major type of financial 
advantages granted to SOEs.  
d. The Machinery and Equipment Sector  
 
In the machinery and equipment sector, 524  the visible role of the state is relatively small in 
comparison with strategic and other pillar industries. The machinery and equipment sector 
accounted for about 19% of China’s total industrial value added, and more than 9% of GDP in 
2010.525 The state share accounted for a combined 21 percent of China’s gross output in the overall 
machinery and equipment industry in 2009.526 In 2009, SOEs accounted for 17 percent of urban 
investment in fixed assets in the sector. Nevertheless, large SOEs are prominent in the railway 
subsector and manufacture of aircraft and components subsector.  
 
                                                      
524 Based on the China Statistical Yearbook, there is some overlap between the machinery and equipment sector, on 
the one hand, and the information technology sector, on the other hand.  
525 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary.  
526 Data is from the China Statistical Yearbook, 2009.   
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The machinery and equipment sector is also encouraged by the industrial policy.527 Manufacture 
of aircraft, aircraft parts and components, and other airborne equipment was listed in the 
“encouraged” machinery manufacturing sector in the Catalogue of Industrial Structure 
Adjustment.  New-energy and energy-saving equipment were added to the 2011 version of the 
catalogue as “encouraged”. In 2011, MIIT announced the Agricultural Machinery Development 
Policies with the aim of optimizing the manufacture of agricultural machinery.528 Tax incentives 
are granted for manufacturing and R&D activities concerning agricultural machinery.529 SOEs 
received more subsidies than POEs, with the exception that Sany Heavy Industry Co., Ltd., which 
also received significant financial advantages. (See Table 23 below.)  
Table 23 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Machinery and Equipment Sector from 2007 to 2014  
(Unit: million RMB)  















Co., Ltd.  
SOE 
77% 

























POE 115,577 0 0 0 0 1.2 0 0 0 1.2 
 
In summary, although SOEs do not dominate the machinery and equipment sector in general, they 
dominate subsectors such as manufacture of railway and aircraft components. SOEs receive more 
                                                      
527 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary.  
528 MIIT Announcement 2011/26, On 17 August 2011. 
529 WTO documents G/SCM/N/155/CHN and G/SCM/N/186/CHN, 21 October 2011. 
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financial advantages than POEs with some exceptions for large POEs that have close connections 
to the government. The sector is expanding and will be more likely to receive governmental 
support.  
e. The Information Technology Sector 
 
According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the state’s role in the information technology sector 
is not very large. For example, SOEs accounted for only 9 percent of gross output and 11 percent 
of fixed investment in this sector in 2009. 530  The information technology sector 531  has been 
identified as a new strategic emerging industry, in which SOEs are expanding, although they are 
not in a predominant position. Reconstruction of SOEs is on the way in the IT sector. The largest 
IT company in China is China Electronics Corporation, which is a wholly-owned SOE. It has 15 
subsidiaries that are publicly traded on stock exchanges, covering the entire electronics and 
information technology sector.532 
 
Financial advantages are granted to SOEs. Examples can be found in the table below.  Meanwhile, 
POEs also receive a lot of financial advantages due to the policies adopted by China to encourage 
development of the sector. For instance, the Circular on Certain Policies for Further 
Encouragement to Development of Software Industry and Integrated Circuit Industry, 
promulgated in 2011, further encourages development in the manufacturing of integrated 
circuits. 533  Under the Circular, eligible companies are accorded preferential tax treatment, 
including the business tax exemption, the enterprise income tax exemption and reduction for five 
years, and tariff exemptions for imported critical equipment.534  
                                                      
530 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 44-48. 
531The information technology sector includes the electronics industry, which covers communication equipment, 
computers and other electronic equipment. 
532  Hehui XIn, “Which IT segment will benefit from the undergoing reform of SOEs,” Jan 23, 2016,  
https://www.xinhehui.com/zt-gptzjq/view-43187.html 
533 State Council Circular 2011/1. 
534 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, summary. For detailed information on tax preference for the manufacture of integrated circuits, see WTO 
documents G/SCM/N/155/CHN and G/SCM/N/186/CHN, 21 October 2011.  
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Table 24 Examples of Subsidies Received in the Information Technology Sector from 2008 to 2015  
(Unit: million RMB)  
















SOE 1080 95 61 26 26 24 16 33 15 No 
data 
296 
Jilin Sino  
Microelectronics 
Co., Ltd 
POE 1,236 12 14 6 23 53 0.2 29 5 （2） 142.2 
 
In summary, SOEs’ role in the information and technology sector is not very large. Nevertheless, 
SOEs are expanding in this sector. SOEs receive disproportionally more financial advantages than 
POEs, including cash grants, tax exemptions, tariff exemptions for imported critical equipment, 
subsidies for electricity fees, subsidies for electrical business and etc. It is believed that this sector 
will receive more support from the government in the future, which will benefit SOEs over POEs.   
 
3.2 The Nature of Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs  
3.2.1 The Nature of Financial Advantages associated with SOEs  
(1) SOEs as Givers of Financial Advantages 
a. SOEs Give Capital Input to Other SOEs  
 
In addition to the financial advantages from the government, SOEs also receive financial 
advantages from state-owned banks (SOBs) and other SOEs. Statistics have found that SOBs favor 
SOEs over POEs. 535  An OECD study noted that the total factor productivity of POEs is 
approximately twice that of SOEs, while SOEs continue to receive a disproportional share of 
                                                      
535 Bank lending is biased in favor of SOEs. For instance, if the SOEs’ share in City A is higher than City B by one 
percent, then the growth in loan/output ratio in City A will be higher by 0.34 percent. See Shang-Jin Wei and Tao 
Wang, “The Siamese Twins: Do State-Owned Banks Favor State-Owned Enterprises in China?” China Economic 
Review Volume 8(1) 1997, 19-29.  
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credits.536 The average debt-to-equity ratio of SOEs was roughly 1.6 while it was below 0.8 for 
private firms in 2015. SOEs receive low-cost capital from SOBs through easy access to loans 
(loans to uncreditworthy enterprises), 537 low interest rates, 538 non-pay back loans, and export 
promotion loans.539 
 
SOBs give benefits to SOEs by lending at below-market interest rates.540 It was found that SOEs 
paid an average annual interest rate of 1.6 percent from 2001 to 2008, while private companies 
during the same period paid 5.4 percent.541 Sinopec’s weighted average interest rate on short-term 
loans (i.e., loans with duration of one year or less) was 2.7 percent in 2010, much lower than the 
market rate of 5.36%.542 China Southern Airlines with high debt levels reported an interest rate of 
1.13 to 1.97 percent in 2010. China Southern Airlines has a credit line with the government‐owned 
Agricultural Bank of China.543  China Telecom Limited obtained nearly all of its RMB 20.7 billion 
short‐term borrowings in 2010 from its parent SOEs or SOBs, with interest rates ranging from 3.5 
percent to 5.8 percent, while the borrowing rate from its SOE parent was as low as 3.9 percent.544 
CNOOC’s weighted average interest rate for 2010 was 3.4 percent.545 In 2012, China Coal Energy 
                                                      
536  OECD, “Economic Survey of China 2005”, (Sept. 16, 2005), 86; OECD, “China in the Global Economy: 
Governance in China” (2005), 140. 
537 Paul Saulski, “Panel II: The Competitive Challenges Posed by China’s State Owned Enterprises,” Hearing on 
“Chinese Stat-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises”, Testimony before the U.S.- China Economic and Security 
Review Commission (Feb. 15, 2012), 2-3.    
http://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2.15.12saulski_testimony.pdf ;Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An 
Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
Commission (October 26, 2011), 55. 
538 Terence P. Stewart, et al., “China’s Support Programs for Automobiles and Auto Parts under the 12th Five-Year 
Plan”, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, Jan. 2012, at 60; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-
Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. 
– China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 2.  
539 Report to the U.S. Congress on Export Credit Competition and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (June 
2011), 113; Yang Wanli, “Sinohydro: Top Hydropower Engineering firm,” China Daily, Oct. 20, 2009. 
540 Sebastian Claro, “Supporting inefficient firms with capital subsidies: China and Germany in the 1990s,” Journal 
of Comparative Economics 34 (2006) 377-401, 378.  
541 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011).  
542 According to the China Information Center, the average of monthly prime lending rates in China from December 
2009 to December 2010 was 5.36 percent. See Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned 
Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 
2011), 4. Citing FN82.  
543 Agricultural Bank of China. ABC Signed the Bank‐Enterprise Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Agreement 
with China Southern Airlines. Beijing, June 11, 2011. 
544 Annual Financial Report of China Telecom Corporation Limited, F‐23 (2011).  
545 Annual Financial Report of CNOOC Limited, F‐54 (2011). 
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Company borrowed RMB 278,860,000 and foreign currency of 3,817,440 from the Bank of China 
as a short-term loan with the interest rate of 2.28%, which was much lower than the market interest 
rate of 5-6%.546   SOBs also give loans to uncreditworthy SOEs. In 2003, non-performing loans 
by SOEs at the four major SOBs amounted to more than 17 percent of China’s GDP.  547 Many 
SOEs are kept from going bankrupt by getting generous loans from SOBs and the loans are not 
expected to be paid back in full and/or on time. 548 In 2003, new lending equaled almost one-quarter 
of GDP. Half of all bank loans went to SOEs, and most will never be repaid.549  
 
In return, SOBs receive subsidies from the government for “bad” loans as a compensation for the 
difference between the interest rates given to SOEs and the market interest rate. The government 
gives subsidies for interest rates to SOBs, which would consequently give loans at low-interest 
rates to SOEs. Hence, financial advantages given by SOBs to SOEs are actually paid for by the 
government. However, the fact that banks receive subsidies is less transparent. For instance, some 
subsidies are categorized as savings or income of the main business rather than grants from the 
government. So it is uncertain how many subsidies are granted to banks to compensate them for 
lending to SOEs. Also, the SOB’s subsidies to SOEs are less transparent than budgetary subsidies 
in terms of measurement and monitoring.550 
(b) SOEs Give Other Inputs to Other SOEs 
 
SOEs also receive financial advantages from other SOEs in terms of other inputs, such as raw 
materials, energy, oil, gas, metals, minerals, electricity, water, better access to railways, and other 
commodities and services. 551  It is typical in the chain from railway SOEs, to coal SOEs, to 
                                                      
546 2012 Annual report of China Coal Energy Company, submitted to the Shanghai Stock Exchange.  
547 Hejing Chen and John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” 
Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014). 
548 Shang-Jin Wei and Tao Wang, “The Siamese Twins: Do State-Owned Banks Favor State-Owned Enterprises in 
China?” China Economic Review Volume 8(1) 1997, 19-29.  
549 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 33.  
550 Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China 
Accession Protocol,” Journal of International Economic Law 7(4), 863-919. citing FN 54. 
551 There are arm length transactions and transactions among related parties. SOEs frequently transact with related 
parties. In the energy sector and in vertically integrated operations, 12 percent of Sinopec Corp.’s sales and 7 percent 
of its purchases in 2010 involved related parties. Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned 
Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 
2011), 4; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing 
 125 
electricity SOEs, and all the way to steel/aluminum SOEs. Due to the relationship between 
upstream and downstream industries, benefits flow among them, for instance, the coal industry 
receives subsidies for providing coal at lower prices to the steel industry/electricity industry, to 
ensure that a certain supply of coal is available to be used in producing electricity/energy, to ensure 
a certain supply of coal is available to be used by the steel industry, to ensure certain supply of 
electricity to be used by the steel industry.  
 
SOEs in the coal industry have better access to railways for transporting their coal, and the railways 
in China are operated by SOEs. POEs’ access to railways for transporting their coal is limited.   
Evidence can be found in some cases where there are governmental policies explicitly directing 
the railway SOEs to give better access and allocation quotas to SOEs in the coal industry or steel 
industry. For instance, railways ministries and the National Development and Reform Commission 
made policies that coal used for electricity and for steel companies will be given priority in terms 
of transporting coal through rails.552 Some railways services are reserved or allocated with priority 
to transporting coal. Such policies are mainly targeted at giant five electricity SOEs and large SOEs 
in the coal industry every year, and almost half of transportation services are used for transporting 
coal.553 However, sometimes, it is hard to find such explicit evidence of government policies. With 
or without evidence showing that the government is involved, SOEs in the coal industry have better 
access to railways services provided by SOEs than POEs.  
 
                                                      
Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission 
(Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 2012), 2. 
552 “The Ministry of Railways stated that railways will undertake the task of transportation for coal as long as there 
are markets demanding coal,” China News, July 2, 2016. http://alt.823veyo.com/fctkzc/3236.html  
553  “The Railway Department Guarantees the Transportation of Coal,” Guangming Newspaper, Nov. 19, 2011. 
http://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2011-11/10/nw.D110000gmrb_20111110_6-10.htm ; “SOEs in the Coal Industry 
and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major source of selling coal, and PingCoal (an SOE) makes profits at the 
amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, the Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html  Datong Coal Industry Company Limited, and Shenhua 
Group (Energy company), and electricity SOEs, take advantage of their better access to transportations, especially 
railways, and better retail ability in markets, purchased coal from small coal miners at lower prices, and resell them at 
higher prices. POEs and small-and-medium sized enterprises have to spend a lot money in order to get their coal 
transported to markets by rails. What’s more, they cannot get sufficient access to railways through money sometimes. 
(There are some administrative interventions in the allocation of railways services.) Therefore, they prefer selling their 
coal to the large SOEs who have better access to railways. Electricity SOEs also benefit in such a way as five giant 
SOEs in the electricity sector, including China Huaneng, and China Huadian Corp., all sell coal for profit, and such a 
business has been their focus. It is also because they take advantage of their better access to rails.  
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It is beneficial to SOEs in the steel industry since they have better access to railways for getting 
coal as the input, and for transporting their steel products. Increased prices of oil will significantly 
affect road transportation of coal for POEs in the steel industry since they have difficulty in getting 
their input of coal transported by rails.554 Furthermore, the government gives subsidies to SOEs in 
the coal industry for low-priced coal provided to the steel industry.555 
 
Taking coal as an input for an example, after the abolishing of dual prices for coal, electricity SOEs 
may approach coal miners to purchase coal at prices lower than market prices at large quantities. 
There may or may not be evidence of governmental policy that directing SOEs in the coal industry 
to provide coal at prices lower than market prices for the usage of generating electricity. The prices 
of coal used for electricity is different from the prices of coal used for non-electricity. Although 
the price difference is reducing after around 2008.556  
 
Taking electricity as an input for another example, given that transmission of electricity is costly557 
and consumes energy as well, direct power purchase 558  is a way for large users to reduce 
transaction costs and get a better deal for lower prices of electricity. Electricity is a significant 
input for the steel, cement, glass, petrochemicals, non-ferrous metals, paper, and chemicals 
industries, which are energy-intensive, in that the cost of electricity accounts for 20% to 80% of 
the whole costs of such products. For instance, the steel companies may approach the electricity 
companies (SOEs) for direct power purchase at lower prices.559 Many aluminum companies have 
approached electricity companies for direct power purchase. For instance, the power sector, which 
is dominated by SOEs, may provide electricity at a price lower than the market price since it is a 
                                                      
554 “The Steel Industry: the Influence of Increased Price of Electricity on the Steel Industry”, Guotai Junan Securities, 
June 23, 2008. http://money.163.com/08/0623/11/4F4C0QQG00251M00.html# 
555 Evidence can be found in the previous section about advantages given to the coal industry.  
556 “SOEs in the Coal Industry and SOEs in the Electricity Industry are the major sources of selling coal, and PingCoal 
(an SOE) makes profits in the amount of trillions RMB per year”, blog, The Chinese Times, March 6, 2010. 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_5efc3eed0100hkmq.html 
557 For instance, the cost of transporting electricity is more than 25% of the total if the distance is longer than 1500 
kilometers.  
558 Direct power purchase is a transaction directly between the seller of electricity and buyer of electricity without an 
intermediary, with agreed prices which probably are lower than the prices of on-grid electricity purchases.  
559 Shuwei Zhang, “The Reform in Electricity Prices is More About the Pricing Mechanism, Rather Than Whether the 
Prices are Higher or Lower,” Energy, June 11, 2014, http://energy.people.com.cn/n/2014/0611/c71661-
25135482.html 
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government-set price.560 Chalco claims that the government is currently pushing a policy that 
favors large smelters over smaller ones, which benefits Chalco by granting it preferential treatment 
in the allocation of raw materials and electricity supplies. It is conducted through policies that 
allow Chalco to purchase electricity directly from electricity producers (SOEs) at prices lower than 
market prices.561 Many aluminum companies have their own electricity generators, through buying 
coal from the coal industry at lower prices.562  
 
In addition, SOEs may refuse to deal with POEs. For example, it seems that the state-owned 
aviation fuel company offers less generous terms to service private passenger carriers, and the 
computerized reservation system refuses to book flights for private carriers.563  
 
(2) SOEs Receive More Financial Advantages in Various Forms with Less Transparency 
 
Combining existing research and my findings, the following can be observed. Although financial 
advantages granted to SOEs in different industries may vary in types, they typically receive: 
subsidies specifically for a project undertaken by the SOEs, or subsidies specific to the SOE, or 
specific to its factory; subsides for following government policy by providing low prices of 
products, such as coal to, mainly, other SOEs, such as the steel industry; tax refunds, exemption 
from natural resource taxes, import-tax rebates; subsidies for purchasing state bonds; price support; 
cash grants; subsidies for imported products when they are priced higher than domestic products; 
price controls on fuels to prevent prices from increasing; land-use discounts; tax credits for 
purchasing some domestic equipment; export subsidies or export insurance; subsidies for interest 
on loans; subsidies for electricity costs; energy subsidies (coal, natural gas, and electricity); and 
                                                      
560 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319; Eight SOEs account for approximately 70 percent 
of revenue in the power sector. See the National Bureau of Statistics; State-owned and controlled firms account for 
more than 90 percent of output in 2009, see Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned 
Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 
2011), 44-48, (Table V‐4: Top SOE share of revenues in China’s power sector, 2010).  
561 Annual Financial Report of Aluminum Corporation of China Limited 2011, 37.  
562 “National Development Reform Commission Adjusted and Lowered the Price of Electricity, which will Benefit 
the Industry of Steel, Cement and Other Metal Industries,” China Business News, 20 April 2015. 
http://business.sohu.com/20150420/n411526521.shtml  
563  Michael Wines, “China Fortifies State Businesses to Fuel Growth”, New York Times, 29 August 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/30/world/asia/30china.html  
 128 
preferential tax rates.564  
 
Many subsidies are from local governments given to local SOEs, such as coal and steel companies. 
Some subsidies are given without explanation. Some subsidies are given with conditions unknown. 
Government financial support may be misrepresented as revenue or profit of the company in its 
annual financial report. I found two trends in general. One is that subsidies increased from 2007 
to 2014, especially the amount of money granted increased dramatically. Second, subsidies granted 
to SOEs are usually specifically targeted to the SOE in question, while most subsidies granted to 
POEs are related to R&D and environmental protection without specific targets. Additional 
findings by existing research can be observed below, suggesting that systematic financial 
advantages granted to SOEs exist.  
a. More Financial Advantages Granted to SOEs than to POEs  
 
The principal beneficiaries of these policies are SOEs, as well as other favored domestic companies 
attempting to move up the economic value chain.565 The amount of subsidies is increasing over 
the time.566 The growth of financial advantages granted to SOEs from the government exceeds the 
growth of profits of these enterprises.567 For instance, the growth of profits in 2014 compared to 
the preceding year was 10.13%, while the growth of subsidies during the same period was 13.63%. 
In 2015, the petrochemical industry received 30% more subsides than 2014, which was associated 
with subsidies granted to Sinopec.568 The subsidies granted to SOEs increased from 26 trillion 
RMB in 2001 to 81 trillion RMB in 2009. 569 (See Table 25 below).  
 
 
                                                      
564 Some subsidies are related to compensatory price control measures.  
565 2016 Nations Estimate Report, U.S.T.R. p. 92. 
566 “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: Each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the Top One,” 
Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307  
567 Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First 
One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm  
568 Ibid.  
569  “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
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Table 25 Subsidies Received by SOEs from 2001 to 2009 
(Unit: trillion RMB)  
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Subsidies 
to SOEs 
26 21 19 18 17 18 18 96 81 
 
SOEs receive disproportionally more financial advantages than POEs. At the macro level, SOEs 
are dominant in the industries described above and financial advantages to these industries are 
mainly enjoyed by SOEs. In most pillar industries, such as the steel industry, no comparable POEs 
can compete with SOEs. It is mainly the large SOEs who benefit more from the government as 
opposed to the smaller POEs. For instance, in the first half of 2014, among 2537 publicly traded 
enterprises (A shares) on stock exchanges in China, 90 % of them received subsidies of 32 trillion 
RMB in totality. 61.64% of them went to 854 SOEs, which account for 34.16% of the number of 
enterprises in totality.570 Central SOEs received subsidies accounting for 31.43%, and local SOEs 
received subsidies accounting for 30.21%. In 2014, among A shares and B shares on stock 
exchanges in China, central SOEs received subsidies accounting for 40.78%, local SOEs received 
subsidies accounting for 26.58%, POEs received subsidies accounting for 23.52% of the total, 
FOEs and others received subsidies accounting for 9.13%.571 In totality, SOEs received subsidies 
accounting for 67.36%, much higher than its proportion in terms of numbers on the exchange in 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen, on which the number of SOEs accounted for 44.7% of companies 
listed. 572  China deployed a RMB 4 trillion fiscal stimulus package to counter the economic 
downturn triggered by the global financial crisis in 2008. Most of these funds and the RMB10 
trillion bank loans that supported this fiscal measure, at the end, were allocated to SOEs.573  
 
                                                      
570 “The most profitable SOEs received financial subsidies from the government and the government is becoming 
corporatization”, Blog, JieFang News Magazine, Nov. 22, 2014.  
http://blog.people.com.cn/article/1416621257770.html  
571 Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First 
One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm  
572 This data was estimated at the end of September 2011, 1,047 SOEs were listed on the Stock Exchanges in Shanghai 
and Shenzhen. WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, 
WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121. 
573 Gang Fan and Nicholas C. Hope, “Chapter 16: The Role of State-Owned Enterprises in the Chinese Economy,” 
China US Focus, 4. http://www.chinausfocus.com/2022/wp-content/uploads/Part+02-Chapter+16.pdf    
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Top SOEs received subsidies. The top ten publicly traded enterprises on stock exchanges in China 
received subsidies accounting for 10% of the total subsidies granted to all enterprises in 2014. 
PetroChina ranked as the top subsidy recipient, and the Construction Bank ranked as the third. 
Nearly 50% of the subsidies went to the most profitable SOEs or monopolistic SOEs.574 In 2014, 
PetroChina received subsidies accounting for 6.8% of subsidies granted to all enterprises, and 
Sinopec received subsidies accounting for 4.9% of all subsidies.575 Given that bankruptcy and 
privatization of loss-making SOEs is difficult due to social concerns and the fact that no POEs are 
willing to buy loss-making SOEs, China is still subsidizing its loss-making SOEs implicitly. Loss-
making SOEs received subsidies and then covered their losses and became profitable. In the first 
half of 2014, 422 loss-making publicly traded enterprises in A shares and B shares received 
subsidies. Among them, 311 enterprises are in the manufacturing industry, 27 enterprises are in 
the information and software industry, 18 of them are in the agriculture industry, and 12 of them 
are in the mining industry.576 Loss-making industries are primarily in the steel, cement, chemical, 
shipbuilding, automobiles, paper industries and other traditional industries. Some central SOEs 
became profitable after receiving subsidies. For instance, the profits of China COSCO, an SOE, 
increased by 0.2 trillion RMB from 2014 to 2015 while subsides granted to it increased by 2.5 
trillion RMB.577  
b. In Various Forms  
a) Lower Capital Cost 
 
SOEs tend to benefit from lower cost of capital and better access to capital than POEs. 578 
According to statistics from the Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research in 2009, analyzing 
the statistics from 280,000 enterprises in China, SOEs could get loans at 2.55% interest rate while 
the interest rate for POEs was nearly two percent higher. The cost of financing of POEs is nearly 
                                                      
574 Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First 
One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm  
575 “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: Each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the Top One,” 
Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307 
576 Shukun Wang, “SOEs Received 60% of all Subsidies from the Government, and PetroChina Ranked as the First 
One,” New Beijing Magazine, Oct. 10, 2014, http://news.xinhuanet.com/finance/2014-10/10/c_127079629.htm 
577 “Ranking of SOEs Receiving Subsidies: Each SOE received 50 million RMB and Sinopec ranked as the Top One,” 
Vision Times, April 27, 2016. http://m.secretchina.com/node/606307 
578 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121. 
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two times of the cost of financing SOEs.579  The difference may vary based on different research 
and statistics. From 2000 to 2007, it was found that the market interest rate is 2.92 times of that 
enjoyed by SOEs. 580  Taking into account the corporate size, the cost of financing by large POEs 
is 6% higher than that of large SOEs, and the difference is 9% for small-and-medium sized POEs 
and small-and medium sized SOEs. Large POEs can rarely receive interest rates of 10% or lower, 
while SOEs enjoy interest rates of 5.3% in Zhejiang Province.581 It is estimated that from 2001 to 
2008, 68% of the nominal profits of all SOEs are a result of lower financial costs.582  
 
b) Capital and Dividends Locked 
 
First, as for those SOEs that are publicly trade on stock exchanges, China implements a strict 
policy of non-tradeable shares, i.e., there is a certain percentage of shares held by the state in the 
SOE that cannot be traded. Second, Chinese SOEs did not turn over any profits to the Chinese 
Government from 1994 to 2007.583 After 2008, the majority of SOEs are required to hand over 
some profits to the state, while some not.584 In 2009, only 6% of all profits of all SOEs were turned 
over to the government, and the figure was 2.2% in 2010.585 The amount of dividend handed over 
by SOEs to the government increased after 2011.586 652 SOEs have been added to the list of SOE 
that need to turn over dividends to the government while SOEs in the financial services and 
                                                      
579 Data is from the HongKong Institute for Monetary Research in 2009. 
580 Xiaoxuan Liu and Xiaoyan Zhou, “A Test on the Relationship between Financial Resources and Economy”, Journal 
of Financial Research (2011) (2). [Jinrong Ziyuan Yu Shiti Jingji Zhijian Peizhi Guanxi de Jianyan—Jianlun Jingji 
JIegou Shiheng de Yuanyin]. 
581 He said that he did an survey on the costs of financing of enterprises in Zhejiang Province in China in 2012. See 
the Chairman of the Association of Industrial and Commercial of P.R.C.: SOEs’ interest rate is 5.3% while a 10% for 
POEs can make POEs happy”, Goldsen Engtone, (assessed Sept. 14, 2016) 
http://www.jinxinyintong.com/industry/2013/01/1156.html  
582 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
583 “Opinions on the Budgets of SOEs by the State of Council,” [Guowuyuan Guanyu Shixing Guoyou Ziben Jingying 
Yusuan de Yijian] 2007 (Doc. No. 26). It provides that some SOEs are required to turn over partial of their profit 
obtained in 2008 to the state. 
584 SOEs not covered by the law regarding SOEs’ dividends are SOEs in agriculture, railways, and financial sectors.   
585  World Bank, “SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom?”, World Bank Report (Oct. 17, 2005), 5.  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/961421468243568454/pdf/566510WP0SOE1E10Box353729B01PUBLI
C1.pdf  
586 Ministry of Finance, “Circular on Improvement to Certain Issues about Operation Budgets of State-Owned Assets,” 
promulgated on 23 December 2010, Doc. No. 2010/392.  
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telecommunication sectors are not on the list. 587 Currently, about 5-15% of profits of Chinese 
SOEs are handed over to the state.588 It is planned to have SOEs give the government 30% of their 
profits by 2020,589 which is still relatively low in comparison with the percentage of profits paid 
by SOEs and POEs in other countries. About 40% of profits of publicly traded enterprises are 
turned over to their shareholders. About 30-60% of profits of SOEs are turned over to the state in 
other countries. 590  Moreover, profits turned over by SOEs to governments are mainly given back 
to these SOEs in various forms, such as capital injection. Only 3.51% of the funds composed of 
dividends from SOEs are distributed for the welfare of society, while the remaining funds of 
dividends are given back to SOEs.591 
 
c) The Right to Use Land, Resources Fees and Tax Burden 
 
Prior to 2002, the right to use land was given to SOEs nearly without charges while POEs have to 
pay high fees to the government for the right to use land. Currently, the right to use land is still 
enjoyed by SOEs with little cost.592 For instance, according to the annual report 2004 of Sinopec, 
Sinopec paid rent to its parent SOE, i.e., Sinopec Group, who only paid 5% of the rent as a business 
tax to the government. Hence, the rent is still retained by the SOE group instead of going to the 
government. Also, the price of rent paid by Sinopec to its parent SOE is almost 10 times lower 
than the rent paid by POEs.593 The subsidiary SOE pays the rent of land to its parent SOE, which 
                                                      
587 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 
2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121. 
588 From 2002-2008, the dividend rates of 172 Chinese SOEs on the HongKong Stock Exchange was 23.2%. The 
dividend rates of Chinese SOEs on the U.S. stock exchanges was 35.4% in 2005. World Bank, “SOE Dividends: How 
Much and to Whom?”, World Bank Report (Oct. 17, 2005).  
589 Decision on Certain Major Issues Concerning the Comprehensive Deeping of Reform (15 November  2013). ; 
Lingling Wei, “China Looks to Consolidate State Companies to Avoid Layoffs,” The Wall Street Journal, March 12, 
2016. http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-looks-to-consolidate-state-companies-to-avoid-layoffs-1457775420 
590 World Bank, “SOE Dividends: How Much and to Whom?”, World Bank Report (Oct. 17, 2005), 5.    
591 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 78-83. 
592 Article 3 of “Temporal Regulations regarding the right to use land in the reform of SOEs”, [Guoyou Qiye 
Gaigezhong Huabo Tudi Shiyongquan Guanli Zanxing Guiding], The Ministry of Land and Resources of P.R.C., Feb. 
17, 1998. It provides that Parent SOEs can rent or equitize the right to use the land to their subsidiaries. 
593 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
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treats such payment as its income or profit. This phenomenon is found widely in monopolistic 
industries in China like coal, gas, oil, mining, cigarette, telecommunication, etc.594  
 
The resource tax on oil is merely 1% of sales revenue in China, lower than the average royalty on 
oil worldwide, which is about 10-20%. The real royalty on gas in China is less than 3% of sales 
revenue, lower than the average royalty on gas in other countries, namely, 8% and above. The real 
royalty on coal in China is less than 2% of sales revenue, lower than the average royalty on coal 
in other countries, which is about 8%-10%. In 2015, the royalty on iron ore was reduced by 40%.595 
Data is lacking with respect to royalties on other resources, such as non-ferrous metals. But on 
average, royalties in China are lower than the global average royalties. 596  In the 
telecommunications sector, SOEs in absolute dominance have access to essential facilities and 
network flows provided by the government without any charge. In contrast, the resources in this 
regard are commonly allocated through bidding in other countries.597  From 2007 to 2009, the 
average tax burden of 992 SOEs on stock exchanges in China was 10%, while it was 24% for 
POEs.598 The lesser tax burden on SOEs is largely due to exemptions from taxes or tax refunds.599 
 
d) Some Loss-Making or Inefficient SOEs became Competitive due to the Above Advantages 
Granted to Them   
 
First, financial advantages granted to loss-making SOEs increased in recent years, particularly in 
the coal and steel industries. In 2015, almost half of important steel companies, most of which are 
                                                      
594 Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. 
http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html  
595 The Steel Industry in China: the Cost of Exploring Iron Ore and of Using On-grid Electricity Was Reduced, Leading 
to Large Steel Corporations Benefited,” Yuanta Securities (Hong Kong), April 10, 2015.  
http://finance.qq.com/a/20150410/051918.htm 
596 “Regulations on Compensation Fees for Rare Resources” [Kuangchan Ziyuan Buchang Guanli Guiding], The State 
Council, 1994; “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of 
Economics (June 12, 2011), 39-63. Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. 
http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html  
597 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
598 The tax reform unified the tax rate as 25% for enterprises after 2008, see art. 2, 3, 4. of Tax Law of P.R.C., 
(approved on March 16, 2007), effective on Jan 1, 2008. http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2007-03/19/content_554243.htm   
599 Qing Ze, “How are subsidies granted to SOEs?” JING55, Nov.20, 2014. 
http://www.jing55.com/toutiao/20141120/210e8b75dae30d5e72189.html  
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SOEs, were unprofitable. 600  In the coal industry, all local SOEs are unprofitable. Small-and 
medium sized POEs have no choice but to shut down while SOEs survived with governmental 
support.601 Sixteen publicly-traded coal companies received subsidies about the amount of 2.1 
trillion RMB in 2015 which increased by 80% from 2014.602  Second, SOEs make profits primarily 
from monopolies or exclusive rights, and the occupation of rare resources with increasing price.603 
The total profits of central SOEs account for 67.5% of the total profits of SOEs. The profits of top 
ten SOEs comprised 70% of all net profits made by central SOEs in 2009. The profits of central 
SOEs were mainly made by monopolistic SOEs. 604  For instance, China National Petroleum 
Corporation and China Mobile Limited made profits exceeding one third of the total profits made 
by central SOEs.  Third, the average return on equity of SOEs was 8.16% from 2001 to 2009, 
while the comparable figure of POEs was 12.9%, and the average real return on equity of SOEs 
was -6.29% if various preferential advantages were removed from SOEs.605 It was also found that 
efficiency of SOEs was lower than POEs from financial indicators and productivity indicators.606 
Overall, loss-making SOEs survived and inefficient SOEs became profitable due to the above 
advantages granted to them.    
 
3.2.2 The Nature of Advantages of Monopolies and Exclusive Rights  
(1) SOEs Are More Likely to Receive Monopolies or Exclusive Rights  
 
SOEs are more likely to receive monopolies or exclusive rights, such as entry permits, 
production/exploration licenses, distribution licenses, export rights, import rights, etc. For instance, 
                                                      
600 Xiaofeng Zhang and Xiaoyu Ren, “Realization of Ten Experiments in SOE Reform, and the Steel and Other Six 
Industries will Face New Opportunities”, Finance China, Feb 27, 2016. 
http://finance.china.com.cn/stock/zqyw/20160227/3603626.shtml 
601 “National Development Reform Commission Adjusted and Lowered the Price of Electricity, which will Benefit 
the Industry of Steel, Cement and Other Metal Industries,” China Business News, 20 April 2015. 
http://business.sohu.com/20150420/n411526521.shtml 
602 “Sixteen Publicly Traded Central SOEs in the Coal Industry Received 2.1 trillion RBM Last Year, and Loss-
Making Enterprises Would not Have Survived without Subsidies from the Government,” Sinoergy, 8 April 2016.  
http://www.sinoergy.com/bianji1/24123  
603 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 39-63. 
604 Id., at 78-83. 
605 Id., abstract.  
606 Xiaoxuan Liu, “An Analysis of the Effects of Privatization on China’s Industries,” Economic Research Journal 
(Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), Issue 8, 2004,    
 135 
the Anti-Monopoly Law specifically prohibits “administrative monopolies”, which means abuses 
of administrative power to eliminate or restrict competition.607 However, statutory monopolies (or 
oligopolies) by SOEs are not classified as administrative monopolies.608 Hence the law protects 
the monopolistic SOEs in industries deemed nationally important. 609    
 
With regard to the entry rights, for instance, although the law does not explicitly provide that only 
SOEs are permitted in the telecommunication industry, the Chinese Government limits the entry 
into the industry through MIIT’s issuance of specific permits.610 There are only three enterprises 
(China Mobile, China Telecom and China Unicom, all of them are SOEs) that are currently 
authorized to provide mobile services in China, although the law allows POEs entering value-
added telecommunication service business.611 
 
With respect to exclusive exploration and production rights, for instance, in the oil industry, 
exclusive rights of exploration and wholesale distribution are only granted to SOEs in fact.612 The 
Chinese government almost always allocates rights to natural-resource exploration as no-bid 
contracts to SOEs. 613  In the rare earths industry, only a limited number of enterprises are licensed 
to produce, and small-scale enterprises have been ordered to shut down.614 About 300 companies 
                                                      
607  Article 8 and Chapter 5 of the Anti-Monopoly Law. SAIC's Provisions on the Suppression of Abuse of 
Administrative Power to Eliminate and Restrict Competitive Conduct (entered into effect on 1 Feb. 2011, SAIC 
Decree 2011/55), arts. 3 & 4.  NDRC Provisions on Prohibition of Price Monopoly with a focus on price-related 
violations.   
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=0&CGid=96789#menu4 
608 Article 7 of Anti-Monopoly Law 2008; WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary,  Trade Policy 
Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, p. 35, 58, 61, 63, 72, 73, 114, 121, para. 253. 
609 The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 95.  
610 Such as in the areas of local and long distance fixed-line telephone services, and data service providers whose 
telecommunications services cover two or more provinces.  
611 Annual Financial Report China Mobile Limited, 20-F Form (2014).  
http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php 
612 Annual Financial Report of Sinopec, 20‐F Form; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐
owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 
26, 2011), 4.  
613 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 5.   
614  Considering the cutthroat price competition, the Ministry of Public Security, the General Administration of 
Customs, and the Ministries of Land Resources (MLR) and Environmental Protection, ordered 126 rare-earth 
production firms to suspend production and revoked another 161 firms’ production licenses in August 2013. “China 
Focus: China must tackle rare earth industry chaos,” Shanghai Daily, Aug 9, 2014. 
http://www.shanghaidaily.com/article/article_xinhua.aspx?id=234479.  
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had production permits prior to 2012.615 Due to strict rules on the entry into the rare earths industry, 
as of 2016, there are only 44 companies that are permitted in the rare earths industry,616 the majority 
of which are SOEs.  There are extraction quotas and production quotas, both of which were issued 
sometimes for the benefit of SOEs. Extraction quotas in 2014 increased 10 % in comparison with 
that of 2013.617 Part of the reason for the increase is to meet the needs of six giant SOEs after 
consolidation.618 Adjustment and modification of production quotas have occurred occasionally 
for the benefits of SOEs.619  
With respect to the exclusive rights to export or import, under the planning system prior to 1978, 
China’s trade was conducted under a state trading system with only 12 foreign trade corporations 
(FTC), which were one type of SOEs at that time.620 Beginning with the reform in 1979, the 
number of trading enterprises increased to 200,000, and SOEs accounted for a large share of the 
                                                      
615 Yue Qi, “Reuters: China is going to give up export duties and export quotas for rare earths,” Wall Street China, 
June 4, 2014. http://wallstreetcn.com/node/93218.  Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s 
Republic of China, “Rules on Conditions for Entry Into the Industry of REEs Announced by MIIT,” MIIT, Aug 6, 
2012.  
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/14767819.html 
616 Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China (MIIT), The Fifth List of Firms 
That Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry into the REEs Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2014 (41), 
June 23, 2014, available at 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057569/n3057572/c3569588/content.html (in Chinese); 
MIIT, The Fourth List of Firms That Have Complied With the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs 
Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2013(31), July 4, 2013. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680202/content.html (in Chinese); 
 MIIT, The Third List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, 
MIIT Doc. No. 2012(65), Dec. 26, 2012. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680411/content.html (in Chinese);   
MIIT, The Second List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs 
Industry, MIIT Doc. No. 2012(61), Dec. 11, 2012. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/n1652858/n1653100/n3670459/c3680427/content.html (in Chinese); 
 MIIT, The First List of Firms that Have Complied with the Regulation on Conditions for Entry Into the REEs Industry, 
MIIT Doc. No. 2012(59), Nov. 21, 2012.  
 http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146285/n1146352/n3054355/n3057569/n3057579/c3566732/content.html (in Chinese). 
617  “It is still not enough to increase production quotas by 112,00 ton,” Xinhua News, June 20, 2014. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/energy/2014-06/20/c_1111232486.htm. 
618 “Report on the Economic Performance of the Industry of REEs in 2013,” MIIT, Feb. 21, 2014. 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294132/n12858402/n12858507/15890977.html   
619 For instance, China MinMetals Corp. (SOE) produced rare earths without permits and was forced to suspend 
production in June 2013. Nevertheless, in September 2013, China MinMetals Corp. said that MIIT agreed to increase 
the second assignment of production quotas of originally 1435 tons, which was announced in middle of 2013, to 2135 
tons. It is unknown why MITT decided to increase the production quota for China MinMetals Corp. The underlying 
reason might be that production capacity of MinMetals Corp is not fully used. As an SOE, it has negotiation leverage 
over the government due to its connections to the government. “Subsidiary of China MinMetals has its second 
assignment of producing REEs increased,” STCN, Sep. 11, 2013. http://kuaixun.stcn.com/2013/0911/10749049.shtml 
620 N. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990, Cambridge University Press, 1991.   
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trade. 621  In the rare earths industry, with respect to export or import rights, exporting licenses and 
export quotas were issued to eligible enterprises, most of which are SOEs. Before the consolidation 
strategy, there were approximately 300 enterprises in the rare earths industry in China. However, 
only around 30 enterprises, most of which are SOEs, filed applications for exporting REEs each 
year prior to consolidation.622  
 
(2) Anti-Competitive Behavior and Behavior Influenced by Governments After Receiving 
Monopolies or Exclusive Rights 
 
SOEs’ taking advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights in non-reserved markets, such as 
upstream or downstream sectors, to increase market shares, is an example of anti-competitive 
behavior after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights. Basically, there are three kinds of markets, 
i.e., the upstream production market, the middle-stream distribution or transportation market, and 
the downstream retail market. SOEs take advantage of their monopolies in the upstream production 
market or the middle-stream market, to expand their market shares in the downstream market, 
where the competitors in the downstream market are dependent on the monopoly’s supply of input. 
It is in violation of the Anti-Monopoly Law 2008.623 However, the anti-competitive behavior was 
not prosecuted.  
 
Taking oil as an example, before 1998, POEs had a large percentage of the downstream retail 
market for oil in gas stations. However, a governmental document authorized expansion 
respectively by two giant SOEs (CNPC and Sinopec Group) in 1998 and division of markets into 
northern and southern markets controlled by them respectively. 624 CNPC and Sinopec Group 
                                                      
621 Working Party on State Trading Enterprises-State Trading-Updating Notification Pursuant to Article XVII:4(a) of 
the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII, China, Addendum, 
G/STR/N/9/CHN/Add.1, 14 July 2003,  
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=@Symbol=%20g/str/n/*%20and%20%20@
Symbol=%20chn&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# 
622 My calculation was based on data found in the website of the Ministry of the Commerce.  
623 Article 17, 18.2, 18.4 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China. Adopted at the 29th meeting of 
the Standing Committee of the Tenth National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China on August 30, 
2007, effective as of August 1, 2008. 
624 “Opinions Regarding Regulating Small Refineries and the Distribution of Crude Oil and Processed Oil” (the so-
called Doc. No. 38), issued by the State Economic and Trade Commission of the P.R.C. in 1998. This document 
authorized three SOEs to be vertical monopolies in exploration, refining, import, distribution and resale.  
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began to acquire privately-owned gas stations in the retail market, with the threat of withdrawing 
supply of oil to privately-owned gas stations. In that sense, through the “exchange oil for the 
downstream market”, SOEs take advantage of their monopolies in the upstream market for 
producing oil, to expand their market share in the downstream market for the retail of oil, which 
is not reserved to them by their monopolies, resulting in many POEs going out of business.  
 
The same strategy occurred in the natural gas market. In the upstream market for producing natural 
gas, CNPC’s production of natural gas accounts for 76% of the total in China. In the middle-stream 
market for transporting and distributing natural gas, pipelines owned by CNPC account for 80% 
of the total pipelines in China. In addition, CNPC and Sinopec Group are not in direct competition 
with each other in the natural gas market. The downstream market for the retail of natural gas in 
urban areas had a diversity of ownership prior to 2008.625 For instance, the City Government of 
Wuwei, through the bidding system, granted a 30-year exclusive project franchise to a POE 
(Xijiang Guanghui) in 2007 for delivering natural gas to retail end-users in the city and for 
providing customer services. However, after the commencement of the “West-East Gas Pipeline” 
in 2008,626 which is largely operated by CNPC, CNPC began to negotiate with the provincial 
governments. These agreements, taking one of them between Ganxu Province and CNPC as an 
example, provide that CNPC will provide natural gas to the province with steady supply on 
favorable terms, in exchange for receiving exclusive franchises for delivering natural gas to retail 
end-users in Ganxu Province and for providing customer services.    As a result, city governments 
in Ganxu Province, including Wuwei city, had no choice but to withdraw the exclusive franchise 
from the POE (Xijiang Guanghui) in 2008, in light of CNPC’s monopolistic status in the upstream 
and middle-stream markets for natural gas. POEs in the downstream market have no choice but to 
give up business in the cities where pipelines are available, in light of the fact that CNPC is its 
largest supplier of natural gas to the POE who has business of transporting natural gas by road to 
                                                      
625  In March 2003, NDRC, the former State Economic and Trade Commission, and the former Foreign Trade 
Department issued “Catalogue of Industries for Guiding Foreign Investment” [Waishang Touzi Chanye Zhidao Mulu], 
which opened the urban network of gas and pipe to foreign investment. In May 2004, the Ministry of Construction 
issued “Measures for the Administration on the Franchise of Municipal Public Utilities” [Shizheng Gongyong Shiye 
Texu Jingying Guanli Banfa], article 4 authorized municipal governments to franchise in terms of the supply of gas 
through pipelines in urbans.  It changed local monopolies into regional competitors in the market of supplying gas 
through pipelines.  
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=3491&CGid=  
626 It transports imported foreign natural gas as well as natural gas from the Western China to the Eastern China.  
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those cities not reached by pipelines.627 Some local SOEs that were granted exclusive franchises 
in the downstream retail market for natural gas in cities, lobbied their local governments, and 
cooperated with CNPC in the city to jointly enjoy the market subject to the condition that CNPC 
is the controller in the retail market of natural gas to end users in the city. Hence, CNPC takes 
advantages of its monopoly of natural gas production and transmission to expand its market shares 
in the retail sale of natural gas in urban areas and customer services, through the strategy of 
“resources in exchange for markets” and negotiations with higher level of governments, resulting 
in a vertical integrated market for natural gas to the exclusion of POEs who are in the urban market 
for gas retail sale.628 
 
It should be admitted that such anti-competitive behavior could also take place where monopolies 
and exclusive rights are granted to POEs. However, several differences can be laid out. SOEs are 
more likely to engage in anticompetitive activities than private, profit-maximizing firms.629 Anti-
competitive behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights is more likely to be 
exempted from domestic competition law either by law or by selective enforcement. With regard 
to decisions influenced by governments, SOEs are more likely to follow guidelines and 
instructions of governments.  
 
3.2.3 The Nature of Regulatory and Other Advantages in Favor of SOEs  
(1) Mergers and Acquisitions Among SOEs are Assisted by Governments and Exempted From 
Domestic Competition Laws   
 
Mergers and acquisitions among SOEs are assisted or directed by governments, and are exempted 
from domestic competition laws. Government mandated mergers and acquisitions are usually 
implemented at little or no cost. Beginning in 1990s, China adopted a consolidation strategy, which 
includes vertical and horizontal mergers and acquisitions of SOEs assisted by the government, 
                                                      
627 “Why Did the Merger of Subsidiaries of CNPC Paused: the Natural Gas Market Refuses Monopolistic Power,” 
Energy, SINA, Jan 12, 2016. http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/2016-01-12/doc-ifxnkkuy7943686.shtml 
628 Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging its Resources for 
Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China Economic Times, August 
1, 2008.  http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html 
629 David E.M. Sappington and Sidak, J. Gregory, “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises,” 71(2) Antitrust 
Law Journal (2003): 479, 484.  
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shutting down small POEs and SOEs through administrative orders, and directing SOEs to buy 
POEs through administrative orders. 630  The Chinese Government takes measures to limit 
competition in favor of its SOEs.631 In the Five-Year plans, one section is about encouraging 
mergers and restructuring to develop national champions and Chinese brands, with a focus on the 
auto, steel, cement, machinery, aluminum, rare earth, pharmaceutical, electronic information, 
shipbuilding, petrochemicals, textiles and light industries. Although SOEs are not mentioned 
explicitly, they already dominate many of the abovementioned industries.632   
 
Horizontal consolidation can be found in the steel industry and coal industry. Beijing has chosen 
Baosteel, Beijing Shougang, Tangshan Iron and Steel, Anben Steel, and Wugang as a focus for 
industry consolidation activities.633 Baosteel, one of the three steelmakers currently owned by the 
central SASAC, has explored mergers with a number of SOEs owned by sub‐national SASACs. 
In 2009, the government of Hebei province and its SASAC pursued a major consolidation of SOEs 
in the region, leading to Hebei Iron and Steel becoming of the world’s top producers.634 The 
remaining enterprises are small and medium sized. Although monopoly is less likely, bloc SOEs 
are more likely to occur in the steel industry.  In the non-ferrous metals industry, China adopted 
the strategy of consolidating the rare earth industry into six giant groups at the end of 2013, 
including Baogang Group, China Minmetals, Chinaclo, Guangdong Rare Earth Corp, Ganzhou 
Rare Earth Group, and Xiamen Tungsten. 635  They are all SOEs, three of which are owned 
                                                      
630 Fifth Plenary Session of the 14th Communist Party of China, Sept. 28, 1995; Robert E. White, Robert E. Hoskisson, 
Daphne W. Yiu & Garry D. Bruton, “Employment and Market Innovation in Chinese business Group Affiliated Firms: 
The Role of Group Control Systems” 4(2) Management and Organization Review (2008): 225-56.  
631 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 5.   
632 “Guiding the merger and reorganization of enterprises”, in Part three, chapter nine, section four of 12th Five Year 
Plan, http://www.gov.cn/2011lh/content_1825838_4.htm in Chinese 
http://www.cbichina.org.cn/cbichina/upload/fckeditor/Full%20Translation%20of%20the%2012th%20Five-
Year%20Plan.pdf in English; One purpose of consolidation strategy currently is to deal with the overcapacity problem. 
See “Opinions of the State Council Regarding Over Production of the Steel Industry and Poverty Reduction”, the State 
of Council of P.R.C., Feb. 04, 2016, Doc. NO. [2016] 6.  [Guowuyuan Guanyu Gangtie Hangye Huajie Guosheng 
Channeng Shixian Tuokun Fazhan de Yijian] http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-02/04/content_5039353.htm ; 
633  George Haley, “Overview of China’s pillar and strategic industries,” Expert testimony to U.S.-China Economic 
and Security Review Commission’s hearing, “the Extent of the Government’s Control of China’s Economy, and Its 
Impact on the United States,” May 25, 2007.  
634  “The Closing Deal of Consolidation of three SOEs in the Steel industry”, Price of Steel, Jan 25, 2010. 
http://ggjgw.com/new_view.asp?id=8251&ad=16  
635 Xiaoqin Ruan and Feng Qin, “Six rare earths blocs are ready, and MIIT will discuss proposals,” Finance Sina, Oct. 
28, 2014. http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20141028/071620660117.shtml 
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controlled by the central government.636 An oligopoly by the six giant SOEs is inevitable.637 Each 
bloc has an exclusive jurisdiction over its region in the domestic Chinese market. Taking Baogang 
Group as an example, it became in charge of rare earths in the Northern area after the 
consolidation.638 SOEs obtain dominant positions in those industries, and their division of markets 
is assisted and directed by the government.  
  
Some mergers and acquisitions among SOEs violate the Chinese Anti-Trust Law. However, they 
are not prosecuted. For instance, the mergers among SOEs in the telecommunication sector in 2008 
initiated by MIIT, NRRC and the Ministry of Finance, to restructure 6 SOEs into 3 SOEs,639 didn’t 
get authorization from the Ministry of Commerce, violating Article 21 of the Chinese Anti-Trust 
Law.640 The Chinese domestic anti-trust laws or competition laws give exemptions for Chinese 
SOEs and are not enforced against Chinese SOEs in practice. 641  
 
(2) Other Regulatory Advantages 
 
As for other regulatory advantages, evidence can also be found from the Anti-Monopoly Law, 
which make references to industrial policy goals, including strengthening SOEs.642 The Chinese 
domestic anti-trust laws or competition laws are not enforced against Chinese SOEs in most cases 
and the enforcement is selective and limited.643 The pricing of monopolies may violate Chinese 
                                                      
636 For instance, Ganzhou Rare Earth Group was established by the city and eight counties in 2004 to exclusively 
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637 Economic Information, “Geography and market division by six giant REEs group,” People.cn, Aug 12, 2014. 
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640 Article 21 of Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of China, it provides that most restructuring of central 
and local SOEs needs authorization from the government. 
641  For more examples, see Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard 
International Law Journal, Vol. 57 (May 13, 2016): 55-6.  
642 Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted at the 29th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Tenth National People’s Congress and effective as of August 1, 2008); Article 1, 4, 7 of the Anti-Monopoly Law 
2008. See Legislative Affairs Commission, “Interpretation of the Anti-Monopoly of the People’s Republic of China,” 
Law Press China (2008) at 4 translated and quoted in U.S. Chamber of Commerce, China’s Application of its Anti-
Monopoly Law, at 24 
643 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
57 (May 13, 2016): 55-6; The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
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Anti-Trust Law.644 However, SOEs are not prosecuted. Literature also talks about other kinds of 
advantages that enjoyed by SOEs, such as investment laws that disadvantage FOEs in favor of 
SOEs, the enforcement of anti-bribery laws targeting MNCs/FOEs, while Chinese SOEs are not 
prosecuted by China for bribing foreign officials.645 
 
3.3 The Trade Effects of Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs  
 
China is a large trader and investor. In pursuance of the “going out” policy, which encourages 
entities to be involved in global markets, imports to China reached their highest level in 2013, 110 
times the amount of imports in 1983, and China is one of the top destinations for foreign 
investment.646 As for China’s exports and outward investment, Chinese firms are now major 
competitors in advanced country export markets and major foreign investors.647 There has been a 
dramatic increase in Chinese outbound investment in recent years.648 China’s export/GDP ratios 
rose from 8% in 1978 to 26% in 2000 and 21% in 2015, while the U.S. ratios rose from 10% to 
11% to 13.4 in 2014. 649  In 2009, China surpassed Germany to become the world’s largest 
                                                      
Barriers,” (2016), 95.  
644 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 83-101. 
645 China uses the AML to coerce multinational companies (MNCs) to transfer assets to SOEs. See Daniel C.K. Chow 
and Anna Han, Doing Business in China: Problems, Cases, and Materials (West 2012), 168; Daniel Chow, “How 
China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies Doing Business in China and 
Other Countries,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 307, October 5, 2015, North Caroline 
41(3) Journal of Int’l Law (Spring 2016): 455; “China Media: Xi Jinping’s Anti-Corruption Call,” BBC News, Nov. 
20, 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-20405106 ; PRC Criminal Law, art. 164 (Crime of offering 
bribes to persons other than state officials), (amended in 2011 based on the United Nations Convention Against 
Bribery), other relevant provisions are art. 163, 385, 387 (crime of offering bribes to state officials); Samuel R. Gintel, 
Fighting Transnational Bribery: China’s Gradual Approach, 31 (1) Wisc. Int’l L.J. (2013): 7-9. However, China has 
never brought a prosecution under the new Criminal Law since its enactment in 2011.  
646  My calculation is based on “China Imports: 1983-2016,” Trading Economics, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/imports ; Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned 
Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 
2011), 4. 
647  My calculation is based on “China Exports: 1983-2016,” Trading Economics, 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/exports ; The “going‐global strategy” (zouchuqu) was proposed in 2000 at 
the 5th plenary session of the 15th Central Committee. See Junyeop Lee, “State Owned Enterprises in China: 
Reviewing the Evidence,” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development OECD Occasional Paper (2009), 
9. www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/30/42095493.pdf 
648 Nargiza Salidjanova, “Going Out: An Overview of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment,” US- China 
Economic & Security Review Commission, USCC Staff Research Report (March 30, 2011), 5-6.  
649  My calculation is based on the following sources: “A glimpse of Chinese Economy,” Research HKTDC, 
http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/ 中 國 經 貿 資 料 / 中 國 經 貿 概 況
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exporter.650 In industries such as steel, glass, paper, and auto parts, all of which are capital-
intensive industries, and in the space of approximately five years, China rose from a net importer 
to among the largest producers and exporters in the world.651 In 2006, China became the largest 
steel exporter in the world by volume.652 In 2010, China became the second-largest producer (47%) 
of steel in the world in 2011. In the years 2002 through 2011, the value of China’s exports of autos 
and auto parts increased and rose from the world’s 16th largest to the 5th largest auto and auto parts 
exporter.653 The reason for giving an account of China being a large trader is to explain that it is 
not a price taker, but its behavior (giving advantages to SOEs) can affect international markets 
(world prices). For instance, welfare in the subsidizing country deteriorates even more when a 
subsidy is given by a large country to its export-competing industries. Large trading nations, after 
obtaining economic influence in one country, may threaten to stop making purchases, or to cut off 
supplies.654 
 
Chinese SOEs play a profound role in China’ progress toward becoming a large trader. SOEs 
account for 80% of Chinese FDI.655 67.6% of all Chinese outbound direct investment has been 
funded by Chinese central SOEs in 2009.656 During the period from 1995-1999, the share of SOEs 
exports in total exports remained close to 50%.657 SOEs in services are also expanding to global 
                                                      
/ff/tc/1/1X000000/1X09PHBA.htm ; “Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP),” World Bank National Accounts 
Data, and OECD National Accounts Data Files, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS ; Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State 
Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” China Economic Review 17 (2006) :1-13.  
650  Steven Mufson, “China Surpasses Germany as World’s Top Exporter”, Washington Post, Jan. 11, 2010. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/10/AR2010011002647.html   
651 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 2.   
652 Alan H. Brice, Timothy C. Brightbill, Christohper B. Weld, and D. Scott Nance, “Money for Metal: A Detailed 
Examination of Chinese Government Subsidies to Its Steel Industry,” Prepared for the American Iron and Steel 
Institute (AISI), the Steel Manufacturers Association (SMA), the Committee for Pipe and Tube Imports (CPTI), and 
the Specialty Steel Industry of North America (SSINA) (July 2007), 1.  
653  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Fact Sheet: WTO Case Challenging Chinese Subsidies,” 2012. 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/fact-sheets/2012/september/wto-case-challenging-chinese-
subsidies 
654 They may ask for concessions on economic, political, or military affairs as well. Robert Loring Allen, “State 
Trading and Economic Warfare,” 24 Law and Contemporary Problems (Spring 1959): 256-275, 263.  
655 Adrian Wooldridge, “The Visible Hand”, The Economist (Jan 21, 2012).  
http://www.economist.com/node/21542931 ; Ministry of the Commerce of P.R.C. (MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical 
Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (Beijing: 2010), 12. 
656 Ministry of the Commerce of P.R.C. (MOFCOM), 2009 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct 
Investment (Beijing: 2010), 12. 
657 Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” 17 China Economic 
Review (2006) :1-13.  
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markets, such as telecommunication services. 658  Some subsidies are used to promote the 
competitiveness of a selected group of large SOEs. The trade effects of subsidies to profit making 
SOEs are a major concern to China’s trading partners, because these key profit-making SOEs are 
competitive rivals to large multinational enterprises both in global markets and in the Chinese 
domestic market.659 Some loss-making SOEs may manage to revive with the help of subsidies and 
thereafter can also affect export markets.660 
 
It can be found that there are commonalities in all problems in terms of impacts. They either hinder 
imports, restrain exports, or promote exports, through either increasing or decreasing supply, 
increasing or decreasing prices, or leading to a difference between domestic prices and world 
prices. The impacts are different depending on the industry or sector in the context of China. Export 
promotion is the major effect in the steel, cement, aluminum industries dominated by SOEs.661 
Some literature traces how energy subsidies to Chinese steel have continued to rise along with the 
industry’s exports.662  Some research has shown a positive relationship between China’s exports 
and subsidies to SOEs.663 Other literature has tested the relation between subsidies to loss-making 
SOE and exports.664 Overall the implication is that subsidies to SOEs have been an important 
                                                      
658  For instance, CMCC (China Mobile Limited) has its settlement arrangements with respect to international 
interconnection and roaming with the relevant telecommunications services providers in foreign countries and regions, 
and collected the relevant usage fees and other fees. See “Overviews”, the website of China’s Mobile Limited, and its 
annual financial reports. 
 http://www.chinamobileltd.com/en/about/chairman.php  
659 Hejing Chen and John Whalley, “The State-owned Enterprises Issue in China’s Prospective Trade Negotiations,” 
Centre for International Governance Innovation (2014); The Behavior of Bureaucrats and State Banks in Allocating 
Credit to Chinese State-Owned Enterprises, Journal of Development Economics 71 (2003) 533-559, citing FN 1.  
660 Julia Ya Qin, “WTO Regulation of Subsidies to State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs)- A Critical Appraisal of the China 
Accession Protocol,” 7(4) Journal of International Economic Law: 863-919.  
661 The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 86. 
Also, more and more complaints and questions were raised at the Trade Policy Review of China at the WTO towards 
SOEs and their advantages in 2016 as compared to 2010. See WTO Trade Policy Review: China, Concluding remarks 
by the Chairperson, 20 and 22 July 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp442_crc_e.htm ; WTO Trade 
Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/342, 15 June 2016; WTO 
Trade Policy Review: China, Conlcuding remarks by the Chairperson, 31 May and 2 June 2010, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp330_crc_e.htm ; WTO Trade Policy review: China, Concluding 
remarks by the Chairperson, 19 and 21 April 2006, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp262_crc_e.htm  
662 Use the figure 3.1 with specific numbers, Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, 
State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 57.  
663 Sourafel Girma, Yundan Gong, Holger Gorg, and Zhihong Yu., “Can Production Subsidies Foster Export Activity? 
Evidence from Chinese firm-level data,” Working Paper Series No. 6052, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 
(London: Jan. 2007). 
664 It explores the relation of loss-making SOE subsidies to SOE exports to estimate regressions on exports of SOEs 
using data from a set of thirty Chinese provinces.  Citing FN 6 from Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies 
to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” 17 China Economic Review (2006) :1-13. 
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influence in generating SOEs’ exports. 665  For instance, the Chinese Government’s financial 
support in steel and aluminum industries have contributed to massive excess capacity in China, 
with the result of over-production distorting global markets. China’s aluminum excess capacity 
contributes to a decline in global aluminum prices.666  
 
Export restraints are the major effects in natural resources sectors, such as non-ferrous metals. 
Take one more example, the strategy of shutting down POEs and expanding power of SOEs, giving 
several giant SOEs control of exploration, production, and distribution, can lead to SOEs being in 
control of natural resources, affecting exports in that SOEs may form a bloc to restrain exports.667  
The impact of impeding imports of goods or services or foreign investment is primarily seen in the 
sectors of petroleum, telecommunication, civil aviation, shipping and shipbuilding, auto vehicles, 
etc., dominated by SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights, which may constitute barriers to 
trade.668 For instance, the share of imported vehicles accounts for 5% of Chinese market in terms 
of numbers of cars sold in 2014.669 Taking the civil aviation industry (manufacture of commercial 
aircraft) as an another example, of the 120 central SOEs listed on SASAC’s website, three of the 
top five listed companies are involved in the aerospace or aviation industry, and there are seven 
                                                      
665 Richard S. Eckaus, “China’s Exports, Subsidies to State Owned Enterprises and The WTO,” China Economic 
Review 17 (2006) :1-13.  
666 The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 86.  
667 Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4.  
668 For instance, trade barriers can be done through mark-up, custom specification, etc. Mark-up means the ratio 
between the cost and selling prices. In the context of import monopolies, mark-up prices mean the selling prices to 
domestic markets after importing the goods. Custom specification means an official document stating details and rules 
for importing or exporting goods into or from a country.  See Dictionary Cambridge, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/customs-specification (last visited June 28, 2017.); One example 
can be found between Japan and Australia concerning importing STEs of wheat, barley and sugar from Australia to 
Japan. See WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by Australia Concerning the New and 
Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/6, 9 Oct. 2007; WTO Working Party on State 
Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by Australia Concerning the New and Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, 
State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/7, 7 Oct. 2009; WTO Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questions Posed by 
Australia Concerning the New and Full Article XVII Notification of Japan, State Trading, G/STR/Q1/JPN/9, 20 Oct. 
2009.   
669 1.4 million vehicles were imported to China in 2014, while 23.7 million vehicles were sold in China in 2014. See 
China-Britain Business Council, “Report: The Automotive Market in China,” 2015 EU SME Centre, (2015), 5, 8.  
http://www.ccilc.pt/sites/default/files/eu_sme_centre_sector_report_-_the_automotive_market_in_china_update_-
_may_2015.pdf  ; China Association of Automobile Manufacturers, A summary on the automobile market in 2014 
and an estimate on the automobile market in 2015, 
http://www.caam.org.cn/xiehuidongtai/20150112/1805144356.html.  
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SOEs in the aviation or aerospace industry in total on the list.670 China currently accounts for 22 
percent of Airbus’ 2010 orders and 15 percent of Boeing’s orders, and COMAC (an SOE) is in 
competition with Boeing and Airbus.671 In March 2008, the China Commercial Aircraft Company 
(COMAC) was formed to design and build large passenger aircraft of over 150 passengers to 
reduce China’s imports of Boeing and Airbus.672  
 
In a nutshell, given that China is a larger trader and investor and Chinese SOEs play a profound 
role in China in terms of trade and investment, grants of various advantages to Chinese SOEs 
generate negative international effects. These effects can be observed as promoting exports of steel, 
aluminum, cement, etc., restraining exports of natural resources, and impeding imports of, for 
instance, petroleum and services, to China.  
 
3.4 Little Incentive in Domestic China to Deal with the Problems  
 
Little incentive can be found domestically in China to deal with the problems of SOEs receiving 
advantages from the analysis of political economy theory, from the Chinese Communist Party’s 
(CCP) perspective, and from the historical and ideological perspectives.   
3.4.1 Political Economy Theory Does Not Work Well in China  
 
If political economy theory works, incentives can be found from domestic interest groups to 
oppose the grants of advantages. However, political economy theory doesn’t work so well in the 
context of China, and hence there is little domestic incentive to deal with the problems. 
Nevertheless, political economy theory can be used to explain partially why there is little domestic 
                                                      
670 See a list of central SOEs on the website of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission 
of the State Council, http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n1180/n1226/n2425/index.html  
671 For instance, COMAC’s jet in the next plan is the C919, a narrow‐body jet that China hopes will be able to compete 
directly the Airbus 320 and the Boeing 737. “G.E. to Share Technology with China in New Joint Venture,” New York 
Times, Jan. 17, 2011. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/business/global/18plane.html?_r=0 . “Ryan Air May Spend Billions on Cheap 
Chinese Jets,” Independent.ie. Feb. 6, 2011. 




incentive to deal with the problems, given that economic reform, particularly SOE reform in China, 
is intertwined with political factors.673  The model of the classic political economy theory based on 
the U.S. politics, has two players, i.e., politicians and voters (voters can be categorized into 
different interest groups, such as corporations and individuals). On the contrary, in the context of 
China, there are three major players, i.e., the Chinese Communist Party, the state/government, and 
SOEs. The concept of voters is insignificant in China.  
 
(1) SOEs Have Strong Lobbying Power to Ask for Advantages Without Opposition from 
Counterparties  
 
SOEs ask for advantages that will benefit their economic interests. Grants of monopolies and 
financial advantages can guarantee SOEs’ profits.674 SOEs oppose the reforms on a diversity 
ownership or any reduction of advantages.675 For instance, the largest SOEs in the oil industry 
strongly oppose market reform in natural gas which can increase production.676 Beneficiaries, such 
as SOEs themselves, directors and managers of SOEs, can get benefits through SOEs receiving 
various advantages, equivalent to the outcome resulting from improving the productivity or 
efficiency of SOEs in the end. For instance, monopolistic status guarantees SOEs large profits, and 
hence, directors and mangers of SOEs can get benefits indirectly. Since beneficiaries in the end 
enjoy the same benefits, they wouldn’t care about the means of getting the end either through 
improving the efficiency of SOEs or through SOEs receiving advantages. Furthermore, incentives 
and motives of managers of SOEs will more likely cause them to ask for advantages. For instance, 
given that expanding the scale of operations rather than profit-maximization is the goal of SOEs, 
the managers are promoted based on the scale of the operation in most cases. Hence, given that 
                                                      
673 Dali L. Yang, Remarking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford University Press, 2004); See Barry Naughton, Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-
1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1-25 and 309-26.  
674 The need for maintaining monopolistic profit also accounts for governmental price control. Government may also 
set high floor prices for SOEs so that they can get profit. 
675  See Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise Governance in China: An International 
Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006), 15-33. China Examiner, “SOE Reform 
Encountered Difficulties and Obstacles: Xi Jinping Cannot Tolerate with it and Li Keqiang Was Angry,” 29 May 
2016.   
676 Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging its Resources for 
Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of Other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China Economic Times, Aug. 
1, 2008. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html 
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receiving more advantages can help SOEs expand the scale of operations, it creates incentives for 
managers to advocate for more grants of advantages from the government.  
 
Chinese SOEs have stronger lobbying power and have no comparable counterparties that can 
leverage against them. On the one hand, first, SOEs are well-organized and well-financed interest 
groups.677 Second, SOE managers are powerful. For instance, the hierarchical ranks in CNPC and 
Sinopec group are equivalent to those of governmental departments. The managers of CNPC and 
Sinopec have higher profiles than the officials in the bureau that supervises them.678 On the other 
hand, consumers or taxpayers in China have little voice in the political arena. POEs in China are 
less likely to have a significant influence on political officials. There are no competing interest 
groups of POEs that can counter the influence of SOEs. The power of trade unions in China is not 
comparable to those in western countries. It is contrary to political economy theory which models 
that taxpayers are voters in the U.S., influencing the political agenda, and the balance coming from 
the competing interest groups.679  
 
(1) Potential Conflicts of Interest can be Handled by the CCP  
 
There are potential conflicts of interest among different interest groups,680 which may have a by-
product consequence of reducing advantages granted to SOEs. First, there are conflicts of interest 
between SOEs and governmental budgets. There are budgetary constraints for giving advantages.  
Given that the efficiency of SOEs is lower than that of POEs, doubts are cast to the efficiency of 
granting advantages to SOEs, and hence the efficiency of governmental expenditure.681 Second, 
there are conflicts of interest among different SOEs, such as the competition among giant SOEs in 
the same industry,682 and the competing interests among import-competing SOEs, SOEs who need 
                                                      
677 Paul Krugman, “Is Free Trade Passe?” 1 Economic Perspective (1987): 131-144, 142. 
678 Usha C.V. Haley and George T. Haley, Subsidies to Chinese Industry, State Capitalism, Business Strategy, and 
Trade Policy (Oxford Uni. Press, 2013), 37.  
679 The balance can come from, for instance, industries which use intermediate products as inputs, who can exercise 
countervailing power and block the protection of domestic intermediate products, see Dominick Salvatore, 
International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 277.  
680 These are essentially zero-sum games in that one group receive advantages at the expense of another group. 
681 Ling Liao and Liulong Cao, “The Reform on the Supply Side: the Steel industry turns left and the coal industry 
turns right,” notes from the first day of survey done by the GF Securities regarding the reform on the supply side 
facing the reform of SOEs, GF Securities Research, 23 July 2016. http://www.weidu8.net/wx/146138 
682 The anti-trust dispute between China Unicom and China Mobile shows that there is interest conflict among SOEs. 
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imported goods as inputs, and exporting SOEs.683 Third, there are conflicts of interest between the 
central government and local governments. SOE reform is related to fiscal and taxation systems, 
which significantly affect the relationship between the central government and local governments. 
The central government wants to have stronger power over local governments, and hence, may 
require local governments to reduce grants of advantages to SOEs through taking back local 
governments’ power to grant advantages to SOEs, whose revenues largely contribute to local 
governments’ budgets. 684  Fourth, there are political struggles among political factions. For 
instance, at the end of 1970s, the political struggles between the reform faction within the CCP 
and their conservative rivals, resulted in an economic reform, which was the most political 
effective way for the reform faction to gain political power. Hence, the reform faction embraced 
non-state enterprises and relaxed some monopolies of state enterprises to have economic growth. 
The CCP is divided between the ruling faction in power and the opponents, i.e., the non-ruling 
faction not in power, which may have connections with high profile managers and directors of 
SOEs. Hence, the reform of SOEs is one tool for the ruling faction to weaken the power of 
opponents through, for example, a diversity of ownership, changing managers and directors of 
SOEs, anti-corruption, etc. However, it should not be expected that the extent of reducing 
advantages granted to SOEs in SOE reform will be intense, given that political fights essentially 
switch power from one faction to the other within the CCP.685   
 
However, the abovementioned conflicts of interest are not strong given that there is shared 
common interest among those groups and the CCP is capable of managing these conflicts of 
interest through the rotation of personnel and directives. In China, the three major players, i.e., 
                                                      
In the fall of 2011, reports indicated the National Development and Reform Commission was investigating anti-
competitive behavior by two major telecom SOEs, China Unicom and China Mobile allegedly charging prices for 
access to their broadband backbone networks that were higher for competitors than for internet operators. See Andrew 
Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State‐owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China 
Economic and Security Review Commission (October 26, 2011), 4; Elizabeth J. Drake, “Chinese State-Owned and 
State-Controlled Enterprises: Policy Options for Addressing Chinese State-Owned Enterprises,” Testimony before the 
U.S. – China Economic and Security Review Commission (Partner, Law Offices of Stewart and Stewart, 15 Feb. 
2012), 8. 
683 Joost Pauwelyn, “New Trade Politics After the Doha Round,” Les Conférences de HEI avec le parrainage du 
quotidien Le Temps, Geneva, 5 December 2007.  
684 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, China: Record of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 
2012, para. 126. 
685 For instance, high profile managers or CEOs in PetroChina, Sinopec, CNOOC, China Mobile, Telecom, China 
Unicom have stepped down after Xi Jinping took power. See China Examiner, “SOE Reform Encountered Difficulties 
and Obstacles: Xi Jinping Cannot Tolerate With it and Li Keqiang Was Angry,” 29 May 2016.   
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SOEs, the government, and the CCP share the common interest in a network given that the 
incentives of the directors and managers of SOEs and the government officials are associated with 
the CCP. It is contrary to the incentives of the politicians in political economy theory based on the 
U.S. electoral model, which are associated with the voters (campaign contributors). For instance, 
if there is a battle between import-competing SOEs on one hand (they advocate for domestic 
subsidies for SOEs and restraint of imports), and SOEs who are consumers of imported goods and 
SOEs who export on the other hand (since these SOEs will advocate for reducing import restraints 
and export subsidies), SOEs usually do the cost-benefit analysis in terms of how much tariffs 
should be imposed on imported goods, and the CCP may address it by Party directives through the 
government, by directing the import-competing SOEs to sell the product domestically to other 
downstream SOEs at prices lower than imported goods. Furthermore, the CCP tries to eliminate 
conflicts of interest through a rotation system of personnel among SOEs and government officials 
by the CCP’s appointment power.686 For instance, there might be a conflict of interest between 
SOEs asking for financial advantages, and the governmental budgetary department that wants to 
restrain grants of financial advantages to SOEs. Keeping in mind the roster personnel, officials in 
the budgetary department and SOE managers may agree on an exchange of current interests for 
future interests. An official (A) might be rostered to be an SOE manager in the future, and an SOE 
manager (B) might be rostered to be an official in the future.  Thus, A and B agree explicitly or 
implicitly that A will agree to give financial advantages to the SOE in which B is a manger now. 
In exchange, in case that A becomes the SOE manager and B becomes the official in the future, B 
will be willing to give financial advantages to the SOE in which A becomes a manager in the future.  
 
In summary, political economy theory, which is based on the U.S. politics, doesn’t work well in 
China in that SOEs have strong lobbying power to ask for advantages without opposition from 
counterparties. POEs, trade unions, taxpayers and consumers in China have less lobbying power 
than SOEs, which have better connections with the government and the CCP. Furthermore, 
potential conflicts of interest, such as the conflict of interest between SOEs and governmental 
                                                      
686 Dali L. Yang, Remarking the Chinese Leviathan: Market Transition and the Politics of Governance in China 
(Stanford University Press, 2004), 5. The roster can be evidenced by one survey of the resumes of officials in ministries 
and commissions in the State Council, it shows that 56 out of 183 officials have working experiences in SOEs, 
accounting for 30.6%. A survey of resumes of senior executives of 123 central SOEs shows that 115 senior managers 
of 47 SOEs have the background of working in governmental offices. See “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of 
the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), Abstract.  
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budgets, the conflict of interest among different SOEs, and the conflict of interest between central 
and local governments, and conflict of interest among political factions can be well handled by the 
CCP through rotation of personnel and directives.  
3.4.2 Little Incentive from the Chinese Communist Party  
 
The need for political legitimacy and the fact that the Party controls the state explains ultimately 
the reason for giving advantages to SOEs. 687 The essential reason for the CCP to initiate an 
economic reform was the desire for legitimacy as the controlling party since improving lives of 
the people is the best way to preserve the CCP’s power.688 Giving various advantages to SOEs can 
ensure SOEs’ dominance in strategic and other important sectors, which allows the Party to control 
the economy through SOEs.689 The Party wants to control the state, which is primarily achieved 
by controlling the economy through SOEs with two parallel management structures. 690  The 
primary objective of the CCP in the past years is to maintain stability, which is guaranteed by 
maintaining employment, even in face of decreased GDP. This is because the continuous 
dominance of the CCP is dependent on stability. The status quo is more likely to be maintained as 
long as stability is not threatened. SOE reform is limited by its objective of sustaining social 
stability. Such limitation is taken advantage of by SOEs, which bet that SOE reform won’t be 
thorough. As long as the CCP feels that subsidies to SOEs are necessary in order to maintain 
employment levels, SOEs have incentives to lobby for subsidies.691   
 
To that end, it is not likely that the CCP will reduce influence over SOEs, or reduce substantively 
various advantages to SOEs, despite current challenges, such as slowed economic growth in China 
                                                      
687 Daniel Chow, “How China Promotes its State-Owned Enterprises at the Expense of Multinational Companies 
Doing Business in China and Other Countries,” Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, No. 307, October 
5, 2015, 41(3) North Caroline Journal of Int’l Law (Spring 2016): 455.  
688 SOE reforms were deemed to be necessary in order to increase economic growth and raise living standards. See Xi 
Li, Xuewen Liu and Yong Wang, “A Model of China’s State Capitalism,” HKUST IEMS Working Paper N. 2015-12 
(Feb. 2015), 9. http://iems.ust.hk/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/IEMSWP2015-12.pdf   
689 Daniel Chow, The Legal System of the People’s Republic of China in a Nutshell, 3rd edition (West Academic 
Publishing, 2015), 21.  
690 One structure is the corporate management structure, and the other is the Party structure. Persons who hold positions 
in the corporate management structure simultaneously hold positions in the Party structure of approximately equal 
rank. See Liwen Li and Curtis Milhaupt, “We are the (National) Champions: Understanding the Mechanisms of State 
Capitalism in China,” 65 Stan. L. Rev. 697 (2013): 737.  
691 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review, China: Record of the Meeting, WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 
2012, para. 61.  
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in recent years;692 overcapacity in steel and metal industries caused by financial advantages granted 
to SOEs; insufficiency of increasing wages of workers to deal with inflation partially caused by 
large investments by SOEs and subsidies granted to SOEs;693 the increasing prices of real estate, 
which can be partially attributed to the fact that many financial advantages granted to SOEs are 
channeled into the financial sector or the real estate sector instead of being used to improve 
productivity.694 Those challenges are not strong nor urgent enough to make the CCP implement 
thorough SOE reform that will put the stability into risk.  
 
Although some reform efforts have been made regarding SOEs, 695 eliminating various advantages 
granted to SOEs and regulating their behavior afterwards are not likely to occur in China. China 
has indicated that future foreign trade development will transfer from scale expansion to quality 
and profits promotion.696 In that sense, there is less pressure on SOEs to expand scale, and hence 
less SOEs’ lobbying for advantages. But the whole dynamic of the motives of managers of SOEs 
doesn’t change. In light of the development of a social security system nowadays, there is less 
need for maintaining SOEs solely out of the employment concern, and hence it is more likely that 
loss-making SOEs will go bankrupt. China has reduced non-tradeable shares of SOEs publicly 
                                                      
692 It is evidenced by the fact that both exports and imports are declining, shown from the data about trade balancing 
during the period of 2010-2015. See “China Balance of Trade, 1983-2016, Data/Chart/Calendar/Forecast,” Trading 
Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/china/balance-of-trade   
National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2015, (2015).  
 http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2015/indexeh.htm; “Fresh Data Confirms Chinese Economic Slowdown,” BBC 
News Business, 1 March 2016. http://www.bbc.com/news/business-35693794   
693 For more about the historical reform of Chinese SOEs and grant of various advantages to SOEs, see Barry Naughton, 
Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jiagui Chen, 
Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: 
Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008); Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise 
Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).   
694 As for some SOEs that are publicly-traded on stock exchanges, the profit from non-main operation has exceeded 
the profit from main operation. See “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule 
Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 101-111. 
695 SASAC, NDRC and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security announced “Ten experiments for SOE 
reform” on Feb. 25, 2016, including the power of the board of directors, salaries, state assets operation companies, 
mergers and restructuring of central SOEs, ownership reform in some key industries, shares held by workers, 
information transparency of SOEs, separating social obligation of SOEs for their workers and easing historical burden. 
“Report of the Development of the Steel Industry 2016”, Association of the China Steel Industry, May 25, 2016,  
http://www.chinamission.be/chn/zgggfz/zghgjj/t1366468.htm; Ye Yang, “SASAC announced the timeline for the 
Reform on the Supply Side, and the production of Coal SOEs are to be reduced,” Xinhua Net, July 22, 2016. 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2016-07/22/c_129168257.htm 
696 “China’s Foreign Trade Flourishes,” China Daily, 08 Dec. 2011, p. 8. http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-
12/08/content_14230448.htm 
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listed on stock exchanges.697 From 2002-2009, there was reform of some monopolistic industries 
like oil, gas, airline, electricity generation and distribution, telecommunications and railways. 
However, they were only minor reforms.698 Regulation of behavior of SOEs with monopolies or 
exclusive rights didn’t work out very well since “administrative capture” may occur particularly 
where local governments are captured by SOEs. 699  The SASACs system cannot increase 
independence of SOEs’ decision making substantively given that the interference from other 
governmental agencies is not eliminated absolutely, and that the double roles of SASACs, as both 
the owner and the regulator of SOEs, create problems, and that the CCP has its members in 
SASACs.700  
 
In a nutshell, there is little incentive from the CCP the deal with the problems of SOEs receiving 
various advantages, given that the SOE reform may threaten stability, which is the CCP’s primary 
objective and essential factor in preserving control over the state. Although there are some 
challenges in the economic development caused by giving advantages to SOEs, and some reform 
efforts directed at SOEs have been made, these challenges are not urgent enough to compel the 
CCP to undergo thorough SOE reform regarding withdrawing various advantages to SOEs.     
                                                      
697 In May 2010, China’s State Council issued Certain Opinions on Encouraging and Guiding the Sound Development 
of Private Investment towards sectors that have been dominated by SOEs. The policies set out in the Opinions are not 
applied to foreign investment. See WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: 
China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, summary, para. 14. 
698 For instance, in May 2013, China introduced a pilot program to allow non-SOEs to do the business of the resale of 
mobile services to customers through entering leasing contracts with China Unicom, China Telecom or China Mobile. 
However, this pilot program ended in 2015 See Annual Financial Report of China Mobile Limited, 2014 20-F Form, 
(2014). http://www.chinamobileltd.com/sc/ir/reports.php ;  Foreign firms are excluded from the pilot program. See 
The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 91; 
WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, 
summary. 
699 For example, China attempted to supervise the electricity monopoly by establishing an independent agency in 2012. 
This effort, however, failed due to “administrative capture” by the electricity industry. To take an another example, 
local governments may lower the standard of regulations on giant SOEs in the oil industry regarding their 
transportation and retail out of fear the giant SOEs in the oil industry may threaten to withdraw or reduce the supply 
of oil to that city. See Jinbiao Xia and Xiantang Zhang, “CNPC: Being Questioned About its Strategy of Exchanging 
its Resources for Downstream Markets to the Exclusion of Other Enterprises in Downstream Markets,” China 
Economic Times, August 1, 2008. http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/67723/7597579.html  
700 “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule Institute of Economics (June 12, 
2011), 17-34; Michael M. Du (Ming Du), “China’s State Capitalism and World Trade Law” 63 (2) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, 409-448 (Jan. 11, 2014): 417-419; Law of the People’s Republic of China on the State-
Owned Assets of Enterprises (Adopted at the 5th session of the Standing Committee of the 11th National People's 
Congress on October 28, 2008), arts. 11-15.  http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7195&CGid=    
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3.4.3 The Historical and Ideological Factors 
 
The examination of the historical factor is relevant from the viewpoint of path dependence.701 Also, 
one theory suggests that trade policies are biased in favor of maintaining the status quo. It is more 
likely for an industry to be protected now if it was protected in the past. Governments also seem 
reluctant to adopt trade policies that result in large changes in the distribution of income, regardless 
of who gains and who loses. 702 Most SOEs have already gotten advantages from governments, 
and it is likely that such advantages will remain without major changes in the future. The origins 
of giving subsidies for inputs or raw materials, subsidies for fixed assets, subsidies to loss-making 
SOEs, better access to capital, etc., can be found by tracing back to the history of China after 
1979.703  However, the path dependence justification for granting advantages to SOEs cannot be 
sustained given that, first, it has been a long period of time since the 1979 economic reform, and 
hence departure from the path is available; and second, circumstances have changed a lot as 
opposed to 1990s or decades ago, given that Chinese SOEs are more active in global markets.  
 
Ideological obstacles can be found in that the communist political ideology and its perception that 
state should play the dominant role in economy and state ownership should remain intact continues. 
To that end, giving various advantages to SOEs is an effective way to preserve the ideology of 
state capitalism. In the reform of SOEs regarding state ownership, the state grip is tight though.704  
 
 
                                                      
701 From a path dependence viewpoint, historical process and institutional conditions matter to some degree. For the 
basic concept of path dependence, see S. J. Liebowitz, “Path Dependence, Locke-In, and History,” 
https://www.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/paths.html 
702 Dominick Salvatore, International Economics, 5th edition (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1995), 277.  
703 For more about the historical reform of Chinese SOEs and grant of various advantages to SOEs, see Barry Naughton, 
Growing Out of the Plan: Chinese Economic Reform, 1978-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1996); Jiagui Chen, 
Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang (China: 
Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 319; Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise 
Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).  
704 For instance, the SASAC of Shangxi Province requires that the percentage of state shares shall be more than 50% 
in publicly traded SOEs in the energy sector. It is the same with the steel industry where the cooperation between 
SOEs and POEs regarding mixed ownership is not encouraged by the government. See Ling Liao and Liulong Cao, 
“The Reform on the Supply Side: the Steel industry turns left and the coal industry turns right,” notes from the first 
day of survey done by the GF Securities regarding the reform on the supply side facing the reform of SOEs, GF 
Securities Research, 23 July 2016. http://www.weidu8.net/wx/146138  
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3.4.4 Summary of 3.4 
 
There is little incentive in China to deal with the problems of SOEs receiving various advantages. 
This is because the relationship among SOEs, POEs, governments, taxpayers, consumers, etc., are 
quite different from western countries, such as the U.S., which is the basic model of political 
economy theory. In political economy theory, different interest groups have respective lobbying 
power for their own interest, and encounter opposition from other interest groups, and hence there 
is a balance and check. However, Chinese SOEs have strong lobbying power and little opposition 
from other interest groups. The potential conflict of interest among different interest groups in 
China can be better handled by the CCP through personnel rotation and directives. The CCP has 
control over the state through control over the economy, which is primarily through the tool of 
SOEs. Reform on SOEs regarding reducing or withdrawing advantages given to SOEs may 
threaten the social stability, which may consequently threaten the control status of the CCP. To 
that end, the CCP has little incentive to deal with the problems of SOEs receiving advantages. The 
status quo is more likely to be maintained, and the communist political ideology is likely to prevent 
the CCP from any further attempts to make thorough SOE reform.   
 3.5 Conclusion of Chapter 3 
 
This Chapter examines the problem of SOEs in the context of China, and finds that SOEs are 
widely present in China generally. By examining the extent to which Chinese SOEs receive various 
advantages from the Chinese Government in ten industries, it finds that SOEs receive more 
financial advantages in various forms with less transparency than POEs; SOEs are more likely to 
receive monopolies and exclusive rights, and are more likely to engage in anti-competitive 
behavior and their decision making is more likely to be influenced by governments; SOEs are more 
likely to receive regulatory advantages, such as mergers and acquisitions that are assisted by 
governments, exemption from domestic competition laws, and other laws. Given that China is a 
large trader and investor, and Chinese SOEs play a significant role in international trade, there are 
negative trade effects caused by giving advantages to Chinese SOEs, such as impeding imports, 
promoting exports, restricting exports and impeding foreign investment in China. This has caused 
concern at the international level regarding the grants of advantages and the behavior of SOEs. 
The problems need international disciplines given that there is little incentive for China to deal 
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with the problems. That is because political economy theory doesn’t work well in China in that 
Chinese SOEs have stronger lobbying power and have no comparable counterparties raising 
opposition. The potential conflicts of interest can be handled by the CCP, which has little incentive 
to deal with the problems since the CCP’s primary objective is to maintain stability.  
 
After examining the problems in the context of China, the next chapter will look at current WTO 
rules to figure out whether they are adequate or not to solve the problems of SOEs receiving 























Chapter 4: The Existing WTO Rules Addressing the Problems and 
Their Weaknesses  
 
This Chapter will examine the current WTO rules that are relevant to address the various 
advantages granted to SOEs and the special WTO rules that are applicable to China and its SOEs. 
In general, these rules fail to regulate adequately advantages granted to SOEs.705 In Section one, I 
examine the rules that discipline financial advantages granted to SOEs in the areas of trade in 
goods, trade in services, and trade-related investment. Then I examine the rules that discipline 
monopolies and exclusive rights granted to SOEs in the above three areas, as well as rules that 
discipline regulatory advantages granted to SOEs in the three areas. Last, I examine the special 
rules agreed to by China in its accession to the WTO with respect to advantages granted to SOEs. 
Finally, the purposes of the rules will be explored in order to illustrate the limitations of these rules.  
 
In Section two, I explain how the current WTO rules cannot cover some issues related to SOEs, 
and how the current rules are deficient even if they could be interpreted more broadly than at 
present so as to address issues related to SOEs receiving advantages. First, I analyze four aspects 
in respect of financial advantages enjoyed by SOEs: (i) the problems of SOEs giving financial 
advantages to other SOEs; (ii) the problem of upstream subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs; 
(iii) the problem of privatization in the context of Chinese SOEs; and (iv) the problem of finding 
“specificity” and “benchmark” in the context of Chinese SOEs. These aspects will be examined 
with possible approaches to address them within the WTO rules. Assessments of the inadequacy 
of each approach will be given.  
 
Second, I examine monopolies or exclusive rights granted to SOEs. I look at the problem from two 
aspects, one is the grant of monopolies or exclusive rights per se, and the other is the behavior of 
SOEs that have been granted monopolies or exclusive rights. I examine the WTO rules to consider 
whether they are adequate to address these two aspects. Third, I examine the regulatory advantages 
granted to SOEs. On the one hand, the exemption from domestic competition laws and other 
regulatory advantages will be examined. On the other hand, the behavior of SOEs after receiving 
                                                      
705 An historical account of rules to address this problem has been given in Chapter One. 
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regulatory advantages will be analyzed. In addition, I consider the issue of whether there are 
justifications to excuse the behavior of SOEs or exceptions to WTO rules that should apply to 
SOEs. Finally, I consider the transparency requirements of the WTO in this regard and the fact the 
WTO Members, particularly China, often do not comply with them.  
 
4.1 The Existing WTO Rules 
4.1.1 Financial Advantages Granted to SOEs 
 
Financial advantages granted to SOEs are partially caught by the following rules in the WTO. In 
the area of trade in goods, GATT Article III(8)(b) of GATT provides that subsidies are an 
exception to the national treatment obligation. The ultimate fate of subsidies in the area of trade in 
goods is determined under special rules governing subsidies, as prescribed in Article XVI of GATT 
about subsidies, Note to Article XVI in the Annexes,706 Article VI about countervailing duties, and 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (the SCM Agreement). It seems that the 
SCM Agreement is a lex specialis in relation to the text of GATT Articles VI and XVI.707 The 
SCM Agreement prescribes a definition of subsidies, three types of subsidies subject to different 
disciplines, two kinds of remedies, including CVDs and complaints to the DSB in the WTO.708  
 
Subsidies are defined as a “financial contribution by a government or a public body that confers a 
benefit, and is specific,” or “there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article 
XVI of GATT 1994”.709 Export subsidies and import substitution subsidies are deemed to be 
specific and are prohibited.710 Other subsidies are actionable subsidies if they cause adverse effects 
or serious prejudice, including (i) claims of injury to the domestic industry of another member 
where the importing member can bring an action at the WTO or impose CVDs, (ii) claims of 
nullification or impairment of benefits, in particular relating to tariff concessions of the subsidizing 
                                                      
706 Annex I, Ad Article XVI of GATT.  
707 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 290.  
708 Article 5 of the SCM Agreement.   
709 Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement.  
710 Non-actionable subsidies are carved out. The provisions about non-actionable subsidies, such as R&D subsidies, 
environment-related subsidies and subsidies to disadvantaged regions, expired in 2000 due to the opposition to renew. 
See Article 8 of the SCM Agreement.  
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country so that the trading partner can bring a non-violation claim, and (iii) claims of serious 
prejudice to the interests of another member in the subsidized markets, including in third-country 
markets when a subsidy causes damage to its export opportunities on world markets.711 So the 
provisions are all applicable to subsidies granted to SOEs. No distinctions are made among the 
recipients, i.e., whether they are POEs or SOEs.  
 
The SCM Agreement applies only to trade in goods, excluding trade in services.712 As to trade in 
services, Article XV of GATS merely prescribes negotiation obligations for Members to develop 
multilateral disciplines to avoid trade-distortive effects of subsidies. It also requires members to 
exchange information concerning all subsidies related to trade in services that they provide to their 
domestic service suppliers, as well as consultation obligations. To date, GATS rules on subsidies 
have not been developed.713 So there are no rules relating to financial advantages granted to SOEs 
that are services suppliers. General rules regarding specific commitments on market access (Art. 
XVI of GATS) and the national treatment obligation (Art. XVII of GATS) may be applicable, but 
GATS rules allow subsidies to services suppliers to be excepted from the national treatment 
obligation.   
 
In respect of trade-related investment, there are no specific rules regarding subsidies in the TRIMs 
Agreement, which is the WTO agreement regarding investment measures related to trade in 
goods.714 Investment measures related to trade in services are not disciplined. Essentially, by 
explicit reference, the TRIMS Agreement is an application of Article III and XI of the GATT 
regarding the national treatment obligation and general elimination of quantitative restrictions.715 
Hence, rules are similar to those applicable to trade in goods. In contrast, financial advantages 
granted to SOEs, who are in competition with foreign investments related to trade in services, may 
not be disciplined by the WTO rules.  
 
                                                      
711 Articles.5 and 6 of the SCM Agreement.  
712 Article 1 of the SCM Agreement expressly refers to purchases of goods but omits any reference to purchases of 
services, see Panel Report, US — Large Civil Aircraft (2nd Complaint), para. 7.968. 
713 Alan O Sykes, “The Limited Economic Case for Subsidies Regulation,” E15Initiative, Geneva: International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015.  
714 The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (referred to as the TRIMs Agreement).  
715 Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.   
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4.1.2 Monopolies or Exclusive Rights Granted to SOEs 
(1) Trade in Goods: regarding Exclusive Trading Rights 
 
Article XVII of GATT 1994 allows the existence of monopolies and grants of exclusive rights in 
respect of exportation and importation. Despite that, Article XVII:3 provides a negotiation 
obligation to reduce such obstacles caused by state trading for the purpose of expanding 
international trade. It recognizes that enterprises granted exclusive rights or monopolies might be 
operated so as to create serious obstacles to trade, thus “negotiations designed to limit or reduce 
such obstacles…” are of importance.  
 
More specifically, Article XVII:1(a) requires Members to undertake that their STEs shall “act in a 
manner consistent with general principles of non-discriminatory treatment prescribed in this 
Agreement…” and Article XVII:1(b) requires these entities to make purchases or sales solely in 
accordance with commercial considerations. Notes to Article XVII permit export price 
discrimination by STEs as long as different prices are charged for commercial reasons to meet 
conditions of supply and demand in export markets.716 Taking into account that import monopolies 
would undermine tariff concessions, GATT Article II:4 provides that a Member that has an import 
monopoly, “shall ensure that its tariff concessions are not violated through the use of import 
monopoly power.”717  
 
With respect to Member states’ notification obligations, Article XVII:4 provides the transparency 
obligation for Members about the existence of STEs and relevant products subject to them.718 The 
WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994 provides detailed 
procedures and rules for notification through questionnaires, including that governments are 
required to notify any support or benefits provided to STEs that can influence the level of imports 
or exports.719  
                                                      
716 Notes to Article XVII:1 of GATT.  
717 Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger, The Economics of the World Trading System (The MIT, 2002), 149.  
718 In the case of an import monopoly of a product, which is not the subject to a concession under Article II, Article 
XVII (4)(b) provides a notification obligation of the import mark-up or the resale price, on the request of another 
Member.     
719 The Working Party is set up on behalf of the Council for Trade in Goods to review notifications and counter-
notifications through questionnaires. Membership of the Working Party shall be open to all Members indicating their 
wish to serve on it. See paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994; 
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Apart from Article XVII regarding state trading, other general GATT rules such as Article III, XI, 
II might be applicable as well. The dispute settlement procedure in Article XXIII has been used 
by members based on “nullification or impairment” of GATT rules and GATT benefits by trade-
distorting practices of STEs.720 
 
(2) Trade in Services 
 
Regarding monopolies or exclusive rights per se, in service areas without a market-access 
commitment, GATS allows the existence of service monopolies and exclusive service rights. In 
services areas with a market-access commitment, XVI:2 (a) of GATS limits quantitative 
restrictions on market access. It provides that it is prohibited to have limitations on the number of 
service suppliers whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, or exclusive service 
suppliers in sectors where market-access commitments are undertaken.721 However, this is about 
limitations on foreign service suppliers. It doesn’t prevent the government from granting domestic 
monopolies and exclusive rights to domestic SOEs, to the exclusion of domestic POEs, as long as 
the market-access commitment is not violated. In other words, foreign service suppliers may face 
competition with SOEs who are granted domestic monopolies or exclusive rights.  
 
SOEs that have been granted monopolies or exclusive service rights are partially covered by 
Article VIII of GATS about monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, which concerns any 
enterprises granted monopoly or exclusive service rights by the government.722 Article XXVIII (h) 
provides that “monopoly supplier of a service” in Article VIII means “any person, public or private, 
                                                      
The Working Party reviews the questionnaires associated with the notifications. The questionnaire requires that all 
exclusive or special rights or privileges granted to the STE, as well as any other support or assistance provided by the 
government, are to be specified. “Technical Information on State Trading Enterprises”, WTO Website,  
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/statra_info_e.htm  
720 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation of Article XVII and 
Proposals for Reform,” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 71-96 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
75, citing FN 7.  
721 Paragraph 2 of Article XVI of GATS.  
722 Articles XXVIII (h) and VIII:5 of GATS.  
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which in the relevant market of the territory of a Member is authorized or established formally or 
in effect by that Member as the sole supplier of that service”.   
 
Regarding the behavior of these monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, Article VIII (1) of 
GATS provides that a monopoly supplier or exclusive service supplier may not act in a manner 
inconsistent with a member’s MFN obligations and specific commitments regarding market access 
and national treatment.723 Hence, a monopoly service supplier or exclusive service supplier is 
subject to MFN obligations. Regarding the MFN obligation imposed on a monopoly, there is a 
difference between GATT and GATS. Paragraph 1 Ad Note to Article XVII of GATT allows the 
charging by a STE of different prices for its sale of a product in different markets provided that 
such different prices are charged for commercial reasons to meet conditions of supply and demand 
in export markets. In contrast, a monopoly supplier of a service would violate MFN obligations if 
it charges different rates to different foreign buyers.724 It is understandable in that a monopoly 
supplier of a service charges prices only in its own market, i.e., only one market, rather than various 
export markets where STEs sell goods. With regard to the obligation of specific commitments (NT 
and market access) that shall be observed by the monopoly supplier or exclusive service suppliers, 
the rules are only concerned with the service sector where specific commitments are undertaken. 
For most WTO Members, the number of service sectors subject to commitments is limited. Also, 
these specific commitments are subject to Article XXI of GATS regarding modification of 
commitments.725  
 
Article VIII (1) of GATS only disciplines “supply of the monopoly service”, which means that a 
monopoly’s behavior in its input market is not subject to any discipline.726 For instance, in the 
production and distribution of energy and communications services, the monopoly or exclusive 
service suppliers often constitute the only consumer or the major consumers of some specialized 
inputs. Due to the lack of competition in market for such specialized inputs, monopoly or exclusive 
                                                      
723 Article VIII of GATS.   
724 Aaditya Mattoo, “Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO rules for Goods and Services,” in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 37-70 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 41. 
725 Article XXI of GATS.   
726 Aaditya Mattoo, “Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO rules for Goods and Services,” 
in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 37-70 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 39. 
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suppliers may use their power to purchase inputs at prices below those that would normally prevail, 
thereby giving themselves a cost advantage in their primary market.727   
 
Apart from disciplining the supply of the monopoly service, Art. VIII (2) of GATS also disciplines 
the field where the entity in question competes with other service suppliers outside the scope of its 
monopoly rights, provided that the field of service outside the monopoly service is subject to 
specific commitments in its schedule.728 It prohibits cross-subsidization for monopoly service 
suppliers, i.e., transferring advantages of the monopoly in the reserved sector to services outside 
the scope of its monopoly rights. 
 
In respect of trade-related investment, there are no specific rules regarding monopolies or 
exclusive rights applicable to service providers.729  
4.1.3 Regulatory Advantages Granted to SOEs  
 
As to trade in goods, Article XI of GATT about General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions 
may be resorted to for regulatory treatment in favor of SOEs, such as import and export barriers 
and restrictions. 730  Article III of GATT about National Treatment on Internal Taxation and 
Regulation may be resorted to for regulatory treatment in favor of SOEs, such as deregulation of 
SOEs and anti-trust law exemption for SOEs, and so on.731 As to trade in services, the MFN 
obligation of Article II of GATS applies. Specific commitments as prescribed in Article XVI about 
market access and Article XVII about the national treatment obligation may be resorted to as well. 
As to trade-related investment in goods, there are no specific rules except for the application of 
Article III and XI of GATT as provided in Article 2 of the TRIMs Agreement.  
 
                                                      
727 Aaditya Mattoo, “Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO rules for Goods and Services,” 
in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 37-70 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 37-8. 
728 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” 
in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 173-4.  
729 The TRIMs Agreement is mainly about application of the national treatment obligation and the quantitative 
restrictions prohibitions in GATT. 
730 Article XI of GATT. 
731 Article III of GATT.  
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4.1.4 Advantages Granted to Chinese SOEs  
 
In addition to general WTO rules that are applicable to all WTO Members, China undertook special 
commitments under its WTO Accession Protocol and the related Working Party Report. The 
special commitments undertaken by China have specified different rules for disciplining SOEs and 
advantages they get.  
 
(1) Financial Advantages 
 
Article 10 (1) of the Protocol provides that China has the obligation to notify any subsidy within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement. Article 10 (2) provides a ‘specificity’ rule for 
subsidies to SOEs, i.e., subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as specific if SOEs are the 
predominant recipients of such subsidies or SOEs receive disproportionately large amounts of such 
subsidies. Article 10 (3) requires China to eliminate all export subsidies, including those to Chinese 
SOEs. The Working Party Report, which constitutes an integral part of China’s Accession Protocol 
to WTO, requires China to eliminate all import-substitution subsidies. 732  This means that 
exceptions for developing countries are not available to China.733 Thus, China could not invoke 
Articles 27.8, 27.9 and 27.13 of the SCM Agreement regarding the special and differential 
treatment for developing countries.734   
 
With regard to cheaper inputs provided by SOEs to other SOEs, paragraph b of Article 3 of the 
Protocol about non-discrimination can be resorted to, which particularly provides that goods and 
services provided by public or state enterprises, in areas including transportation, energy, basic 
telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production, should be in conformance with non-
discrimination principles.735 As provided in article 12 of the Protocol, regarding the agriculture 
sector, China is obligated to notify any fiscal and other transfers between or among SOEs in the 
agricultural sector and other enterprises that operate as state trading enterprises in the agricultural 
sector. 
                                                      
732 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 Nov. 2001, para. 168.  
733 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 10.  
734 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, 10 Nov. 2001, para. 171.  
735 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art.3.  
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Article 15 of the Protocol provides that deviations to the normal WTO rules can be applied in 
respect of price comparability in determining subsidies. It allows choosing a different benchmark 
in identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit if market economy conditions are not prevailing 
or if prevailing terms and conditions in China may not be available as appropriate benchmarks. 
This deviation doesn’t have an expiration date, as opposed to the special rules on dumping cases, 
which expire after 15 years.736 Usually in sectors or industries where SOEs are predominant, it is 
more likely that prevailing terms and conditions in China may not always be available as 
appropriate benchmarks.   
 
Annex 5B of the Protocol provides that “subsides provided to certain SOEs which are running at 
a loss,” given in the form of grants or tax breaks, are to be phased out over a period of 5 years.737 
The Protocol also provides that other subsidies need to be phased out upon China’s accession to 
the WTO, including the priority in obtaining loans and foreign currencies based on export 
performance, and preferential tariff rates based on the rate of local content instead of imports used 
in automotive production. These subsidies are mainly enjoyed by SOEs given the fact that SOEs 
have easier access to loans than POEs and given that SOEs are dominant in automotive production.  
 
(2) Advantages of Grants of Monopolies and Exclusive Rights and Privileges  
 
With regard to the issue whether the grants of exclusive rights are allowed or not, article 5 of the 
Protocol provides that within three years after accession, all enterprises in China shall have the 
right to trade in all goods except for the list in Annex 2A.738 This means that grants of exclusive 
rights regarding importation and exportation are not allowed, including grants to SOEs, except for 
the list in Annex 2A.739  
                                                      
736 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, arts. 15(b) and (d). 
737 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, Annex 5B.  
738 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 5 (right to 
regulate); With respect to grants of exclusive rights to import or export, the following are allowed under the Protocol 
of China’s Accession to WTO, as provided in its ANNEX 2A1 about products subjects to state trading (imports), such 
as crude oil, processed oil, chemical fertilizer; ANNEX 2A2 about products subject to state trading (export), such as 
tungsten ore, and other rare earths, minerals, coal, crude oil, processed oil, silk. (the trading rights of natural rubber, 
timber, plywood, and steel are to be liberalized with 3 years after accession.) 
739 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 5 and Annex 2.  
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With respect to the regulation of the behavior of entities granted exclusive rights to import or 
export, including those SOEs that have been granted such rights, in addition to GATT, Article 6 
of the Protocol provides that such entities should make decisions independently from the state’s 
influence, and are to be transparent about purchase procedures and export pricing mechanisms.740 
Another provision that might be relevant regarding regulation of the behavior of SOE monopolies 
or SOEs with exclusive rights, is paragraph b of Article 3 about non-discrimination. It particularly 
provides that goods and services provided by public or state enterprises, in areas including 
transportation, energy, basic telecommunications, other utilities and factors of production, to 
foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises, shall be in conformance with 
the non-discrimination principle, as compared to the treatment accorded to other individuals and 
enterprises.741  
 
(3) Regulatory Advantages 
 
With regard to price controls, Article 9 of the Protocol provides that price controls are not allowed 
except for goods and services listed in Annex 4, and China shall make best efforts to reduce and 
eliminate these controls.742 Under the Protocol, products subject to state pricing include natural 
gas. Products subject to government guidance pricing include processed oil and fertilizer. Public 
utilities that are subject to government pricing include electricity, gas for civilian use, tap water, 
heating power and water supplied by irrigation works. Service sectors that are subject to 
government pricing include postal and telecommunication services. Service sectors that are subject 
to government guidance pricing include transport services, such as rail transport of both passenger 
and freight, air transport of freight, port services and pipeline transport, and bank services, such as 
settlement, clearing and transmission services. 
 
                                                      
740 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 6 (state trading). 
741 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 3 (non-
discrimination).  
742 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 9 (price 
controls).  
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(4) Additional Commitments Relevant to Advantages Received by SOEs 
 
The Working Party Report requires the behavior of Chinese SOEs to be based on commercial 
considerations, without any governmental influence or application of discriminatory measures.743 
In the area of investment, with respect to the manufacture of motor vehicle engines, China agreed 
to remove the 50 per cent foreign equity limit for joint-ventures upon accession.744 
 
4.2 Weaknesses of the Existing WTO Rules Addressing the Problem  
 
Most normal advantages given to SOEs can be regulated by the rules described above. However, 
some specific issues are not effectively covered by current rules. This section will explore those 
challenges that have confronted the current WTO rules or elements of rules by the various 
advantages granted to SOEs.  
4.2.1 Financial Advantages Granted to SOEs  
 
Apart from the coverage deficiency that the SCM Agreement is only applicable to trade in goods, 
rather than trade in services, or trade-related investments, several issues cast challenges to the SCM 
Agreement when it is applied in the context of SOEs. This is particularly true with the elements of 
“a government or public body” “benefit” and “specific”. I would analyze the problem of SOEs 
giving advantages to others; the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry benefiting from 
SOEs in the upstream industry that receive advantages; the problem whether benefits continue to 
exist or not after SOEs undergo privatization; the problem of identifying a “benchmark” for finding 
the existence of benefits and of finding “specificity” for actionable subsidies in the context of 
SOEs under the SCM Agreement. The SCM Agreement is inadequate to address these problems 
                                                      
743 WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Nov. 10, 2001, art.7, paras. 44-6, 
which was incorporated into the Protocol. China confirmed in WPR para. 47, which was incorporated into the Protocol, 
that laws and regulations relating to procurement by state enterprises would not be considered laws and regulations 
relating to government procurement and therefore their purchases and sales would be subject to GATT Article III and 
GATS Articles II, XVI and XVII. 
744 “The representative of China indicated that China was not in a position to commit to joining the Agreement on 
Trade in Civil Aircraft at the present stage.” See WTO, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, 
WT/MIN(01)/3, Nov. 10, 2001, art. 7, paras. 207 and 239.  
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due to limitations on its subject matters, ambiguity of current legal texts, and strict standards about 
the legal elements of “benchmark” and “specificity”.   
  
(1) The Problem of SOEs Giving Advantages to Other SOEs   
 
SOBs and SOEs give financial advantages to other SOEs in terms of capital and inputs, such as 
raw materials, energy, oil, gas, metals, minerals, electricity, water, better access to railways, and 
other commodities and services. Those SOEs that receive financial advantages from SOBs and 
other SOEs will export goods and services to foreign markets, and hence, they have comparative 
advantages over their competitors. Those SOEs that receive financial advantages from SOBs and 
other SOEs are in competition with foreign competitors in the Chinese domestic market, and hence, 
they have comparative advantages over their competitors. The inadequacy of the rules arises 
because of the limitation on subject matters in the SCM Agreement regarding who can give 
advantages. For a subsidy to exist, there must be a financial contribution by a government or public 
body. However, there is no clear answer to the question of whether SOEs can be considered to be 
public bodies and therefore givers of subsidies by looking at the legal texts of the SCM Agreement.  
 
Three interpretative approaches may be utilized to address the problem within current WTO rules, 
i.e., the “private body” approach, the “public body” approach, and the approach of regulating the 
behavior of SOEs. The first two approaches are within the framework of the SCM Agreement, and 
the third approach is within the framework of the whole of WTO rules, particularly Members’ 
Accession Protocols. However, all encounter difficulties. 
a. The “Private Body” (entrust/direct) Approach within the SCM Agreement 
 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement provides that  
 
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution 
by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as 
"government"), i.e. where:…(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs a 
private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to (iii) above which would normally 
be vested in the government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by 
governments; (emphasis added). 
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In light of the purpose of the article 1.1(a)(1)(iv), which is an anti-circumvention provision,745 the 
“private body” approach within the SCM Agreement treats an SOE as a private body “entrusted 
or directed by a government” to provide a financial contribution.  Hence, benefits given by SOEs 
to another entity can be challenged as subsidies under the SCM Agreement, as long as two 
conditions can be proved, i) a link of “entrustment or direction” between the government and the 
SOE in question;746 and ii) the SOE is deemed to be a private body.    
 
The first condition  
The “private body” approach encounters difficulties in satisfying the first condition in three senses. 
First, in WTO jurisprudence, it is complicated to prove an “entrustment or direction” link between 
a government and an SOE. In U.S.-Export Restraints, according to the Panel, the “entrusts or 
directs” standard requires an “explicit and affirmative action of delegation or command”, rather 
than mere government intervention in the market.”747 The Panel in Korea–Commercial Vessels 
rejected the argument that “some degree of government ownership, by itself, constitutes proof of 
government entrustment or direction,” and stated that “although a government ownership share in 
an entity may increase the ability of a government to entrust or direct that entity, there must still 
be evidence of an affirmative act of delegation or command before a finding of entrustment or 
direction may be made.”748 Therefore, the mere fact of state ownership of the SOE or that the state 
acts as the controller of an SOE cannot automatically imply the existence of “explicit and 
affirmative action of delegation or command”.  
 
In U.S.-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, the AB extended the scope of actions 
covered by “entrustment” and “direction” beyond “delegation” and “command”. It explained that 
“entrustment” occurs where a government gives responsibility to a private body, and “direction” 
occurs where the government exercises its authority over a private body and that, in both cases, 
                                                      
745 WTO AB Report, US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAM, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted June 27, 2005, 
para. 113. 
746 Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 (1) Journal of World Trade 167-190 (2014): 
169.  
747 WTO Panel Report, United States-Measures Treating Exports Restraints as Subsidies (US-Export Restraints), 
WT/DS194/R, adopted 29 Jun. 2001, paras. 8.29-8.31. 
748  WTO Panel Report, Korea-Measures Affecting Trade in Commercial Vessels (Korea-Commercial Vessels), 
WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 2005, para. 7.406.  
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“the government uses a private body as a proxy to effectuate one of the types of financial 
contributions listed in paras. (i) through (iii).” It also said that involvement of some form of “threat 
or inducement” could serve as evidence of entrustment or direction.749 In other words, the AB 
emphasized that governments have a lot of means to “entrust” or “direct” an entity, and are not 
limited to “command” or “delegate”. The essence is that some degree of compulsion is involved. 
In addition, the AB excluded “mere policy pronouncements”, “mere acts of encouragement” and 
“inadvertent or a mere by-product of government regulation” as sufficient to demonstrate the link 
of “entrust or direct”750 The mere facts that the government is the controller of an entity doesn’t 
automatically imply that “a government gives responsibility to”, “a government exercises its 
authority over” or “threat or inducement”, and hence neither does it imply the existence of the link 
of “entrustment or direction by a government”.  
 
Second, although the link of “entrustment or direction by a government”, to some degree, has been 
relaxed in US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, the non-transparent relationship 
between the government and SOEs makes it hard to get evidence of a specific “entrustment and 
direction” in a particular case. Furthermore, the determination of entrustment or direction is made 
on a case-by-case basis, and “even if the link is established in one case, this proof of link is needed 
in every future case.”751 For instance, one factor that may be relevant, but not conclusive, in 
determining the existence of entrustment or direction under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) is the 
“commercial unreasonableness” of a financial transaction.752 It requires examination of particular 
the facts of every case, and thus puts a heavy burden on the investigating authority.  
 
Third, even if the use of circumstantial evidence is permitted, the conclusion is uncertain.  On one 
extreme, there is exclusively private conduct, and on the other extreme, there is exclusively 
                                                      
749 WTO AB Report, US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 27 June 2005, 
paras. 112-116. 
750 AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMS, para. 114. 
751 Ru Ding, “‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise,” 48 (1) Journal of World Trade 167–190 (2014): 
170-171; Commentaries to the ILC Draft Articles, Article 8, Commentary (5), p. 107; International Law Commission's 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, Report of the ILC on the work of its Fifty-
third session, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifty-sixth session, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp. IV.E.2 
("ILC Draft Articles"). International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (Jul. 26, 2001). 
752 AB Report, Japan–Countervailing Duties on Dynamic Random Access Memories from Korea (Japan — DRAMs 
(Korea)), WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted 28 Nov. 2007, para. 138. 
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governmental conduct.753 Somewhere in the middle, there is a mixture such as a situation might 
be found where an SOE engages in behavior deviating from that of ordinary market players, such 
as providing goods or services at lower than market prices or on terms unfavorable to itself. It is 
hard to categorize the above situation as exclusively private conduct. One approach adopted by the 
Japanese investigating authority (JIA) in Japan–DRAM (Korea) may shed light on the observation 
of the situation. In that case, JIA’s finding of entrustment or direction was based on the totality of 
circumstantial evidence, including (i) the Government of Korea’s intent to “keep Hynix alive”; (ii) 
that no rational creditor would have entered into the restructuring transactions in view of Hynix’s 
poor and deteriorating financial condition; (iii) the non-commercial reasonableness of entering into 
the restructurings; and iv) the Government of Korea “was in a position to be able to exercise 
sufficient influence on” the four creditors of Hynix. In a nutshell, “the JIA found that the decisions 
of the four creditors to participate in the restructurings were not commercially reasonable, and 
could therefore only be explained by some external, non-commercial factor, namely the 
involvement in the restructurings of the Government of Korea.”754 
 
In that case, the factors of “non-commercial reasonableness” and “the government’s capacity to 
influence” are regarded as relevant circumstantial evidence by the investigating authority, and the 
Panel and AB didn’t reject it.  
 
We recognize that the commercial unreasonableness of the financial transactions is a relevant factor in 
determining government entrustment or direction under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement, particularly 
where an investigating authority seeks to establish government intervention based on circumstantial evidence.755  
 
In Japan–DRAM (Korea), Japan argued that the Korean government had pressured creditors to 
forgive obligations owed to them by the company under investigation, and had thus conferred 
subsidies. The Appellate Body agreed that, at least in principle, government pressure on private 
                                                      
753 Panel Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/R, adopted on 21 Feb. 2005. 
“Situations involving exclusively private conduct—that is, conduct that is not in some way attributable to a 
government or public body—cannot constitute a financial contribution for purposes of determining the existence of a 
subsidy under the SCM Agreement.” See AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, 
WT/DS296/AB, adopted on 27 June 2005, para. 107.  
754 AB Report, Japan-DRAMs (Korea), WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted 28 Nov. 2007, paras.117 and 119.  
755 AB Report, Japan-DRAMs (Korea), WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted 28 Nov. 2007, para.138. 
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creditors to restructure their obligations could amount to “directing” a private body to engage in a 
“direct transfer of funds” and thus amount to a subsidy.756  
 
In cases of SOEs giving advantages, the factor of “non-commercial reasonableness” and pressure 
from the government may be found. There may be more helpful circumstantial evidence in the 
case involving SOEs than a case involving POEs, for example, state ownership and the dynamics 
among the government, the Party and SOEs, are all relevant circumstantial evidence. However, 
some of these relevant factors have been recognized by WTO cases while others have not and the 
significance of each factor is not clear. It is still uncertain whether a link is established in the end 
even if all relevant factors are taken into account.   
 
The second condition 
Moreover, the second condition for establishing that the government has entrusted or directed a 
“private body” is problematic. The phrase “entrusts or directs a private body to carry out” in Article 
1.1(a)(1)(iv), clearly requires that the entity that is directed or entrusted by a government is a 
private body. However, it can be disputed whether an SOE is “a private body” in the sense of 
Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv).757 In addition, there is the issue of who should bear the burden of proving 
that the SOE in question is a private body?  
 
From a standpoint of pure logic, a spectrum can be observed from on the one extreme, a private 
body without any state-owned shares, and on the other extreme, a government. This spectrum is 
based on the statement by the AB in US–Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China):  
 
“this provision [Article 1.1(a)(1) (iv)] introduces the concept of “private body”…the term “private body” 
describes something that is not “a government or any public body”. The panel in US — Export Restraints made a 
similar point when it observed that the term “private body” is used in Article 1.1(a)(1) (iv) as a counterpoint to 
government or any public body, that is, any entity that is neither a government in the narrow sense nor a public 
                                                      
756 AB Report, Japan-DRAMs (Korea), WT/DS336/AB/R, adopted 28 Nov. 2007, para. 123.  
757 Julien Chaisse and Tsai-yu Lin (eds.), International Economic Law and Governance: Essay in Honour of Mitsuo 
Matsushita (Oxford Univ. Press 2016), 243.    
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body would be a private body….758 (footnotes omitted, and emphasis added.) 
 
An inference can be made logically that SOEs are somewhere in the middle between the two 
extremes, or at least SOEs are not private bodies. It is also because the definition of the word 
“private” includes “of a service, business, etc., provided or owned by an individual rather than 
the state or a public body” and “of a person: not holding public office or an official position”.759 
 
In summary, the “private body” approach is not sufficient to address the problem of SOEs giving 
advantages to others, given that the standard for satisfying the “entrust/direct” requirement is strict, 
i.e., it requires an explicit and affirmative action of delegation or command by the government to 
the entity in question, and state ownership or state control of an entity cannot automatically imply 
the existence of “entrustment/direction”, even if relevant circumstantial evidence is taken into 
consideration. In addition, it is hard to argue that SOEs are private bodies.    
b. The “Public Body” Approach within the SCM Agreement 
 
Subsidies granted by SOEs may be subject to the SCM Agreement if it can be demonstrated that 
the SOE at issue is a “public body”, and thereby subject to the same rules that restrain a government 
from granting subsidies. According to the SCM Agreement, one type of a subsidy is a financial 
contribution to an individual/individuals or entity/entities by a government or a public body. The 
WTO legal texts don’t mention explicitly that SOEs giving advantages to others can be covered 
by the SCM Agreement, and neither do they mention whether SOEs can be the givers of subsidies, 
nor do they give a definition of the phrase “a public body”. This approach differs from the “private 
body” approach in that the “public body” approach identifies the nature of SOEs, i.e., whether they 
are public bodies or not. The “private body” approach attributes the behavior of SOEs to a 
government. Moreover, there is no need to prove the nature of the SOE in question and other 
similar SOEs in future cases if the SOE in question is deemed to be a public body in the case at 
                                                      
758 AB Report, United States — Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, 
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted March 11, 2011, paras. 29–294. 
291, 292,  
759 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted March 11, 2011, 
paras. 29–294. 291, 292,  
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hand, while the proof of the link of entrustment or direction in the “private body” approach is 
needed in every future case even if the link has been established in one case.760  
 
The question of what constitutes a public body should be answered prior to the question of whether 
SOEs are public bodies. Some authors have examined the meaning of the term “public body” from 
the perspectives of the literal meaning of the words in them, the context and the purpose and 
objective and the negotiating history of the SCM Agreement. No definition was given for the term 
“public body” in the SCM Agreement. The AB found the term “government” is a relevant context 
for interpreting the meaning of the phrase “public body”.761  Considerations of the object and 
purpose of the SCM Agreement do not favor either a broad or narrow interpretation of the term 
“public body”.762  As for negotiators’ intent, the term “public body” was not in the first draft of 
the SCM Agreement, but was inexplicably added into the text in the second draft.763 It was not 
clear what was in the mind of negotiators when adding “public body” in the provision. Therefore, 
the negotiating history is too ambiguous to rely upon.764  
 
Four legal standards have been presented or debated so far in WTO jurisprudence in the 
determination of what constitutes a public body.765 First, the “government organ/agency” standard, 
which views a public body as functionally equivalent to a government organ/agency, which would 
                                                      
760 Ru Ding, “‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise,” 48(1) Journal of World Trade 167–190 (2014): 
170-171.  
761  Appellate Body Report, United States—Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Flat 
Products from India (US — Carbon Steel (India)), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, para. 4.22.  
762 Appellate Body Report, US—Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, para. 4.28; Appellate 
Body in US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China). 
763 The Tokyo Round negotiation (1973-9) generated the Subsidies Code. “In this Agreement, the term ‘subsidies’ 
shall be deemed to include subsidies granted by any government or any public body within the territory of a 
signatory…(omitted)” See footnote 1 on page 18 of The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Article VI, 
XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. (MTN/NTM/W/236, 5 April 1979),  
https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/SULPDF/91990092.pdf  ; Document MTN.GNG/NG10/W/38, 18 Jul. 1990 
& MTN/GNG/NG10/W/38/Rev.1, 4 Sep. 1990, Uruguay Round Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) 
Agreement Negotiating History.   
764 Ru Ding, “‘Public Body’ or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise,” 48 (1) Journal of World Trade 167–190 (2014): 
170-171. 
765 There are four cases so far: Panel Report, Korea Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 2005; Panel 
Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, adopted 22 Oct. 2010; AB Report, US 
– Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted 11 March 2011; Recently cases 
reaffirm: Panel Report, United States — Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (US- 
Countervailing Measures (China)), WT/DS437/R, 14 July 2014; AB Report, US- Countervailing Measures (China)), 
WT/DS437/AB/R, 18 Dec. 2014; Panel Report, US-Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/R, adopted 14 July 2014; AB 
Report, US-Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted 8 December 2014.   
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mean that SOEs are not public bodies, was rejected by panels and the AB.766 Second, the “majority  
ownership” standard, which views a public body as an entity that is majority government owned, 
and hence SOEs are public bodies, was rejected by the AB.767 Third, the “government control” 
standard, adopted by two panels, which views SOEs as public bodies since they are controlled by 
the government, was rejected by the AB.768 Finally, the “vested governmental authority” standard, 
which was adopted by the AB, views a public body as an entity that possesses, exercises, or is 
vested with governmental authority. Under the last standard, only a few SOEs have been held to 
be public bodies in WTO jurisprudence. The last two standards of “government control” and 
“vested governmental authority” generated much heated debate and controversy. However, both 
standards are limited in their ability to address the problem of SOEs giving subsidies to others 
SOEs.  
 
The “government control” standard takes the view that “control” is sufficient and treats a 
government’s ability to control the entity in question as determinative in establishing that the entity 
in question constitutes a public body. In contrast, the “vested governmental authority” standard 
takes the view that the “ability to control” is not a determinative factor, and other factors need to 
be examined to determine whether “an entity possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental 
authority” for the purpose of finding a public body. 769  However, the literature and WTO 
jurisprudence to date haven’t analyzed in detail the specific factors considered by each standard, 
or the extent to which they overlap or are similar.770  
                                                      
766 China argued for this standard, which is the same definition as that given by the AB to the term “government 
agency” in Article 9.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture, see AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, adopted March 11, 2011, para. 321; Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, paras. 8.55 and 8.59.   
767 It was once applied by the investigatory authority in U.S. in determining that relevant SOEs at issue were public 
bodies principally based on a rule of majority ownership, that SOEs are majority government owned. See AB Report, 
US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 277.  
768 Panel Report, Korea Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, adopted 7 March 2005, para.7.50; Panel Report, US – 
Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.73.  
769 “Subparagraph (iv) envisages that a public body may “entrust” or “direct” a private body to carry out the type of 
functions or conduct illustrated in subparagraphs (i)–(iii)…Thus, pursuant to subparagraph (iv), a public body may 
exercise its authority in order to compel or command a private body, or govern a private body’s actions (direction), 
and may be responsible for certain tasks to a private body (entrustment)…for a public body to be able to exercise its 
authority over a private body (direction), a public body must itself possess such authority, or ability to compel or 
command. Similarly, in order to be able to give responsibility to a private body (entrustment), it must itself be vested 
with such responsibility...” For the reasoning by the AB, see Appellate Body Report, US — Countervailing Duty 
Investigation on DRAMS, paras. 111 and 116, paras. 29–294. 
770 For more debate about whether SOEs are “public bodies” within the SCM Agreement, see Ru Ding, ‘Public Body’ 
or Not: Chinese State-Owned Enterprise, 48 (1) Journal of World Trade 167-190 (2014): 169; Mark Wu, “The ‘China, 
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The “government control” standard 
With regards to the “government control” standard, it refers to “the everyday financial concept of 
a “controlling interest” in a company”, which is defined as  
 
“The technical definition of what is needed for a controlling interest is a maximum of 50 per cent plus one share 
of the voting stock of a company, with the possibility that a much smaller voting block can be controlling, 
depending on how dispersed the ownership of the remaining shares is, and the extent to which the other 
shareholders participate in voting.” (footnote omitted, emphasis added.)771 
 
In terms of evidential factors for the “government control” standard, the factor of “government 
ownership” is considered as highly relevant (indeed potentially dispositive) evidence of 
government control.772 “On its own, majority government ownership is clear and highly indicative 
evidence of government control, and thus of whether an entity is a public body for purposes of the 
SCM Agreement.” 773  It gives “primacy to evidence of majority government-ownership”. 774 
Recognizing that public body determinations are to be made case-by-case, and  
 
“there could be cases (however rare in practice) in which a government-owned entity was completely insulated 
(e.g., by law) from any government involvement in, or influence over, its operations, such that the entity was not 
controlled by the government…In such a situation, it would be the entity and the government in question that 
would have in their possession the information as to the absence of government control, and in our view it would 
be incumbent upon them, and certainly it would be in their interest, to bring that information to the attention of 
the investigating authority. To the extent that such evidence were placed on the record, the investigating authority 
would be required to include its analysis of that evidence in its determination as to whether the entity was or was 
not a public body.” (emphasis added.)775  
 
                                                      
Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 57 (May 13, 2016); For critics 
of AB’s standard from the perspectives of interpretative method and legal implications, see Michel Cartland, Gerard 
Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?” 46 J. World Trade 979, 
2012.   
771 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.134, in its footnote 
256, the Panel cited various definitions of financial concept of a “controlling interest” in a company.  
772 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.134.   
773 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.135. 
774 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.136. 
775 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R, para. 8.136.   
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It can be summarized that under this statement evidence of “majority government ownership” 
alone is sufficient to satisfy the “government control’ standard, and hence, to establish the entity 
in question is a public body, unless it can be proved otherwise by the entity and the government 
concerned that the control is absent.  
 
The Panel that adopted the “government control” standard also considered and analyzed other 
factors, such as the existence of meaningful control and the nature of the entity. In Korea 
Commercial Vessels, the Panel found that the entity in question was a public body primarily based 
on the evidence that it was 100 per cent owned by the government or other public bodies. 
Nevertheless, the Panel also stated that the operations of the entity were conducted by presidents 
who were appointed and dismissed by the government, and mentioned that the government enjoyed 
extensive control over the parameters within which the entity in question (KEXIM) must operate. 
The Panel found that KEXIM would follow whatever the government directed or asked it to do. 
Also, the Panel considered that the “public” nature of KEXIM is further confirmed by KEXIM’s 
own perception of itself.776  
 
Therefore, I think the Panel in this case also considered the factor of “meaningful control”. 
However, the “government control” standard considers the factor of meaningful control as 
unnecessary, and the factor of “formal (i.e., majority voting) control” alone is decisive and 
sufficient to find the existence of a public body.777 In addition, the panel takes the view that 
whether “an entity [was] operating on a commercial basis” was not relevant for deciding whether 
the entity was a public body or not. Rather, whether it “operated on a commercial basis” was 
relevant for the “benefit” analysis in the subsidization analysis of the SCM Agreement.778 It also 
considered the “pursuance of public policy objectives” as an unnecessary factor in finding a public 
body.779  
                                                      
776 Panel Report, Korea Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R. para. 7.50.  
777 As to the distinction between “formal control” and “meaningful control”, the former can be evidenced by majority 
ownership or majority voting, while the latter means that the daily operation of the entity, and decision-making of the 
entity is not independent. For instance, under “formal control”, the managers of the entity enjoy large discretion in 
terms of making decisions regarding daily operation of the entity, without much interference from the majority owner. 
The managers/CEO are more likely to be independent, and behave like professional managers, although their 
appointments are largely influenced by the majority owner. Under “meaningful control”, the shareholders (majority 
owners) have extensive control over the mangers’ decision making in daily operation of the entity.  
778 Panel Report, Korea Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, paras 7.45-7.50.  
779 Panel Report, Korea Commercial Vessels, WT/DS273/R, para.7.50.  
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The “vested governmental authority” standard 
With regards to the “vested governmental authority” standard, first, it takes the view that if a statute 
or other legal instrument expressly vests governmental authority in the entity concerned, it is easy 
to establish that the entity is a public body. 780 Second, in the absence of an express statutory 
delegation of governmental authority, 781  relevant factors or evidence to establish vested 
governmental authority include ownership, control, meaningful control, appointments of managers 
in high positions and policy mandates. All the various relevant factors or evidence need to be 
examined in order to find the existence of “entities vested with governmental authority”. In US–
China AD/CVD, SOBs were found to be public bodies based on evidence relating to the 
Government of China’s role in the banking industry summarized as follows: i) state-ownership of 
SOBs; ii) state control over SOBs, such as state instructions for the banks, SOB’s lack of 
independence (lack of risk management and analytical skills, following state policies) in lending 
decisions; iii) appointment of chief executives by the state or influenced by the Party;782 iv) SOBs 
required to support China’s industrial policies; and v) SOBs meaningfully controlled by the 
government in the exercise of their functions. These considerations and evidence, taken together, 
were found to demonstrate that the SOBs concerned exercise governmental functions on behalf of 
the Chinese Government.783      
 
Third, the AB, which has adopted the “vested governmental authority” standard, thinks that all 
relevant factors can serve as evidence. One factor is not sufficient and determinative, and an 
investigating authority must “avoid focusing exclusively or unduly on any single characteristic 
without affording due consideration to others that may be relevant”.784 In U.S–China AC/CVD, the 
AB viewed the factor of “meaningful control” as relevant evidence for exercising governmental 
functions, by stating that:  
 
                                                      
780 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 318. 
781 “What matters is whether an entity is vested with authority to exercise governmental functions, rather than how 
that is achieved.” See AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 
318. 
782 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, paras. 349-350.  
783 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 355.   
784 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, paras.4.20 and 5.37.  
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“It follows that evidence that a government exercises meaningful control over an entity and its conduct may serve, 
in certain circumstances, as evidence that the relevant entity possesses governmental authority and exercises such 
authority in the performance of governmental functions. In some instances, however, where the evidence shows 
that the formal indicia of government control are manifold, and there is also evidence that such control has been 
exercised in a meaningful way, then such evidence may permit an inference that the entity concerned is exercising 
governmental authority”.785  
 
It might be inferred from the AB’s statement above that evidence about formal control plus 
meaningful control may satisfy the standard of vested authority. However, the case of US–Carbon 
Steel (India) clarifies “meaningful control” and its relative weight. It held that “meaningful 
control” is relevant, but not decisive and exclusive. The substantive standard should be distinct 
from the evidentiary standard.786 The AB thinks it is wrong to construe the term “public body” to 
mean any entity that is “meaningfully controlled” by a government. In other words, the factor of 
“meaningful control”, similar to other factors, only has evidential weight, rather than the weight 
of serving as the substantive standard.  
 
Overall, the two standards accept that formal control, meaningful control and other factors are 
relevant. The only difference may lie in the different weights and significance attached to each 
factor. The “government control” standard treats the factor of “control” as the decisive matter, 
while the “government authority” standard holds that there is not a single factor that can be 
determinative, and that there is a need to consider all relevant factors in conjunction.   
 
Limitations in general  
There are limitations in using these two standards to address the problem of SOEs giving financial 
advantages to other SOEs. With regards to the “government control” standard, it would be 
unreasonable to treat all SOEs as public bodies. Although case-by-case analysis is allowed, the 
burden of proof is imposed on the entity and the government concerned to demonstrate that there 
is no control in existence. Logically, it is harder to prove the absence of government control than 
to prove the presence of government control.  
 
                                                      
785 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 318.   
786 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, para. 4.37. 
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Second, the consequences of the “government control” standard may give rise to the concern of 
legal fragmentation at the international level. If SOEs are deemed to be public bodies in the WTO 
according to the “government control” standard, there might be legal fragmentation in that SOEs 
are accorded different status at the international level. In the international business community, it 
is widely accepted that the behavior of SOEs, who are doing merely commercial activities, or who 
are merely commercial entities, cannot be attributed to the state. In the international investment 
area, private entities can bring investment claims against the host state under bilateral investment 
treaties or free trade agreements while the state is not allowed to bring such claims. In practice, 
SOEs usually have the standing to bring such investment claims. To that end, SOEs are not deemed 
to be governments, and the behavior of SOEs---bringing an investment claim---is not attributed to 
their government. 
  
Last, the consequences of the “government control” standard may give rise to the concern of legal 
fragmentation at the WTO level. The rule of treating SOEs as “public bodies” may work within 
the SCM Agreement, rather than within all WTO rules. It casts limits on the scope of the rule and 
creates different treatments of SOEs within the WTO, i.e., treating SOEs as public bodies in the 
context of subsidies while treating SOEs not as public bodies in the context of non-subsidies. 
Hence, legal fragmentation arises within the WTO.     
 
In contrast, the “vested governmental authority” standard is too narrow in that most SOEs are not 
covered by it. Only in one case has the AB held that state-owned banks (SOBs) are deemed to be 
public bodies, while the AB in the same case decided that other SOEs are not public bodies within 
the SCM Agreement.787  The AB in US–Carbon Steel (India) held that the National Mineral 
Development Corporation (NMDC) is not a public body within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1) 
of the SCM Agreement.788  
 
Second, the “vested governmental authority” standard creates uncertainty. It needs a case-by-case 
analysis given that the demonstration of “possesses, exercises, or is vested with governmental 
authority” is needed in every future case. The answer remains unclear as to the question of whether 
                                                      
787 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 347. 
788 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, paras. 4.1-4.55. 
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SOEs can be deemed to be public bodies, in that the answer is dependent on the evidence found in 
every case.  
 
Furthermore, it seems that the AB doesn’t attach different weights to different factors, except for 
stating that all relevant factors shall be examined conjunctively. It seems that all relevant factors 
are assigned similar weight. It provides little guidance for practice. For instance, as for the 
“meaningful control” factor, the AB in US–China AD/CVD relied heavily on the “meaningful 
control” factor in finding SOBs as public bodies within the SCM Agreement.789 While the AB in 
US–Carbon Steel (India) clarified that the “meaningful control” factor, which is similar to other 
relevant factors, shall not be assigned a decisive weight.790 However, in the latest case of US-
Countervailing Measures (China), the Panel seemed to follow the earlier case, noting that the 
“meaningful control” factor was weighted significantly by the AB in US–China AD/CVD.791 It 
might be better to clarify, at least, the weight assigned to each factor.  
 
Limitations in the context of Chinese SOEs  
The above two standards are also problematic when they are applied in the context of Chinese 
SOEs. The AB explained that among other relevant factors to be considered are the legal order,792 
economic environment prevailing in the country, the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in question, etc. based on each case’s own merits, by stating that  
 
“whether the conduct of an entity is that of a public body must in each case be determined on its own merits, with 
due regard to the core characteristics and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with the government, 
and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the investigated entity operates.” For 
example, “evidence regarding the scope and content of government policies relating to the sector in which the 
investigated entity operates may inform the question of whether the conduct of an entity is that of a public 
body.”793 (emphasis added.)  
                                                      
789 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/AB/R, para. 318.    
790 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, para. 4.37. 
791 Panel Report, United States-Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (US Countervailing 
Measures (China)), WT/437/R, adopted 14 July 2014, para.7.74.  
792 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, para. 4.54; Panel Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), 
WT/DS436/R, para. 7.66, in that case, the public body issue was not appealed since the panel applied the “vested 
governmental authority” standard.   
793 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, para. 4.29. 
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However, the elements and factors mentioned above are not assigned significant weights except 
for “relevance”. Most cases are brought by a WTO member to complain about the countervailing 
measures imposed on products exported by their SOEs to an importing country. Hence, panels 
evaluate whether the investigating authority in the importing country has conducted a thorough 
examination through all relevant factors in determination of whether the SOE in question 
constitutes a public body. Most investigating authorities only or primarily rely on the ownership 
factor, and hence their decisions are found to be inconsistent with the SCM Agreement. In that 
sense, it remains to be seen whether panels in future cases will state in general that factors like 
legal order, economic environment prevailing in the country, the scope and content of government 
policies relating to the sector in question, etc. based on each case’s own merits, etc. should be 
examined, or will further emphasize the respective significant weight assigned to each factor.  
 
In the context of Chinese SOEs, many factors would seem to be relevant: the factor of which 
industry the SOE is in; the factor of whether the industry/sector concerned is categorized under 
strategic industries or pillar industries or normal industries; the factor of whether there are related 
governmental policies to encourage and support the industry concerned; the factor of market 
structure of the industry and the market power enjoyed by the SOE, particularly whether the SOEs 
benefit from monopoly and exclusive rights; the factor of the extent to which various advantages 
are granted to the industry, and SOEs in particular; and etc. I think these factors should play 
significant roles in the determination of whether a Chinese SOE is a public body or not since these 
factors are typical in the context of Chinese SOEs.  
 
Taking the factors of the industry the SOE is in and of whether the SOE has been granted 
monopolies or exclusive rights as an example, except for SOBs which have already been found to 
be public bodies, SOEs in strategic industries, such as coal, airline and aviation, 
telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical, shipping and manufacturing of ships, and 
electricity, are more likely to satisfy both the “government control” standard and “vested 
governmental authority” standard. In contrast, SOEs in pillar industries, such as steel, non-ferrous 
metal, automotive and auto parts, machinery and equipment, information technology, are less 
likely to satisfy the “vested governmental authority” standard, although the “vested governmental 
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authority” standard may be satisfied in industries with SOE blocs, such as steel, non-ferrous metals, 
and automotive industries. One major difference in the above two sets of industries lies in the fact 
whether SOEs have monopolies or exclusive rights in the industry they are in respectively, and 
whether the competition is limited in favor of SOEs to the detriment of POEs in terms of entry, 
importation, exportation, distribution, and so on.   
 
For instance, in cases of China–US AD/CVD and China–US AD, 794  the products under 
investigation were petrochemicals, rubber, steel (produced by Baosteel), steel pipe, tires, pipe and 
tube, woven sacks, thermal paper, pressure pipe, citric acid, kitchen appliance shelving and racks, 
lawn groomers, print graphics, aluminum extrusions, steel cylinders, steel sinks, etc. produced by 
SOEs. I think these products were produced by SOEs who are in different industries/sectors, with 
different market structures, with different extent of presence (SOEs dominate or significantly 
present in the sector), and with different degree of government supports.795 These factors should 
warrant significant considerations and differential treatment as to the question whether the SOE in 
question constitutes a public body or not.  
c. The Approach of Regulating the Behavior of SOEs   
 
The above two approaches of “private body” and “public body” are in the context of subsidies 
within the SCM Agreement. This section discusses the approach of regulating the behavior of 
SOEs in the context of the WTO rules generally, especially the protocols made by Members. 
 
Giving advantages to others by SOEs can be categorized as one behavior the SOEs conduct. Such 
conduct may give rise to the level of discriminatory behavior or decision-making by the SOEs 
based on non-commercial considerations. Hence, the approach of regulating the behavior of SOEs 
                                                      
794 Panel Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), WT/DS379/R; Panel Report, United States-
Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain Products from China (US Countervailing Measures (China)), 
WT/DS437/R, July 14, 2014. 
795 For instance, in the cement and glass industries, which have not been mentioned in the above section, both SOEs 
and POEs are players in the competitive markets, being quite different from other monopolistic markets dominated 
by SOEs. (Profit in the cement and glass industries is not so high, and they rely on large sales). See “A case study by 
Harvard: the development of the cement industry in China,” Shanghai Securities Newspaper, Nov. 7, 2012, 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/hyyj/20121107/025313597055.shtml  
 184 
can address the problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs, particularly providing goods 
or services at lower prices or on favorable terms.  
 
Paragraph b of article 3 of China’s Accession Protocol can be resorted to since it provides that the 
prices and availability of goods and services provided by public or state enterprises, in areas 
including transportation, energy, basic telecommunications, other utilities and factors of 
production, should be in conformance with the non-discrimination principle, by stating  
 
Article 3 of Protocol China Accession to WTO: Non-discrimination   
Except as otherwise provided for in this Protocol, foreign individuals and enterprises and foreign-funded 
enterprises shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to other individuals and enterprises 
in respect of:   
(a) the procurement of inputs and goods and services necessary for production and the conditions under which 
their goods are produced, marketed or sold, in the domestic market and for export; and 
(b) the prices and availability of goods and services supplied by national and sub-national authorities and public 
or state enterprises, in areas including transportation, energy, basic telecommunications, other utilities and factors 
of production.796  
 
A claim under this provision would be based on differentiated pricing practices. The general 
exception to the national treatment obligation for domestic subsidies in GATT is not applicable 
since the claim is about pricing practices, not subsidization.   
 
However, the specific commitment is only applicable to China. Besides, the non-discriminatory 
obligation only works in domestic markets. Moreover, this particular rule only works in one 
segment of domestic market where FOEs are present. In other words, it only works in a situation 
where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs who are in competition with FOEs (foreign individuals 
and enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises) that produce goods or services in China. In practice, 
there are few FOEs in the Chinese domestic market in the abovementioned segments. It doesn’t 
work in situations where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs who are in competition with 
                                                      
796 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 3 (non-
discrimination).  
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imported goods, or where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs who export goods or services to 
importing markets.  
 
What’s worse, WTO rules currently do not regulate behavior of SOEs in general, let alone the 
obligation of commercial considerations for SOEs, except for those SOEs with exclusive trading 
rights, which will be discussed in detail in section 2.2.2. 
Conclusion of (1) 
 
In summary, the problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs is not sufficiently addressed 
by the current WTO rules in that the “private body” approach within the SCM Agreement faces 
difficulty in proving the link of entrustment or direction between the government and the SOE in 
a particular case, and in proving that SOEs are private bodies.  
 
The problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs is not sufficiently addressed by the “public 
body” approach within the SCM Agreement in that the legal standards and evidential factors for 
the question of what constitutes a public body have limitations in WTO jurisprudence. Particularly 
in the context of Chinese SOEs, the standard of “government control” or “vested governmental 
authority” either results in too many or too few SOEs being found to be public bodies. In addition, 
insufficient attention is given to the factors of which industry the SOE is in and of whether the 
SOE has been granted monopolies or exclusive rights, and other factors that are typical in the 
context of Chinese SOEs.  
 
The problem of SOEs giving advantages to other SOEs is not sufficiently addressed by the 
behavior rules in the WTO, particularly the protocols. The specific commitment made by China 
only applies partially to the situation where SOEs give advantages to other SOEs. The WTO rules 






(2) The Problem of Upstream Subsidies in the Context of Chinese SOEs 
 
Input subsidies and upstream subsidies refer to subsidies granted to an input purchased by the 
downstream industry, which is in competition with imports or which exports to foreign markets.797 
There are four situations of concern to my analysis, i.e., situation 1 is where SOEs dominate both 
the upstream industry and the downstream industry; situation 2 where POEs dominate the upstream 
industry and SOEs dominate the downstream industry; situation 3 where SOEs dominate the 
upstream industry and POEs dominate the downstream industry; and situation 4 where POEs 
dominate both the upstream industry and the downstream industry. Typically, it is situation 4 
where POEs are major players both in the upstream and downstream industries, that is kept in mind 
when most literature discusses whether upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the 
downstream industry and analyses the difficulties encountered under the subsidies rules, i.e., the 
SCM Agreement.  
 
Situations 1, 2, and 3 are worthy of attention given that SOEs are either the major player in the 
upstream industry or the downstream industry or both. Particularly in situation 1 where SOEs in 
the upstream industry receive financial advantages from the government, and then provide goods 
or services to the downstream industry dominated by SOEs, which are in competition with foreign 
producers, it is likely that SOEs in the downstream industry indeed benefit from the advantages in 
this regard. For instance, in the context of Chinese SOEs, financial advantages are granted by the 
government to the coal industry, in which SOEs are major players. The coal industry is the 
upstream industry in relation to the steel industry, in which SOEs are the major players in China. 
Actually, the steel industry receives advantages of three types: i) SOEs in the coal industry receive 
advantages from having better access to railways for transporting coal used for generating 
electricity, and the steel industry gets better deals from the electricity companies for purchasing 
electricity in large quantities directly rather than purchasing on-grid electricity; ii) SOEs in the 
coal industry receive advantages from having better access to railways for transporting coal used 
for producing steel; and iii) the coal industry also gets compensation specifically for supporting 
the steel industry by providing coal at lower prices. Examples can be found in Pinding Shan Tian 
                                                      
797 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Joanna Shelton-Erb, Subsidies in International Trade (The MIT Press, 1984).  
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AN Coal Ltd. (an SOE).798 This situation is also typical in the chemicals, petrochemicals, and non-
ferrous metals industries, such as aluminum. Legal texts don’t address this situation directly. 
However, four approaches may be put forward to address this situation through current rules. 
Nonetheless, all of them encounter difficulties, particularly in the context of Chinese SOEs.  
a. The Subject Approach  
 
The subject approach treats the upstream SOEs as public bodies, who are givers of subsidies 
through the provision of goods or services. This approach is about identifying the nature of SOEs, 
the difficulty of which has been discussed in the section above. Working in situation (1), it treats 
the recipients of subsidies in the upstream industry, for instance, SOEs in the coal industry, as 
public bodies, capable of giving benefits (cheaper inputs) to the downstream industry, for example 
the steel industry, in which the majority of producers are SOEs. Hence, where Chinese steel 
products are in competition with foreign steel products, the subsidies at issue are challengeable 
under the WTO framework. This approach can also be applicable to situation 3 where the steel 
producers are privately owned. This policy of ensuring coal SOEs’ access to railways for coal 
designated for electricity and steel usage has largely benefited coal SOEs, while it is against the 
interests of railways themselves.799 The difficulty in identifying SOEs as public bodies has been 
explained in the section 1.1.2. 
b. The Recipient Approach  
 
The recipient approach is to treat the upstream SOEs and downstream SOEs as related entities as 
if they were part of one group of related companies. In such a case, both the upstream and 
downstream SOEs are viewed as direct recipients of the subsidies. 
 
                                                      
798 For more information about the specific facts of granting advantages, see Chapter Two about the coal and steel 
industries, SOEs as givers of advantages, and regulatory advantages. The example of Pingding Shang Tian An Coal 
Ltd receiving compensation for providing lower prices of coal can be found in its annual financial reports (Shanghai 
Stock Exchange) from 2008-2014.   
799 “Railway authority in Ha’er bing Province adopted policy to secure that coal is transported to markets in order to 
reduce pressure from high demand for electricity nationwide,” June 11, 2016.  http://nlhw.bgzxv.com/gjzj/9262.html 
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In US-Softwood Lumber IV, it was held that that subsidization of inputs does not per se constitute 
subsidization of the final product.800 In US–Softwood Lumber III, the Panel concluded that it “may 
not assume that a subsidy provided to producers of the ‘upstream’ input product automatically 
benefits unrelated producers of downstream products, especially if there is evidence on the record 
of arm’s-length transactions between the two.” 801  The Panel concluded that where there is 
“complete identity between the tenure holder/logger and the lumber producer, no pass-through 
analysis is required.”802  In US–Softwood Lumber IV, it was held that if two industries operate at 
arm’s length, a “benefit pass-through” analysis is needed.803 It can be inferred that if the two 
producers do not operate at arm’s length or if there is complete identity between the two producers, 
a “benefit pass-through” analysis is not necessary, since these two producers can be deemed to be 
one. In that sense, the producers of the processed products are also direct recipients of subsidies.  
 
The same logic can be applied to the case of SOEs to examine whether SOEs in the upstream 
industry and downstream industry are related or not. It can be argued that the state is the major 
shareholder or controller of the two SOEs, and hence, SOEs in the upstream industry and 
downstream industry can be treated as related entities or their transactions can be viewed as not at 
arm’s length in this regard. Furthermore, from the perspective of accounting, there might be one 
financial report for the whole corporate group. This argument works well especially in a situation 
where the parent SOE is subsidized for its products, which are inputs for subsidiary SOEs, who 
produce the processed products. For instance, in natural resources industries, vertical integration 
is common in China. The SOE in the exploration sector is usually a sibling of an SOE in the 
processing sector. To that end, the upstream subsidies can be deemed to be subsidies for the 
downstream industry. Subsidization of inputs, produced by the upstream SOEs, can be deemed to 
be subsidization of the final product, produced by the downstream SOEs.   
 
                                                      
800 AB Report, United States — Final Countervailing Duty Determination with respect to certain Softwood Lumber 
from Canada (US-Softwood Lumber IV), WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 19 Jan 2004.  
801 Panel Report, United States — Preliminary Determinations with Respect to Certain Softwood Lumber from Canada 
(US — Softwood Lumber III), WT/DS236/R, adopted 27 Sep. 2002. (The case was not appealed with mutually agreed 
solution on 12 Oct. 2006), para. 7.71. 
802 Panel Report, US — Softwood Lumber III, paras. 7.72 and 7.74. 
803 AB Report, US-Softwood Lumber IV, WT/DS257/AB/R, adopted 19 Jan 2004, paras. 152-166.  
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However, opposing arguments exist that the key test for whether two entities are related or not lies 
in whether the transaction in question is conducted at arm’s length. It is not reasonable to treat all 
sibling SOEs as one entity regardless of the nature of transactions in practice. In addition, from a 
business viewpoint, it may be hard to demonstrate that SOEs in the upstream industry and SOEs 
in the downstream industry are in one group, particularly if they operate in different industries, 
produce different products, keep separate accounts and so on. 
c. The Approach of “Benefits Pass-Through” 
 
The analysis of “benefits pass-through” examines “whether and to what extent the subsidies 
bestowed on the upstream producers benefited the downstream producers.”804 As noted above, in 
US — Softwood Lumber III, the Panel’s viewed that an investigating authority “may not assume 
that a subsidy provided to producers of the ‘upstream’ input product automatically benefits 
unrelated producers of downstream products, especially if there is evidence on the record of arm’s-
length transactions between the two.”805 In US–Softwood Lumber IV, the AB stated:  
 
“If countervailing duties are intended to offset a subsidy granted to the producer of an input product, but the 
duties are to be imposed on the processed product (and not the input product)... In such a case…especially when 
the producers of the input and the processed product are not the same entity…it [investigating authority] must 
also establish that the benefit resulting from the subsidy has passed through, at least in part, from the input 
downstream, so as to benefit indirectly the processed product to be countervailed…Where the input producers 
and producers of the processed products operate at arm’s length, the pass-through of input subsidy benefits from 
the direct recipients to the indirect recipients downstream cannot simply be presumed.”806 (emphasis added.) 
 
In a nutshell, in the case of subsidies granted to upstream producers, if the upstream producers and 
downstream producers are unrelated, and they operate at arm’s length, it cannot be assumed that 
the downstream producers also receive benefits, and hence, an analysis of “benefits pass-through” 
is needed.  
 
A “benefits pass-through” analysis  “examines whether subsidization of the upstream industry 
                                                      
804 Panel Report, US — Softwood Lumber III, WT/DS236/R, adopted 27 Sept. 2002, para. 7.71. 
805 Panel Report, US — Softwood Lumber III, WT/DS236/R, adopted 27 Sept. 2002, para. 7.71. 
806 AB Report, US — Softwood Lumber IV, WT/DS257/AB/R, paras. 142-3. 
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results in the provision of inputs by the upstream industry at a cheaper price than the price 
prevailing on world markets.”807 In the context of SOEs in the similar situation of subsidized inputs, 
the “benefits pass-through” analysis is needed to prove that there are benefits flowing from the 
upstream industry to the downstream industry, evidenced by, for instance, low pricing of goods or 
services provided by the upstream SOEs to the downstream SOEs. If the upstream subsidies (coal 
subsidies) led to prices of coal lower than the normal market prices in China (world prices are 
usually the benchmark), a potential subsidy might exist with respect to the downstream industry 
such as the steel industry.  
 
In the context of Chinese SOEs, taking the steel industry as an example, first, SOEs in the coal 
industry receive advantages from railways (SOEs) in having better access to railways for 
transporting their coal designated for generating electricity, and prices of coal sold to electricity 
companies (almost all are SOEs) are lower than the prices when coal is sold to other sectors. The 
steel companies usually approach electricity companies for direct power purchase at prices lower 
than on-grid electricity.  Second, SOEs in the coal industry also receive advantages from railways 
(SOEs) in having better access to railways for transporting their coal designated for producing 
steel.  Third, in some cases, the coal industry receives subsidies with specific direction that it is 
compensating them for providing coal at lower prices to the steel industry (usually the title of 
subsidies granted in this regard specifically state that the subsidies are for compensating the coal 
industry for their encouraging and supporting the steel industry). 808  Hence, the government 
imposes conditions on the subsidized industry (the majority of which are SOEs and requires them 
to sell at bargain prices to the downstream industry (the majority of which are SOEs. The 
consequence is that the steel industry benefits from lower cost coal, electricity and transportation. 
Other examples can be found.  
 
As a practical matter, it be may difficult to show that benefits flow from the upstream sector to the 
downstream sector through lower pricing. Due to difficulty in finding information in light of non-
transparency, it is hard to find whether there are explicit governmental policies, and it is hard to 
                                                      
807 William R. Cline (ed.), Trade Policy in the 1980s, 1st edition (MIT Press, 1983), 352-3.  
808 See Chapter Two about the coal industry.  
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find evidence in respect of “benefits pass-through”. I found some scattered evidence.809 Usually, 
what is relevant are not laws on the books, but governmental policies by different levels of 
governments. In addition, it is difficult to prove that inputs are provided at cheaper prices than the 
prices prevailing on world markets or prices under market conditions.  
 
d. The Approach of Channeling Through “Income or Price Support” Within the SCM Agreement  
 
The last approach is related to a specific situation where subsidies are granted to the upstream 
SOEs for the purpose of maintaining prices in the domestic market. This situation may involve 
“income or price support” within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement, which 
provides that “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there is any form of income or price support in 
the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 1994”. Subsidies to the upstream SOEs can be viewed in 
totality as a scheme of income support, for instance, which leads to lower prices of coal/energy for 
the steel industry.  
 
However, while this GATT provision was incorporated into the SCM Agreement, it is mainly of 
historical interest, cases today are normally brought under the more detailed provisions of the SCM 
Agreement.810
 
   
Conclusion of (2) 
 
As for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit from transactions with 
subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, the various approaches that are available within the 
current WTO rules are all inadequate to address the problem. In respect of the subject approach, it 
may be easy to find some SOEs are public bodies while it is hard to conclude the same for other 
SOEs depending on the industry/sector they are in and the nature of the SOE. In respect of the 
recipient approach, it is hard to treat two separate SOEs in the upstream and downstream sectors 
as one group of related companies although some arguments can be made. In respect of the 
                                                      
809 See Chapter Two.  
810 WTO Analytical Index: GATT 1994, Article XVI. 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_06_e.htm  
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“benefits pass-through” approach, it is difficult to find evidence of lowering prices. The approach 
of “price or income support” is mainly of historical interest.  
 
(3) Chinese SOEs Receive Financial Advantages Before and During Their Privatization 
 
First, Chinese SOEs receive financial advantages prior to privatizations. Second, Chinese SOEs 
receive lots of financial advantages for the reconstruction and privatization, the analysis of which 
is similar to the analysis of subsidies granted prior to privatization. After privatization, some of 
these entities continue to engage in international markets. Problems arise if benefits from subsidies 
granted to SOEs prior to privatization continue to exist, and hence, the entity after privatization 
will have comparative advantages over its competitors. 
 
The WTO rules on privatizations and their effect on the actionability of prior subsidies are 
confusing. In the early cases of US–Lead and Bismuth II 811 and US–Countervailing Measures on 
Certain EC Products,812 it was held that the full privatization at arm’s length and for fair market 
value of an SOE that received prior non-recurring subsidies can give rise to a rebuttable 
presumption that the benefit conferred by prior subsidies is extinguished. The AB stated:   
 
“changes in the ownership of a subsidized producer give rise to a rebuttable presumption that the benefit conferred 
by prior subsidies is extinguished ... this would only be where (i) benefits resulting from a prior nonrecurring 
financial contribution, (ii) are bestowed on a state-owned enterprise, and (iii) following a privatization at arm's 
length and for fair market value, (iv) the government transfers all or substantially all the property and retains no 
controlling interest in the privatized producer.813  
 
Literature analyzed the distinction between wealth enhancing benefit and competitive benefit, that 
is, a benefit that reduces the cost of production. From an economic viewpoint, the productive 
                                                      
811 Appellate Body Report, United States — Imposition of Countervailing Duties on Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and 
Bismuth Carbon Steel Products Originating in the United Kingdom (US – Lead and Bismuth II), WT/DS138/AB/R, 
adopted 10 May 2000, para. 68.   
812  AB Report, United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the European 
Communities (US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products), WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 9 Dec. 2002.   
813  Appellate Body Report, United States — Countervailing Measures Concerning Certain Products from the 
European Communities (US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products), WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 9 Dec. 
2002, para. 117; Panel Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC and 
Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/R, adopted 30 June 2010, para. 7.248. 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capacity would not exist but for the government’s uneconomical initial investment.814 The fair 
market price of privatization only affected the wealth of the buyers and the sellers, not the marginal 
cost of production or the competitive advantage. The European position (adopted by AB) in British 
Lead Bismuth was that “benefit” refers only to the wealth of the producer of the allegedly 
subsidized goods. The effect of the government program on production is irrelevant, and causation 
is not part of the definition. The US argued that it is a company’s productive operations that are 
relevant to the determination of whether a subsidy exists. This view requires that causation 
(financial contribution alters producers’ production) be part of the SCM Agreement’s definition 
and that “benefit” mean “competitive benefit”.  
 
However, in EC and certain member States–Large Civil Aircraft, the issue was more complex and 
the outcome less clear. First, the case was brought in 2010, while most alleged subsidies were 
granted decades ago (1990s, 1980s, and 1970s) and some lasted for decades. The U.S. claimed that 
the subsidies granted decades ago caused adverse effects on the U.S. over the period 2001 to 2006. 
Second, the case involved partial privatization.  
 
It was held that there is no requirement that subsidies be present, or that a “present” benefit exist 
or that a “benefit continues” during the reference period. Both the Panel and AB interpreted 
Articles 1, 5, and 6 of the SCM Agreement to not require a complaining party to demonstrate the 
existence of a “present” benefit or a “benefit that continues” during the reference period.815 There 
may be a time lag between the provision of subsidies and their effects, as explained by the 
Appellate Body in US – Upland Cotton.816 “Under certain circumstances, a past subsidy that no 
longer exists may be found to cause or have caused adverse effects that continue to be present 
during the reference period.”817 “Effects of a subsidy will ordinarily dissipate over time and will 
end at some point after the subsidy has expired.”818  
 
                                                      
814 It is hard to determine “uneconomic investment” ex ante as opposed to ex post, and so as to the quantification. 
815 AB Report, European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC and Certain Member 
States — Large Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 18 May 2011, paras. 691-3, and para. 712.  
816 See AB Report, US – Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/AB/R, adopted 3 March 2005, paras. 476, 482, and 484; AB 
Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 18 May 2011, para. 712. 
817 AB Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, para.712. 
818 AB Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, para.713.  
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In the analysis of “present adverse effects of a subsidy”, two aspects about “how the subsidy has 
been materialized and affected over time” shall be taken to account, i.e., one is the depreciation of 
the subsidy given that a subsidy has a finite life, and the other is the “intervening events” that may 
have occurred following its grant that may affect the projected value of the subsidy.819   
 
Second, as for the question of whether the intervening events of “changed ownership” extinguish 
benefits or not, the AB indicated in US–Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products that the 
findings of that dispute should be confined to the “very precise set of facts and circumstances”, 
and emphasized that there is “no inflexible rule requiring that investigating authorities, in future 
cases, automatically determine that a ‘benefit’ derived from pre-privatization financial 
contributions expires following privatization at arm’s length and for fair-market value”.820 In any 
event, the AB in EC - Civil Aircraft divided in three ways.    
i) One position is that the presumption of extinction only applies to a full privatization, 
rather than partial privatizations or private-to-private sales. 
ii) The second position is that, although the utility value of equipment derived from the 
subsidies is not extinguished after privatization, this is irrelevant once a fair market 
price is paid for the equipment or the assets of a company. It views that the presumption 
rule also applies to partial privatization and private-to-private sales. Nevertheless, this 
position noted the issue of a transfer of control to the new owners, by stating  
“The same firm may continue to make the same products with the same equipment…The utility value of 
equipment acquired as a result of the financial contribution is not extinguished as a result of a 
privatization at arm's length and for fair market value. However… the utility value of such equipment to 
the newly privatized firm is legally irrelevant for purposes of determining the continued existence of a 
"benefit" under the SCM Agreement…the value of the benefit under the SCM Agreement is to be assessed 
using the marketplace as the basis for comparison. Therefore…once a fair market price is paid for the 
equipment, or more broadly the assets of a company, their market value is redeemed, regardless of the 
utility value a firm may derive therefrom…This Member considers the rationale underlying the Appellate 
Body's case law on full privatization in the context of Part V of the SCM Agreement equally to apply in 
situations of partial privatization and private-to-private transactions and in the context of Part III of the 
SCM Agreement. This Member also notes that…an important question in this context is to what extent 
                                                      
819 AB Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, paras. 709-10.  
820 Appellate Body Report, US – Countervailing Measures on Certain EC Products, WT/DS212/AB/R, adopted 9 
Dec. 2002, para. 127.  
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the partial privatization or private-to-private transactions resulted in a transfer of control to new owners 
who paid fair market value for shares in the company.” (footnote omitted, emphasis added.) 
iii) The third position is that in a sale of shares, regardless whether there is a transfer of 
control or not, the value of assets of the company, to which the shares attach, does not 
change at all, including the benefit of any subsidy granted, which continues to benefit 
the recipient, and doesn’t extinguish. 
“…I entertain no small measure of doubt that an acquisition of shares, concluded at arm's length and for 
fair market value, constitutes relevant circumstances warranting the conclusion that an extinction of 
benefit has taken place. A subsidy granted to a recipient company contributes to the net asset value of 
that company…When shares change hands on an arm's-length basis and for fair market value, the buyer 
pays a price that, in the estimation of the buyer, places a proper value on the future earnings of the 
recipient. Those earnings derive from all the assets of the recipient, including the benefit of any subsidy 
paid to the recipient…The central point is that a sale of shares, whether or not it conveys control, 
transfers rights in the shares to a new owner. The assets of the company, to which the shares attach, do 
not change at all. Nor could it be otherwise, because the buyer would then not acquire the full benefit of 
the bargain: the buyer would pay for an asset (the subsidy) that had in the very sales transaction been 
"extinguished"…The changing price of listed securities reflects the different valuations that buyers and 
sellers place upon companies and their underlying assets. However, nothing about these trades extracts 
the value of any asset, including the benefit of any subsidy granted. That subsidy continues to benefit the 
recipient, even if the ownership of the recipient's shares changes from one day to another.”821 (footnote 
omitted, emphasis added.)822 
 
In sum, the uncertainty continues in respect of whether benefits continue or not after partial 
privatization. It is not sure the factor “whether privatization at arm’s length and for fair-market 
value” and the factor “whether there is a transfer of control” can play determinative roles.  
 
In the context of Chinse SOEs, some privatizations are partial privatizations, and for the publicly-
listed SOEs, control is still retained by the government. Accordingly, the benefits of the subsidies 
would not be extinguished under any of the three positions. However, as for the privatizations with 
a transfer of control, the uncertainty continues in respect of whether the benefits of the subsidies 
would be extinguished under the three positions. In addition, given that many mergers and 
                                                      
821 AB Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/AB/R, paras.726.  
822 “Given that the Appellate Body in this case does not need to come to any final view on the issue of extinction in 
the context of a partial privatization or private-to-private sales, these matters do not require more definitive 
determination.” AB Report, EC and Certain Member States — Large Civil Aircraft, paras. 730-2.  
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acquisitions occur among Chinese SOEs, questions may arise as to whether subsidies pass through 
to the new company where an SOE that has previously received subsidies is restructured and 
legally reorganized to form a new company. This question was answered in EC–Large Civil 
Aircraft, where it was found that changes to the corporate structure of the producer of Airbus LCA 
did not require a demonstration that subsidies provided to the Airbus Industrie consortium “passed 
through” to Airbus SAS, the current producer of Airbus LCA.823 Hence, the analysis of subsidies 
prior to the restructuring and merger of SOEs is not affected by the restructuring and merger as 
long as the predecessor SOE and current SOE are not substantively different in economic reality.  
 
Hence, as for the privatizations with a transfer of control, the uncertainty continues in respect of 
whether the benefits of the subsidies would be extinguished under the three positions. To that end, 
the legal problem remains that in cases of partial privatization of Chinese SOEs when there is a 
transfer of control, it is not clear whether subsidies received prior to privatization can still be 
subject to the SCM Agreement given that it is not clear based on current jurisprudence whether 
the legal element of “benefit” as required under the SCM Agreement can be established or not.  
 
(4) The Element of “Benchmark Prices”  
 
Article 14 (d) of the SCM Agreement provides that:  
  
“The provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government shall not be considered as conferring 
a benefit unless the provision is made for less than adequate remuneration, or the purchase is made for more than 
adequate remuneration. The adequacy of remuneration shall be determined in relation to prevailing market 
conditions for the good or service in question in the country of provision or purchase (including price, quality, 
availability, marketability, transportation and other conditions of purchase or sale).”  
 
Article 15 (b) of China’s Accession Protocol provides that deviations can be applied in price 
comparability in determining subsidies if there are special difficulties in application of general 
rules. It allows choosing a different benchmark in identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit if 
                                                      
823 “Finally, we do not consider that the relationship between the predecessor companies and Airbus SAS is one that 
can be characterized as a relationship between unrelated companies operating at ‘arm's length’”. See AB Report, 
European Communities — Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (EC and certain member States — Large 
Civil Aircraft), WT/DS316/AB/R, adopted 18 May 2011, paras. 691-3, 768 and 776. 
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market economy conditions are not prevailing or the possibility that prevailing terms and 
conditions in China may not always be available as appropriate benchmarks. This provision 
doesn’t have an expiration date.824  
 
Thus, in order to find whether there is a subsidy, it must be examined whether benefits are given 
to the recipients that are otherwise not available under the market conditions. A benchmark is 
needed for such comparison.825 In cases of SOEs receiving advantages, the market in which SOEs 
operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are monopolists or dominate the market. How 
are the factors, for instance, that the state subsidizes the price of a raw material input, the state 
dominates the banking sector and sets the interest rates charged by SOBs, and the state’s ability to 
set electricity prices, and prices of the right to use land in China, etc., relevant in finding that 
Chinese prices in general do not “permit a proper comparison”?826 
 
The current standard for using an alternative benefit benchmark is relatively strict. The burden of 
proof is on the importing country to explain the reason for choosing a different benchmark.827 First, 
the standard focuses on the outcome, i.e., whether the proposed benchmark is market-determined. 
In US–Carbon Steel (India), it was held that the issue of finding a benchmark is whether the price 
is a market-determined price reflective of prevailing market conditions in the country of provision, 
rather than a function of the source of the price.828  
 
Second, it was held that prices of goods provided by, for instance, SOEs must also be examined to 
determine whether they are market determined or not.829 It was recognized that a government, in 
its role as a provider, for instance, through SOEs, may distort prices.830 It was recognized that the 
more predominant a government’s role in the market is, the more likely this role will result in the 
distortion of private prices.831 Despite the above recognitions, however, it was held that Article 
                                                      
824 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 15 (b) and (d).   
825 Article 1.1(b) and 14 of the SCM Agreement.  
826 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard International Law Journal 
(May 13, 2016): 47.  
827 In anti-dumping cases, the burden of prove is on China.  
828 AB Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.154. 
829 AB Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.154. 
830 AB Report, US – Softwood Lumber IV, para. 100.  
831 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 444. 
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14(d) of the SCM Agreement “establishes no legal presumption that in-country prices from any 
particular source, including government-related prices other than the financial contribution at issue, 
can be discarded in a benchmark analysis.”832 It was held in US Countervailing Measures (China) 
that there is no per se rule that the fact that the government is the predominant supplier establishes 
that there is price distortion.833 It means that the fact that SOEs are the predominant supplier does 
not per se establish there is price distortion.834 “Evidence relating to government ownership of 
SOEs and their respective market shares does not, in and of itself, provide a sufficient basis for 
concluding that in-country prices are distorted.”835  Neither can the fact that the government is the 
predominant supplier of the relevant goods, exclude consideration of other factors.836   
 
Finally, the analysis will vary depending upon the circumstances of the case, the characteristics of 
the market being examined, and the nature, quantity, and quality of the information.837 Hence, the 
factors relating to the structure of the relevant market, whether the market is dominated by the 
state, the nature of the entities operating in that market, SOEs’ respective market shares, whether 
systematic subsidies are associated with the market, whether there is price control, or prices set by 
SOEs, entry barriers, conditions of competition, behavior of SOEs, etc., are only deemed to be 
relevant factors, in finding, for instance, whether the government is influencing the pricing conduct 
of SOEs, rather than decisive factors.838  
 
In sum, in cases of SOEs receiving advantages, the market in which SOEs operate may be distorted, 
particularly where SOEs are monopolists or dominate the market. The legal element of “benefit” 
is required in order to establish the existence of subsidies subject the SCM Agreement. A 
benchmark is necessary for the finding of a benefit for the purpose of comparison and proving that 
benefits are given to recipients that are otherwise not available under the market conditions. It is 
usually difficult to find the existence of benefits if the benchmark is the market where SOEs 
dominate. Although current rules allow choosing a different benchmark in identifying and 
                                                      
832 AB Report, US – Carbon Steel (India), para. 4.154; AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), para. 4.64. 
833 AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/AB/R, para. 4.51. 
834 AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/AB/R, para 4.52. 
835 AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/AB/R, para. 4.62.   
836 AB Report, US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China), para. 446. 
837 AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/AB/R, para. 4.47. 
838 AB Report, US – Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/AB/R, para. 4.62.   
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measuring the benefit subject to certain conditions, the mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one 
industry or market cannot automatically imply there is price distortion which warrants an 
alternative benchmark. Hence, the finding of “benefits” for the purpose of establishing a subsidy 
subject to the SCM Agreement would be difficult given that the mere fact that SOEs dominate in 
one market cannot warrant an alternative benchmark.  
 
(5) The Element of “Specificity”  
 
The above problems primarily cast challenges to whether the measure in question constitutes a 
subsidy. In addition, the SCM Agreement requires that an actionable subsidy must be specific, 
which can be enterprise specific, industry specific or regional specific.839 Besides, in the situation 
of upstream subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs, the requirement of “specificity” needs to be 
proved in situations where the SOEs in the upstream industry provide goods or services at lower 
prices or on favorable terms to one or a certain number of industries, rather than all industries. 
Furthermore, China’s commitments in its accession to the WTO include a special rule of specificity 
in relation to SOEs,840 i.e., subsidies provided to SOEs will be viewed as specific if SOEs are the 
predominant recipients of such subsidies or SOEs receive disproportionately large amounts of such 
subsidies. 
 
In the context of China, however, it is hard to prove “specificity” either as “industry specific” or 
“enterprise specific”. First, it is usually various (dominant) SOEs in many industries that receive 
financial advantages. In practice, policies adopted by the Chinese Government usually identify 
strategic industries and pillar industries and give instructions and guidelines to favor these 
industries, in which SOEs either dominate or prevail. However, the details of how this favoritism 
is implemented may be difficult to find. It is not clear, for example, whether the Chinese 
Government favors these industries through granting specific financial advantages, information 
about which is largely unavailable. Thus, the policies and guidelines that specify certain industries 
as favored industries cannot per se easily be used to establish there is an “industry specific” subsidy 
for the purpose of finding “specificity” in making subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement.  
                                                      
839 Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.   
840 Para.10.2, Part I of the Protocol of China Accession to the WTO.  
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Second, the recipients of advantages are largely SOEs even if the conditions for receiving 
advantages are neutral in their face without specific targets. But this phenomenon is not easily 
caught by the special commitments made by China given that so far, there have been no WTO 
cases involving this provision made by China in its accession commitments. The reason for not 
fully utilizing the special rule might be the evidential difficulties in finding information showing 
that SOEs are predominant recipients of the subsidies at issue or SOEs receive disproportionately 
large amounts of such subsidies. The “specificity” rule focuses on the outcome or result of a 
subsidy, rather than the status of the recipients in markets. Thus, it is hard to prove “enterprise 
specific”.  
 
In sum, it is difficult to satisfy the legal element of “specificity” in cases of Chinese SOEs receiving 
advantages, given that information in this regard is scarce in terms of finding either “industry 
specific” or “enterprise specific”.  
 
(6) Summary of Section 4.2.1  
 
In summary, this section examined the deficiencies of current WTO rules in regulating financial 
advantages granted to SOEs in five aspects. First, the problem of SOEs giving advantages to other 
SOEs is not sufficiently addressed by the current WTO rules either through the “private body” 
approach within the SCM Agreement, the “public body” approach within the SCM Agreement, or 
the behavior rules in the WTO, particularly the protocols regarding specific commitment made by 
China. Second, as for the problem of SOEs in the downstream industry which benefit from 
transactions with subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry, the various approaches, including the 
subject approach, the recipient approach, the “benefits pass-through” approach, or the approach of 
“price or income support” that are available within the current WTO rules, are all inadequate to 
address the problem. Third, as for the privatizations of SOEs with a transfer of control, the 
uncertainty continues in respect of whether the benefits of the subsidies would be extinguished, 
and it is not clear whether subsidies received prior to privatization can still be subject to the SCM 
Agreement. Fourth, in cases of SOEs receiving advantages, it is usually difficult to find the 
existence of benefits, which is one legal element in establishing the existence of a subsidy, if the 
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benchmark is the market where SOEs dominate, since current WTO jurisdiction holds that the 
mere status of SOEs’ dominance in one industry or market cannot automatically imply there is 
price distortion which warrants an alternative benchmark. Finally, it is difficult to satisfy the legal 
element of “specificity” in cases of Chinese SOEs receiving advantages, given that information in 
this regard is scarce in terms of finding either “industry specific” or “enterprise specific”.  
 
4.2.2 Monopolies and Exclusive Rights Granted to SOEs 
 
(1) Grants of Monopolies or Exclusive Rights  
 
Current WTO rules allow governments to grant monopolies or exclusive rights. Even though WTO 
jurisprudence has found some grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to violate WTO trade rules 
in a couple of cases, and some members have challenged the grants of exclusive rights or 
monopolies through strategically utilizing WTO rules, these findings and efforts confront 
limitations. In the context of Chinese SOEs, the problem of vertical integrated monopolies or 
exclusive rights is severe, i.e., an integrated monopoly, such as i) one SOE or bloc SOEs benefit 
from vertical monopolies or exclusive rights to production, distribution, and 
exportation/importation in industries that have characteristics of network sharing and common 
connections, 841 and ii) integration among upstream, midstream, and downstream sectors, such as 
petrochemical SOEs integrated chemicals, energy and transportation businesses, and coal SOEs 
integrated energy and railway operations.  
 
The section below will examine the deficiencies of current rules in prohibiting or limiting the 
grants of monopolies or exclusive rights, including monopolies, exclusive distribution rights, 
exclusive trading rights, and exclusive production rights. The next section will examine the legal 
inadequacy in regulating the behavior of SOEs that are granted such monopolies or exclusive rights, 
if these grants are permitted.  
  
                                                      
841 Jiagui Chen, Research on the 30 Years of China’s Stat-owned Enterprise Reform, eds. Zheng LV and Sujian Huang 
(China: Economy & Management Publishing House, 2008), 308-331.  
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a. Grants of Monopolies or Exclusive Rights Are Not Prohibited Within the WTO  
 
Historically, grants of monopolies or exclusive rights have not been per se illegal under 
GATT/WTO rules. 842  In practice, the WTO acknowledges that members may organize their 
economies differently. Indeed, one author has concluded that the Uruguay Round negotiators 
foresaw four alternative economic structures besides the market-oriented model, i.e., the command 
economy structure, the transition economy, corporatism and the integrated conglomerate-led 
structure.843  
 
The WTO rules literally allow grants of monopolies or exclusive rights. First, in respect of trade 
in goods, Article XVII allows member to maintain state trading, and to grant monopolies or 
exclusive rights, as reflected in the wording of Article XVII:1(a): “Each contracting party 
undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise…or grants to any enterprise, 
formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such enterprise shall…”. Although Article 
XVII imposes some obligations, discussed below, in respect of state trading, as shown in Notes to 
Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII,844 there is no question that it is permitted.  Second, the 
grants of exclusive rights or monopolies to entities that do not fall within the definition of state 
trading enterprises under Article XVII are not covered by the WTO. For instance, Article XVII of 
the GATT is mainly about trading monopolies or exclusive rights, and hence, other monopolies or 
exclusive rights are not even discussed in GATT, such as production monopolies or exclusive 
rights. Third, monopolies or exclusive rights cannot be challenged under the SCM Agreement, 
which only applies to “financial contributions” or “income support or price support”. Hence, it 
                                                      
842 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
157-161; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Contracting Parties, “Report of the Committee on Legal and 
Institutional Framework”, L/2281, 1964, paras. 9-10. 
843 Corporatism refers to “a system of social and political organization in which major [societal and interest groups] 
are integrated into the governmental system. Each functional group is granted a “deliberate representational monopoly 
within their respective categories in exchange for observing certain controls on the selection of leaders and articulation 
of demands and supports. Examples include labor or agricultural producers. Corporatism can be found in Latin 
America and parts of Europe. The integrated conglomerate-led structure can be found in East Asia, like Japan and 
South Korea. Each industrial conglomerate features cross-shareholding relationships that serve to integrate companies 
across multiple sectors. In addition, each has its own financing vehicle. The state works closely with conglomerates 
to drive economic policy. See Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard 
International Law Journal (May 13, 2016), 24-6. 
844 “Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms ‘import restrictions’ or ‘export restrictions’ include 
restrictions made effective through state-trading operations.” See Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII in the 
Annex of GATT.  
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doesn’t cover advantages other than financial advantages. Lastly, in respect of trade in services, 
GATS Article VIII on monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, GATS Article XVI on market 
access, GATS Article XVII on national treatment, and Article 5 and Annex 2A of the Protocol of 
China’s Accession to the WTO which allows China to maintain exclusive trading rights for a list 
of goods,845 all presume the existence of monopolies or exclusive rights. For instance, GATS 
Article XVI:2(a) requires Members not to limit the number of service suppliers whether in the 
form of numerical quotas, monopolies, or exclusive service suppliers in sectors where market 
access commitments have been undertaken. It allows Members to have monopoly service suppliers 
in sectors where market access commitments have not been undertaken.   
 
An example of the application of the rules is in Korea–Restrictions on Imports of Beef, where the 
U.S. claimed that the Livestock Products Marketing Organization (hereinafter LPMO), which was 
established by the Korean Government to exclusively administer the importation of beef, 
constituted an import monopoly controlled by domestic producers and was in itself a separate 
“import restriction” within the meaning of Article XI. In other words, the U.S. challenged the very 
existence of the import monopoly under Article XI and XVII in a sense that it constituted a barrier 
to trade. The GATT Panel concluded that the mere existence of an import monopoly cannot itself 
be in violation of the GATT, by stating that  
 
“the LPMO had been granted exclusive privileges as the sole importer of beef. As such, the LPMO had to 
comply with the provisions of the General Agreement applicable to state-trading enterprises, including those 
of Articles XI:1 and XVII…Article XI:1 proscribed the use of ‘prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, 
taxes or other charges’, including restrictions made effective through state-trading activities, but Article XVII 
permitted the establishment or maintenance of state-trading enterprises, including enterprises which had 
been granted exclusive or special privileges. The mere existence of producer-controlled import monopolies 
could not be considered as a separate import restriction inconsistent with the General Agreement...As the 
rules of the General Agreement did not concern the organization or management of import monopolies but 
only their operations and effects on trade, the Panel concluded that the existence of a producer-controlled 
monopoly could not in itself be in violation of the General Agreement.”846[emphasis added] 
                                                      
845 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 5 and Annex 2.  
846 GATT Panel Report, Republic of Korea – Restrictions on Imports of Beef – Complaint by the United States (Korea-
Beef (US)), L/6503, adopted 7 November 1989, BISD 36S/268, paras. 114-115. It can be inferred that it is the same 
with Article II:4, which applies to “a monopoly of the importation of any product described in the appropriate Schedule 
annexed to this Agreement”. 
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b. WTO Limits on Monopolies or Exclusive Rights Grants  
 
WTO jurisprudence has recognized limits on grants of exclusive rights or monopolies in some 
cases, depending on the types of monopolies or exclusive rights, including exploration rights, 
production rights/processing rights, distribution rights (wholesale or retail), import rights, and 
export rights.  
 
a) Exclusive Distribution Rights Granted to SOEs 
 
In respect of trade in goods, grants of exclusive distribution rights are largely allowed. In Canada–
Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), all the disputes were about the business practices of the liquor 
boards which were granted exclusive rights to distribute imported or local alcoholic beverages 
across provincial and national borders, rather than the grants of such exclusive distribution 
rights.847 Nevertheless, grants of exclusive distribution rights to SOEs may violate the national 
treatment obligation of the GATT. Article XVII of the GATT allows the existence of monopolies 
in respect of the right to trade (export or import), but it doesn’t cover the right to distribute. So the 
grant of exclusive rights to distribute may violate Article III:4, which requires national treatment 
of imported goods. In China Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, regarding 
imported reading materials, the Panel found that Chinese measures restricted distribution channels 
for certain imported reading materials by requiring their distribution to be conducted exclusively 
through subscription, and by Chinese SOEs, unlike for like domestic reading materials, whose 
distribution can be conducted by foreign-invested entities. The Panel found that the government 
granted exclusive distribution rights to SOEs and these measures were inconsistent with GATT 
Article III:4.848 
 
However, the deficiency of the above approach in challenging exclusive distribution rights granted 
to SOEs through Article III (national treatment) lies in that, first, no violations can be found if the 
                                                      
847 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
848 Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China — Publications and Audiovisual Products), WT/DS363/R, adopted 12 
August 2009; Appellate Body Report, China – Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for 
Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products (China — Publications and Audiovisual Products), 
WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 Dec. 2009.   
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domestic like products are also subject to exclusive distribution by SOEs. For instance, in the 
Chinese petroleum industry, imported crude oil can only be distributed wholesale by SOEs, even 
through POEs can import crude oil. However, domestic crude oil is also only distributable by SOEs. 
Hence, no differential treatment can be found between the domestic and imported goods. Second, 
exports of goods subject to exclusive distribution by SOEs may be thereby indirectly affected by 
the behavior relating to prices, quantities, terms of transactions for exports, of SOEs that have been 
granted exclusive distribution rights. However, such grants of exclusive distribution rights to SOEs 
affecting exports cannot be challenged under GATT Article III:4 given that no imported goods are 
involved. In addition, such grants of exclusive distribution rights to SOEs affecting exports is 
allowed in general under GATT Article XVII. Although GATT Article XI may be resorted to if 
such exclusive distribution rights can be argued to be equivalent to quantitative restrictions, the 
argument is not easy to pursue.    
 
In respect of trade in services, given that the distribution services are involved, grants of exclusive 
rights to distribution of imported goods only to SOEs can be a violation of Article XVI of the 
market access obligation or Article XVII of the national treatment obligation under the GATS, but 
only if commitments have been made for the service at issue. In China–Publications and 
Audiovisual Entertainment Products, regarding distribution services, the U.S. challenged 
measures that permitted only two SOEs---China Film Distribution Company and Huaxia Film 
Distribution Company---to distribute imported films for theatrical release, and measures that 
restricted distribution channels for certain imported reading materials by requiring their 
distribution to be conducted exclusively by Chinese SOEs through subscription,849 The Panel 
found that Chinese measures were inconsistent with GATS Article XVI (market access 
commitment) and XVII (national treatment). 
 
This approach largely avoids the deficiency mentioned above in situations where imported goods 
and domestic goods are all distributed exclusively by SOEs. However, some distribution services 
of goods in strategic sectors or pillar industries are not subject to schedule commitments made by 
China. Given that claims regarding market access commitments or the national treatment 
                                                      
849 Panel Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products WT/DS363/R, adopted 12 August 2009; AB 
Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 Dec. 2009.  
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obligation under GATS need to establish that the respondent party has specific commitments made 
in this regard and given that the specific commitments are limited in terms of their scope and 
content, such as varying depending on different modes of supply, such claims are difficult to 
establish.  
 
b) Exclusive Trading Rights to Export or Import Granted to SOEs 
 
In respect of trade in goods, exclusive rights of import or export granted to SOEs are disciplined 
in some cases through individual Member’s accession protocol commitments to eliminate such 
exclusive rights and commitments to grant trading rights to all eligible entities on a national 
treatment basis. China has undertaken such commitments in its accession protocol. So China would 
violate its specific commitment to eliminate such exclusive rights by granting such exclusive rights 
to SOEs. In China Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, China granted exclusive 
importation rights only to SOEs, rather than foreign invested enterprises, regarding imported 
reading materials, audiovisual home entertainment products, sound recordings, and films.850 As 
for imported films for theatrical release, the only designated or approved importer is the China 
Film Import and Export Corporation, which is a Chinese SOE. For other finished audiovisual 
products, such as finished audiovisual home entertainment products, finished sound recordings,  
there was only one SOE—the China National Publications Import and Export (Group) 
Corporation—that has been approved to import finished audiovisual products. 
 
Those SOEs in question enjoyed exclusive importation rights of respective goods. The U.S. 
targeted those exclusive rights. It was held by the panel and upheld by the AB that among many 
measures, those measures mentioned above were inconsistent with Articles 5.1 (obligation to grant 
the right to import) and 5.2 (obligation to grant the right on a national treatment basis) of Part I of 
the Protocol of Accession. 851  China violated the obligation to grant the import right to all 
enterprises and the obligation to grant the import right in a non-discriminatory way.  
                                                      
850 AB Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, para. 6.  
851 China also violated its obligations under the provisions of paragraph 1.2 of Part I of the Protocol of Accession (to  
the extent that it incorporates commitments in paragraphs 83 (obligation to grant import right) and 84 (discriminatory 
grants or discretionary grants) of the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China). WTO, Report of the 
Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/MIN(01)/3, Nov. 10, 2001, para. 84(b). 
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The implementation of the AB report has not been satisfying in that the grants of exclusive rights 
have not been withdrawn. Instead, China agreed to raise its quota of foreign studio films by seventy 
percent.852 This result indicates that disciplining grants of exclusive rights through case law may 
be limited when parties are willing to compromise based on their own interests, rather than strictly 
adhere to WTO rules.   
 
China has undertaken commitments in its accession protocol to eliminate exclusive rights to export. 
So, it is a violation of its specific commitment to grant exclusive rights to export to SOEs. The 
China-Rare Earths case concerned export limits on rare earths, which are important inputs of some 
electronic consumer products. Demand for rare earths has grown rapidly over the past decade. 
China is the major supplier of rare earths.  China imposed certain restrictions on the right of 
enterprises to export rare earths and molybdenum. The entities that received the right to export are 
almost all SOEs. 853  The AB found that China has violated its commitment in its Accession 
Protocol to eliminate trading restrictions, particularly Article 5.1 and 5.2. Later China ceased 
issuing exclusive trading rights in this area.  
 
However, the means of disciplining grants of monopolies or exclusive rights through individual 
commitments upon their accessions to the WTO have limitations given that individual 
commitments are limited to the individual nation, such as China. Hence, these rules are without a 
universal application.  
 
On the other hand, as to the problem of granting privileges to STEs, some WTO members have 
challenged grants of excusive trading rights in combination with privileges on the grounds that 
they will inevitably lead to some behavior inconsistent with the GATT, but their arguments were 
rejected. In Canada-Wheat Export and Grain Imports, the U.S. developed a new approach of 
challenging the existence of exclusive trading rights in combination with other advantages as a 
whole under GATT Article XVII in a sense that the combination of these elements together in 
                                                      
852  Matthew Garrahan, “China Eases Restrictions on Hollywood Films,” Fin. Times, Feb. 19, 2012. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d24696e6-5abd-11e1-b056-00144feabdc0.html#axzz42ENRRTec. 
853 Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Rare Earths, Tungsten and Molybdenum 
(China- Rare Earths), WT/DS431/AB/R, adopted 7 August 2014; My findings about the nature of these entities.  
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totality will inevitably lead to a violation of the GATT, for instance, leading to some behavior, 
which is inconsistent with the provisions of GATT Article XVII:1. Hence, in terms of remedies, 
the only way to prevent such GATT-inconsistent behavior is to remove the monopolies or other 
advantages granted to the entity at issue (so that the totality is lost). This put the grants of exclusive 
trading rights and other advantages per se under challenge implicitly. The logic behind the 
argument goes like this: if A is consistent with the WTO rules, and if B is consistent with the WTO 
rules, but the combination of A and B will inevitably/necessarily lead to C, which is prohibited 
under the WTO, then the combination of A and B is not consistent with the WTO rules. Ultimately, 
it requires the removal of A or B. In addition, this approach can save the complaining party from 
engaging in case-by-case investigations, and the rules can be applied in future cases. In theory, C 
mentioned above could be any rule in the WTO, for instance, the Anti-Dumping Agreement, or 
behavior disciplines in GATT Article XVII.854  
 
The inadequacy of the U.S. approach can be illustrated. First, the Panel and AB implicitly 
recognized Canada’s argument in this regard, pointing out that the strategy of implicitly and 
indirectly challenging the grants of exclusive rights and other advantages per se, which are allowed 
in general under the WTO, is not permitted. Second, within the WTO, it is hard to find a violation 
of a provision, to which the combination of exclusive rights and other advantages are alleged to 
inevitably lead. The claim will be largely dependent on the meaning of another provision that the 
combination of exclusive rights and other advantages are alleged to inevitably lead to. 
 
c) Service Monopolies Granted to SOEs   
 
In the area of trade in services, grants of monopolies to SOEs may violate market access 
commitments in GATS. In China-Electronic Payment Services, a monopoly granted to China 
UnionPay (SOE) in respect of services for payment card transactions denominated and paid in 
RMB in China, the Panel found that China violated XVI:2(a) of GATS on market access.855 China 
                                                      
854 This strategy can also be found in the EU law, where the C is about competition rules. The existence of monopolies 
will inevitably lead to abuse of the dominant positions, which is prohibited under the competition rules within the EU 
rules. Hence, the grants of monopolies in this regard are challenged and can be prohibited.  
855 Panel Report, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, paras. 7.508-7.636. 
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UnionPay is an SOE.856 The Panel found that China maintained China UnionPay as a monopoly 
supplier for the clearing of certain types of RMB-denominated payment card 
transactions.857 Article XVI:2(a) requires Members not to limit the number of service suppliers 
whether in the form of numerical quotas, monopolies, exclusive service suppliers in sectors where 
market access commitments have been undertaken. The Panel concluded that China acted 
inconsistently with its market access commitment under Article XVI:2(a) of the GATS by granting 
China UnionPay a monopoly for the clearing of these types of RMB payment card transactions.858  
 
Such a result is possible only in respect of services subject to market access commitments. This is 
generally inadequate to control monopoly rights in services because many WTO Members have 
made only limited commitments under GATS.  
 
d) Exclusive Production Rights Granted to SOEs 
 
In the area of trade in goods, grant of exclusive production rights to SOEs is not disciplined by 
WTO rules. First, governments are allowed to grant exclusive production rights. Second, the very 
existence of SOEs is allowed under the WTO. Third, granting exclusive production rights to SOEs, 
is not disciplined, except to the extent that GATT Article XVII applies, but it only concerns trading 
rights or rights that “affect import or export”. Thus, only if SOEs with exclusive production rights 
in fact affect export or import, may they be subject to Article XVII.  
 
However, where exclusive production rights are granted to SOEs and there are some governmental 
measures relating to export/import in existence, it is the governmental measures relating to 
export/import that are subject to WTO disciplines, rather than the grants of exclusive production 
rights per se that are under challenge. In the absence of any explicit governmental measure relating 
to import/export, the mere existence of exclusive production rights granted to SOEs cannot be 
challenged. Even if it can be found that SOEs with exclusive production rights may affect 
export/import, such as the SOE in question also exports or imports in addition to production, it is 
                                                      
856 Tangfei, “Who is the owner of UnionPay?”, JRJ.COM, Oct. 1, 2013,  
http://opinion.jrj.com.cn/2013/10/01080115912728.shtml 
857 Article XVI (2) (a) of GATT.   
858 The panel found no inconsistency with China’s national treatment commitments. See Panel Report, China – Certain 
Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, paras. 7.508-7.636. 
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only the behavior of SOEs with exclusive rights that is subject to GATT Article XVII, rather than 
the grants of exclusive production rights, which are allowed under GATT Article XVII.  
  
e) Other Privileges Granted to SOEs 
 
In the areas of trade in services, grants of privileges may violate the national treatment obligation 
of GATS. In the case of China–Electronic Payment Services, China UnionPay was granted various 
privileges. China required that all ATMs, merchant card processing equipment and point-of-sale 
terminals in China to be capable of accepting payment cards bearing the “UnionPay” logo and post 
the “UnionPay” logo. In contrast, services suppliers of other Members had to negotiate for access 
to merchants. The Panel found that each of these requirements, including that all payment card 
processing devices must be compatible with China UnionPay’s system, must use the China 
UnionPay’s electronic funds transfer network rather than the foreign enterprises’ electronic funds 
transfer network (e.g., Visa network or MasterCard network), and must bear the “UnionPay” logo, 
to be inconsistent with China’s mode 1 and mode 3 national treatment obligations under Article 
XVII of the GATS. In the Panel’s view, China modified the conditions of competition in favor of 
China UnionPay through these requirements and failed to provide national treatment to electronic 
payment services suppliers of other Members.859 
 
Once again, the inadequacy of WTO rules in controlling grants of monopolies lies not only in the 
limited commitments made by WTO Members under GATS, but also the questionable 
implementation of dispute settlement decisions. In the implementation stage of China – Electronic 
Payment Services, China agreed to comply with the WTO’s rulings by July 2013, but China has 
not yet taken the needed steps to authorize access by foreign suppliers in the market of credit card 
and processing companies that supply electronic payment services to banks and other businesses, 
despite the U.S.’s active pressure on China to comply with the WTO’s rulings and the threat of 
taking further steps at the WTO.860   
 
                                                      
859 Panel Report, China – Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, WT/DS413/R, paras. 7.508-7.636.  
860 The U.S. Trade Representative, “2016 U.S.T.R. National Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,” (2016), 90.  
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Conclusion of (1) 
 
Grants of monopolies or exclusive rights are not disciplined adequately. WTO rules allow grants 
of monopolies and exclusive rights. Although some kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights have 
been challenged by parties in WTO dispute settlement proceedings, only some of the challenges 
succeeded while others failed. Those that succeeded typically involved claims of country-specific 
commitments, such as GATS market access commitments, or protocol commitments, but many 
countries have made only limited GATS commitments and have no protocol commitments. 
General WTO rules do not usually address the issue.  
 
(2) Regulating the Behavior of SOEs with Monopolies or Exclusive Rights 
 
Given the inadequacy of WTO rules in respect of granting monopolies and exclusive rights, it is 
necessary for completeness to explore whether WTO rules regulate the behavior of those SOEs 
that have been granted such monopolies or exclusive rights. Once again, it appears that WTO rules 
inadequately regulate such behavior. First, not all SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights are 
subject to behavior regulations at all. Second, much anti-competitive behavior is not disciplined. 
Third, similar behavior is subject to different disciplines depending on which area of trade is 
concerned, or which market is concerned. For example, some behavior may be disciplined if it is 
conducted by SOEs in the area of trade in goods rather than in the area of trade in services, or vice 
versa.  
 
This part will first examine the subject coverage of the current WTO rules. Then I proceed, based 
on the types of behavior of SOEs that have been granted monopolies or exclusive rights, to 
consider how the current WTO rules can to some degree discipline some behavior. I conclude, 
however, that such rules are yet inadequate.  
a. Only Some SOEs are Disciplined 
 
WTO rules are directed at its Members, rather than individuals or corporations. How to attribute 
behavior of SOEs with exclusive rights to WTO Members? International law usually uses rules of 
attribution, requiring some degree of connection between the state and the entity. However, under 
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some rules, such as GATT Article XVII and GATS Article VIII, WTO Members are responsible 
for the behavior of a monopoly, even if the government does nothing, as the rules impose an 
obligation on WTO Members to prevent certain behavior.861  
 
This section will discuss the coverage of GATT Article XVII, i.e., whether it can be applicable to 
SOEs with exclusive state trading rights, SOEs with exclusive production and distribution rights, 
SOEs with exclusive natural resources exploitation rights, and SOEs with de facto monopolistic 
or oligopolistic status. Then, other rules, such as GATT Articles II, III and XI, will be examined 
to see whether they can be applicable SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights.  
 
Article XVII 
With regard to the coverage of GATT Article XVII, it cannot cover all SOEs with monopolies or 
exclusive rights. The subject matter is defined in Article XVII:1(a) which provides that: 
 
“Each contracting party undertakes that if it establishes or maintains a State enterprise, wherever located, or grants 
to any enterprise, formally or in effect, exclusive or special privileges, such enterprise shall, in its purchases or 
sales involving either imports or exports…” 
 
State Trading Rights 
First, SOEs with trading monopolies or exclusive rights are subject to Article XVII by falling 
within the definition of state trading, given that trading monopolies or exclusive right can definitely 
influence import or export.862 The Understanding on The Interpretation of Article XVII of the 
GATT 1994 provides a working definition of a “state trading enterprise” as follows:    
 
"Governmental and non-governmental enterprises, including marketing boards, which have been granted 
exclusive or special rights or privileges, including statutory or constitutional powers, in the exercise of which 
                                                      
861 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994; Panel 
Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, paras. 6.39 and 6.43.  
862 In London Conference, the UK proposed to define STE by using a simple control criterion; any enterprise 
effectively controlled by the state should be considered an STE. However, it is only through latter case law that the 
definition is clarified, and judge retains substantial discretion to define what effectively amounts to control. Report of 
the First Session of the London Preparatory Committee of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, 
U.N. Doc. E/PC/T/33, Oct.,1946 (“London Draft”), art. 31.  It implies disciplines on SOEs. See Douglas Irwin, Petros 
Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 157-161.  
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they influence through their purchases or sales the level or direction of imports or exports.” 863 
 
Production and Distribution Rights 
Second, it remains ambiguous whether SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights in production or 
distribution can be covered by Article XVII. In spite of the phrase “exclusive or special rights or 
privileges” in Article XVII:1(a), the provision limits its coverage by specifying that it applies to 
“purchases or sales involving either imports or exports”. Moreover, the working definition in the 
1994 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of GATT narrowed down the scope of 
entities that shall be reported to WTO, to only those enterprises i) granted exclusive or special 
rights or privileges, and ii) in the exercise of these rights they influence through their purchases or 
sales the level or direction of imports or exports.864  
 
There are two approaches to argue that SOEs with exclusive production or distribution rights are 
covered by Article XVII:1. One approach is through aggressive interpretation of “in the exercise 
of which [exclusive or special rights or privileges] they influence through their purchases or sales 
the level or direction of imports or exports”. It may be aggressively interpreted that production or 
distribution activities can indirectly affect imports or export, and hence the behavior of SOEs with 
exclusive production or distribution rights is covered by Article XVII. Also, the working definition 
in the Understanding cannot substantively alter the coverage of Article XVII:1(a) as the 
Understanding provides that “Recognizing that this Understanding is without prejudice to the 
substantive disciplines prescribed in Article XVII”. 865  However, the approach of aggressive 
interpretation may encounter critics of judicial activism. Besides, while exclusive exploitation 
rights are mentioned in the Ad Interpretative Note to Article XVII:1(a), exclusive production or 
distribution rights are mentioned nowhere. Thus, it may be inferred that exclusive production and 
distribution rights are intentionally left untouched by the drafters of GATT.  
  
                                                      
863 WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, 
para. 1.   
864 Id.  
865 Id.  
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The second approach is relying on the Illustrative List developed by the Working Party on State 
Trading Enterprises866 in pursuance to its mandate provided in the Understanding of Article XVII 
for the purpose of facilitating Members compliance with notification requirement. GATT Article 
XVII:4(a) and paragraph 1 of the Understanding on Article XVII require that Members should 
notify their STEs and their operations to the Council for Trade in Goods. The Working Party on 
State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications. The format for such notifications is a standard 
questionnaire.867 
 
With regard to which entity is subject to notification, paragraph 1 of the Understanding of Article 
XVII has the working definition of STEs as (i) a governmental or non-governmental entity, 
including marketing boards; (ii) the granting to the enterprise of exclusive or special rights or 
privileges; and (iii) a resulting influence, through the enterprise's purchases or sales, on the level 
or direction of imports or exports.”868 The Working Party completed its mandate to develop an 
Illustrative List of the kinds of relationships between governments and state trading enterprises 
and the kinds of activities engaged in by these enterprises, which may be relevant for the purposes 
of Article XVII.869 The Illustrative List is not intended to be exhaustive. The Illustrative List tried 
to clarify what constituted an exclusive or special right or privilege in the sense of Article XVII 
and the Understanding.870 Despite differing positions about whether certain activities should be 
included in the illustrative list,871 the Illustrative List tried to make efforts to reach any SOEs and 
to know more about their relationship with their governments.  
                                                      
866 It was established by the Council for Trade in Goods at its meeting of 20 Feb. 1995, pursuant to paragraph 5 of the 
Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. The 
mandate of the Working Party is set out in paragraph 5 of the Understanding. 
867 The 1960 questionnaire was revised in 1998 and then again in 2003 when the frequency of notifications was made 
less burdensome. See 1960 Questionnaire on State Trading, BISD 9S/184-185, adopted 24 May 1960; WTO Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questionnaire on State Trading, G/STR/3, adopted 7 April 1998; WTO Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Questionnaire on State Trading, (G/STR/3/Rev.1), adopted on 14 November 2003; 
Report (2002) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/591, adopted 21 November 2002. 
868 WTO Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994.  
869 Report (1995) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/35, adopted 14 November 1995; Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Illustrative List of Relationships Between Governments and State Trading 
Enterprises and the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These Enterprises, G/STR/4, 30 July 1999. 
870 Report (1997) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/198, adopted 17 November 1997.  
871 Report (1998) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/281, adopted 26 November 1998; Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Proposal from the U.S.: Draft Illustrative List of The Relationships between 
Governments and State Trading Enterprises and State Trading Activities, G/STR/W/32, 1 October 1996; Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Proposal from New Zealand DRAFT ILLUSTRATIVE LIST of The Relationships 
between Governments and State Trading Enterprises and State Trading Activities, G/STR/W/31, 17 September 1996.  
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The list does seem to cover certain SOEs that have been granted exclusive rights to production, 
distribution and trade. For example, one type of entity listed is “a government-owned or partially 
owned enterprise” meeting the following conditions:  
 
“the enterprise purchases or sells a given product or group of products, either directly or indirectly through third 
parties under contract or transfer of right; and one or more of the following applies:  
 (i) the enterprise is specially authorized or mandated by the government to do one or more of the 
following: control and/or conduct import or export operations; distribute imports; control domestic production, 
processing, or distribution.   
 (ii) all or part of the enterprise's activities are supported by government in one or more of the following ways, 
and the support afforded is specific or more favorable to the enterprise and not generally available to other entities, 
or is not warranted by purely commercial considerations: budget allocations; interest rate/tax concessions; 
guarantees (e.g. for loans or against business failure);  revenue from the collection of tariffs; preferential access 
to foreign exchange; any off-budget support or assistance.” 872 
 
Regarding activities engaged in by STEs, the list also refers to activities that can be related to trade 
in an indirect way.873 The List also outlines activities that were included in some notifications 
previously, such as “(i)  Authorizes or manages domestic production and/or processing of 
domestic production; (ii)  Determines the purchase price and/or sales price of domestic production; 
(iii)  Manages domestic distribution of domestic production and/or imports; (iv)  Undertakes 
purchases and sales of domestic production based on predetermined floor and ceiling prices 
(intervention purchases/sales)”, etc.874 
 
However, the List does not represent a definition of what constitutes a state trading enterprise as 
provided in Article XVII and its Interpretative Notes or the working definition contained in the 
                                                      
872 Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Illustrative List of Relationships Between Governments and State 
Trading Enterprises and the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These Enterprises, G/STR/4, 30 July 1999.  
873 Such activities include (a) Controls or conducts imports or exports; (b) Administers multilaterally or bilaterally 
agreed quotas, tariff quotas or other restraint arrangements, or other import or export regulations; (c) Issues 
licenses/permits for importation or exportation; (d) Determines domestic sales prices of imports; and (e) Enforces the 
statutory requirements of an agricultural marketing scheme and/or stabilization arrangement. See Working Party on 
State Trading Enterprises, Illustrative List of Relationships Between Governments and State Trading Enterprises and 
the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These Enterprises, G/STR/4, 30 July 1999. 
874 Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, Illustrative List of Relationships Between Governments and State 
Trading Enterprises and the Kinds of Activities Engaged in by These Enterprises, G/STR/4, 30 July 1999.  
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Understanding.875  Each member has discretion to determine whether an enterprise should be 
notified under Article XVII. 
 
In sum, in light of inadequacy of the two approaches, it remains uncertain that whether SOEs that 
have been granted monopolies or exclusive production or distribution rights are covered by Article 
XVII’s provisions regarding behavior regulations, given that it is a case-by-case analysis to 
examine whether imports or exports are affected or not. 
 
Natural Resources Exploitation Rights  
The third problem with respect to the coverage of Article XVII is that, SOEs with exclusive rights 
to exploit national natural resources may not be covered by Article XVII:1 (a). The Ad 
Interpretative Notes to Article XVII Paragraph 1 (a) provides that “…privileges granted for the 
exploitation of national natural resources but which do not empower the government to exercise 
control over the trading activities of the enterprise in question, do not constitute “exclusive or 
special privileges”. Although theoretically and logically one can distinguish between granting 
exclusive exploitation rights to SOEs without control over the trading activities of these SOEs, and 
granting exploitation rights to SOEs with control over the trading activities of these SOEs, 
governments usually do not explicitly announce that they control the trading activities of SOEs. In 
reality, there might be certain informal control over the trading activities of these SOEs, 
particularly in the context of Chinese SOEs, which would be difficult to establish in a specific 
dispute.   
 
Transparency Issues 
Finally, it should be stressed that some de facto monopolistic or oligopolistic status enjoyed by 
SOEs may easily escape disciplines due to the lack of information. For instance, government 
assisted concentration and consolidation among SOEs, issuing non-exclusive production 
license/exploration permits and export/import licenses to SOEs can in fact result in SOEs enjoying 
monopolies or exclusive rights, in the following situations: i) Situation one: although POEs are not 
prohibited by law from entering the industry, in fact, no POEs exist in the industry; ii) Situation 
two: in fact, there are no POEs large enough that can be comparable to large SOEs, for example, 
                                                      
875Id.  
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there are only small and medium sized POEs in the steel industry. Hence, the SOEs are in dominant 
positions. It is not easy to find the grants of exclusive rights in fact. In the case of China 
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, the panel found that “the United States had 
not been able to demonstrate that China’s regulations and rules established, either de jure or de 
facto, a duopoly that would prevent other enterprises from applying for, and receiving, a license 
to distribute imported films.” 876  Hence, it is difficult finding evidence for claim of de facto 
exclusivity.  
 
In summary, with regard to the coverage of Article XVII, only some SOEs are disciplined, 
including SOEs with trading monopolies or exclusive rights. But it is uncertain whether SOEs with 
monopolies or exclusive rights in production or distribution can be covered by Article XVII. SOEs 
with exclusive rights to exploit national natural resources may not be covered by Article XVII due 
to the difficulty of proving state control over trading activities of these SOEs.  
 
Other GATT Articles 
In respect of the coverage of GATT Articles II, III and XI, Article II (tariff concessions) only 
concerns a monopoly of the importation of a product subject to concessions. Article III is only 
applicable to governmental measures affecting imported goods. Given that article XI concerns 
import and export restrictions, exclusive rights to exploitation, production and distribution are not 
covered by Article XI unless they are equivalent to import or export restrictions. The aggressive 
argument that exclusive rights to exploitation, production and distribution are equivalent to an 
export or import restriction is hard to pursue. 
 
b. Only Some Behavior is Regulated  
 
Different behavior by STEs are subject to different provisions. Article XVII on STEs is only about 
discriminatory behavior and commercial considerations. Article XI can regulate import or export 
STE’s behavior associated with quantitation restrictions since according to the Interpretative Note 
to Articles XI, which specifies that the terms “import restrictions” or “export restrictions” include 
                                                      
876 Panel Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/R, adopted 12 August 2009; AB 
Report, China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/AB/R, adopted 21 Dec. 2009.  
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restrictions made effective through state trading operations, Article II can regulate import STE’s 
behavior regarding mark-ups associated with pricing.  
 
This section will look at the various behavior of SOEs after receiving advantages. First, SOEs’ 
discriminatory behavior, such as pricing differently, will be examined. Second, SOEs’ decision 
making not based solely commercial considerations will be examined. Third, SOEs’ anti-
competitive behavior will be examined, such as taking advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights 
in non-reserved markets, abuses of their dominant positions, and engaging in cross-subsidization, 
collusion and exclusion behavior. Last, to take an example of one type of anti-competitive behavior 
conducted by SOEs, a case study of export restraints associated with SOEs will be analyzed.   
 
a) Discriminatory Behavior  
 
After receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, SOEs may engage in discriminatory behavior, such 
as pricing differently between the domestic market and export markets. In the case of 
discriminatory behavior of the sort dealt with by MFN, it might be addressed by current WTO 
rules through several channels. However, each encounters difficulty. GATS requires that the 
suppliers of monopoly services shall not violate the MFN obligation, and specific commitments 
regarding market access and national treatment. However, the purchasing behavior by SOEs with 
monopolies or exclusive rights is not disciplined. In addition, many WTO members made limited 
specific commitments in GATS on national treatment. In the GATT, the MFN obligation in Article 
XVII is applicable to SOEs with trading monopolies or exclusive rights.877 However, an export 
STE can charge different prices for its sales of a product in different export markets, provided that 
such different prices are charged for commercial reasons.878  
 
                                                      
877 Panel Reports, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea –Various Measures 
on Beef), WT/DS161/R, WT/DS169/R, adopted 31 July 2000; Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting 
Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef (Korea –Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, 
adopted 11 Dec. 2000, para. 753; GATT Panel Report, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review 
Act (Canada-FIRA), L/5504, adopted 7 Feb. 1984, BISD 30S/140, para. 5.16; Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports 
and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.48.  
878 GATT, the Interpretative Note to Article XVII:1; Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, 
WT/DS276/R, para. 6.49.  
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As for the question of whether the national treatment obligation applies to SOEs with monopolies 
or exclusive rights, it raises some issues worthy of discussion. There are three approaches that 
could be taken to make the national treatment principle applicable. One approach is through 
interpreting Article XVII:1(a) as embracing NT. The text of Article XVII:1(a) requires Members 
to undertake that their STEs shall “act in a manner consistent with general principles of non-
discriminatory treatment prescribed in this Agreement…”. This reference to “general principles of 
non-discriminatory treatment”, arguably can include MFN and NT, since the text doesn’t explicitly 
exclude NT. However, it remains controversial whether the non-discrimination principle in Article 
XVII:1(a) refers only to MFN, or also refers to NT. One position argues that no NT obligation 
exists with respect to how state trading enterprises operate, 879  from examining the drafting 
history,880 the interpretative note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII of GATT stating that 
the terms “import restrictions” or “export restrictions” include restrictions made effective through 
state trading operations, 881 and the absence of such specific reference to Article III.882 Several 
GATT panel reports, such as Belgian Family Allowances and Canada–Administration of the 
Foreign Investment Review Act, adopted this position.883  
 
The second approach is applying GATT Article III to address the discriminatory behavior against 
foreign producers by SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights. However, it encounters the issue 
of whether the application of Article III is only available by a specific reference, or whether Article 
III can be applied directly. One argument is that Article XVII is a self-contained code of trade rules 
governing state trading enterprises, rendering other GATT provisions applicable only by 
                                                      
879 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), 326-27.   
880 William J. Davey, “Article XVII GATT: An Overview” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas 
Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 17-36 
(University of Michigan Press, 1998), 26. 
881 ANNEX I: Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms 
“import restrictions” or “export restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations. 
882 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation of Article XVII and 
Proposals for Reform,” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 71-96 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
75; GATT Panel Report, Canada – Import, Distribution and Sale of Alcoholic Drinks by Canadian Provincial 
Marketing Agencies (Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC)), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37.  
883 GATT Panel Report, Belgian Family Allowances, G/32, adopted 7 November 1952, BISD 1S/59, 60, para. 4; 
GATT Panel Report, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (Canada-FIRA), L/5504, 
adopted 7 Feb. 1984, BISD 30S/140, 163, para. 6.16.  
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reference.884 Article II:4 and the Interpretative Note to Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII have 
specific references to STEs, while such reference is absent in Article III.885 Nevertheless, the 1997 
Annual Report of the WTO notes in respect of STEs: “There is nothing in the rules to suggest that 
autonomous behavior by enterprises in a manner contrary to the standards set out in the relevant 
WTO provisions would escape the scope of the obligations accepted by Members in those 
provisions.”886 Hence, Article XVII is not a self-contained code for STEs, and Article III could be 
applicable. Furthermore, Article III was applied by several panels in cases involving state-created 
monopolies. In the EU-Canada Alcohol case, the Panel avoided the issue of whether Article III 
can be applied directly by applying Articles II:4 and XI to the STEs involved.887 However, the 
Panel saw “great force” in the argument that Article III:4 was also applicable to state-trading 
enterprises at least when the monopoly of the importation and the monopoly of the distribution in 
the domestic markets were combined, as was the case of the provincial liquor boards in Canada. 
The Panel thought this interpretation was confirmed by the wording of Article III:8(a).888  In the 
FIRA case, the Panel applied Article III to the challenged measure directly and avoided the issue 
of whether NT is embedded in Article XVII:1, since once a violation of Article III:4 has been 
found, the panel though it was unnecessary to examine the issue of whether NT is embedded in 
Article XVII:1.889  
 
Even if Article III is applicable, it is hard to view SOEs as the state for the purpose of applying 
Article III. Although in the FIRA case, it was found that the behavior of firms violated Article III:4, 
those firms were effectively required by the government of Canada to behave as they did in order 
to get a subsidy.890 In the Canadian Alcoholic Drinks case, it was held that the practices of the 
                                                      
884 Robert Howse, “State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade Rules: The Canadian Experience,” in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 185 and 187. 
885 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
paras. 4.26-7; Robert Howse, id., at 186-7.  
886 WTO, 1 Annual Report 1997 (Geneva: WTO, 1997), 59.  
887 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
paras. 4.26-7. 
888 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
para. 4.26. 
889 GATT Panel Report, Canada-FIRA, L/5504, adopted 7 Feb. 1984, BISD 30S/140, para. 5.16. 
890 Robert Howse, “State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade Rules: The Canadian Experience,” in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 186.  
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STEs at issue (Canadian liquor boards, which were found to be the government agencies) violated 
Articles III and XI.891 STEs, particularly the marketing boards, are more likely to be deemed to be 
governmental agencies both by the international and domestic laws.  However, it is not the same 
for the discriminatory behavior by SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights. SOEs are not like 
the STEs in those cases discussed above such as the cases of Canada FIRA and Canadian Alcoholic 
Drinks. SOEs engaging in commercial activities are usually treated as commercial entities. In 
practice, it is wisely explicitly provided in domestic laws that these SOEs are commercial entities, 
not governmental agencies. As a result, it may be harder to subject the activities of such SOEs, if 
they are deemed to be commercial entities, to other provisions of GATT except for Article XVII.  
 
A third approach is reframing the discriminatory behavior by SOEs with monopolies or exclusive 
rights as issues regarding market access, hence, subject to GATT Article II:4 or XI. Although the 
issue of applicability doesn’t arise since Article II:4 has specific reference to STEs, one limitation 
is that Article II:4 only applies to products subject to commitments. In addition, Article II:4 only 
applies to import monopolies, by providing that when a government maintains a monopoly on 
importation of a product which has been bound, the operation of this monopoly should not “afford 
protection on the average in excess of the amount of protection provided for in that Schedule. In 
EU-Canada Alcoholic Drinks, the Panel held that Canada’s import monopolies’ discriminatory 
mark-ups were higher for imported products than those applied to domestic products and as a result 
were affording protection in excess of tariff bindings, and therefore a violation of Article II:4.892 
Given that Article XI has specific reference to STEs, 893 it can be applied directly. In the 1988 
Panel report on Japan-Trade in Semi-Conductors, the Panel having already found the Japanese 
measures to be inconsistent with Article XI, did not consider it necessary to examine them in the 
light of Article XVII:1(c).894 In EU–Canada Liquor Board, the Panel found Article XI applied to 
an STE, viewing the discriminatory listing requirements as analogous to quotas or quantitative 
restrictions on imports that were restrictions made effective through state-trading operations 
                                                      
891 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), DS17/R, adopted 18 Feb. 1992, BISD 39S/27, 
paras. 6.1-6.3.  
892 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC)), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
paras. 4.15-9.  
893 Annex I: Ad Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII Throughout Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV and XVIII, the terms 
“import restrictions” or “export restrictions” include restrictions made effective through state-trading operations. 
894 GATT Panel Report on Japan — Trade in Semiconductors, L/6309-35S/116, adopted on 4 May 1988, BISD 
35S/116, paras.159-160. 
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contrary to Article XI:1.895 However, not every claim can be reframed in this way. In addition, 
Article II cannot apply in cases of export monopolies and Article XI cannot apply to a situation 
where an export STE sells to export markets at a lower price than in the domestic market.896 
 
There are limitations of only applying other provisions of GATT instead of applying Article XVII. 
STEs may lead to non-tariff trade barriers not being effectively covered by the general GATT 
disciplines of Articles II, III, and XI.897 Once the violation of other provisions in GATT has been 
established, panels usually choose not to examine Article XVII due to judicial economy. The 
claims of GATT-inconsistent discrimination were always decided in favor of the complaining 
parties directly on the bases of Articles I, III, and XI rather than on Article XVII.898 Avoiding 
discussion of Article XVII and its content (i.e., whether it includes NT), makes the relationship 
between Article XVII and non-discrimination principle more complex.  
 
b) Decisions Not Based on Commercial Considerations  
 
SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights from governments are more likely to follow 
decisions of governments, and are influenced by governments. Current rules are not sufficient to 
solve the problem. First, as for the non-commercial considerations based behavior of SOEs with 
monopolies or exclusive rights, only SOEs in trade in goods are disciplined in this regard, and no 
commercial considerations requirement exists in GATS.  
 
Second, in respect of trade in goods, Article XVII:1 is not adequate to solve the problem of non-
commercial considerations based behavior of SOE with monopolies or exclusive rights, due to the 
relationship between the solely commercial considerations obligation in Article XVII:1(b) and the 
non-discrimination principle in Article XVII:1(a). Disputes arise regarding whether the solely 
commercial considerations obligation in Article XVII:1(b) is a separate obligation from the non-
                                                      
895 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (EEC), L/6304, adopted 22 March 1988, BISD 35S/37, 
paras 4.24-5.  
896 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.47.  
897 Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “GATT Law on State Trading Enterprises: Critical Evaluation of Article XVII and 
Proposals for Reform,” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, 
Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 71-96 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 
85.  
898 Id., at 81-2. 
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discrimination obligation in Article XVII:1(a) or it is dependent on Article XVII:1 (a). The 
“dependent” relationship means that a violation of Article XVII needs violations of Article XVII:1 
(a) and (b), and a violation of Article VII:1(b) cannot be established without a finding of a violation 
of Article XVII:1(a). Hence, “a discriminatory behavior based on non-commercial considerations” 
is required. The “independent” relationship means that Article XVII:1(b) is one example of Article 
XVII:1(a), and a finding of a violation of Article XVII:1(b) is sufficient in and of itself to the claim 
of a violation of Article XVII:1. The AB confirmed the “dependent” relationship.899 It is also 
consistent with previous decisions.900 To that end, behavior of SOEs with monopolies or exclusive 
rights based on non-commercial considerations without violating non-discrimination principle 
wouldn’t be caught by Article XVII:1, given that the disciplines of Article XVII:1 are aimed at 
preventing certain types of discriminatory behavior.901 
 
Third, sales maximization or selling at lower prices per se, rather than profits maximization doesn’t 
necessarily violate the commercial considerations obligation according to current WTO 
jurisprudence. The U.S. in Canada–Wheat Exports and Grain Imports resorted to Article XVII:1(a) 
and (b) and argued that the STE in question, which had exclusive exporting rights would inevitably 
behave in a way inconsistent with non-discrimination principles and commercial considerations 
when utilizing their exclusive rights and other advantages. In respect of the commercial 
considerations obligation, however, the U.S. argument failed due to the AB’s interpretation of the 
relationship between Article XVII:1(a) and (b), and its interpretation of the meaning of the term 
“commercial considerations”.  It was held that Articles XVII:1(a) and (b) are related to each other 
in that subparagraph (a) of Article XVII:1 sets out an obligation of non-discrimination and 
subparagraph (b) clarifies the scope of that obligation.902  
 
Non-commercial considerations are distinct from anti-competitive behavior, which is not 
disciplined under Article XVII:1(b).903 The U.S. made a distinction between the maximization of 
                                                      
899 AB Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 89-91, 94, 98, and 99.  
900 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Administration of the Foreign Investment Review Act (FIRA), L/5504, adopted 
7 Feb. 1984, BISD 30S/140, para. 5.16. 
901 AB Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/AB/R, para. 145. 
902 AB Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 89, 99 and 100. 
903 Panel Report, Canada — Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada—
Wheat Exports and Grain Imports), WT/DS276/R, adopted 6 April 2004. The Appellate Body Report, Canada — 
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revenue/sale/quantity/scale and the maximization of profits, and asserted that the Canadian Wheat 
Board, which was granted exclusive export trading rights and other privileges, was motivated to 
maximize its sales or revenue, rather than profits, by selling wheat in some markets at lower prices 
than “commercial actors” could offer.904 The Panel found that “if an entity is driven to maximize 
sales ‘at all cost’ without regard for the returns, it may be considered as “non-commercial 
considerations”.905 The distinction may be drawn as follows. Profit-maximization means that 
revenues minus costs, and elements need to be considered include prices, sales and costs. Revenue-
maximization only cares about sales regardless of costs. It can be inferred that “sales maximization” 
per se is not necessarily considered as “non-commercial considerations” unless there is no regard 
profits at all.  Furthermore, in terms of the pricing, the United States asserts that revenue-
maximizing firms will tend to make sales in greater volumes and at lower prices than would profit-
maximizing firms.906 The Panel noted that the “commercial considerations” requirement doesn’t 
necessarily require profit maximization,907 and lower prices or selling high quality at lower prices 
in order to increase market share or deter competitors is consistent with commercial 
considerations.908 The Panel held that “if an export STE were to sell into a particular market at a 
price that is lower than the best price available to it in that market, this might indicate that the 
STE in question is not charging the lower price for purely commercial reasons”.909 It may be 
inferred that selling at lower prices per se is not necessarily considered as “non-commercial 
considerations” unless lower than the best price available to it in that market.  
 
In the context of Chinese SOEs, it is contested that Chinese SOEs are largely pursuing the goal of 
maximizing scale of their operations, sales and revenues, rather than profits. The tendency to 
expand scale of their operations and sales, regardless of profits and costs, continues after the end 
of the planned economy.910 In addition, the promotions of managers of SOEs are associated with 
                                                      
Measures Relating to Exports of Wheat and Treatment of Imported Grain (Canada—Wheat Exports and Grain 
Imports), WT/DS276/AB/R, adopted 30 August 2004.  
904 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.112.   
905 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.127. 
906 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.132. 
907 There exist private trading enterprises that do not maximize profits. See Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and 
Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.134. 
908 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.144. 
909 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, paras. 6.129-130 and 6.133.  
910  Becky Chiu and Mervyn K. Lewis, Reforming China’s State-Owned Enterprises and Banks (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2006), 61. 
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the size and scale of the SOE. Furthermore, grants of advantages enable SOEs to maximize sales 
at the expense of costs, leading to losses, which in return can warrant SOEs to receive more 
advantages from the government. However, despite that fact Chinese SOEs’ considerations 
underlying decision-making are somewhat different from normal businessmen or commercial 
actors, it is hard to find evidence directly in respect of whether Chinese SOEs pursue sales 
maximization with no regard to profits and costs. Hence, it is hard to claim a violation of the 
commercial considerations obligation. Evidence is also needed in order to figure out whether the 
prices of Chinese SOEs who are pursuing expansion of scale, are the best available prices in that 
market, and whether there are foregone opportunities. To that end, it remains to be seen whether a 
similar claim may be sustained in the context of Chinese SOEs. It is subject to the discretion of 
the Panel in terms of dealing with the evidence and the AB will not interfere with a panel’s exercise 
of its discretion.911 Even if the claim of violating the commercial considerations obligation is 
established, discrimination between markets based on non-commercial consideration needs to be 
established further.  In sum, factual difference may alter the conclusion in the context of Chinese 
SOEs. 
 
c) Most Anti-Competitive Behavior is Undisciplined  
 
SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, are more likely to engage in anticompetitive 
activities than private profit-maximizing firms.912 Their anticompetitive behavior includes taking 
advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights in non-reserved markets, such as upstream or 
downstream sectors, to increase market shares; abuses of their dominant positions; and engaging 
in cross-subsidization, collusion and exclusion behavior, such as export restraints, etc.  
 
Partially disciplined 
Some anticompetitive behavior is captured partially by current WTO rules. GATS Article XVIII 
(Additional Commitments) provides that Members may negotiate commitments with respect to 
measures affecting trade in services not subject to scheduling under Articles XVI or XVII. Special 
                                                      
911 AB Report, US—Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, adopted Dec. 8, 2014, para. 142.  
912 David E.M. Sappington and Sidak, J. Gregory, “Competition Law for State-Owned Enterprises,” 71(2) Antitrust 
Law Journal 479 (2003), 484.  
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GATS negotiations in basic telecommunications were concluded in 1997 with a “Reference Paper”. 
Members can select any or all the provisions of the model Reference Paper to be included in their 
specific commitments. The model Reference Paper contains pro-competitive regulatory principles. 
For instance, section one is about competitive safeguards, mentioning prevention of anti-
competitive practices in telecommunications with a list of examples of anti-competitive practices 
such as anti-competitive cross-subsidization. 913  WTO jurisprudence has interpreted 
anticompetitive behavior in the Reference Paper as including monopolization or abuses of a 
dominant position in ways that affect prices or supply; horizontal coordination of suppliers related 
to price-fixing and market-sharing agreements; 914  the removal of price competition by the 
government together with the setting of uniform prices by the major supplier if there are effects 
tantamount to those of a price-fixing cartel; cross-subsidization through government determination 
or approval of rates or rate structures;915 and the allocation of market share between suppliers 
imposed by the authorities if there are effects tantamount to those of a market sharing arrangement 
between suppliers. 916 In addition, the exemption or immunity under national competition law 
cannot save a member from its obligations under the Reference Paper. A member would be obliged 
to revise or terminate the measures leading to anti-competitive behavior of exclusive suppliers.917 
However, such commitments are only binding in the telecommunications sector and only on 
Members who made such commitments.  
 
Some anticompetitive behavior in respect of trade in goods, may be covered by GATT Article XI 
and II, in addition to non-discrimination.  With respect to the problem of STEs limiting the quantity 
of import or export, Article XI can be resorted to given that the Interpretative Note to Article XI 
states that the terms ‘import restrictions’ or ‘export restrictions’ include restrictions made effective 
through state trading operations”.  With regard to the problem of STEs pricing very high for import, 
Article II can be resorted given that Article II:4 will be violated if a monopoly of importation of a 
                                                      
913 See more about the model Reference Paper, in WTO Analytical Index: GATS, Article XVIII, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_03_e.htm#article18B  
914 Panel Report, Mexico- Measures Affecting Telecommunications Services (Mexico — Telecoms), WT/DS204/R, 
adopted 17 August 2000, paras. 7.234 and. 7.238. 
915 Panel Report, Mexico — Telecoms, WT/DS204/R, adopted 17 August 2000, para. 7.242. 
916 See more about the model Reference Paper, in WTO Analytical Index: GATS, Article XVIII, 
 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gats_03_e.htm#article18B  
917 Panel Report, Mexico — Telecoms, WT/DS204/R, para. 7.242. 
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product subject to concessions prices high enough to exceed the tariff ceiling.918 However, as for 
a product not subject to a concession, only notification is required according to Article XVII:4 (b), 
which provides that such import monopolies on products not subject to tariff concessions, shall 
notify the import mark-up on the product.  With regard to a minimum import price, it was held to 
be a restriction on import falling within Article XI:1. In EEC–Minimum Import Prices, a minimum 
import price system as enforced by the additional security919 has been considered by the GATT 
Panel to be a restriction “other than duties, taxes or other charges” within the meaning of Article 
XI:1.920 
 
Most anticompetitive behavior of SOEs in respect of trade in services, may not be disciplined 
effectively. Article IX of GATS921 addressing business practices of service suppliers other than 
monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, is worded broadly, and it notes that certain such 
practices may “restrain competition and thereby restrict trade in service”.922 However, Article IX 
of GATS is not applicable here given that it is applicable to certain business practices of service 
suppliers, other than those falling under Article VIII, which is about monopolies and exclusive 
suppliers. Furthermore, Article IX only obligates Members to consult.  The WTO only obligates 
its Members to list products that are under price control, and there are no obligations for WTO 
Members to clarify their SOEs’ pricing mechanisms, except for special commitments made by 
Members, such as Russia923 and China. Article 6 of the China’s Accession Protocol provides that 
                                                      
918 An Interpretative Note clarifies that the provisions of paragraph 4 are to be applied in the light of Article 31 of the 
Havana Charter and explains that: “the term “import mark-up”... shall represent the margin by which the price charged 
by the import monopoly for the imported product exceeds the landed cost.” 
919 A requirement that importers of tomato concentrates provide additional security to guarantee that the free-at-
frontier price plus the customs duty payable would equal or exceed a determined minimum import price. The security 
would be forfeited in proportion to any quantities imported at a price lower than the minimum price. 
920 However, one member of the Panel noted that “importation of tomato concentrate at a price lower than the 
minimum price could still be carried out by importers who had an interest in doing so…The system operated in a way 
to levy an additional charge which raised the price of tomato concentrate imported at a price lower than the minimum 
price…(therefore) the minimum import price system was not being enforced in a manner which would qualify it as a 
restriction within the meaning of Article XI.” GATT Panel Report on EEC — Programmes of Minimum Import Prices, 
Licences and Surety Deposits for Certain Processed Fruits and Vegetables, L/4687, adopted on 18 October 1978, 
BISD 25S/68, para. 4.9. 
921 Article IX of GATT.   
922 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” 
in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 161-180 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 174.  
923 Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade Organization, 
WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 November 2011, para. 91. 
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such entities should be transparent about purchase procedures and export pricing mechanisms.924 
The Protocol of Accession requires China to “provide full information on the pricing mechanism 
of its state trading enterprises for exported goods.”925  However, even if there exists an obligation 
of transparency, it is largely related to export pricing, and is little related to domestic prices in 
cases of discrimination or cross-subsidization.  
 
Not disciplined  
Taking advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights in non-reserved markets and abuses of 
dominant positions are not disciplined. Article XVII:1(b) concerns behavior based on non-
commercial considerations, rather than anticompetitive behavior or unfair competition. Some 
commercial considerations may lead to anti-competitive behavior. For instance, “in some 
circumstances, selling into one market at a price that is intended to deter other exporters from 
contesting that market may be commercial behavior, even if it may also be anti-competitive.”926 
In Canada–Wheat Exports and Grain Imports, the U.S. wanted some behavior code such as anti-
competitive disciplines on STEs, and argued that a STE shall not make use of special and exclusive 
privileges granted to it to the disadvantage of commercial actors.927 The Panel concluded that the 
requirement that STEs make purchases or sales solely in accordance with commercial 
considerations must imply that they should seek to purchase or sell on terms, which are 
economically advantageous for themselves.928 STEs with exclusive or special privileges are not 
prevented from gaining a competitive advantage by making use of these privileges, and may put 
their competitors at a competitive disadvantage.929 The AB found in that case that Article XVII:1(b) 
does not impose comprehensive competition-law-type obligations on STEs.930 In addition, such 
STEs are not required to make sales solely in accordance with “fair” commercial considerations.931 
The Panel also found that the second clause of Article XVII:1(b) of the GATT is not for the 
                                                      
924 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 6 (state trading).   
925 WTO, Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WT/L/432, 23 Nov. 2001, art. 6.  
926 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.81.   
927 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.74.  
928 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.87. 
929 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.100.   
930 AB Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/AB/R, paras. 145 and 151; Panel Report, 
Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, paras. 6.127, 6.129, 6.130, and 6.133. 
931 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, para. 6.101. 
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protection of STEs’ competitors, i.e., it is not a protection of fair competition. STEs are not 
required to give regard to their competitors, nor to care about fair competition.932  
 
Cross-subsidization by SOEs is not regulated by GATT in respect of trade in goods. Article VIII 
of GATS, which limits cross-subsidization, is only applicable to trade in services. Hence, using 
the monopoly rent derived from advantages from the government for one of an SOE’s businesses 
to subsidize another business of the SOE, through undercutting prices or pricing below cost in non-
monopoly businesses (non-reserved markets) is not disciplined in respect of trade in goods.  
 
Collusion and exclusion behavior among giant SOEs who enjoy monopolies or exclusive rights 
may not be disciplined effectively by the current WTO rules. For instance, competition among 
SOEs groups might be reduced due to cooperation or conspiracy among bloc SOEs. Bloc SOEs 
may agree to limit output, reduce exports and increase export prices, and so on. The example of 
export restraints can be illustrated as follows. After receiving advantages and gaining dominant 
positions in markets, SOEs become capable of engaging in certain behavior, such as export 
restraints.  
 
A Case Study: The Situation of Export Restraints 
One particular form of anti-competitive behavior involves export restraints, which are anti-
competitive.  The problem is where there are no explicit export restraint measures issued by the 
government, export restraints may be effectively implemented by SOEs, which are the dominant 
players in the upstream industry.933 Current rules are not adequate to address this problem in the 
following aspects.934  
                                                      
932 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R, paras. 6.65, 6.68 and footnote 183.     
933 For instance, in China - Rare Earths, the Chinese government’s measures regarding export duties, export quotas 
and restricting the right to export were found inconsistent with its WTO commitments. After the dispute, China 
removed export duties, export quotas and the restriction on trading rights of enterprises. However, after the litigation, 
China adopted the strategy of consolidating the rare earths industry into 6 giant SOEs. Each SOE has an exclusive 
jurisdiction over its district. The whole rare earths market in China is divided under the control of the six giant SOEs. 
The 6 SOEs have exclusive rights to produce rare earths. They may apply export restraints by themselves. See 
Implementation of Adopted Reports of WT/DS431/AB/R, the DSB Meeting, 20 May 2015. 
 https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds431_e.htm  
934 The discussion here is primarily from the international perspective. From an anti-trust law perspective/competition 
law perspective, such as in the domestic market of the U.S., export restraints applied by SOEs may be subject to the 
U.S. competition law. SOEs, however, may raise defense of state doctrine/state immunity in that they are compelled 
by the government and hence are exempted from being sued in domestic U.S. court.  
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First, Article XVII of GATT is unlikely to reach these situations where there is conspiracy and 
cooperation among bloc SOEs to restraint exports given that it can be argued to be commercially 
motivated and hence consistent with the obligation of commercial based considerations within 
Article XVII:1(b), even if SOEs here in question can fall within the coverage of GATT Article 
XVII to the extent that SOEs indirectly affect exportation. This is because export restraints by SOE 
blocs are anti-competitive behavior rather than behavior not based on commercial considerations.  
 
Second, in light of the terms “export restrictions” in Article XI including restrictions made 
effective through state trading operations,935 combining Articles XVII and XI is not sufficient to 
address the problem. It is the market dominance that SOEs gained through advantages from 
governments that make these dominant SOEs able to implement export restraints by themselves. 
There are various advantages that may give arise to SOEs’ dominance in a market. One is 
monopolies and exclusive rights, the other is regulatory advantages. Article XI is not applicable 
unless it can be demonstrated that the entities in question are state trading operations.   
 
Third, Article XI alone is not likely to regulate the problem. Quantitative restrictions and a 
minimum export price can be held to be restrictions on exports failing within Article XI:1, such as 
in Japan–Trade in Semiconductors, where it was held that like a minimum import price constitutes 
a restriction within Article XI:1, a minimum export price also constitutes a restriction within 
Article XI:1.936 Similar rulings regarding a minimum export price can be found in China–Raw 
Materials, where the Panel found that a minimum export price requirement is a quantitative 
restriction on trade prohibited by Article XI:1, because this requirement to export at a coordinated 
minimum export price by its very nature has a limiting or restricting effect on trade. 937 However, 
it is difficult to attribute SOEs’ behavior to the government for the purpose of applying Article XI 
on elimination of export restrictions except for duties. Article XI:1 has a wide application to 
“import and export restrictions or prohibitions made effective through quotas, import or export 
                                                      
935 GATT Interpretative Note to Article XI.  
936 GATT Panel Report on Japan — Trade in Semiconductors, (L/6309 - 35S/116), adopted on 4 May 1988, paras. 
104, 105 
937 Panel Report, China — Measures Related to the Exportation of Various Raw Materials (China — Raw Materials), 
WT/DS394/R, WT/DS395/R, WT/DS398/R, adopted 5 July 2011, paras. 7.1081-2. 
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licenses or other measures,”938 i.e., referring more broadly to “measures” rather than referring to 
“laws or regulations”.939 Nevertheless, attribution is needed so that the behavior in question can 
be attributed to the government. In China–Raw Materials, the Panel found that various measures 
involving the China Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and 
Exporters (CCCMC), who administered the export price, were attributable to China, because 
China acknowledged that it delegated authority to the CCCMC to coordinate export prices.940 Also 
the CCCMC’s charter directed it to set and coordinate export prices for all branches under its 
authority, including the raw materials at issue in that dispute.941 In that case, enterprises that 
deviated from coordinated export prices, were subject to the imposition of penalties, either on the 
exporting enterprises or on export licensing entities that issued licenses to them.942 In the case of 
SOEs, evidence needs to be found so that the behavior of SOEs conducting minimum 
export/import price or quantitative restrictions can be attributed to the government.  
 
Fourth, most literature has talked about general export restraints imposed on all market participants 
in the industry at issue, i.e., situations where a government restricts the exportation of an essential 
input product for a domestic industry, and both the upstream industry and the downstream industry 
are dominated by POEs. There are three issues raised at the WTO in respect of export restraints 
imposed by governments, i.e., i) whether export restraints can be deemed to be “a financial 
contribution” within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement; ii) whether 
export restraints can be deemed “any form of income or price support” within the SCM Agreement; 
and iii) whether export restraints can be challenged through the Anti-Dumping Agreement.  
 
In respect of the discussion of whether export restraints can be deemed to be “a financial 
contribution” to the extent that the government “entrust or directs” a private body to provide 
goods at lower prices to the domestic market within the meaning of Article 1.1 (a)(1)(iv) of the 
SCM Agreement, This approach is discussed in US–Export Restraints (Softwood I), where Canada 
restricted the exportation of logs, an essential input into the production of lumber, resulting in 
                                                      
938 Panel Report, China — Raw Materials, para. 7.1072 
939 Panel Report, China — Raw Materials, para. 7.1073    
940 Panel Report, China — Raw Materials, para. 7.1005. 
941 Panel Report, China — Raw Materials, para. 7.1026. 
942 Panel Report, China — Raw Materials, para. 7.1064. 
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increasing the domestic supply of logs, and thus, lowering their price to domestic purchasers.943 A 
“benefit” is present. The U.S. insisted on the “effects approach”, which only focuses on effects of 
the governmental action, views the government has implicitly directed a private body to supply 
goods to the domestic industry, in that if the sellers of logs cannot export them they have no choice 
but to sell them domestically, it is functional equivalent to “government had ordered the domestic 
producers to do so”.944 The Panel rejected the U.S.’s effect approach, and instead, focused on the 
nature of government action, and hence, held that export restrictions cannot constitute a subsidy 
to a downstream industry, based on the following reasons: the fact that there is no government’s 
direction or entrustment to POEs in cases of export restraints. 945 The AB in US-DRAM stated that 
“government’s entrustment or direction” cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-product of 
governmental regulation.”946 Export restraints are governmental regulation, the mere by-product 
of which is that more goods under the export restraints are sold in the domestic market. The 
structure of the SCM Agreement is only to discipline actions listed explicitly, rather than non-
listed actions with equivalent effects, such as governmental regulations.947 The Panel notes that 
“the function of the fourth subparagraph [art. 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement] is not to 
encompass forms of action other than those provided in subparagraphs (i) to (iii)…but rather to 
avoid circumvention of those subparagraphs by a government simply acting through a private body 
or through a funding mechanism”. The AB in US-DRAM agreed in this regard.948  
 
In respect of the discussion in the literature as to whether export restraints can be deemed “any 
form of income or price support” within the SCM Agreement,949 Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM 
Agreement provides that “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if there is any form of income or price 
support in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994”. The relevant text in GATT Article XVI 
                                                      
943  Panel Report, United States—Measures Treating Export Restraints as Subsidies (US – Export Restraints) 
(Softwood I), WT/DS194/R, adopted 29 June, 2001, para. 2.5.  
944 In contrast, Canada views that “a producer faced with an export restraint would have multiple options, which might 
include selling to domestic purchasers, for example, vertically integrating or switching to another business altogether.” 
Panel Report, US – Export Restraints (Softwood I), WT/DS194/R, adopted 29 June, 2001, paras. 8.22-8.23.  
945 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 111-22. 
946 AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted on 27 June 2005.  
para. 114.  
947 See Panel Report, US – Export Restraints (Softwood I), WT/DS194/R, adopted 29 June 2001, paras. 8.15-76.  
948 AB Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB/R, para. 112. 
949 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 123-5.  
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provides that “If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, including any form of income or price 
support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any 
product into,” (emphasis added). Some scholars argued that the phrase “income or price support” can 
be a provision to cover situations that cannot fall within the scope of “financial contribution”.950     
However, one difficulty in cases of export restraints is that they operate to decrease exports, rather 
than increasing exports, contrary to the requirement of “operates directly or indirectly to increase 
exports of any product…” in GATT Article XVI. The other difficulty is still the distinction 
between border measures and financial assistance. The US–Export Restraints Panel noted that “the 
support of the price of a commodity by imposing high tariffs on imports would not constitute a 
subsidy within the meaning of Article 1.”951 Hence, “regulatory mechanisms involving border 
measures, such as tariffs and export restraints, although producing a transfer of economic resources, 
cannot be caught within the scope of either ‘financial contribution’ or ‘price or income 
support’”.952  
 
In respect of efforts that have been made to challenge export restraints through the Anti-Dumping 
Agreement, however, such efforts failed in the case of EU–Biodiesel. In that case, the EU alleged 
that the domestic price of soybeans and soybean oil, which are the inputs of biodiesel, are 
depressed due to export restraints imposed on soybeans and soybean oil, and hence distorts the 
costs of production of biodiesel producers in Argentina. 953 Based on Article 2.2.1.1 of Anti-
Dumping Agreement, “costs shall normally be calculated on the basis of records kept by the 
exporter or producer…provided that such records…reasonably reflect the costs associated with the 
production and sale of the product under consideration..”. In calculating the normal price for the 
purpose of finding dumping, the EU decided not to use the cost of soybeans in the production of 
biodiesel in Argentina. The Panel held that Article 2.2.1.1 is “to establish whether the records 
reasonably reflect the costs actually incurred, and not whether they reasonably reflect some 
hypothetical costs that might have been incurred under a different set of conditions or 
                                                      
950 Id., at 125.  
951 Panel Report, US — Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAMs, WT/DS296/AB/R, para. 8.38. 
952 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 124; Robert W. Staiger and Alan O. Sykes, “Currency Manipulation; and World Trade,” 9 
World Trade Review 04, 583-627 (Oct. 2010), 610-11.  
953 AB report, European Union-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina, WT/DS473/AB/R, adopted 6 
Oct. 2016, para. 5.4,  
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circumstances and which the investigating authority considers more ‘reasonable’ than the costs 
actually incurred.” 954  The AB upheld the Panel’s decision. 955  Therefore, the textual words 
“records…reasonably reflects the costs…” of the Anti-Dumping Agreement casts limitations in 
that it only requires that records reasonably reflect the costs actually occur, rather than a judgement 
of the reasonableness of the actual costs, which are lower than costs in the absence of export 
restraints. To that end, the situation of export restraints imposed on inputs, and hence affect prices 
of downstream industry, cannot be solved through the Anti-Dumping Agreement.956  
 
The above literature didn’t examine export restraints imposed in relation to SOEs, particularly in 
the context of China, the analysis of which is different both in terms of challenges and solutions. 
There are difficulties for the current WTO rules to reach export restrains imposed by governments. 
It is even more difficult for the current WTO rules to reach export restraints effectively applied by 
SOEs without governmental measures.   
Conclusion of (2) 
 
WTO rules inadequately regulate behavior of those that have been granted such monopolies or 
exclusive rights in aspects of coverage and types of behavior. Only some SOEs are disciplined. 
SOEs with trading monopolies or exclusive rights are subject to Article XVII. While it remains 
ambiguous whether SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights in production or distribution can be 
covered by Article XVII given that it is a case-by-case analysis to examine whether import or 
export are affected or not. SOEs with natural resources exploitation rights are likely to escape 
disciplines given that it is not easy to find out whether governments retain certain control over the 
trading activities of these SOEs.  
 
                                                      
954  Panel Report, European Union-Anti-Dumping Measures on Biodiesel from Argentina (EU-Biodiesel), 
WT/DS473/R, adopted 6 Oct. 2016, para. 7.242.  
955 AB Report, EU-Biodiesel, WT/DS473/AB/R, adopted 6 Oct. 2016, para. 6.26.  
956 Such litigation strategy was also used recently by some complaining parties, for instance, in the case of Ukraine-
Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate. “Ukraine rejected the price of natural gas actually paid by Russian 
producers of ammonium nitrate, replaced it with the adjusted export price of natural gas that is delivered at the German 
border.” See Ukraine-Anti-Dumping Measures on Ammonium Nitrate, request for consultation by the Russian 
Federation, WT/DS493/1, G/L/1114, G/ADP/D109/1, 12 May 2015, p. 2, item 4.  
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Only some behavior is regulated. The national treatment obligation does not apply to SOEs with 
monopolies or exclusive rights, due to the narrow interpretation of the non-discrimination principle 
in GATT Article XVII:1(a), and the applicability issue of GATT Articles III, II:4 and XI.  SOEs 
after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights from governments are more likely to follow 
decisions of governments, and are influenced by governments. However, only SOEs in trade in 
goods are disciplined in this regard, and no commercial considerations requirement exists in GATS. 
In respect of trade in goods, the commercial considerations based obligation in Article XVII:1(b) 
is dependent on Article XVII:1(a)’s non-discrimination obligation. What’s more, sales 
maximization or selling at lower prices per se, rather than profits maximization, doesn’t necessarily 
violate the commercial considerations obligation according to current WTO jurisprudence. 
 
SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, are more likely to engage in anticompetitive 
activities. Some anticompetitive behavior is captured partially by current WTO rules. However, 
taking advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights in non-reserved markets and abuses of 
dominant positions are not disciplined. Article XVII:1(b) concerns behavior based on non-
commercial considerations, rather than anticompetitive behavior or unfair competition. Cross-
subsidization by SOEs is not regulated by GATT in respect of trade in goods. Collusion and 
exclusion behavior among giant SOEs who enjoy monopolies or exclusive rights may not be 
disciplined effectively by the current WTO rules, such as the case study of the situation of export 
restraints. Specifically, although there are no explicit export restraint measures issued by the 
government, export restraints may be effectively implemented by SOEs, which are the dominant 
players in the upstream industry. GATT Article XVII, even combined Articles XVII and XI, and 
Article XI, is not likely to regulate the problem. Most literature has talked about general export 
restraints imposed by governments, and didn’t examine export restraints imposed in relation to 
SOEs, particularly in the context of China, the analysis of which is different both in terms of 
challenges and solutions. There are difficulties for the current WTO rules to reach export restraints 
imposed by governments. It is even more difficult for the current WTO rules to reach export 
restraints effectively applied by SOEs in the absence of governmental measures.   
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In a nutshell, disciplining the behavior of SOEs that have been granted monopolies or exclusive 
rights is inadequate within current WTO rules. Only some SOEs are subject to disciplines. Only 
some behavior is regulated, leaving much behavior of SOEs undisciplined. 
 
4.2.3 Regulatory Advantages Granted to SOEs 
 
SOEs enjoy regulatory advantages, such as the exemption of government-assisted mergers and 
acquisition of SOEs from domestic competition laws, selective enforcement of domestic 
competition laws or anti-bribery laws in favor of SOEs, etc., and other regulatory advantages. But 
current WTO rules are not sufficient to address the problem.  
 
First, the grant of regulatory advantages to SOEs is not covered by the SCM Agreement as it 
merely covers grants of “financial contribution” or “income or price support”. However, at the 
outset, it is worth noting that the distinction between financial and non-financial assistance may 
be artificial.957 Various authors have discussed the distinction between financial assistance and 
regulation. The former is commonly considered as a form of government action that may constitute 
a subsidy while it is controversial to treat regulations as a form of subsidy.958 There are, however, 
different criteria that distinguish financial assistance from regulation, although it is argued that 
these criteria are not clear in drawing the line between what is and what is not a subsidy.959 
Although, all government regulatory policies have price effects on the inputs that are used by 
domestic firms to produce final products, subsidies disciplines generally ignore the effect of 
regulatory policies on the costs of firms. It is considered impractical to have “regulatory subsidies”, 
i.e., to attack as a subsidy the failure of a foreign government to provide certain levels of regulation 
of environmental or labor protection. In the absence of measures of harmonization at the 
international level, it is within the sovereignty of each State to decide the level of environmental 
                                                      
957 For a detailed discussion of whether regulation can be a subsidy and detailed analysis of elements of the SCM 
Agreement, as well as the distinction between regulatory measures and financial assistance, see Luca Rubini, The 
Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
94, 142-198.  
958  Merit E. Janow and Robert W. Staiger, “US-Export Restraints: United States---Measures Treating Export 
Restraints as Subsidies,” World Trade Review, Vol.2(S1), 201-235 (Jan. 2003).  
959 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 94. 
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or labor protection in its society. The differences in standards between various states may affect 
competition, but they cannot be relevant as such for subsidy rules.960  
  
Second, with respect to the approach of applying other trade rules, the trade rules that might be 
applicable in the situation of regulatory advantages granted to SOEs, are Articles II, III and XI of 
GATT, and the market access commitments and the national treatment obligation of GATS. As 
for rules regarding the national treatment obligations, they only work in the domestic setting in 
China, leaving SOEs overseas behavior and SOEs’ exportation uncovered. It doesn’t address the 
situation where SOEs after receiving regulatory advantages export goods/services to foreign 
markets.  Furthermore, the issue of non-enforcement of bankruptcy laws, anti-trust 
law/competition laws and environmental laws in favor of SOEs is difficult to solve within the 
WTO. It is difficult to prove in individual cases that the SOE is in a similar situation as the FOE 
for the purpose of demonstrating “likeness” as required by the national treatment obligation. The 
enforcement of domestic regulatory laws is largely outside WTO’s jurisdiction.  
 
SOEs after receiving regulatory advantages, may obtain dominance in a market, and their behavior 
afterwards are similar to behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies and exclusive rights. The 
analysis is the same as that in the section of II. 2.2 of chapter three.  
 
In summary, current WTO rules cannot regulate the problem of SOEs receiving regulatory 
advantages to the extent that the grant of regulatory advantages to SOEs is not covered by the SCM 
Agreement due to the distinction between financial and non-financial assistance, such as regulatory 
policies. Other trade rules are not able to regulate the problem either due to limited coverage.  
 
4.2.4 Transparency Requirements in the WTO and the Inadequacy in its Compliance  
 
The WTO rules impose various transparency requirements on its Members. With respect to 
transparency of STEs, Members are required to notify their STEs and their operations according 
                                                      
960 OECD, Competition Policy in Subsidies and State Aid, Competition Policy Roundtable, DAFFE/CLP (2001) 24, 
(Paris, OECD Publishing, 2001), 27-8; Marc Benitah, The law of subsidies under the GATT/WTO System (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001).  
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to GATT Article XVII:4(a) and paragraph 1 of the Understanding of Article XVII. The Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises reviews notifications.961 The format for such notifications is a 
standard questionnaire.962 The notifications are made to the Council for Trade in Goods and 
circulated to all members. Counter-notifications may also be made by a member.963  With regard 
to which product of the entity is subject to notification, the notification covers all the products over 
which the entity has authority, even if the STE in question has not affected any imports or exports 
during the reporting period. Hence, Members shall notify the enterprises referred to in paragraph 1 
of the Understanding whether or not imports or exports have in fact taken place.964 With regard to 
what information needs to be submitted associated with the STE, information includes the criteria 
the STE used to make decisions regarding quantity, price of imports or exports, and resale prices; 
whether private traders are allowed to import or export and on what conditions; whether there is 
free competition between private traders and the STE; all exclusive or special rights or privileges 
granted to the STE, as well as any other support or assistance provided by the government; the 
relationships between governments and STEs referred to on the illustrative list; and etc.965   With 
respect to financial advantages, Article 25 of the SCM Agreement specifies the notification 
requirement for subsidies subject to the SCM Agreement. China is also required to undergo 
transitional reviews under Section 18.2 of China’s Protocol of Accession to the WTO Agreement, 
including the provision of information on granting of subsidies.  
 
However, the compliance with the notification requirement is poor. In respect of the notification 
requirement regarding STEs, from examining annual reports of the Working Party on STEs from 
1995 to 2015, it seems that many agenda items would be put on the table to deal with STEs at the 
very beginning, such as completing the Illustrative List, finishing questionnaire, solving non-
compliance with notification requirement, and the European Union even proposed discussing the 
                                                      
961 The mandate of the Working Party is set out in paragraph 5 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article 
XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994. 
962 Report (2002) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/591, adopted 21 November 2002; 1960 
questionnaire on state trading (BISD 9S/184-185); 1998 revision of the questionnaire on state trading (G/STR/W/30) 
[draft]; (G/STR/3), adopted on 14 November 2003 (G/STR/3/Rev.1), see G/STR/3/Rev.1. G/STR/5; G/STR/6 and 
G/STR/7. 
963 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, para. 4. 
964 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the GATT 1994, para. 3.   
965 The questionnaire requires every Member to furnish statistics, by quantity and value, on imports, exports and 
national production of the products notified. See STEs on the WTO Website.   
 239 
adequacy of Article XVII.966 However, later on, few members complied with the notification 
requirements, and the agenda of the Working Party is now limited to a certain range of mandates 
authorized by Members. Although the required frequency of notifications has been reduced, some 
members still have not submitted notifications.967 Some STEs in many countries went unreported 
for years. Very few Members complied with the notification requirement, even where there were 
no STEs to report.968 
 
The non-transparency problem is particularly severe in the context of China. Two concerns are 
raised. One is that due to the non-transparency problem in China, it is very hard for trading partners 
to gather information, and the other is that notifications submitted by China in pursuance to the 
trade policy review and other requirements under the WTO rules are not adequate. It makes it 
harder for trading partners to complain about the non-compliance. For instance, with regard to 
China’s notification under the SCM Agreement, in October 2011, China notified to the WTO its 
subsidy programs during 2004-2008. 969  However, in many cases there are no figures on the 
magnitude of support provided, and no information is available on subsidies provided at the 
provincial level. 970 The United States filed a counter notification detailing 200 central and sub-
central government subsidies that had never been notified by China.971 In these circumstances, 
Article 25.10 called on China to notify those subsidies promptly. However, in its subsequent 
subsidies notification, China included only 10 of the 200 subsidies identified in the U.S. counter 
notification and has not taken any further action.972 The consequence of non-compliance with 
notification requirements is only peer pressure on the non-compliant members at committee 
                                                      
966 Report (2006) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/788, adopted 16 October 2006. 
967 Report (2008) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/857, adopted 6 October 2008; “New and 
full notifications were first required in 1995 and, subsequently, every third year thereafter, while updating notifications 
are to be made in the intervening years, indicating any changes since the last new and full notification,” See Report 
(2002) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/591, adopted Nov. 21, 2002. 
968 Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XVII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994.  
969 WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Subsidies: New and Full Notification Pursuant to 
Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
G/SCM/N/155/CHN (G/SCM/N/186/CHN), 21 October 2011; WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Trade Policy Review: 
Report by the Secretariat: China, WT/TPR/S/264, May 8 2012, Summary.  
970 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China: Record of the Meeting, 
WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 2012, para. 57.  
971 WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Subsidies: Request from the United States to China 
Pursuant to Article 25.10 of the Agreement, G/SCM/Q2/CHN/42, 11 October 2011.  
972 WTO Trade Policy Review Body, Report by the Secretary, Trade Policy Review: China: Record of the Meeting, 
WT/TPR/M/264, July 17, 2012, para. 66. 
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meetings at the WTO. It is not strong enough to induce members to comply with notification 
obligations.  
  
The reasons for failure to notify may be incapacity of members, disagreement on substantive 
provisions, such as the definition of STEs, and that members are afraid of providing information 
that may be used in the dispute settlement mechanism against them.  
4.3 Conclusion of Chapter 4  
 
In light of the widespread presence of SOEs in China, the essential difficulties in addressing the 
problem of SOEs receiving advantages lie in two aspects: one is the relationship between the 
government and SOEs (identification of SOEs, whether SOEs are public bodies, whether SOEs 
are independent from governmental intervention or control, whether SOEs are directed or entrusted 
by the government, whether the behavior of SOEs can be attributed to the government and under 
what conditions), and the other is the behavior of SOEs (such as SOEs giving advantages to other 
SOEs, various anti-competitive behavior, non-commercial considerations, etc.).  
 
I have explored existing WTO rules to find possible solutions to the problem of SOEs getting 
various advantages. Basically, the WTO rules scattered across different issues may address a piece 
of the problem but do not address adequately the problem as a whole.  
 
First, I laid out the existing WTO rules that can discipline financial advantages granted to SOEs in 
the area of trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related investment, existing WTO rules that 
can discipline advantages of monopolies and exclusive rights granted to SOEs in the above three 
areas, existing WTO rules that can discipline regulatory advantages granted to SOEs in the three 
areas, and the special rules agreed to by China in its accession to the WTO with respect to 
advantages granted to SOEs. 
 
Most importantly, I explained how the current WTO rules cannot cover some issues related to 
SOEs, and how the current rules are deficient even if they can be maximized to address issues 
related to SOEs getting advantages.  In respect of financial advantages enjoyed by SOEs, I show 
the deficiency in rules disciplining financial advantages granted to SOEs through the following 
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issues (i) the problems of SOEs giving financial advantages to other SOEs; (ii) the problem of 
upstream subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs; (iii) the problem of privatization in the context 
of Chinese SOEs; and (iv) the problem of finding “specificity” and “benchmark prices” in the 
context of Chinese SOEs.  With respect to the deficiency of rules regarding disciplining advantages 
of monopolies and exclusive rights granted to SOEs, I demonstrate that there is inadequacy in that 
the WTO allows the grants of monopolies and exclusive rights and the efforts in WTO 
jurisprudence that tried to implicitly attack the grants of monopolies or exclusive rights failed to 
some degree. I also demonstrate that there is inadequacy in regulating the behavior of SOEs with 
monopolies and exclusive rights, or regulatory advantages, including such actions as the 
discriminatory behavior, decisions not based on commercial considerations, and anti-competitive 
behavior, etc.  With respect to the inadequacy in rules regarding disciplining regulatory advantages 
granted to SOEs, current WTO rules are limited to regulate such grants of regulatory advantages.  
Last, I show that there is also inadequacy in the transparency requirements of the WTO and that 

















Chapter 5: Proposals to the WTO Rules to Address the Problem  
 
In this Chapter, I make proposals to address the deficiencies in WTO rules that were addressed in 
Chapter three. I have divided the proposals into three groups, (i) proposals relating to improving 
WTO trade remedies; (ii) proposals relating to improving WTO trade rules generally and (iii) 
proposals for adding competition rules to the WTO Agreement. At the outset, however, several 
general issues common to all proposals will be discussed. Lastly, a combination of the three types 
of rules will be examined with explanations of what different combinations would be necessary in 
order to solve all the problems. Most proposals draw inspiration either from the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership Agreement (TPP model) or the European Union rules (EU model). Some are based on  
my innovation and other sources.  
5.1 Commonalities  
 
All three proposal groups have the following commonalities. They have rules governing SOEs 
receiving advantages distinct from rules governing POEs receiving advantages. There is a 
distinction made between exceptions available to SOEs receiving advantages and exceptions 
available to POEs receiving advantages. Rules regarding SOEs receiving advantages will be 
applicable in respect of the areas of trade in goods, trade in services, trade-related investment in 
goods, and trade-related investment in services.  
 
First, all three proposal groups treat SOEs separately from POEs. The problems are different in 
the context of SOEs, as opposed to privately-owned enterprises (POEs). Due to the relationship 
between SOEs and governments, such as the network among managers and governmental officials 
through rotation, the following differences between SOEs and POEs can be found, particularly 
with respect to the impacts on markets. i) SOEs can act as givers of advantages; ii) SOEs receive 
more advantages on more favored terms; iii) SOEs’ lobbying power to get advantages is large such 
as in China; iv) the behavior of SOEs after they receive advantages is different as opposed to POEs 
in that a) SOEs are more likely to pursue revenues, rather than profits; b) SOEs have public 
objectives/motives in addition to commercial objectives/motives, and will be more likely to get 
compensation from governments for acting pursuant to these public objectives/ motives; in 
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contrast, POEs are more likely to respond to market signals, while SOEs are less likely to respond 
to market signals since they have other objectives to pursue; c) decisions of SOEs are more likely 
to be influenced by governments while POEs have broader options than SOEs. For instance, 
Chinese SOEs will follow the governments’ industrial policies and macro policies, like prices, set 
by NDRC (National Development and Reform Commission).973 Furthermore, government barriers 
to trade are distinguished from private barriers to trade, and barriers to trade associated with SOEs 
may be identified somewhere between these two barriers thereof.  
 
This distinction was inspired by the proposed TPP Agreement, which has a chapter named SOEs 
and designated monopolies that deals with the behavior of SOEs, non-commercial assistance to 
SOEs, and behavior of SOEs that have been granted monopolies.974 The proposed TPP Agreement 
establishes separate disciplines on i) financial advantages granted to SOEs, which are subject to 
the provisions regarding non-commercial assistance to SOEs, from those granted to POEs in 
general, which are subject to WTO rules regarding subsidies; and ii) the behavior of SOEs from 
the behavior of POEs, which are subject to a separate chapter on competition rules. In the TPP 
Agreement, there are detailed obligations and rules in the Chapter on SOEs as opposed to only a 
few soft rules in the Chapter on competition policy, which is primarily applicable to POEs. The 
comparison indicates that disciplining SOEs receiving advantages in the TPP negotiation 
encountered fewer obstacles than negotiating disciplines on POEs, and there were more concerns 
regarding SOEs.  
 
Second, the separation between the treatment of SOEs and POEs can also be found in proposals 
regarding exceptions and justifications. Currently, there are no general exceptions available in the 
SCM Agreement. In contrast, violations of other GATT or GATS rules might be justified under 
the general exceptions provisions, e.g., GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV. The proposals 
embody the following considerations. First, the proposals distinguish between exceptions available 
                                                      
973 In China, NDRC (National Development and reform Commission) is a very powerful agency, the head of which is 
in a position higher than the minister of commerce, although they are supposed to be equal by law. In contrast, SOEs’ 
micro policies are set by SASAC (State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council) regarding assets and profits of SOEs. Currently, it is not clear whether the independence of SOEs is going to 
be reduced or enhanced.  
974 See the Proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (signed 2016), Chapter 17 on State Owned Enterprises and 
Designated Monopolies. It also has Chapter 16 on competition policy, which allows each Member’s national 
competition law to be applicable to all commercial activities. 
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to SOEs receiving advantages and exceptions available to POEs receiving advantages. I prefer 
reducing the scope of exceptions for advantages granted to SOEs, as opposed to the TPP 
approach.975 Second, the proposals provide that exceptions cannot be invoked in the case of export 
related grants of advantages to SOEs and non-commercial assistance granted to SOEs solely as a 
result of state ownership or control, given that the situation where advantages granted to SOEs 
solely as a result of their state ownership is distinct from the debate that subsides are widely used 
as instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives and the concerns of 
WTO overreach into domestic policy. 
 
From a normative perspective, the scope of justifications should be distinguished from the scope 
of advantages, which should be defined objectively. The analysis of purposes for granting 
advantages should be at a subsequent and different level.976 For instance, the argument that grants 
of certain advantages to SOEs are compensation for a disadvantage imposed on those SOEs, should 
be put in the discussion of justifications rather than the discussion of the scope of advantages.977 
With respect to the extent of permitted justifications, although some justifications should be 
available for members to pursue legitimate objectives, which are either related to efficiency 
(correcting market failure) or distributive objectives, 978  some justifications no longer work 
nowadays based on the following balancing tests, i.e., i) whether granting advantages to SOEs is 
the best tool to achieve the objective, or whether the objective can be better achieved by other 
alternative means rather than the means of giving advantages to SOEs; ii) cost-benefit analysis; 
and iii) the proportionality principle.979 The cost-benefit analysis and the proportionality principle 
were inspired by the EU rules.980 The Commission reviews state subsidies to business to assess 
                                                      
975 Chapter 29 of the TPP Agreement provides that GATT Article XX and GATS Article XIV are applicable to the 
Chapter 17, which is about SOEs.   
976 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 23, 389. 
977 WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Subsidies: New and Full Notification Pursuant to 
Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994 and Article 25 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, 
G/SCM/N/155/CHN (G/SCM/N/186/CHN), 21 October 2011, para. 151.  
978 However, an empirical finding of Vietnam giving interest rate subsidies during economic crisis, found that many 
subsidies were used by enterprises in stock market speculation or real estates, rather than in production or expansion. 
Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 45.  
979 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 3rd edition (Routledge, 2005), 
282.   
980  Joaquin Almunia, 9th Global Forum on Competition, held in Paris, 18-19 Feb. 2010, available at 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/abuse/9thoecdglobalforumoncompetition18-19february2010.htm  
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their impact on competition.981 Taking another example, the justification of compensating SOEs 
for bearing the burden of employment, social responsibilities, and social security function, may no 
longer work. For instance, such social costs imposed on SOEs account 1.55% of total costs of 
Chinese SOEs in the coal industry.982 Furthermore, an independent and separate social security 
system in China has been established in 2000, reducing any need to compensate SOEs for social 
security functions.983  
  
With respect to how to provide justifications/exceptions, the placement of justifications will be 
different under three approaches. With respect to the competition rules approach, I propose to have 
an independent set of exceptions. With respect to the trade remedies approach, given that the SCM 
Agreement doesn’t have exceptions and the applicability of general exceptions of GATT to 
subsidies is debatable, I propose to utilize the “specificity” element to serve as a tool to recognize 
some legitimate interests and policies, or to introduce an independent set of exceptions, or carve 
out certain types of subsidies, which has been suggested by some scholars.984 Given that the 
provisions on non-actionable subsidies in the SCM Agreement expired in 2000 due to opposition 
to renew them, it seems that it is hard for Members to agree on permitted subsidies. With respect 
to the trade rules approach, I propose to put some exceptions into the analysis of substantive 
obligations, or to have an independent set of exceptions. The former proposal was inspired by the 
NAFTA case of UPS v. Canada. Canada asserted that UPS Canada and Canada Post were not in 
like circumstances because only Canada Post could guarantee nationwide delivery of publications 
to all residential addresses in Canada, and assuring nationwide delivery to all residential addresses 
was an essential aspect of its public policy goal, although they were directly competing in the 
courier business. It was recognized by the Tribunal who put the analysis of “public policy” into 
                                                      
981 The fundamental principles were laid down in 1957, as a necessary condition to achieving a common market in 
goods and services in the EU, and remain unchanged today in the new Lisbon Treaty. See George Bermann, Roger 
Goebel, William Davey and Eleanor Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union Law, 3rd edition (West Academic 
Publishing, 2010). 
982 “The Internalization of the Costs, Prices, and External Prices of Coal,” Unirule Institute of Economics (2008).  
983 State Council, “Notification Regarding Ensuring the Payment of Pension on Time for Retired Employees from 
Enterprises and SOEs” No. (2000) 8; “The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned Enterprises,” Unirule 
Institute of Economics (June 12, 2011), 78-83; Xuejin Zuo and Hangsheng Cheng, State-owned Enterprise 
Governance in China: An International Comparative Perspective (China: Social Science Academic Press, 2006), 1-
14, and 40-49.  
984 Robert Howse, “Do the World Organization Disciplines on Domestic Subsidies Make Sense? The Case for 
Legalizing Some Subsidies”, in Kyle W. Bagwell and George A. Bermann (eds.) Law and Economics of Contingent 
Protection in International Trade (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 85-102.  
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the analysis of “like circumstances”, which is in the substantive obligation, i.e., the national 
treatment obligation, and concluded that there are legitimate considerations for treating postal and 
courier services separately.985  
 
Third, current WTO rules have separate disciplines on advantages granted to enterprises in the 
areas of trade in goods, trade in services, trade related-investment in goods, and trade related-
investment in services. For instance, the SCM Agreement only applies to trade in goods. However, 
there is no economic rationale for leaving one specific area undisciplined. 986 All areas should be 
covered. For instance, modifications can be made so that the SCM Agreement is applicable to all 
areas including trade in goods, trade in services, and trade related-investment. This proposal was 
inspired by the proposed TPP Agreement, which applies the same rules to all kinds of markets, 
regardless of whether they are domestic markets or foreign markets, except for the area of trade in 
services in the domestic market. The reason for leaving the area of trade in services in the domestic 
market not covered, probably, is not out of an economic rationale, but rather, is out of a political 
compromise given opposition from countries with SOEs that wanted to protect their domestic 
service providers. This proposal was also inspired by the state aid rules in the EU model, which 
have general applicability, i.e., applicable to all state aid in the areas of trade in goods and services, 
except for sectors that do not affect trade between member states.  
 
WTO Members hold divergent positions on this issue. Several WTO Members have proposed to 
define a subsidy in the area of trade in services without the requirement of “a financial 
contribution”, which is the goods model, given that the nature of services is different from the 
nature of goods.987 Second, the distinction between trade in goods and trade in services in the WTO 
can be traced back to the negotiating history, which indicates that the distinction is largely related 
to political contingency, rather than rational reasons. It might be much easier to conclude an 
                                                      
985 United Parcel Service of America Inc. v. Government of Canada (UPS v. Canada), UNCITRAL, Award on the 
Merits (24 May 2007), paras. 92 and 97; States should have stated reasons in advance rather than ex post. See 
Dissenting Opinion of Arbitrator (Separate Statement of Dean Ronald A. Cass), UPS v. Canada, para. 124, p. 40.  
986 Alan Sykes, “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective,” Law and Economics 
Research Paper Series Paper No. 380. 
987 WTO Working Party on GATS Rules, “Communication from Chile: The Subsidies Issue,” S/WPGR/W/10, 2 April 
1996, p 1; Report by the Chairperson on the Working Party on GATS Rules, Negotiations on Subsidies, S/WPGR/10, 
30 June 2003, para. 15; Gary N. Horlick and Peggy A. Clarke, “WTO Subsidies Discipline During and After the 
Crisis,” 13(3) Journal of Int’l Economic Law (2010): 859-874, 873.  
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agreement on trade in goods than one on services due to the fact that trade in services was less 
common and domestic protection of services was intense at the time of WTO negotiations. Third, 
given that trade in services increased in the past decades and global markets for trade in services 
advanced, the demand for more openness of the area of trade in services and reducing the 
protection for domestic services is increasing. Last, there is no theoretical basis for such a 
distinction between the area of trade in goods and the area of trade in services with respect to 
advantages granted to SOEs. In addition, there is interplay between goods and services and hence, 
the line dividing trade in goods and trade in services are vague.988 
5.2 Trade Remedies Proposals 
 
My trade remedies proposals are focused on changes to the SCM Agreement so as to ensure that 
financial advantages received by SOEs are adequately controlled. For reasons explained below, I 
do not propose to deal with the problem of SOEs receiving monopolies and exclusive rights or 
regulatory advantages, and their behavior afterwards, under the SCM Agreement.  
5.2.1 Financial Advantages 
 
With respect to financial advantages, the first issue is that SOEs, such as SOBs, give financial 
advantages, such as capital and other inputs, to other SOEs. Given that it is governments, rather 
than enterprises, that are primarily subject to WTO obligations, the issue of governments giving 
financial advantages to enterprises will be regulated by the WTO rules, while the issue of SOEs 
giving financial advantages to enterprises will largely escape disciplines of WTO rules. The 
current WTO rules are not sufficient to solve this problem given that first, it is hard to attribute 
SOEs’ behavior to the government within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. The Agreement 
provides that a subsidy shall be deemed to exist only if there is a financial contribution by a 
government or public body, and one form of financial contribution is where a government entrusts 
or directs a private body to carry out the financial contribution. The standard for satisfying the 
“entrust/direct” standard is strict, i.e., it requires an “explicit and affirmative action of delegation 
                                                      
988 There is no definition of “services” provided in GATS. In the case of China — Publications and Audiovisual 
Products, it was disputed whether films and sound recordings are services or goods. The Panel held that the measure 
affects both trade in goods and services, and hence it could be a violation of both GATT and GATS. See Panel Report, 
China — Publications and Audiovisual Products, WT/DS363/R, adopted 21 Dec. 2009, paras. 4.301-4.313.   
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or command, and state ownership and control cannot automatically imply the existence of 
“entrustment/direction”. Hence, it is hard to attribute SOEs’ behavior to the government. Second, 
it is hard to treat SOEs as public bodies that are capable of giving financial contribution to others 
within the meaning of SCM Agreement. The current jurisprudence has adopted the “vested 
governmental authority” standard, ruling that a public body is an entity that possesses, exercises, 
or is vested with governmental authority, and that one factor, such as “government control”, is not 
sufficient and determinative. By rejecting the “government control” standard, initially adopted by 
panels and imposing a stricter test, the AB has made it difficult for SOEs to be considered as public 
bodies. Last, trade remedies rules do not regulate SOEs’ behavior directly. 
 
A second issue in respect of finding financial advantages under the SCM Agreement is the problem 
of upstream subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs. For instance, the Chinese government gives 
subsidies to SOEs in the coal, electricity and railway industries, which therefore could provide 
lower prices for coal/electricity/transportation by railway to the steel/aluminum industries which 
are dominated by SOEs that export steel/aluminum to foreign markets. Under current WTO rules, 
foreign governments can only impose countervailing duties on imported goods sold by those 
enterprises that receive subsidies. Hence, SOEs in the steel and aluminum industries can argue that 
they are not the recipients of subsidies, it is the coal industry that receive subsidies directly from 
the government. However, the downstream industry may in fact benefit from transactions with 
subsidized SOEs in the upstream industry due to lower prices of inputs. The current WTO rules 
are not adequate to address the problem given that it is hard to treat SOEs in the upstream industries 
as public bodies that give lower prices of inputs to the downstream industries.  
 
I would not propose to substantively change the definition of “entrust/direct” to mean that “state 
control can automatically imply the existence of entrustment or direction” since there may be 
situations of facial control where controllers do not interfere with the daily operation of the entity. 
Instead, I propose to change the interpretation of the SCM Agreement so as to treat as public bodies 
those SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and are given monopolies or 
exclusive rights or dominant positions due to regulatory advantages in a particular industry within 
the meaning of the SCM Agreement. This proposal will be referred to as “the public body 
presumption proposal” hereinafter, i.e., it proposes that entities under the meaningful control of 
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the government, and with monopolistic or dominant market power, can be presumptively deemed 
to be public bodies, unless evidence to the contrary is put forth by the responding party with regard 
to the entity in question. The presumption of “public body” status of SOEs based on control and 
market status, places the burden of proof on the party who has the SOE to demonstrate either that 
“meaningful control” is not present in a sense that the government is not in actual control of daily 
operations, and that the decision-making of SOEs is independent, or that the SOEs in question do 
not enjoy monopolistic or dominant market power as a result of favor from governments. If these 
can be proved, the presumption is rebutted. It is sort of a middle position between the “government 
control” standard and the “government vested authority” standard that have been discussed in 
WTO jurisprudence so far.    
 
The proposal doesn’t go too far from the AB’s “governmental authority standard”. First, the AB 
states that its view on “public body” comes from the analysis of text, context, object/purpose, and 
that its interpretation merely “coincides” with “the essence of Article 5 of the ILCDAs”, which 
provides that “The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of 
the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that capacity in the particular instance.”989 
It might be interpreted that SOEs that have been granted monopolies or exclusive rights are entities 
empowered by the state to exercise elements of the governmental authority given that most 
monopolies or exclusive rights are granted out of public interest, or at least governments so allege.  
 
Second, the factor “meaningful control” doesn’t go too far away from the latest jurisprudence and 
wouldn’t raise too much controversy. The AB in US-Carbon Steel (India) clarified that the 
“meaningful control” factor shall not be assigned a decisive weight compared to other relevant 
factors.990 In the latest case of US-Countervailing Measures (China), the Panel seemed to view 
that the “meaningful control” factor was weighted significantly by the AB in US-China 
AD/CVD.991 The Panel didn’t question the U.S.’ interpretation that “public body” can mean an 
                                                      
989 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/L.602/Rev.1 (Jul. 26, 2001), art. 8; Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is 
Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?” 46 J. World Trade 979, 996-1001 (2012), 997. 
990 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, para. 4.37. 
991 Panel Report, US Countervailing Measures (China), WT/DS437/R, adopted 14 July 2014, para. 7.74.  
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entity that is controlled by a government such that the government can use the resources of that 
entity as its own, citing the concept of “meaningful control” relied upon by the Appellate Body 
in US –China AC/CVD. The Panel in US-Countervailing Measures (China) found that the U.S. 
investigative authority didn’t apply their alleged “meaningful control” standard in the investigated 
case at hand even assuming the alleged standard is the right interpretation of the term “public 
body”. To that end, it can be inferred that the Panel didn’t follow the AB explicitly to denounce 
the interpretation that “meaningful control” is a decisive factor in interpreting the term “public 
body”, which the AB has clearly denounced in US-Carbon Steel (India). The panel’s attitude 
towards the significance of the factor “meaningful control” in the interpretation of the term “public 
body” seems different from that of the AB. Although the AB’s view is more authoritative, the 
contradiction between the AB and panels may open the door for my proposal in the future.  
 
Third, the factor relating to “market status” wouldn’t go much away from the AB’s interpretation. 
The AB mentioned that relevant factors may play different roles in different cases, such as the 
factor of market power and the industry in which the entity is. The AB explained that “whether the 
conduct of an entity is that of a public body must in each case be determined on its own merits, 
with due regard to the core characteristics and functions of the relevant entity, its relationship with 
the government, and the legal and economic environment prevailing in the country in which the 
investigated entity operates.”992 “Evidence regarding the scope and content of government policies 
relating to the sector in which the investigated entity operates may inform the question of whether 
the conduct of an entity is that of a public body.”993 Hence, the factor of whether the SOE enjoys 
monopolistic/dominant market positions out of receiving various advantages from the government 
could be a relevant factor.  
 
The proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to others, and the problem 
of upstream subsidies in the situation of SOEs from a legal viewpoint. One major reason that these 
two problems may escape the discipline of the SCM Agreement lies in that SOEs that are givers 
of advantages cannot fit into the categories of “governments” or “public body” captured by the 
SCM Agreement, and hence, it cannot be established that there is a subsidy given by a government 
                                                      
992 AB Report, US — Carbon Steel (India), WT/DS436/AB/R, para. 4.29.  
993 Ibid.  
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or public body. By treating SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and are 
given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions, as public bodies within the meaning 
of the SCM Agreement, the proposal expands the reach of SCM Agreement to many cases where 
SOEs give advantages to others, and where SOEs receive upstream subsidies and give advantages 
to downstream industries. The proposal makes it possible to establish there is a subsidy in these 
two situations and makes them subject to the discipline of SCM Agreement by focusing on the 
nature of SOEs as givers of advantages as a subject matter.  
 
The proposal can solve the two problems largely from a practical viewpoint. First, the emphasis 
on the factor of whether the SOE enjoys monopolistic or dominant market positions out of 
receiving various advantages from governments, has economic grounds. If SOEs are in dominant 
positions in a specific industry or market, with no or little competition from POEs, these SOEs 
could provide goods or services lower than the world prices. If SOEs were not in dominant 
positions in a specific industry, their provision of goods or service at prices lower than the world 
prices would not affect the market too much since POEs can compete with them in the market. To 
that end, whether SOEs have monopolies or exclusive rights in the industry can be the standard 
for the typology of SOEs. For instance, SOEs in energy producing sectors may provide energy at 
prices below market rates to SOEs in other sectors. This proposal directly responds to the problem 
of productive inputs provided by SOEs to other SOEs.  
 
Second, the presumption of SOEs under meaningful control of the government and with 
monopolistic or dominant market power as public bodies, fits into the reality of China and can well 
handle the problems at issue. For instance, Chinese SOEs in strategic industries, such as coal, 
airline and aviation, telecommunication, petroleum and petrochemical, shipping and 
manufacturing of ships, and electricity, enjoy monopolies or dominant market power due to 
statutory grants or governmental measures limiting competition in the favor of these SOEs. The 
Chinese Government usually maintains state ownership in absolute control of strategic industries 
with the purpose of “protecting public interest, national interest, and security interest”. It fits into 
the “public body” discussion insofar the stress is all on the public interest.   The proposal takes 
into consideration that it is difficult to gather evidence regarding SOEs due to their non-
transparency. The proposal is more likely to motivate China to move toward a direction that could 
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produce evidence about Chinse SOEs not being meaningfully controlled by the government or 
reducing the predominant status of SOEs in strategic industries particularly. Hence, China may 
have the motive to reduce or eliminate the actual control over daily operation and management of 
SOEs, and the decision-making of SOEs may become independent and be commercially based, on 
the one hand, and to increase competition in strategic or pillar industries, on the other hand.  
  
One additional problem in disciplining subsidies lies in the difficulty in establishing the legal 
requirement that an actionable subsidy must be specific.994 Particularly in the situation of upstream 
subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs, the requirement of “specificity” needs to be proved in 
situations where the SOEs in the upstream industry provide goods or services at lower prices or 
favorable terms to one or a certain number of industries, rather than all industries. Furthermore, 
despite China’s commitments in its accession to the WTO that subsidies provided to SOEs will be 
viewed as specific if SOEs are the predominant recipients of such subsidies or SOEs receive 
disproportionately large amounts of such subsidies,995 it is hard to find evidence regarding the 
outcome of a subsidy in terms of recipients.  
 
I propose, instead of focusing on the outcome of a subsidy, to focus on the market power of 
recipients (SOEs) in question, or the status of SOEs in the sector, i.e., whether they are 
monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or enjoy exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs, in 
finding the legal element of “specificity”. This proposal comes with a rebuttable presumption rule 
that financial advantages granted to those SOEs are deemed to be specific unless evidence to the 
contrary can be proved.  The proposal makes sense from economic and historical viewpoints. In 
the view of economists, the requirement of specificity cannot be explained by any economic 
rationale.996 Specificity was not necessarily required by the 1979 Tokyo Round Subsidies Code.997 
Specificity is more of an administrative tool, and it embraces the “de facto” test.998 It is due to 
                                                      
994 Article 2 of the SCM Agreement.   
995 Para.10.2, Part I of the Protocol of China Accession to the WTO.  
996 An export restriction on one good will tend to diminish imports generally and will stimulate other exports, 
equivalent to import tariff and export subsidy. However, it doesn’t meet the “specificity” requirement in the SCM 
Agreement. See Merit E. Janow and Robert W. Staiger, “US-Export Restraints: United States---Measures Treating 
Export Restraints as Subsidies,” 2(S1) World Trade Review, 201-235 (Jan. 2003).   
997 The Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Report by the Director-General (Geneva: GATT, 1979), 181.  
998 John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).  
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administrative contingency and judicial economy, as well as the balance between the imposition 
of CVDs and grants of subsidies, that specificity is required in the SCM Agreement. The specificity 
test is a flexible test. For instance, it is more about legal technicalities that specificity is deemed to 
exist for export subsidies. Such flexibility and legal technicalities can be applied in cases involving 
giving advantages to SOEs, who are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or enjoy exclusive 
rights to the exclusion of POEs.  
 
Such a proposal can partially contribute to the solution of the problem of upstream subsidies in the 
context of SOEs, and other cases where subsidies are granted to industries which are dominated 
by SOEs. To find evidence of market status is easier than finding out who receives subsidies 
precisely and how much they receive.    
 
It is also necessary to address the problem of benchmarks. To find whether there is a subsidy, it 
must be determined whether benefits are given to the recipients that are otherwise not available 
under normal market conditions. Hence, a benchmark is needed for such comparison. In cases of 
SOEs receiving advantages, SOEs may purchase inputs, and the input market, such as coal or 
natural resources, may be dominated by SOEs. It may be argued that the market in which SOEs 
operate may be distorted, particularly where SOEs are monopolists or in a dominant position. 
Although, article 15 (b) of China’s Accession Protocol allows choosing a different benchmark in 
identifying and measuring the subsidy benefit if market economy conditions are not prevailing, it 
has been held in one case that the fact of SOEs’ dominance in one market can be used to infer that 
the government played a predominant role in the market acting through SOEs. But in another case, 
it was held that the fact that SOEs are the predominant supplier does not per se establish that there 
is price distortion. In other words, in order to find out whether “market economy conditions are 
prevailing or not”, it is necessary to examine whether prices are determined by market conditions 
or not, rather than to examine whether the government/SOEs dominate in the market in terms of 
market status.  
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I propose to have a presumptive rule regarding benchmarks, which can be applied in cases of SOEs 
receiving advantages where the SOEs are monopolists or dominant players.999 In other words, it is 
refutably presumed that the fact that the government/SOEs is/are the predominant supplier(s) 
establishes that there is price distortion. For instance, selecting a different benchmark is allowed 
in the case of Chinese SOEs, who are dominant in the industry in question. Instead of focusing on 
the consequences of SOEs receiving advantages, such as whether the price is market-determined, 
the proposal focuses on the status of SOEs, the status of the market, whether it is dominated by the 
state or SOEs, the market power structure, whether the government is dominant through SOEs, 
whether there are systematic subsidies granted in association with the market, whether there is 
price control or prices set by SOEs, etc. Combining these factors together can be indicative of 
whether they lead inevitably to distortion of prices by making presumptive inference from status 
to the consequences, without demonstrating the consequences in fact. This proposal is made 
because of the underlying evidentiary issues given that information about all of the factors listed 
above may not be available in China. Hence, all factors are relevant and the rebuttable presumption 
can be made based on several of these factors.   
 
Finally, in cases of partial privatizations of Chinese SOEs with a transfer of control to private 
entities, it is not clear whether subsidies received prior to privatization can still be subject to the 
SCM Agreement given that it is not clear based on current jurisprudence whether the legal element 
of “benefit” as required under the SCM Agreement would be extinguished or not. I propose to treat 
the benefits obtained prior to privatization as not extinguished even if the privatization is at arm’s 
length and for fair-market value, given that competitive advantages still remain.  
5.2.2 Monopolies or Exclusive Rights, and Regulatory Advantages 
 
One problem I have found is that SOEs are more likely to be granted monopolies or exclusive 
rights or regulatory advantages, and most of the grants are not illegal under current WTO rules. 
First, in respect of trade in goods, Article XVII allows member to maintain state trading, and to 
grant monopolies or exclusive rights, as reflected in the wording of Article XVII:1(a). Second, the 
grant of exclusive rights or monopolies that do no fall within the definition of state trading 
                                                      
999 John H. Jackson, Restructuring the GATT System (1990), 84-7.   
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enterprises under Article XVII are not covered by the WTO. Third, monopolies or exclusive rights 
cannot be challenged under the SCM Agreement, which only applies to financial advantages, i.e., 
“financial contributions” or “income support or price support”. Lastly, in respect of trade in 
services, GATS Article VIII—monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, XVI—market access, 
XVII—national treatment, Article 5 and Annex 2A of the Protocol of China’s Accession to the 
WTO that allows China to maintain exclusive trading rights for a list of goods, all presume the 
existence of monopolies or exclusive rights. Although, WTO jurisprudence has found certain types 
of exclusive rights or monopolies themselves in violation of the national treatment obligation or 
other special obligations, most of the holdings in cases are not sufficient to challenge the grants of 
monopolies or exclusive rights completely. Furthermore, regulatory advantages, such as mergers 
and acquisitions among SOEs that are assisted or directed by governments and that are exempted 
from domestic competition laws, and non-enforcement of bankruptcy laws, anti-trust 
law/competition laws and environmental laws so as to favor SOEs are problems that are difficult 
to solve under current WTO rules.  
 
Within the trade remedies framework, it would be possible to propose to treat grants of monopolies, 
exclusive rights, or regulatory advantages as prohibited subsidies or as actionable subsidies subject 
to countervailing measures if certain conditions are met under the SCM Agreement. Such a 
proposal intends to expand the definition of subsidies beyond financial advantages to cover 
monopolies, exclusive rights and regulatory advantages.  
 
However, I wouldn’t make such a proposal for the following reasons. First, such a proposal would 
be hard to achieve due to the distinction traditionally made in the WTO/GATT between financial 
assistance and other types of advantages.1000 Second, there is a distinction between the forms of 
the government action and the effects of the government action that are usually practiced by the 
EU model and the WTO for the basis of excluding “regulatory subsidies”.1001 Even though the EU 
model emphasizes the effect of conduct, the ECJ didn’t embrace the concept of “a measure having 
                                                      
1000 For a detailed discussion of whether regulation can be a subsidy and detailed analysis of elements of the SCM 
Agreement, as well as the distinction between regulatory measures and financial assistance. See Luca Rubini, The 
Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2009), 
94, 142-198. See also Panel Report, US — Export Restraints, paras. 8.65 and 8.73. 
1001 In order to constitute a state aid, the use of “state resources” is required, which are budgetary consequences for 
the government. Therefore, regulatory measures are not state aids within the EU rules. See Article 107.1 of TFEU.  
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an effect equivalent to State aid”, e.g., public assistance featuring a regulatory element (price fixing, 
labor, insolvency laws). Such measures are not generally caught by State aid rules.1002 Third, with 
respect to regulatory border measures, the EU does not subject border measures to state aid 
rules.1003  Therefore, it might be too controversial to subject all regulatory measures to rules 
regarding subsidies or state aid.1004 Lastly, the U.S., EU and many countries largely allow the 
existence of monopolies and exclusive rights, and hence, distinguishing grants of monopolies and 
exclusive rights from subsidies in practice. They subject the grants of monopolies and exclusive 
rights to competition laws rather than rules on subsidies.1005  
5.2.3 Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the trade remedies proposals were discussed to address the problem of SOEs giving 
financial advantages to other SOEs; and the problem of upstream subsidies in the context of 
Chinese SOEs, where SOEs in the upstream industry receive subsidies and in turn give financial 
advantages to the downstream industry which is dominated by SOEs. I propose to treat as public 
bodies those SOEs who are under the government’s meaningful control and are given monopolies 
or exclusive rights or dominant positions due to regulatory advantages in a particular industry 
within the meaning of the SCM Agreement. Hence, subsidies could be found in these two 
situations. I propose to focus on the market power of recipients (SOEs) in question, or the status 
of SOEs in the sector, i.e., whether they are monopolistic or dominant in the industry, or enjoy 
exclusive rights to the exclusion of POEs, in finding the legal element of “specificity”. I propose 
to refutably presume that the fact that the government/SOEs is/are the dominant supplier(s) 
establishes that there is price distortion, and hence allowing the selection of a different benchmark 
in finding whether a “benefit” exists or not for the purpose of finding a subsidy.  
 
                                                      
1002 For a list of cases, see Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford University Press, 2009), 152. 
1003 Id., at 164.   
1004 Id., at 172.  
1005 See the U.S. Sherman Act, section 2; Article 106 is about the public undertakings granted special or exclusive 
rights and Article 37 is about state monopolies of a commercial character. See Articles 106 of TFEU (ex Article 86 
TEC, ex article 90 Treaty of Rome) and 37 of TFEU. Other practices may be found in the proposed TPP Agreement 
about non-commercial assistance as elaborated in its Article 17.6, which excludes tax advantages and regulatory 
advantages. 
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With respect to monopolies, exclusive rights and regulatory advantages, I wouldn’t propose to 
treat grants of monopolies, exclusive rights, or regulatory advantages as subsidies.  
 
5.3 Trade Rules Proposals  
 
My trade rules proposals focus on changing Article XVII on STEs, so as to expand it to cover 
SOEs in general and to make the obligations thereunder more rigorous.  
5.3.1 Financial Advantages  
 
SOEs give financial advantages, such as capital and other inputs, to other SOEs. In contrast, WTO 
rules normally regulate WTO Members’ behavior rather than SOEs’ behavior within the trade 
rules framework with some exceptions, such as rules regarding state-trading.  
 
With respect to trade rules, as explained in more detail below, I propose to expand the coverage of 
GATT Article XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and hence the 
obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial considerations in GATT Article 
XVII:1(b) can be applied to all SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights. 
Furthermore, Article XVII:1(b) should be revised to make it independent from Article XVII:1(a). 
To that end, SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights would be obligated not 
to give financial advantages to other SOEs.  
 
This proposal has its origin in the negotiating history of GATT. At the London Conference, the 
UK proposed to define STEs by using a simple control criterion, i.e., any enterprise effectively 
controlled by the state should be considered an STE.1006  
 
This proposal can solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to other SOEs. Requiring 
those SOEs with different kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights to make decisions solely based 
                                                      
1006 Douglas Irwin, Petros Mavroidis and Alan Sykes, The Genesis of the GATT (Cambridge University Press, 2008), 
157-161.  
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on commercial considerations would largely preclude them from giving financial advantages to 
other SOEs.  
 
5.3.2 Monopolies or Exclusive Rights  
  
The problem I found is that SOEs are more likely to be granted monopolies or exclusive rights or 
regulatory advantages than POEs, and most of these grants are not illegal under current WTO rules. 
The other problem is that SOEs receiving monopolies or exclusive rights are more likely than 
POEs to engage in anti-competitive behavior and behavior influenced by governments.  In theory, 
it is possible to propose to eliminate giving monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs. However, I 
would not put forth such proposal given that the establishment of SOEs are in nature linked to 
grants of some monopolies or exclusive rights. I stand by the position that nations are free to 
establish SOEs according to their sovereign rights. Prohibition of giving monopolies or exclusive 
rights to SOEs will trigger a discussion on ownership to the extent that the right to establish SOEs 
will be undermined and the purpose of establishing SOEs will be compromised if such SOEs are 
not allowed to be given monopolies or exclusive rights. Hence, it is less likely to eliminate 
monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs from a practical perspective. To that end, I will focus on 
the behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, and propose accordingly.   
 
(1) Regulating Behavior of SOEs with Monopolies or Exclusive Rights 
 
One major problem I have identified is that SOEs receiving monopolies or exclusive rights are 
more likely than POEs to engage in anti-competitive behavior and behavior influenced by 
governments. As stated above, most behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive 
rights is not disciplined by current WTO rules. First, not all SOEs with monopolies or exclusive 
rights are subject to any behavior regulations. Only SOEs with exclusive trading rights are subject 
to Article XVII on state trading, and it remains ambiguous whether SOEs with monopolies or 
exclusive rights to production or distribution can be covered by these rules, given that it is a case-
by-case analysis to examine whether imports or exports are affected or not. Second, only some 
behavior is regulated, leaving much behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive 
rights undisciplined. For instance, the anti-discriminatory obligations in GATT Article XVII only 
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refer to the most-favored nation obligation, rather than the national treatment obligation. It remains 
uncertain whether the commercial considerations obligation is a separate obligation from the non-
discrimination obligation or is dependent on it. The obligation of “commercial considerations” is 
not concerned with anti-competitive behavior. Hence, STEs with exclusive or special privileges 
are not prevented from gaining a competitive advantage by making use of these privileges, and 
may put their competitors at a competitive disadvantage. Other anti-competitive behavior is not 
generally regulated.  
  
To address these problems, I propose to modify current trade rules, i.e., GATT Article XVII. I 
propose, first, to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of 
monopolies and exclusive rights; second, to impose non-discriminatory obligations through 
Article XVII:1(a), i.e., to embrace the national treatment obligation; and third, to expand the 
coverage of the obligation of commercial considerations applicable to GATS as well, and to make 
the “commercial considerations” obligation in GATT Article XVII:1(b) independent from GATT 
Article XVII:1(a) on the non-discrimination principle. However, I wouldn’t propose to expand the 
content of “commercial considerations” obligation in GATT Article XVII to cover anti-
competitive behavior.  
 
First, with respect to expanding the coverage of GATT Article XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of 
monopolies and exclusive rights, this proposal has origin in the negotiating history. This proposal 
has been explained in the section III.1 on trade rules proposals in respect of financial advantages 
above. 
 
Second, with respect to imposing non-discrimination obligations through Article XVII:1(a), i.e., 
to embrace the national treatment obligation, I would note first that there are no textual limitations 
in Article XVII:1(a) that exclude the national treatment obligation. The argument for such 
incorporation can be supported by both “textual interpretation” and “purposive interpretation”.1007  
The AB’s interpretation method is holistic in a sense that text, context, and purpose are all relevant 
                                                      
1007 Article 31.1 of the Vienna Convention.  
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and must be considered. 1008  Given that the interpretation of the text in Article XVII:1(a) is 
consistent with the application of the national treatment obligation, nothing found in Article XVII, 
serving as context, goes against such an outcome from textual interpretation. Furthermore, GATS 
imposes the national treatment obligations on service monopolies or service suppliers with 
exclusive rights. The purpose of Article XVII:1 is to impose certain obligations, including the non-
discrimination principle, on members that establish state trading, so that members cannot 
circumvent their obligations through the tool of STEs.  According to VCLT, the negotiating history 
can be used to confirm the outcome of applying Article 31 of VCLT or to determine the meaning 
when the interpretation according to Article 31 (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.1009 The interpretation of GATT 
Article XVII:1(a) to embrace the national treatment obligation is not manifestly absurd or 
unreasonable given that there is no textual basis to exclude the national treatment obligation, nor 
does it leave the meaning ambiguous or obscure. Thus, there is no need to look at the negotiating 
history, which should not be used to go against an interpretation which is an outcome of applying 
Article 31 of the VCLT. This proposal draws inspiration from the EU model and the TPP 
Agreement model. Within the EU rules, Article 37 of TFEU provides that non-discrimination 
principle should be applied to the situation of STEs.  
 
Third, with respect to the proposal to expand the coverage of the obligation of acting in accordance 
with commercial considerations to be applicable to GATS as well, and to make the “commercial 
considerations” obligation in GATT Article XVII:1(b) independent from GATT Article XVII:1(a) 
on the non-discrimination principle, it essentially proposes that governments shall not interfere 
with decision-making of SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights. Decision-making of SOEs 
shall be independent, solely based on commercial considerations, free from political intervention, 
and free from the government intervention or Party influence. This proposal was inspired by the 
TPP Agreement, which regulates the behavior of SOEs that have been granted monopolies, and 
provides that commercial activities shall be independent from government influence. 1010 
                                                      
1008 “Interpretation pursuant to the customary rules codified in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention is ultimately a 
holistic exercise that should not be mechanically subdivided into rigid components.” See AB Report, European 
Communities–Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken Cuts (EC-Chicken Cuts), WT/DS269/AB/R, Sept. 
12, 2005, para. 176.  
1009 Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. 
1010 Article 17.4 of the TPP Agreement. 
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Furthermore, some WTO Members have already set forth challenges regarding business 
decisions.1011 Also, I would note that some WTO Members have already made commitments in 
this regard. For instance, Viet Nam undertook commitments that its  
 
“State-owned or State-controlled, including equitized enterprises in which the State had control, and enterprises 
with special or exclusive privileges, would make purchases, not for governmental use, and sales in international 
trade, based solely on commercial considerations, e.g., price, quality, marketability, and availability, and that the 
enterprises of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity in accordance with customary business 
practice to compete for participation in sales to and purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms 
and conditions.”   
 
Viet Nam undertook not to influence, directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of 
enterprises that are State-owned, State-controlled, or that have special and exclusive privileges, 
including decisions on the quantity, value or country of origin of any goods purchased or sold, 
except in a manner consistent with the WTO Agreement and the rights accorded to non-
governmental enterprise owners or shareholders.1012 Viet Nam confirmed that: 
 
“without prejudice to Viet Nam's rights with respect to government procurement, all laws, regulations and other 
measures relating to the purchase or sale of goods and services, by enterprises that are State-owned, State-
controlled, or that have special or exclusive privileges, that are for commercial sale, production of goods or 
supply of services for commercial sale, or for non-governmental purposes, would not be considered to be laws, 
regulations and measures relating to government procurement.  Thus, such purchases and sales would be subject 
to the provisions of Articles II, XVI, and XVII of the GATS and Article III of the GATT 1994.”1013 (emphasis 
added.) 
 
Finally, I wouldn’t propose to expand the content of “commercial considerations” to cover anti-
competitive behavior given that anti-competitive behavior is largely commercially motivated. 
There is an argument that “Article XVII is intended to catch protectionist conduct not easily 
impugned under other provisions of GATT given the avenues that STEs have for building 
                                                      
1011 GATT Panel Report, Canada – Provincial Liquor Boards (US), DS17/R, Feb. 18, 1992, BISD 39S/27, p. 8; Robert 
Howse, “State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade Rules: The Canadian Experience,” in State Trading in the 
Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (1998), 187-8. 
1012 WTO Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, Accession of Viet Nam: Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48, 27 Oct. 2006, para. 78.   
1013 Id., para. 79.  
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protectionism into their day-to-day business decisions.”1014  On this view, the language of Article 
XVII concerning “adequate opportunity…to compete” could be interpreted as requiring more not-
less-than equal opportunities in the sense of national treatment, and extending to a broader notion 
of contestability.1015 However, the argument is not widely accepted and shared. Furthermore, the 
commercial considerations obligation is primarily and even exclusively about making decisions 
independently and free from governmental intervention. Much anti-competitive behavior is based 
on commercial considerations. To take an example, as for SOEs that have been granted a monopoly 
in the electricity sector where SOEs are the sole source, they may sell goods or services at different 
rates to different buyers, or at prices below cost. It may be considered as anti-competitive behavior. 
However, it has been argued that when an entity is the only seller---the mere fact of selling prices 
below cost by an entity is not automatically “non-commercial” within the meaning of Article 
XVII.1016 Hence, it is hard to incorporate the obligation against anti-competitive behavior into the 
obligation of solely commercial considerations, and I wouldn’t propose accordingly to expand the 
content of “commercial considerations” to cover anti-competitive behavior.  
 
The proposals above within the trade rules framework could subject behavior of SOEs with all 
kinds of monopolies or exclusive rights in trade in goods or services to non-discrimination and 
commercial considerations obligations. However, the problem of anti-competitive behavior of 
SOEs cannot be solved within these proposals since I wouldn’t propose to expand the content of 
“commercial considerations” to cover anti-competitive behavior.    
5.3.3 Conclusion 
 
With respect to financial advantages, I propose to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to 
all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and exclusive rights, and hence make them subject to the 
obligation of making decisions solely based on commercial considerations in GATT Article 
XVII:1(b).  
                                                      
1014 Robert Howse, State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade Rules: The Canadian Experience, in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), in State Trading in the Twenty-
First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, (1998), 187.  
1015 Ibid.  
1016 Id., at 102.  
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With respect to SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights, I propose to modify current trade rules, 
to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies and 
exclusive rights, to embrace the national treatment obligation in Article XVII, to expand the 
coverage of the obligation of commercial considerations applicable to GATS as well, and to make 
the “commercial considerations” obligation an independent obligation. But I wouldn’t propose to 
expand the content of “commercial considerations” obligation in GATT Article XVII to cover 
anti-competitive behavior.  
 
5.4 Competition Rules Proposals   
 
My competition rules proposals focus on adding competition rules in the WTO, so as to regulate 
the behavior of SOEs. 
5.4.1 Financial Advantages 
 
One problem that I have identified is that SOEs usually give financial advantages, such as capital 
and other inputs, to other SOEs. Given that it is the governments that are primarily subject to WTO 
obligations, the action of SOEs giving financial advantages to other SOEs will largely escape the 
discipline of WTO rules.  
 
I propose to prohibit SOEs from giving financial advantages to others, particularly SOEs, to the 
extent that such behavior affect or distorts competition. The proposal has competition rules 
elements. More specifically, I would add to the WTO a provision such as Article 17.6 of the TPP, 
which provides:  
 
“Each Party shall ensure that its state enterprises and state-owned enterprises do not cause adverse effects to 
the interests of another Party [nor distort or threaten competition] through the use of non-commercial 
assistance that the state enterprise or state-owned enterprise provides to any of its state-owned enterprises 
with respect to:  
(a)  the production and sale of a good by the state-owned enterprise;  
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(b)  the supply of a service by the state-owned enterprise from the territory of the Party into the 
territory of another Party; or  
(c)  the supply of a service in the territory of another Party through an enterprise that is a covered 
investment in the territory of that other Party or any other Party.”1017 
 
The bracketed language is not in the TPP provision, but could be useful added. The bracketed 
language was inspired by the EU rules in that they regulate state aid within the competition rules 
framework to the extent that state aid threatens the goal of “a single market” pursued by European 
countries in the process of integration by threatening or distorting competition.1018 It regulates state 
aid that distorts or threatens to distort competition by favoring certain undertakings or the 
production of certain goods.1019 The phrase “distort or threaten competition” in the bracket is not 
exactly the same as “cause adverse effects to another state’s interests”. The phrase “distort or 
threaten competition” adds something new. There might be a situation where the welfare of the 
subsidizing country decreases while the other countries’ welfare may not decrease. Such situation 
can be captured by the phrase “distort or threaten competition” while might not be caught by the 
phrase “cause adverse effects to another state’s competition”.   
 
This proposal can completely solve the problem of SOEs giving financial advantages to other 
SOEs since it captures all SOEs in areas of trade of goods or services (including selling goods and 
services in domestic market, exporting goods to foreign markets, providing services to foreign 
markets, and providing goods to foreign markets through investment establishment).  
 
5.4.2 Monopolies or Exclusive Rights  
 
The problem I have identified is that SOEs, after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, are 
more likely to engage in anti-competitive behavior and behavior influenced by governments, such 
as discriminatory behavior, decisions not solely based on commercial considerations, etc. 1020 
                                                      
1017 Article 17.6(2) of the TPP Agreement.  
1018 George Bermann, Roger Goebel, William Davey and Eleanor Fox, Cases and Materials on European Union Law, 
3rd edition (West Academic Publishing, 2010), 1043-44. 
1019 Article 107.1 of TFEU.  
1020 For the same reason explained in section III.2, I would not propose to eliminate giving monopolies or exclusive 
rights to SOEs under the competition rules proposals.  
 265 
Domestic competition laws often do not cover anti-competitive behavior of SOEs, either out of 
legal protection or in fact protection that exempts SOEs from domestic competition laws. What’s 
more, most of the behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights is not 
disciplined by current WTO rules. In particular, WTO jurisprudence has distinguished between 
behavior conducted on a non-commercial basis and anti-competitive behavior in interpreting 
GATT Article XVII, and doesn’t regulate anti-competitive behavior.1021   
 
If grants of monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs are to be allowed, I would propose to regulate 
the behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights through competition rules as 
elaborated as follows.  
 
i) Prohibition of monopolistic behavior or abuse of dominant market position in so far as 
it may adversely affect competition in any market: including such practices as limiting 
production, discriminating by applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, using tying arrangements, engaging in price discrimination, 
preventing entry of other enterprises, or engaging in cross-subsidization in that 
monopoly rent is transferred to “non-monopolized markets” by using monopoly rent to 
undercut prices or price below cost in the non-monopoly businesses (non-reserved 
markets), or taking advantage of monopolies or exclusive rights in the non-reserved 
sectors, or taking actions that have the effect of strengthening a dominant position in 
the market;  
ii) Prohibition of horizontal restraints, such as agreements, understandings and concerted 
practices between or among competitors that limit production, fix prices, divide 
markets or assign quotas, and any other agreement that unreasonably restraints 
competition, for instance, cooperation or conspiracy among SOEs blocs with regard to 
reducing exports quantities and increasing export prices;  
iii) Prohibition of vertical restraints, such as agreements, concerted practices and restraints 
in the course of distribution of products or services, or any agreement that prevent or 
restraint or distort competition unreasonably;  
                                                      
1021 Panel Report, Canada-Wheat Exports and Grains Imports, WT/DS276/R.  
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iv) Requirements of divestiture of competitive activities from monopolistic activities, 
separating accounts, separating business entities as necessary;1022 and 
v) Domestic competition rules shall be applicable to SOEs.   
This competition rule approach was inspired by the EU model. Public enterprises and enterprises 
to which Member States grant special and exclusive rights are subject to the EC rules on 
competition insofar as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance of services 
of general economic interest.1023       
 
This proposal solves the problem that SOEs, after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights, are 
likely to engage in anti-competitive behavior as elaborated above. The more detailed competition 
laws are in the WTO, the more helpful they will be for adjudicators to judge the ongoing day-to-
day business decisions of SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights.1024   
 
5.4.3 Regulatory Advantages 
 
With respect to regulatory advantages given to SOEs, such as exemption of government-assisted 
mergers and acquisition of SOEs from domestic competition laws, selective enforcement of 
domestic competition laws or anti-bribery laws in favor of SOEs, etc., these are not disciplined by 
the WTO rules. It might be argued that such regulatory advantages violate the NT obligation in a 
sense that SOEs are favored by domestic competition laws and enforcement, while FOEs are not. 
However, it is difficult to prove in an individual case where an SOE receives regulatory advantages 
that it is in a similar situation as the FOEs for the purpose of finding “likeness”, as required by the 
national treatment obligation. Furthermore, the national treatment obligation only works in the 
domestic setting in China, i.e., when Chinese SOEs receive regulatory advantages in competition 
                                                      
1022  Deutsche post case (EC law case); and Canada Post Service case (NAFTA case); R. Richard Geddes, 
“Anticompetitive Behavior in Postal Services,” in Competing with the Government, Anticompetitive Behavior and 
Public Enterprises, eds., Richard R. Geddes (Hoover Institution Press, 2004), 100 and 106.  
1023 Jacques H.J. Bourgeois, “EC Rules on State Monopolies and Public Undertakings: Any Relevance for the WTO?” 
in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1 (1998), 161-180, 173.  
1024 Robert Howse, “State Trading Enterprises and Multilateral Trade Rules: The Canadian Experience,” in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis (1998), 189-90.  
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with foreign enterprises in domestic Chinese market. It doesn’t address the situation where SOEs 
export goods/services to foreign markets after receiving regulatory advantages.  
 
I propose to prohibit government-assisted or mandated mergers and acquisition of SOEs to the 
extent that it will lead to concentration and have anti-competitive effects. Government-assisted or 
forced acquisition and mergers, consolidation, and concentration relating to SOEs would be 
prohibited through competition rules regarding merger control. It can be proposed in detail that 
“mergers and acquisitions among SOEs assisted by governments can be anticompetitive when they 
have the effect of facilitating express or tacit collusion, or when they lead to the creation or 
extension of a monopoly or dominant position, and hence to be prohibited”.  
 
This proposal solves the problem of giving regulatory advantages to SOEs in respect of 
government assisted mergers and acquisitions of SOEs, and subject them to domestic competition 
rules.  
 
Proposals regarding regulating the behavior of SOEs after receiving advantages are similar to the 
proposals in the previous section about competition rules proposals for regulating behavior of 




With respect to financial advantages, I propose to prohibit SOEs from giving financial advantages 
to others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior affect or distorts competition. With 
respect to monopolies or exclusive rights given to SOEs, if grants of monopolies or exclusive 
rights to SOEs are to be allowed, I would propose to regulate the behavior of SOEs which receive 
monopolies or exclusive rights through competition rules. With respect to regulatory advantages 
given to SOEs, I propose to prohibit government-assisted or mandated mergers and acquisition of 
SOEs to the extent that it will lead to concentration and have anti-competitive effects. In addition, 
my proposed competition rules for SOEs are like subsidy rules in that if a government does not 
prevent anti-competitive action by SOEs, there will be the possibility of a WTO remedy - a state 
to state remedy. I do not propose a remedy by private action. I neither propose an EU-like 
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commission or international regulatory infrastructure within the WTO, although I am not against 
enhancing the function of current existing committees and working groups within the WTO. 
Furthermore, I only propose to add some competition-like provisions relating to SOEs into current 




From examining the proposals above, problems identified can be largely solved either through the 
combination of the trade remedies proposals and the trade rules proposals, or through the 
competition rules proposals alone.  
 
As for the combination of the trade remedies proposals and the trade rules proposals, the problems 
with respect of financial advantages given to SOEs will be solved either through improving the 
SCM Agreement regarding “public body” “benchmark” “specificity”, so that financial advantages 
given to SOEs will be controlled. More specifically, to treat as public bodies those SOEs who are 
under the meaningful government control and are given monopolies or exclusive rights or 
dominant positions due to regulatory advantages in a particular industry within the meaning of the 
SCM Agreement. In addition, the trade remedies approach proposes to focus on the market power 
of recipients (SOEs) in question, or the status of SOEs in the sector in finding the legal element of 
“specificity”, and rebuttably presume that the fact that the government/SOEs is/are the dominant 
supplier(s) establishes that there is price distortion, and hence allowing the selection of a different 
benchmark to determine whether a “benefit” exists or not for the purpose of finding a subsidy.  
 
Alternatively, the problems with respect of financial advantages given to SOEs will also be 
resolved through improving Article XVII so that certain SOEs will be covered and will be 
obligated to make decisions solely based on commercial considerations, and hence obligated not 
to give financial advantages to other SOEs.  
 
With respect to monopolies and exclusive rights, trade rules proposals propose to improve GATT 
Article XVII so that behavior of SOEs after receiving monopolies or exclusive rights will be 
regulated, including discriminatory behavior and anti-competitive behavior and so on. However, 
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the regulatory advantages granted to SOEs will not be sufficiently resolved either through trade 
remedies proposals or trade rules proposals.  
 
The competition rules approach proposes to prohibit SOEs from giving financial advantages to 
others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such behavior affect or distorts competition. If grants 
of monopolies or exclusive rights are to be allowed, competition rules proposals would be needed 
to regulate the behavior of SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights, or regulatory advantages. 
With respect to regulatory advantages given to SOEs, the competition rules approach proposes to 
prohibit giving regulatory advantages to SOEs, such as government-assisted or mandated mergers 
and acquisition of SOEs to the extent that they have anti-competitive effects.  
 
In terms of effective remedies, it should be admitted that countervailing sanctions by an importing 
nation against foreign SOEs is more effective and direct. In contrast, a state to state remedy 
depends on the responding nation’s measures taken to comply, either as ceasing current 
inconsistency by stopping giving advantages to SOEs or by preventing SOEs from behaving 
inconsistent with rules. A private action under domestic competition rules is also an effective and 
direct remedy. Although I do not propose a private action remedy, and I prefer the competition 
rules proposals with current WTO’s state to state remedy, the concern that close relationship 
between SOEs and the responding nation may lead to no punishment against SOEs doesn’t arise 
in this context. It is because the responding nation is required to either withdraw advantages 
granted to SOEs or stop SOEs from behaving inconsistent with rules. Otherwise, the responding 
nation may face countermeasures against it either in the same area or cross areas by other WTO 
Members under current WTO rules. To that end, the concern regarding regulators captured or SOE 
allies in a government is not of merits. 
 
I would prefer the competition rules proposals since it can solve all the problems and can be 
practically adopted.  The probability of implementing them respectively will be explored in the 





Chapter 6: General Assessments of the Proposals Within the WTO 
Framework 
 
Having made my different proposals in Chapter four above, this Chapter will proceed to assess the 
practicability of implementing the proposals from the following aspects. First, is whether the WTO 
is an appropriate forum to implement the proposals. Second, is how WTO’s legal techniques can 
be utilized to implement the proposals. Third, is the political willingness of WTO Members to 
accept the proposals.  
6.1 WTO as an Appropriate Forum to Implement the Proposals  
6.1.1 WTO’s Legitimacy  
 
The WTO system recognizes different types of national economic systems, and from the initial 
establishment of GATT it has been neutral insofar as the ownership of enterprises is concerned. 
They might be privately owned or state owned. In the WTO system, it is the Members that are 
subject to various obligations. From the history of the WTO, it can be found that trade (i.e., border) 
measures are distinguished from domestic measures. Given that subsides are widely used as 
instruments for the promotion of social and economic policy objectives and their use concerns 
nations’ sovereign rights, there is concern that disciplining subsidies strictly might thereby restrict 
legitimate domestic policies. Therefore, the pattern of WTO regulation shows there are strict rules 
on reducing tariffs and eliminating quotas, while there are loose rules on subsidies and state trading, 
let alone SOEs.1025  
  
The limited effect of the rules on subsidies and STEs also derives from their limited purposes, i.e., 
to prevent circumvention of commitments already made in the WTO. Subsidies and state trading 
can affect international trade and trade agreements and lead to the circumvention of tariff 
commitments. Regarding subsidies, the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement is to impose 
multilateral disciplines on some forms of government intervention, i.e., subsidies that distort 
                                                      
1025 John H. Jackson, World Trade and the Law of GATT (Lexis Law Pub., 1969), 305-8, 625-638; John H. Jackson, 
The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 2nd edition (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1997), 138. 
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international trade, or have the potential to distort international trade.1026 The imposition of CVDs 
causes many trade disputes and has adverse effects. Hence, a need arises to balance the right to 
grant subsidies with the imposition of CVDs.1027 In order to keep the balance, a definition of 
“subsidy” is given that defines “subsidy” in such a way as to avoid a broad definition.1028 Also, 
specificity and an injury test are required for imposing CVDs.  Regarding state trading, 
commitments such as tariff commitments and quota restrictions made by Members could be 
undermined or evaded if enterprises are granted exclusive trading rights and privileges.1029 There 
are various activities by STEs that may subvert WTO commitments and principles: (i) STEs could 
circumvent the MFN principle by discriminating among trading partners in their purchasing and 
selling decisions; (ii) they could evade the GATT Article XI prohibition on quantitative restrictions 
by limiting quantities of imports or exports; (iii) they could go beyond tariff levels by imposing 
prices with higher than commercially normal mark-ups so as to effectively exceed permitted tariff 
levels; (iv) they could get around the national treatment principle by discriminating against 
imported goods in distribution or sales; (v) they could engage in non-transparent cross-
subsidization activities or benefit from various forms of assistance from governments; and (vi) 
they might affect competition on export markets as they undercut other suppliers.1030 Hence, for 
the purpose of preventing circumvention, current rules only discipline the behavior of STEs that 
undermine commitments on tariff or quota restrictions.  
 
The limited effect of the rules also comes from one of the assumptions on which the WTO rules 
are based. Although the WTO is neutral as to forms of ownership, as noted above, it was market 
economies that were in mind when WTO rules were drafted. Governmental grants to POEs are the 
classic situation that was considered when drafters drew up the agreement. GATT rules assume 
                                                      
1026 Panel Report, Brazil — Export Financing Programme for Aircraft (Brazil-Aircraft), WT/DS46/R, adopted 14 
April 1999, para. 7.26; Panel Report, Canada — Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada — 
Aircraft), WT/DS70/R, adopted 14 Apr. 1999, para. 9.119. 
1027 AB Report, US – Countervailing Duty Investigation on Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
(DRAMS) from Korea (US-Countervailing Duty Investigation on DRAM), WT/DS296/AB/R, adopted 27 June 2005, 
para. 115. 
1028 Ibid.  
1029 Japan-Restrictions on imports of certain agricultural products, Report of the Panel adopted on 2 Feb. 1988 (L/6253 
- 35S/163), BISD 35S/163, 229. https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/86agricl.pdf ; Bernard M. Hoekman 
and Patrick Low, “State Trading: Rule Making Alternatives for Entities with Exclusive Rights,” in State Trading in 
the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The 
World Trade Forum Volume 1, 327-344 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 327.  
1030 Hoekman and Low, Ibid. 
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the existence of market economies with enterprises making decisions based on commercial 
considerations without government directives.1031 The assumption that POEs are the major players 
in the market cast some limitations on disciplining subsidies and monopolies or exclusive rights 
granted to SOEs, which were not given much attention at the time of negotiating the agreement. 
Currently, the rules of subsidies may be less than meaningful in an economy where state control 
is pervasive.1032  
 
The limited effect of the rules also comes from changed circumstances after the conclusion of 
Uruguay Round negotiations, and the accession of China to the WTO. Other researchers have 
pointed out why China constitutes a new challenge for WTO law. They view China’s unique 
economic structures (SASAC as a corporate holding for the state, state control of financial 
institutions, state control over planning and inputs, Chinese-style corporate groups and affiliated 
networks, Communist Party involvement and control, and the interconnected nature of private 
enterprises and the Party-State) as making it different from the other economic structures besides 
the market-oriented model considered in the Uruguay Round negotiations.1033 China was not a 
party to the Uruguay Round negotiations. The reason that no more rules dealing with economic 
issues specific to China upon its accession to the WTO lies in first, the belief that China would 
converge along the lines of other economies, as had the countries of eastern Europe. The changed 
economic policies of China after its accession was beyond the expectations of China’s trading 
partners. Many traits of the current economic structure of China were not yet in place upon China’s 
accession to the WTO in 2001. It was not until the Hu-Wen administration beginning in 2003 that 
the new elements of today’s China started. For instance, SASACs were established in 2003.1034 In 
                                                      
1031 William J. Davey, “Article XVII GATT: An Overview” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., 
Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 17-
36 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 21.   
1032 Id., at 22.   
1033 The global trading system has contemplated the possibility of a member’s economic structure other than a market-
oriented structure. Uruguay Round negotiators foresaw the possibility of four alternative economic structures, which 
are composed of command economy, transition economy, corporatism economy, and integrated conglomerate-led 
structure. For more about what the four alternative economic structures precisely are, see Mark Wu, “The ‘China, 
Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard International Law Journal (May 13, 2016).  
1034 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard International Law Journal 
(May 13, 2016).  
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the Uruguay Round negotiations, some members’ drafts dealt with SOEs and related issues.1035 
However, they encountered opposition from countries with many SOEs, and the countries that do 
not have many SOEs didn’t pay much attention to this issue given that SOEs were not active in 
global markets and hence didn’t cause concerns for the international community. In contrast, the 
TPP negotiations were conducted in times when SOEs were more prevalent and the problem had 
become a large concern. As for the Doha Round negotiations, the mandate of which was already 
set in 2001, at which time the problems of SOEs were not as severe as opposed to ten years later. 
Hence, the WTO members haven’t made proposals on SOEs receiving advantages in the Doha 
Round negotiations.  
 
The fact that the WTO has not to date dealt comprehensively with the problems of SOEs does not 
mean that it could not do so. There is discourse about whether the WTO law is more comparable 
to a contract (between) parties or to a constitution (of a community).1036 The contract argument 
emphasizes the historical intent of parties in concluding agreements, while the constitutional 
argument gives much more attention to the present community leading to creative interpretation. 
I would like to combine these two schools, respecting the intents of parties, but acknowledging 
changed circumstances, and hence a need for new negotiations among Members arises. It would 
be acceptable for both schools to negotiate new rules based on changed circumstances, and at least 
to consider members’ willingness.  
 
Furthermore, these proposals in Chapter four concern regulation of grants of financial advantages, 
monopolies and exclusive and regulatory advantages to SOEs, as well as behavior of SOEs, falling 
into different subjects of rules, such as trade remedies rules, trade rules and competition rules.  The 
WTO usually regulates trade policies as supposed to industrial policies, such as domestic subsidies, 
production monopolies, exploration exclusive rights, domestic competition law and its 
enforcement, etc. Industrial policies may or may not be within the WTO jurisdiction based on 
                                                      
1035 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 12-18. 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalRelations/centresandunits/ITPU/docs/woolcockintcomppolicy.pdf 
1036 Luca Rubini, “The Age of Innocence-The Evolution of the Case-Law of the WTO Dispute Settlement: Subsidies 
as A Case-Study”, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Global Governance Programme-222, European 
University Institute Working Papers RSCAS 2016/33, p. 2; Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Enhancing WTO 
Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?” 16(1) Governance (Jan. 2003): 73-94. 
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different views regarding the objectives of the WTO and its mandates. According to the view that 
the WTO is only to reduce trade barriers and protect market access concessions, industrial polices 
may not be reached by the WTO unless trade is affected. According to the view that the WTO is 
designed to increase the overall welfare, and to promote free trade, industrial policies can be 
reached by the WTO. According to the school of thought that views the WTO agreement as a 
global economic constitution,1037 industrial policies can be legitimately reached by the WTO. In 
contrast, some scholars argue that the legitimacy of the multilateral trading order requires greater 
democratic contestability.1038 This view foresees more limited WTO rules, but does not necessarily 
rule out rules on SOEs.  
 
Regarding the subject matter in general, can WTO reach SOEs directly? There are three 
approaches. One is that SOEs’ behavior is regulated to the extent that they are granted advantages. 
The other is that SOEs’ behavior is regulated to the extent that they undermine WTO members’ 
obligations for the purpose of preventing circumvention. Another one is that SOEs are regulated 
due to their state ownership. My proposals are either based on anti-circumvention, or on the fact 
that SOEs are granted advantages. This is because first, the WTO’s legitimacy in expanding its 
subject matter to cover SOEs lies in the purpose of preventing circumvention of WTO rules, i.e., 
governments should not be able to escape their obligations by having SOEs. Second, the mere fact 
of state ownership does not constitute the ground for my proposals. This is primarily due to the 
philosophy that the WTO is neutral as to economic models chosen by each member, and the WTO 
has been ownership-neutral. However, the WTO rules were designed with the assumption of a 
market economy, in which prices are determined by demand and supply, with little governmental 
interferences.1039 SOEs are allowed to exist as long as SOEs also behave like POEs in markets 
without interference of governments, i.e., market players only take into account commercial 
considerations. Giving advantages to SOEs means that there is much governmental interference, 
                                                      
1037 Constitutionalism viewpoint of the WTO stands that a constitutionalized WTO attempts to place economic 
freedom above politics. See Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “Trade Policy as a Constitutional Problem: On the Domestic 
Policy Functions of International Rules,” 41 Aussenwirtschaft (1996): 405-39.  
1038 Robert Howse and Kalypso Nicolaidis, “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global 
Subsidiarity?” 16(1) Governance (Jan. 2003): 73-94.  
1039 Some Members made commitments to transit to a market economy upon their concessions to the WTO or are 
required by other rules in the WTO agreements. For instance, transformation to a market economy is articulated in 
Article 29 of the SCM Agreement, which provides special transition rules for Members in the process of transforming 
from a centrally-planned economy to a market economy.  
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affecting ultimately prices, including domestic prices and world prices, and altering the 
competition relationship between SOEs and their competitors. Therefore, disciplining advantages 
granted to SOEs per se and the behavior of SOEs that have been granted such advantages does not 
go against the ownership-neutrality philosophy of the WTO.  
 
With regard to the question of WTO’s legitimacy in having competition policies, divergent 
positions emerge regarding the compatibility of competition policies with trade policies within the 
WTO, in terms of their respective objectives, 1040  principles, specific rules and concepts and 
limitations regarding the WTO’s capacity of global governance.1041  I believe strong arguments 
support the WTO’s adoption of competition rules in relation to SOEs. First, both trade policy and 
competition policy are instruments of promoting economic and social development.1042 Second, 
due to the concern that trade liberalization of public restraints on trade may be replaced by private 
restraints on trade, particularly hard-core cartels and other anti-competitive behavior,1043 adopting 
competition rules to prevent that fits into the WTO’s objective of trade liberalization. Third, 
nowadays, “most anti-competitive practice that raise prices and reduce output, involve the supply 
of intermediate products purchased by other businesses, rather than goods purchased by final 
consumers.”1044 Hence, competition issues are more related to producers rather to consumers.
  
 
These arguments are even more convincing in the context of SOEs. First, the risk of SOEs’ anti-
competitive practices that could impact adversely on international trade and largely replace 
                                                      
1040 Thera are three various versions of general objectives of the WTO.  Bagwell and Staiger, focusing on efficiency, 
thinks that the purpose of WTO rules is to facilitate internationally efficient outcomes through negotiated 
improvements in market access, consistent with states’ domestically efficient outcomes. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann 
views the notion of WTO as a global economic constitution, a charter of rights for a free and fair competition in world 
market. One position views WTO rules serve to entrench a view of what are good domestic public policies and tie the 
hands of governments in their choice of polices, despite demands of domestic interest groups. 
1041 Julia Ya Qin, “Pushing the Limits of Global Governance: Trading Rights, Censorship, and WTO Jurisprudence – 
A Commentary on the China-Publications,” 10 Chinese Journal of International Law (2011). 
1042  WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Synthesis Paper on the 
Relationship of Trade and Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth: Note by the Secretariat, 
WT/WGTCP/W/80, Sep. 18, 1998, para. 31; WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between 
Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 34.  
1043 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, paras. 35 and 137. 
1044 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 36.  
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governmental restraints, has been enhanced.1045 Second, the nature of disciplining SOEs receiving 
advantages and their behavior to that extent, is different from the nature of disciplining the 
behavior of POEs, given that SOEs are in the middle between public/governmental restraints on 
trade and private restraints on trade. Hence, competition rules in relation to SOEs are not solely 
rules in relation to private restraints on trade. This responds better to the argument that time would 
be better spent removing the remaining public restraints on trade in the WTO rather than private 
restraints. It has been pointed out public distortions to competition take various forms, such as 




In summary, the WTO is an appropriate forum to implement the proposals made in Chapter four. 
Although the WTO system recognizes different types of national economic systems, and is 
ownership neutral, my proposals do not go against WTO’s philosophy. The deficiencies of current 
WTO rules to address the problems identified in this dissertation partially result from limited 
purposes of these rules, such as rules on subsidies and state trading, i.e., to prevent circumvention 
of commitments already made in the WTO; from one of the assumptions on which the WTO rules 
are based, i.e., market economies that POEs are the major players in the market. My proposals are 
either based on anti-circumvention, or on the fact that SOEs are granted advantages. Hence, the 
WTO is legitimacy in expanding its subject matter to cover SOEs for the purpose of preventing 
circumvention of WTO rules, i.e., governments should not be able to escape their obligations by 
having SOEs. Second, the mere fact of state ownership does not constitute the ground for my 
proposals. Last, the WTO’s legitimacy is not put in question by having competition policies, and 




                                                      
1045 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 31.  
1046 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 9-10. 
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6.1.2 Deficiency and Political Difficulties of Other Fora   
 
There are other fora outside the WTO that might be used to address the problems I have found. At 
the regional level, for instance, the EU has a practice of embodying into its BITs and FTAs 
competition rules modeled on the EU’s rules regarding restrictive business practice, state aids and 
public enterprises.1047 This could happen for BITs and FTAs between China and other developing 
countries, given that many developing countries have started to be concerned with the problem 
caused by SOEs.1048 However, BITs are less likely to address the problems given that many BITs 
in fact do not mention SOEs.1049 This is the case for BITs negotiated between China and other 
countries. The reasons might be that, first, the SOEs issue is a top priority that cannot be 
compromised by some countries with significant presence of SOEs, such as China, which is tough 
on this matter. Hence, the other country may not be able to put pressure on China in negotiating 
BITs about SOEs and advantages. Second, China is a large economy or trader with a large market, 
and hence has more leverage over economies smaller than it. The economies smaller than China 
would prefer having access to the Chinese market in the negotiations of BITs and FTAs, and hence, 
are less likely to push on agenda items including SOEs. These reasons can partially account for 
why there is no BIT between China and the U.S. right now.  
  
Moreover, competition rules in RTAs and BITs generally do not address the SOEs problem. 
Although one-third of BITs and FTAs contain provisions related to competition policy,1050 the 
                                                      
1047  See Tomas Baert, “The Euro-Mediterranean Agreements” in Gary Sampson and Stephen Woolcock (eds.), 
Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience (Japan: The United Nations 
University Press, 2003).   
1048 The OECD (2006) analyzed 86 trade agreements that include competition-related provisions, and found that about 
two-thirds were between developing countries (often referred to as South-South agreements). See Gary Clyde 
Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, “International Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a conference titled One 
Year Later: The Antitrust Modernization Commission's Report and the Challenges that Await Antitrust, New York 
University, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 11 April 2008. https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-
papers/international-competition-policy-and-wto 
1049 Some BITs, such as the chapter 12 of U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, have rules regarding SOEs while 
others do not, such as the Indonesia - Russian Federation BIT (2007).  
1050 UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: Bilateral Investment Treaties:1995-2006: 
Trends in Investment Rulemaking (United State, New York and Geneva, 2007), 66-67; 100 out of the 300-odd BITs 
and FTAs, particularly those BITs entered by the U.S. and EU, have competition rules. The primary reason is to 
prevent circumvention. See Tomas Baert, “The Euro-Mediterranean Agreements” in Gary Sampson and Stephen 
Woolcock (eds.), Regionalism, Multilateralism, and Economic Integration: The Recent Experience (Japan: The United 
Nations University Press, 2003).   
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effect of most such provisions is quite limited.1051 The member coverage is limited, the contents 
of competition provisions are limited, and most importantly, the competition provisions in many 
BITs and FTAs are non-binding. 1052  First, competition provisions in RTAs often concern 
cooperation between competition authorities, rather than harmonization of competition 
policies.1053 SOEs and subsidies issues are carved out in most RTAs.1054 Before 2009, RTAs have 
few provisions regarding SOEs or state aid, except for RTAs entered by EU that have state aid 
provisions. In light of China’s economy and Chinese SOEs, more provisions in RTAs in this regard 
are found after 2009. Second, these provisions in RTAs are more of soft law, and there are no hard 
rules on SOEs apart from transparency and cooperation.1055 For instance, the Japan-Korea BIT is 
more cooperation based rather than rule based. NAFTA excludes the competition chapter from its 
dispute settlement mechanism.  
 
The proposed TPP Agreement is different in that it contains detailed provisions on SOEs. However, 
given that the U.S. withdrew from the TPP and the fact that China was not a party to the TPP 
negotiations, it seems unlikely that China would agree to the SOE rules in the TPP, either by 
joining it or accepting the rules in other FTAs. This is especially true given that in negotiating 
FTAs with one or a few other countries, China will likely have the upper hand in the negotiations.  
 
Other fora, like the OECD, the G20, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), etc., are not 
capable of addressing the problems I have identified. The OECD conference on Paris discussed 
about overcapacity, and called on governments to reduce overcapacity, which is closely related to 
giving various advantages to Chinese SOEs. At the G20, which serves as a global forum on steel 
excess capacity, it discussed the issue of steel overcapacity from both economic and political 
                                                      
1051 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 1 and 18-26.  
1052  Except for competition laws in the European Union and ASEAN. See Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, 
“International Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a conference titled One Year Later: The Antitrust 
Modernization Commission's Report and the Challenges that Await Antitrust, New York University, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 11 Apr. 2008. https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/international-competition-
policy-and-wto ; Article 1501 of NAFTA.  
1053 Such as the TPP Agreement, the Japan-Viet Nam BIT (2003) and the Republic of Korea-Viet Nam BIT (2003).  
1054 The U.S.-Singapore Free Trade Agreement has provisions regarding SOEs. In practice, if there is a monopoly in 
one sector, the monopoly usually lobbies for the carved-out specific sector/exceptions from such BITs/FTAs in the 
applicability of competition provisions.  
1055 The U.S. and Australia have RTAs mentioning SOEs.  
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perspectives, and countries agreed to take actions to address this issue. It also raised the awareness 
of the overcapacity issue in SCM Agreement negotiations. It will report annually to the G20 
ministers within its three-year renewable mandate.1056 However, the G20 is not a negotiating forum, 
nor a decision-making forum, nor a law-making forum. Almost every issue can be discussed at 
APEC since it only adopts soft law. However, the issue of SOEs and their advantages have not 
been raised and discussed so far due to sensitiveness, encountering opposition from countries with 
significant presence of SOEs and with close relationship between governments and enterprises, 
such as China, Korea, other Asian countries.1057 Nevertheless, monopolies can be discussed in 
APEC, as well as other issues relating to definitions.1058 It may be expected that later on, the issue 
of SOEs and advantages may be discussed following the issue of monopolies.  However, 
competition policies in the OECD, UNCTAD, ICC, ICN, etc.,1059 are usually non-binding and have 
few substantive provisions. The OECD has made recommendations in this regard as early as 1967, 
and revised it subsequently.1060 However, they are non-binding, and only provide models for 
countries to adopt in bilateral agreements, and most provisions are on procedural and cooperation 
issues. 1061  The UNCTAD Set 1062  was adopted in 1980 and contained few precise provisions 
                                                      
1056  “Steel: Commission Welcomes New Global Forum to Tackle Root Causes of Overcapacity,” European 
Commission, 16 Dec. 2016, Brussels, http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1607 
1057 For instance, governments have close relationship with some giant corporations. Some sensitive industries, like 
military sectors are operated by states.  
1058 E.g., the issue of climate change was covered and discussed at APEC at the very beginning around 1993. Later 
on, “APEC members are promoting trade in environmental goods—from solar panels to wind turbines—in the region 
by reducing tariff to 5 per cent or less by the end of 2015.” See Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, “About APEC, 
Fact Sheets: Climate Change,” 13 May 2015, available athttps://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Fact-
Sheets/Climate-Change ;  It has impacts on the WTO. Currently, there is negotiation on environmental goods 
agreements at the WTO. The whole process took about 10 years. Such process may be resembled to deal with the 
issue of SOEs and advantages. See WTO, “Trade Topics: Environmental Goods Agreement,”   
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/ega_e.htm (last visited 26 Sept. 2017).  
1059 OECD, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 31. 
COM/DAF/TD(2005)3/FINAL (Paris, 2006); UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development),  
Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: How to Assure Development Gains (New York: United 
Nations, 2005); ICN refers to the International Competition Network. 
1060 OECD, “Recommendation of the Council concerning Effective Action against Hard Core Cartels,” 
C(98)35/FINALA, 25 March 1998; WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 71.   
1061 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 12-18. 
1062 UNCTAD, The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition: UNCTAD Set of Multilaterally Agreed 
Equitable Principles and rules for the Control for Restrictive Business Practices, TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2 (Geneva, 
United Nations, 2000).  
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without binding commitments, but was rather an early model for drafting international and national 
competition policies.1063  
 
At the national level, domestic competition laws may not be sufficient to address the problem for 
the following reasons: a) some countries, especially developing countries, may not have domestic 
competition laws and the capacity of enforcing domestic competition laws; b) there is jurisdictional 
limitation that domestic competition laws of one country may not reach the behavior of enterprise 
in another country; c) information is not always available especially regarding an enterprise outside 
of a country’s territory; and d) there are different standards and policies in various domestic 
competition laws, leading to legal segmentation that one behavior is deemed to be problematic by 
one trading partner while not problematic by another trading partner, and voluntary cooperation is 
inadequate to deal with policy differences.1064 
Summary 
 
The WTO is an appropriate forum to implement the proposals made in Chapter 5. First, the WTO 
is legitimate in embracing such proposals. The deficiencies of current WTO rules to address the 
problems identified in this dissertation partially result from limited purposes of these rules, such 
as rules on subsidies and state trading. Rules drafted with WTO’s philosophy and assumptions 
about market economies kept in mind, can hardly catch up with changed circumstances. 
Nevertheless, the WTO is capable of dealing with the problems of SOEs through respecting the 
intents of parties and acknowledging changed circumstances. The reach of WTO rules to SOEs 
doesn’t go against the ownership neutrality philosophy of the WTO. Furthermore, the WTO’s 
legitimacy is not put in question by having competition policies, and there are strong arguments 
supporting the WTO’s adoption of competition rules in relation to SOEs. 
 
                                                      
1063 It was an earlier effort by developing countries to get some control over potential RBPs of multinational companies. 
Stephen Woolcock, supra note 1061. 
1064 Although the effects doctrine can be invoked in theory, developing countries do not have the capacity, resources, 
and information against cartels which are organized abroad. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, “International 
Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a conference titled One Year Later: The Antitrust 
Modernization Commission’s Report and the Challenges that Await Antitrust, New York University, Peterson  
Institute for International Economics, 11 Apr. 2008.  
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On the other hand, other fora outside the WTO, such as BITs and FTAs, are not likely to succeed 
in addressing the problem of SOEs receiving various advantages due to political difficulties or the 
lack of participation by countries with significant presence of SOEs. Technically, competition 
rules in RTAs and BITs are not enough to address the problem due to their soft law effect nature 
and limited coverage. Although the proposed TPP Agreement does much on this subject, its 
influence and effects, however, remain to be seen. Other fora, like the OECD, the G20, APEC, 
etc., are neither sufficient due to the limited coverage, the use of soft law techniques and the limited 
functions of these fora. At the national level, domestic competition laws may not be sufficient to 
address the problem due to limited jurisdiction, limited resources, limited capacity and 
fragmentation of competition rules.  
 
6.2 From the WTO’s Legal Perspective 
 
There are two kinds of legal techniques in the WTO can be used to modify existing rules as 
presently interpreted. One is through negotiation, amendment, ministerial conference decisions or 
general council decisions, and the other is through the dispute settlement mechanism. In practice, 
consensus is practiced for negotiations, amendment, ministerial conference decisions or general 
council decisions.  
6.2.1 Negotiations 
 
Negotiating new rules (i.e., competition rules) by WTO members requires, first, each WTO 
member agrees to initiate negotiations on competition rules, i.e., the agenda to negotiate on 
competition rules is agreed by WTO members by consensus. Otherwise, there will be only 
plurilateral negotiations, rather than multilateral negotiations. Second, to conclude an agreement 
on competition rules requires consent from all members. Otherwise, it is a plurilateral agreement. 
Third, the concluded agreement needs to be ratified by the domestic ratification process of each 
member, in order to enter into force for that member.  
 
It is very difficult to reach consensus politically. There is unwillingness to conclude plurilateral 
agreements that do not included all significant members concerned with a subject. Thus, it should 
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be difficult to conclude a plurilateral agreement affecting SOEs unless the members with a 
significant presence of SOEs participate in the negotiations. Moreover, the usefulness of 
plurilateral agreements on competition rules without members which have significant presence of 
SOEs is in doubt.  
6.2.2 Amendment 
 
According to Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 
the amendment procedure for amending current trade remedies rules (SCM Agreement and Anti-
Dumping Agreement), and other trade rules (such as GATT Article XVII about STEs, and Article 
VIII and XV of GATS about monopolies and exclusive service suppliers, and subsidies) shall go 
through two stages.1065 The first step is to submit the proposed amendment to the Members for 
acceptance. 1066 Any member or the Council for Trade in Goods, or the Council for Trade in 
Services, may initiate a proposal to amend the above mentioned WTO rules. Consensus is needed 
in order for the Ministerial Conference to submit the proposed amendment to the members for 
acceptance, or the Ministerial Conference shall decide by a two-thirds majority of the members 
whether to submit the proposed amendment to the members for acceptance. The second step is to 
have two thirds of the members accept the proposed amendment regarding the abovementioned 
rules, in order to make the amendment take effect for the members that have accepted it.1067 
However, the amendment only takes effect for the members who accept it after acceptance by two 
thirds of members.  
 
It is difficult to have consent from two-thirds of the members. The effect of an amendment would 
be discounted if the amendment doesn’t bind the members with significant presence of SOEs, e.g., 
if these members do not give their consent.    
 
 
                                                      
1065 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article X.  
1066 Id., para. 1.  
1067 Id., paras. 3 and 5.  
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6.2.3 MC/GC Decisions  
 
According to Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement, decision-making in the WTO Ministerial 
Conferences and the General Council is by consensus in general. If consensus is not achieved, 
decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council regarding, for instance, 
competition issues, trade remedies rules, and other trade rules (GATT Article XVII on STEs, and 
Article VIII and XV of GATS), can be taken by a majority of the votes cast. 1068 In practice, 
however, the MC and the GC do not vote; decisions have always been taken by consensus. But in 
theory, voting is possible.  
 
In the case of adopting an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1(including 
all the above-mentioned WTO rules), a recommendation by the Council overseeing the functioning 
of that Agreement, for instance, the Council of Trade in Goods or the Council of Trade in Services, 
is needed. The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by a three-fourth majority of the 
members. 1069  The interpretation adopted by Members pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO 
Marrakesh Agreement is binding on all Members, as held by the AB in US-Clove Cigarettes where 
it stated that “Multilateral interpretations adopted pursuant to Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement 
have a pervasive legal effect. Such interpretations are binding on all Members…including in 
respect of all disputes in which these interpretations are relevant.”1070  Based on the word “shall” 
in Article IX:2 of the WTO Marrakesh Agreement, the AB considered that the recommendation 
from the relevant Council is an essential element.1071     
 
The legal status of decisions made by WTO Ministerial Conferences and General Council have 
been disputed by parties in the dispute settlement mechanism. In the case of US-Clove Cigarettes, 
concerning one paragraph of the Doha Ministerial Decision, 1072  the Ministerial Conference 
                                                      
1068 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Article IX, para. 1.  
1069 Id., para. 2. 
1070 Appellant Report, United-States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US-Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, 4 Apr. 2012, paras. 250 and 257. 
1071 Id., para. 254.   
1072 The relevant provision is the paragraph 5.2 of the Doha Ministerial Decision, which provides as follows: “Subject 
to the conditions specified in paragraph 12 of Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, the phrase 
'reasonable interval' shall be understood to mean normally a period of not less than 6 months, except when this would 
be ineffective in fulfilling the legitimate objectives pursued.” 
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Decision at issue was not regarded as an interpretation within the meaning of Article IX (2) of the 
Marrakesh Agreement due to the absence of a recommendation from the relevant council. 
However, it can be, and was in the case at hand, deemed as a “subsequent agreement” within the 
meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 1073  However, the fact that the Doha 
Ministerial Decision at issue was reached by consensus cannot be ignored, and the word “shall” in 
the Ministerial Decision at issue was also noticed.1074 In other words, the parties to the dispute gave 
their consent to the Ministerial Decision at issue. That’s the key point that the MC Decision at 
issue could also be deemed as a “subsequent agreement” between parties to the dispute.  
 
However, the legal effect of a Ministerial Decision is not clear if it is not reached by consensus, 
but rather by a majority of votes cast. First, a Ministerial Decision that is reached by a majority of 
votes cast is not an interpretation within the meaning of Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement. 
Second, it is arguable whether it can be deemed as a “subsequent agreement” within the meaning 
of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention, and it is not clear the role played by the factor that 
both parties to the dispute gave consent/votes to the Ministerial Decision previously. Article 
31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention is a rule of treaty interpretation, pursuant to which a treaty 
interpreter uses a subsequent agreement between the parties on the interpretation of a treaty 
provision as an interpretative tool to determine the meaning of that treaty provision. Pursuant to 
Article 3.2 of the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body are required to apply the customary rules 
of interpretation of public international law—including the rule embodied in Article31(3)(a) of the 
Vienna Convention—to clarify the existing provisions of the covered agreements. Interpretations 
developed by panels and the Appellate Body in the course of dispute settlement proceedings are 
binding only on the parties to a particular dispute. Article IX:2 of the WTO Agreement does not 
preclude panels and the Appellate Body from having recourse to a customary rule of interpretation 
of public international law that, pursuant to Article 3.2 of the DSU, they are required to apply.1075 
The “agreement” here doesn’t require any specific form, but refers to substance rather than to 
form.1076  
                                                      
1073 Appellant Report, United-States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US-Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, 4 Apr. 2012, paras. 255 and 257.   
1074 Panel Report, US-Clove Cigarettes, WT/DS406/R, 2 Sept. 2011, para. 7.575.   
1075 Appellant Report, United-States-Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes (US-Clove 
Cigarettes), WT/DS406/AB/R, 4 Apr. 2012, para. 258.  
1076Id., para. 267.   
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It is the same with the legal status of committee decisions. In the case of US-Tuna II(Mexico), 
regarding the legal status of committee decisions, the AB held that the Committee Decision at 
issue was adopted by the TBT Committee, which comprises all WTO Members and that the 
Decision was adopted by consensus,1077 and considered that the TBT Committee Decision can be 
considered as a “subsequent agreement” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna 
Convention. 1078 Once again, the fact that the Committee Decision at issue is reached by consensus 
by all WTO members, plays an essential role here. Indeed, committee procedures generally require 
consensus, thus, the legal effect is not clear in respect of a Committee decision that is not reached 
by consensus by all WTO members. 
 
The uncertainty and ambiguity of the legal effects of decisions may be attractive for Members if 
they prefer soft legal effects particularly within the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to the extent 
that soft laws cannot be cited to support arguments in the Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In that 
sense, Members will be more acceptable to those proposals in Chapter four with uncertain and 
ambiguous legal effects, such as serving as relevant context, whether or not they can be deemed 
as a “subsequent agreement” within the meaning of Article 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention. 
Furthermore, Article IX of the Marrakesh Agreement cannot be used to get around the amendment 
procedure in Article X of the Marrakesh Agreement. Therefore, it is hard to have changes to current 
trade remedies rules, or other trade rules (GATT Article XVII about STEs, and Article VIII and 
XV of GATS). It might be easier to some extent to have Ministerial Conference Decisions or 
General Council decisions with respect to competition issues, although probably only at a rather 
general level. However, stand-along ministerial decisions may not be cited in WTO dispute 
settlement. Where ministerial decisions have been used in dispute settlement, it has been to 
interpret existing agreements. It is because the DSU provides in Article 1.1 that it applies to 
"covered agreements", a term that does not seem to include stand-along ministerial decisions.  
 
 
                                                      
1077 AB Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, 
WT/DS381, 16 May 2012, para. 371. 
1078Id., para. 372.  
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6.2.4 The Dispute Settlement Mechanism  
 
With respect to the dispute settlement mechanism, parties may argue that specific existing rules 
should be pushed to their limits. This could lead to a liberal interpretation of the rules by panels 
and the AB.  
 
This is possible because there is discretion derived from ambiguities and general terms 
unexplained by the drafters in the negotiating history. Tracing back to the history, the DSB was 
“created when many WTO Agreements were already at an advanced stage of the final drafting”.1079 
These Agreements had been negotiated with the GATT dispute settlement in mind, which was a 
system with much less power. 1080  Therefore, some ambiguities were created by negotiators 
deliberately. They believed that no interpretation which had not been agreed by them could be 
imposed on them.1081 Had the negotiators known that their agreements would be submitted to as a 
legalistic system such as the present WTO dispute settlement, the Uruguay Round would not have 
been concluded, or ambiguities and general terms would have been clarified.1082  
 
An aggressive interpretation by the panels and AB can also be achieved through defining rules for 
interpretation. In the EU model, the European Union Court defines its own approach to legal 
interpretation, and emphasizes context and purpose, the so-called “judicial activism” model. The 
jurisprudence of the ECJ has developed the interpretation of relevant rules such as “state aid that 
distorts competition among Member States.”1083 The interpretation principle in the WTO is the 
same as that in the EU since it is for the AB to define rules for interpretation.1084 Currently, the 
AB in the WTO focuses more on text as compared to context and purpose. It is possible for them 
to switch the focus to emphasize the purposes of the treaty, i.e., towards more liberal 
                                                      
1079  Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement?” 46 J. World Trade 979 (2012), 986.  
1080 Ibid.   
1081 Ibid.  
1082 Ibid.  
1083 Alan Sykes, “The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective,” Law and Economics 
Research Paper Series Paper No. 380.  
1084 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 13.  
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interpretation.1085 On the one hand, it is fair to say that identification of the treaty object and 
purpose may be difficult, especially in the case of multilateral conventions, like the WTO, which 
have more than one purpose, and these may be in conflict with each other. On the other hand, it 
provides more discretion for DSB. Although there is a limitation imposed by Articles 3.2 and 17.6 
of DSU, which disallows adding to rights or obligations for Members by DSB, Members can do 
nothing to stop DSB from activism, or to reduce the discretion of DSB unless Members change 
and make more explicit relevant DSU provisions, which seems to be impossible in practice.1086 In 
addition, there is nothing like formal stare decisis in the WTO.1087  
 
However, it must be admitted that there are limitations on liberal judicial activism.1088 With regard 
to the possibility of liberal or aggressive interpretation by panels, the decisions of panels risk being 
reversed by the AB. With respect to the possibility of liberal or aggressive interpretation by the 
AB, first, the AB is supposed to interpret the law, rather than creating the law. Second, politically 
speaking, members do not like to give much power to the AB. Members believe that treaty-making 
power shall be exclusively in the hands of members by the means of negotiations.1089  Third, AB 
members are aware that they serve limited terms and that WTO Members can ultimately “rein in” 
the AB through their appointment power. Therefore, it is less likely that the AB will go much 
beyond the legal texts. It is particularly true for the trade rules proposals. This is because the AB 
is less likely to adopt liberal interpretations of GATT Article XVII given that WTO Members 
already have positions and views about how Article XVII should be applied and the interpretative 
space is limited in this regard, while some proposals in the trade rules approach will actually alter 
members’ rights and obligations, such as the expansion of coverage of Article XVII to SOEs. As 
to the trade remedies proposals, it might be possible that AB, especially if membership of the AB 
changes, may adopt different interpretations in the future that are more in line with my proposals. 
                                                      
1085 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard International Law Journal 
(May 13, 2016): 48-50. 
1086 “The DSB will never reach a consensus to stop these practices, because they will always be seen from different 
angles as compared to those who are adversely affected and those who benefit from a particular outcome.” See Michel 
Cartland, Gerard Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?” 46 J. 
World Trade 979 (2012), 991.   
1087  Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute 
Settlement?” 46 J. World Trade (2012): 979, 991.   
1088 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” 57 Harvard International Law Journal 
(May 13, 2016): 48-50. 
1089 My interviews with delegates of WTO Members, Dec. 2016.  
 288 
This is because current rulings about some provisions of the SCM Agreement, such as the 
definition of “public body”, have been criticized and considered contrary to the WTO Agreement 
by some important WTO Members. However, to date the AB has never significantly altered its 




There are several legal techniques that can be utilized within the WTO to implement these 
proposals, such as negotiations, amendment, ministerial conference decisions or general council 
decisions and the dispute settlement mechanism. Although voting is possible, in practice, 
consensus is practiced for negotiation, amendment, ministerial conference decisions or general 
council decisions. Negotiations require consent from all members; an amendment requires consent 
from two-thirds of members. Negotiated rules apply to all members when accepted; an amendment 
only takes effect for the members who accept it. The legal effects of Ministerial Conference 
decisions or General Council decisions are not always clear. Although judicial activism can be 
utilized within the dispute settlement mechanism, legal effects are limited to the particular case. 
Furthermore, there are limitations on liberal judicial activism due to members’ sensitivity about 
treaty-making power.  
 
6.3 From WTO Members’ Political Perspective  
 
This section will analyze WTO members’ political willingness in respect of the trade remedies 
proposals, i.e., improving the SCM Agreement; the trade rules proposals, i.e., improving GATT 
Article XVII; and the competition rules proposals. Political difficulties will be laid out, as well as 
efforts that have been made, and the likelihood of members’ giving consent will be considered. In 
terms of the competition rules approach, I suggest “trade-offs” can be used, particularly for China, 
as well as other members. Lastly, the possibility of embracing the competition rules approach will 
be analyzed, and a proposed framework will be put forth.  
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6.3.1 Trade Remedies Approach  
 
GATT Article XVI (5) on subsidies provides that “The CONTRACTING PARTIES shall review 
the operation of the provisions of this Article from time to time with a view to examining its 
effectiveness, in the light of actual experience, in promoting the objectives of this Agreement and 
avoiding subsidization seriously prejudicial to the trade or interests of contracting parties.” GATS 
Article XV prescribes negotiation obligations for Members to develop multilateral disciplines to 
avoid trade-distortive effects of subsidies.1090 The Working Party on GATS Rules carries out 
negotiations on subsidies in the GATS.1091  
 
However, the difficulty of negotiating or amending the SCM Agreement, such as by changing the 
definition of “public bodies” can be explained as follows. First, the definition of “public bodies” 
in the SCM Agreement is probably intended to be ambiguous by its drafters as a result of 
compromise. This ambiguity both creates discretion for subsidizing members and members 
imposing CVDs. Given the lack of a preamble in the SCM Agreement, WTO jurisprudence views 
that the objective of the SCM Agreement is to keep a balance between subsidizing countries and 
countries imposing CVDs. 1092  Specifically, it is the balance between substantive provisions 
regarding the grants of subsidies and the procedural provisions regarding the use of CVDs. Hence, 
any negotiation on substantive provisions on subsidies will trigger negotiation on the procedural 
use of CVDs. Such negotiations would not be welcomed by members, such as the U.S., who wants 
to preserve the right to use CVDs as trade defenses, and hence are opposed negotiations or 
amendment on the provisions regarding the use of CVDs. Furthermore, some members would like 
to link negotiations on the SCM Agreement with negotiations on the Anti-Dumping Agreement, 
making it more different to negotiate on one specific issue. Some members, like the U.S., are not 
                                                      
1090 Article XV of GATT.   
1091 The Working Party on GATS Rules was established in1995 by the Council for Trade in Services. See WTO 
Council for Trade in Services, Report of the Meeting Held on 30 March 1995: Note by the Secretariat, S/C/M/2, 29 
Apr. 1995, paras. 23-25; See also the Reports of the Working Party on GATS Rules to the Council for Trade in 
Services, S/WPGR/1-21; See also WTO Working Party on GATS Rules, Report of the Meeting Held on 24 Nov. 
2010: Note by the Secretariat, S/WPGR/M/71, 11 Feb. 2011.  
1092 There are critics of the AB’s invention of a preamble to the SCM Agreement, arguing that the drafters specifically 
decided that it would be impossible to agree on these matters and that therefore, the SCM Agreement shall have no 
preamble or any identification of its object and purpose. How then can the AB not only invent such a preamble but 
also use it as one of its interpretative tools? See Michel Cartland, Gerard Depayre and Jan Woznowskl, “Is Something 
Going Wrong in the WTO Dispute Settlement?” 46 J. World Trade (2012): 979, 992-3.  
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willing to negotiate on Anti-Dumping Agreement.1093 Last, the definition of public bodies or the 
scope of subsidies are essentially a question of how much policy space can be reserved for 
members. The negotiation on this regard will trigger the discourse on how to draw a line for policy 
space, which is hard due to conceptual differences. It is hard to have disciplines on domestic 
support, which will come across opposition both from developed and developing members, such 
as the U.S., China, India and so on. 
 
Currently, no substantive proposals on the SCM Agreement have been put forth by members, 
except for some proposals regarding procedural issues. 1094  The U.S. once proposed to have 
notifications regarding ownership of an enterprise by a government or public body, i.e., only some 
notification provisions specific to SOEs.1095 Right before the 10th Ministerial Conference, the EU 
proposed that non-notified subsidies should be presumed as automatically in breach of WTO 
disciplines and therefore actionable under the provisions of SCM Agreement. 1096 However, it 
encountered opposition from developing countries concerned with the capacity to notify. 
Therefore, amending current trade remedies rules seems not likely to occur. 
6.3.2 Trade Rules Approach 
 
The trade rules approach primarily includes modifying GATT Article XVII, such as expanding the 
coverage of Article XVII and adding to it behavior type regulations. 
 
Historically, with respect to regulation of the behavior of SOEs that have been granted monopolies 
or exclusive rights, attention was more paid to the area of service. In the area of services, there was 
much greater concern about monopoly control over essential facilities, particularly as to telecom 
                                                      
1093 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, p. 6. 
1094 The Doha negotiation on subsidies and countervailing measures is mainly focused on developing countries and 
least developed countries. See WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session, Doha, 9-14 Nov. 2001, Implementation-
Related Issues and Concerns: Decision of 14 November 2001, WT/MIN(01)/17, 14 Nov. 2001, para. 10.  
1095 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Proposal from the United States, Expanding the Prohibited “Red Light” 
Subsidy Category Draft Text, TN/RL/GEN/146, 5 June 2007, p. 3.   
1096 WTO Negotiating Group on Rules, Communication from The European Union, Rules Negotiations-Transparency, 
TN/RL/W/260, 16 July 2015, p. 2.  
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and transport networks and terminals. 1097  Accordingly, the WTO Reference Paper contains 
regulatory principles applicable to liberalized trade in basic telecommunications stating that 
“appropriate measures shall be maintained” to prevent three kinds of anti-competitive practices, 
including anti-competitive cross-subsidization.1098 In contrast, in the area of trade in goods, rules 
regulating the behavior of STEs, although established in GATT, played a minor role in practice, 
in large part because the main sectors or countries where STEs are prevalent were excluded from 
1947 GATT, like agriculture, services, and centrally-planned economies.1099  
 
Currently, regarding behavior of exporting STEs, regulation of their behavior has been discussed 
in negotiations. This is because the number of exporting STEs has declined since Canada and 
Australia have limited their use of STEs,1100 the opposition to negotiate on exporting STEs from 
members with exporting STEs is reduced. Negotiations on agriculture may touch on the issue of 
STEs, especially exporting STEs. However, members primarily focus on the effects of the 
problems, rather than the problems per se. For instance, touching on the existence of STEs per se 
is rare at the WTO, except for one proposal to eliminate the agricultural export monopoly 
powers. 1101  After 2011, negotiations have focused on specific issues. The 10th Ministerial 
Conference in Nairobi dealt with export competition, including behavior regulations, financing, 
and subsidies, rather than eliminating monopolies. 1102  With regard to importing state trading 
                                                      
1097 Aaditya Mattoo, “Dealing with Monopolies and State Enterprises: WTO rules for Goods and Services,” in State 
Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in International 
Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 37-70 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 37.  
1098 WTO Negotiating Group on Basic Telecommunications, Telecommunications services: Reference Paper, 24 Apr. 
1996, Articles 1.1 and 1.2.  
1099 Bernard M. Hoekman and Patrick Low, “State Trading: Rule Making Alternatives for Entities with Exclusive 
Rights,” in State Trading in the Twenty-First Century, eds., Thomas Cottier and Petros C. Mavroidis, Studies in 
International Economics, The World Trade Forum Volume 1, 327-344 (University of Michigan Press, 1998), 327. 
1100 For instance, Canada has ended the Canadian Wheat Board's marketing monopoly for Western Canadian wheat 
and barley as of 1 August 2012. See WTO Working Group on State Trading, New and Full Notification Pursuant to 
Article XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article Xvii from 
Canada, G/STR/N/16/CAN, 22 July 2016, p. 12; Currently, there are no statutory restrictions on the export of rice 
grown in other Australian states other than the New Wales State, which has the Rice Marketing Board for the State of 
New South Wales to award an authorized buyer with the exclusive, or non-exclusive, right to export rice grown in the 
State of New South Wales. See WTO Working Group on State Trading, New and Full Notification Pursuant to Article 
XVII:4(a) of the GATT 1994 and Paragraph 1 of the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article Xvii from Australia, 
G/STR/N/16/AUS, 29 July 2016, p. 2.  
1101 WTO Committee on Agriculture Special Session, Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture, TN/AG/W/4/Rev.4, 
6 Dec. 2008, Annex K, p. 69, Article 3(a)(iv) provides “Members shall eliminate, by 2013, the use of agricultural 
export monopoly powers for such enterprises.”  
1102  Tenth WTO Ministerial Conference, Export Competition, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015, 
WT/MIN(15)/45 — WT/L/980, Nairobi, 2015.  
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enterprises, it is primarily discussed in the context of tariff-quota restrictions, such as when STEs 
control the management and administration of a tariff-quota, impeding imports.1103 Other behavior 
of importing STEs is not discussed, such as the mark-up prices. The issue of importing STEs is 
usually associated with domestic support at the negotiation table.  
 
In a nutshell, although several proposals from Members regarding STEs have been put forth in the 
Doha Round Negotiations,1104 amending or negotiating current trade rules about monopolies, such 
as GATT Article XVII, is less likely in terms of regulating behavior of SOEs that have been 
granted monopolies or exclusive rights. Even the proposal to start a discussion in Working Party 
on STEs on the adequacy of the current WTO disciplines on state trading encountered 
opposition.1105 Currently, there are no negotiations on the behavior of SOEs, nor the existence of 
monopolies or exclusive rights granted to SOEs. It is largely because members want to have policy 
space reserved for allowing to grant monopolies or exclusive rights to SOEs. In agricultural area, 
the current negotiations focus on the privileges granted to STEs/SOEs, rather than the existence of 
SOEs per se nor the behavior of SOEs. In addition, the function of Working Party on STEs is 
limited due to its limited number of meetings commenced, and hence, is less likely to serve as a 
negotiation forum.1106  
6.3.3 The Balanced Competition Rules Approach 
 
With respect to the competition law approach, I suggest a balanced method. In order to implement 
the competition rules proposals, some other issues can be traded off for the purpose of obtaining 
                                                      
1103 WTO Ministerial Conference Ninth Session, Understanding on Tariff Rate Quota Administration Provisions of 
Agricultural Products, as Defined in Article 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Ministerial Decision of 7 Dec 2013, 
WT/MIN(13)/39, WT/L/914, Bali, 11 Dec. 2013.  
1104 Steve McCorriston and Donald Maclaren, “Trade and Welfare Effects of State Trading Enterprises”, Paper 
prepared for presentation at the XIth Congress of the EAAE (European Association of Agricultural Economists), The 
Future of Rural Europe in the Global Agri-Food System, Copenhagen, Denmark, (Aug. 24-27, 2005), 3.  
1105 Report (1996) of the Working Party on State Trading Enterprises, G/L/128, adopted 28 Oct. 1996; The European 
Communities submitted a paper outlining suggestions for future work to be undertaken by the Working Party on State-
Trading Enterprises, including an examination of whether Article XVII and the Understanding needed further 
strengthening. It was explained that the intent of the paper was not to renegotiate Article XVII. See WTO Working 
Party on State Trading Enterprises, Working Party on State Trading Enterprises: submission by the European 
Community, G/STR/W/33, 4 Oct. 1996.  
1106 The Working Party on State Trading Enterprises only has regular meetings, i.e., twice a year. See WTO, Trade 
Topics: State Trading, Working Party Meetings 2016 and 2017, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/statra_e/statra_e.htm (last visited 27 Sept. 2017) 
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members’ consent in this regard. Among many things, one of them is the investment issue 
involving SOEs.  I haven’t mentioned the element of “investment review” so far, and I will explain 
in detail why this element can be traded off in the following section. Afterwards, I will analyze 
China’s position on accepting some arrangement of trade-offs in order to be willing to 
accommodate the competition rules proposals. Other members’ political willingness will also be 
examined. Two elements can be embodied and discussed. One is the specific provisions relating 
to SOEs receiving advantages in balance with investment review, and the other is the competition 
rules element. Each element will be analyzed from the political perspective.  
(1) Trade-offs 
 
In order to achieve the competition rules proposals regarding SOEs disciplines, there are many 
issues can be taken into account for trade-offs, such as market access issues, investment issues, 
etc. I picked the element of “investment review” in particular for the balance between the element 
of specific provisions relating to SOEs receiving advantages and investment review relating to 
SOEs, and will elaborate it later in detail.  
 
Before going to the analysis of political willingness of each member, the issue of trade-offs needs 
to be discussed in the first place. One reason why it is difficult to achieve the trade remedies 
approach and the trade rules approach is because negotiations on trade remedies or trade rules are 
more likely to be merit based without linkage to other issues and linkage is often strongly opposed 
by members. The WTO is a member driven system, and the practice is consensus regardless of 
legal provisions providing the possibility of majority voting decisions. China, as well as other 
members with significant presence of SOEs, plays a significant role in the WTO nowadays. Hence, 
it is difficult to have consent from them per se.  
 
The idea of trade-offs through negotiations might be possible in practice in light of changed 
circumstances, taking into the willingness of each member or a group of members. My proposal 
concerning trade-offs is not the same as the Uruguay Round single package deal. It was much 
easier to reach consensus at the end of the Uruguay Round negotiations since the single package 
deal facilitated the end of the negotiation. This was due to the smaller number of members, the 
fact that developing countries lacked understanding of GATT rules, and many Latin America, 
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African countries and developing countries were willing to keep in line with western countries. 
However, nowadays, industrialized developing countries have their own considerations and the 
number of WTO members is larger. It is more difficult to reach consensus nowadays, making a 
single package deal complex and difficult to proceed with. The Doha negotiations got stuck due 
to complexities of linkage. Therefore, members nowadays turn to focus on a specific issue without 
mentioning linkage. For instance, in the 10th Ministerial Conference, little linkage was done, and 
many issues were discussed based on their own merit, such as the export competition issue. For 
those non-Doha issues, a single package deal is less likely to be pursued nowadays. Currently, 
there are not many issues on the table, making it hard to have a single package deal.  
 
Although the single package deal is less likely to take place, some trade-offs are possible. The 
public choice equilibrium holds that equilibrium in a political market shifts only if something 
changes, which take places only if someone wants it. 1107  The precondition of trade-offs in a 
package deal is that each party has something to offer and wants some benefits from others. 
Accordingly, the current political equilibrium has changed since some countries want to discipline 
the advantages granted to SOEs, particularly Chinese SOEs, which affect international trade 
significantly. Meanwhile, China and other countries with lots of SOEs receiving advantages want 
something else from other members. For instance, China wants to regain rapid economic growth 
and political strength by being more active in global markets. It might be possible to have 
competition elements disciplines with some provisions specific to SOEs, to be balanced with 
provisions regarding the screening and review of investments by SOEs, in a sense that the 
investment review shall take into account that SOEs have been subject to disciplines at the WTO.  
a. From the perspective of China: Pressure faced by China  
 
The idea of trade-offs can work for China and other members with a significant presence of SOEs. 
There are many complaints about Chinese SOEs, and Chinese SOEs also face many difficulties in 
international markets. Cost-benefit analysis needs to be applied. For instance, if the benefits 
obtaining from other issues/areas are less or much less than the benefits deriving from SOEs and 
                                                      
1107 William Bishop, “From Trade to Tutelage: State Aid and Public Choice in the European Union,” Presentation to 
Conference of ACE, Copenhagen, 2 Dec. 2005. 
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their advantages, little incentive for trade-offs can be found here. The extent of different pressure 
faced by China and other members with a significant presence of SOEs can be explained as follows.  
  
The conflict of interest or competition between Chinese SOEs and SOEs from other countries, 
such as the United Arab Emirates, Russia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, India, Brazil, 
Norway, Thailand, etc. can be observed as follows. SOEs from different countries receiving 
advantages may be competitors and have conflicts of interest, and hence, those members with 
significant presence of SOEs may be willing to accept disciplines on SOEs and advantages. 
However, for instance, SOEs from Southeast Asia are primarily operating in domestic markets, 
and their impacts in international markets are much less than Chinese SOEs, in light of trade and 
FDI. Hence, SOEs from Southeast Asia are not competitors with Chinese SOEs in steel, cement, 
machinery equipment, aluminum, etc. in international markets. Nevertheless, the competition 
between Chinese SOEs and Southeast Asia SOEs in the domestic markets of Southeast Asia 
countries may become intense in near future.  
 
Current negotiations and rules are not specifically tailored to SOEs except for the Government 
Procurement Agreement. However, discrimination from the area of government procurement is 
not a big interest for China. Some countries, such as the U.S. and the EU, based on reciprocity, 
allow discrimination against Chinese enterprises in their government procurement in recent years 
although Chinese enterprises are not excluded from participating in the bidding process. 1108 
However, such pressure is not profound for China, whose market share in the EU or US 
government procurement is not large. China’s investment, particularly done by SOEs, is primarily 
in infrastructure (railways, high ways, transportation) in developing countries, like Africa, Latin 
America and Asia (Thailand and Indonesia) in the forms of build-operate-transfer or build-transfer 
financed by export-import banks at low or no interest. These activities are more in the nature of 
bilateral economic cooperation/governmental assistance at national levels, rather than purely 
commercial activities. For instance, the “one-belt and one road” strategy. Hence, the government 
                                                      
1108 See Frédéric Simon, “EU to Confront China with ‘Reciprocity’ in Public Contracts,” EURACTIV, 9 Mar. 2012.  
China is not a Party to the Government Procurement Agreement, and is in the process of negotiations. See WTO, 
Government Procurement Agreement: Parties, Observers and Accession, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/memobs_e.htm  
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procurement negotiations and the practice of government procurement of other members are not 
of great interest for Chinese SOEs.  
 
Pressure coming from increasing trade remedies cases brought against China and other countries 
with significant presence of SOEs receiving various advantages1109 is not intense enough given 
that current WTO rules are not sufficient to address the problem of SOEs receiving advantages. 
More and more trade remedies cases are brought based on the perception of “fair trade” through 
countervailing duties (CVDs).1110 The scope for unfair trade allegations is open-ended.1111 Grants 
of advantages to SOEs can hence be captured by the notion of “unfair trade”. Furthermore, there 
will be more cases concerning CVDs since anti-dumping cases may drop to a great extent due to 
the expiration of the provision regarding China’s non-market economy status in 2016, which is a 
method of calculation applicable to China in the imposition of anti-dumping duties against imports 
from China.1112 However, the outcomes of these disputes based on current WTO rules regarding 
trade remedies do not put much pressure on China, except for a political unfriendly environment 
for China.  
 
One motive for China might be having a set of new rules with general application in exchange for 
eliminating relevant specific commitments undertaken by China upon their accession to the WTO. 
For instance, the specific commitment undertaken by China not to impose export duties.1113 To 
that end, new rules will be applicable to all Members, rather than to a limited number of Members, 
who will feel as though they are being singled out for harsher treatment.1114  However, in practice, 
it is impossible to renegotiate specific commitments undertaken upon accession. If China wants to 
                                                      
1109 For instance, developed countries, such as the U.S., Australia, Canada and New Zealand, take into account the 
difference between SOEs and POEs in imposing CVDs or anti-dumping duties on goods largely related to SOEs. 
1110 The argument of “fair trade” is widely used, and particularly, is harmonized to reflect political and ideological 
objectives. See Dominick Salvatore (edited), Protectionism and World Welfare (Cambridge England: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993), 38. 
1111 Id., at 40; Jagdish Bhagwati, The World Trading System at Risk (Princeton University Press, 1991), 14. 
1112 Edwin Vermulst and Brian Gatta, “Concurrent Trade Defense Investigations in the EU, the EU’s New Anti-
Subsidy Practice Against China, and the Future of Both,” 11 (3) World Trade Review (2012): 527–553.  
1113 Other examples can be found, for instance, the Russian Federation is the only WTO Member having undertaken 
WTO-plus obligations on the use of export taxes on fossil fuels. See WTO Working Party on the Accession of the 
Russian Federation, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the Russian Federation to the World Trade 
Organization, WT/ACC/RUS/70, WT/MIN(11)/2, 17 Nov. 2011, para. 625.  
1114 Mark Wu, “The ‘China, Inc.’ Challenge to Global Trade Governance,” Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 
57 (May 13, 2016): 47.  
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initiate the renegotiation, other trading partners will ask for compensation. Other members will 
also ask for renegotiating on their accession commitments. 
 
There is, however, much pressure coming from the investment area. More and more investment 
restrictions are imposed on SOEs by foreign governments with respect to mergers and acquisitions, 
and green field investment, through investment screening or investment security review for foreign 
investment. For instance, there are different kinds of investment reviews relating to SOEs’ 
investments, including security concerns, environmental concerns, resources preservation 
concerns, and leaking research and development concerns, etc. SOEs’ investments may be blocked 
or endure long delays, etc.1115  It may be an incentive and pressure for China to accept new rules 
on SOEs at the international level if such disciplines can be balanced with liberalized rules on 
investment review toward SOEs. The argument can be developed that investment review by 
members shall take into account that the new disciplines on SOEs and their advantages at the WTO. 
It is better to have common rules in relation to SOEs rather than a multiplicity of different rules 
by different members at national levels. In addition to that, investments made by SOEs may face 
local litigation after entry. This creates a motive for China to accept international rules to address 
SOEs. To that end, on the one hand, there are competition rules disciplining SOEs within the WTO 
particularly in the context of receiving various advantages, and on the other hand, it is not realistic 
to control SOEs by blocking their investments in the first place by investment review. Hence, 
liberalized investment review relating to SOEs may be exchanged for having competition-like 
rules disciplining SOEs under the WTO. The overall package can be inclusive.  
b. From the Perspective of Other Members 
 
There appears to be no political will among current WTO Members to have a general agreement 
on investment.1116 However, the willingness of other members to trade off the investment issue 
(trade-related investment, or only the entry issue in the investment area) can be elaborated as 
follows. First, it may encounter opposition from developing countries, especially LDCs, or African 
                                                      
1115  Jing Li & Jun Xia, “State-owned Enterprises Face Challenges in Foreign Acquisitions,” Columbia FDI 
Perspectives, Perspective on Topical Foreign Direct Investment Issues, No. 205, July 31, 2017.  
1116 Daniel C.K. Chow and Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade Law: Problems, Cases, and Materials, 2nd 
edition (Aspen Publishers, 2012), 570. 
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countries regarding the investment policies.1117 However, only touching the issue of investment 
review might be acceptable to them whereas they oppose rules on the full range of investment 
policies. Second, some developed members are not against the idea of having investment 
provisions at the WTO since many BITs entered by developed members usually have investment 
chapters.1118 Industrial interest groups and labor unions from developed members, which are in 
direct competition with SOEs, particularly Chinese SOEs, will likely to lobby their governments 
to negotiate new disciplines on SOEs receiving advantages at the international level. 1119 
Furthermore, there are many members with few SOEs who are concerned with the negative effects 
caused by advantages granted to SOEs, and think that the problems are international issues that 
need international solutions.  
Third, there are different conceptions of SOEs, and government support for certain industries, and 
the extent of allowing government to intervene the economy. Developing members and members 
with significant presence of SOEs, such as Russia, Viet Nam and Malaysia, emphasize the 
justifications for establishing SOEs, and of giving advantages to SOEs as well as historical reasons, 
and think these are domestic issues. Members who are parties to the TPP, such as Malaysia, are 
willing to accept such rules disciplining SOEs and advantages as long as much flexibility is 
embodied. Meanwhile, some developed members may also want to have exceptions for their SOEs 
(like the TPP exceptions for SOEs),1120 making it possible to have exceptions to new rules. To that 
end, exceptions under new disciplines are acceptable to both sides, i.e., developed members that 
want to discipline SOEs receiving advantages, and members with significant presence of SOEs.  
 
                                                      
1117 The investment issue is sensitive at the WTO in that it is politicalized in light of opposing and divergent positions 
between the North and the South.  
1118 Such as the Japan-India BIT and the Japan-Mongolia BIT.  
1119 In the U.S., both the industry and labor union had lobbied for these norms in the TPP negotiations. See Sander 
Levin, “The Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations: The Need for Congress to Get Fully in the Game, A Report to 
the Council on Foreign Relations” (18 Sept. 2014), p.5, 
http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/documents/ 
Levin%20Report%20to%20CFR%20on%20TPP.pdf (visited 17 Nov. 2015); “USTR: U.S. Facing Resistance On TPP 
SOE Proposal From Other Countries,” Inside U.S. Trade (26 Aug. 2011); Sabina Dewan, “Getting State-Owned 
Enterprises Right in the Trans-Pacific Partnership” (23 Feb. 2012), 
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/regulation/news/2012/02/23/11134/getting-state-owned-enterprises-right-
in-the-trans-pacific-partnership/ (visited 17 Nov. 2015); Ian F. Fergusson et al., The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
Negotiations and Issues for Congress, CRS Report for Congress R42694 (13 Dec. 2013), p. 46. 
1120 For instance, the U.S. may want to have exceptions for its SOEs, like the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), 
which is a government-owned and operated entity within the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  
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Finally, India is more inactive and is likely to be in line with China on this issue of SOEs and 
advantages. Some members that do not have direct competition with Chinese SOEs, may not give 
priority to the negotiations in this regard. The new disciplines would exclude sovereign wealth 
funds, so middle east oil members are less likely to raise opposition to rules regarding SOEs and 
advantages. The position of a member on the issue of having rules regarding SOEs and their 
advantages is primarily due to whether this member is in competition with SOEs or not.  
 
(2) The Competition Laws Element 
 
In assessing the prospects for a blended competition approach to SOEs, it must be kept in mind 
that past efforts to incorporate competition rules into the GATT/WTO system have failed. For 
example, international cartels were widespread during the 1930s.1121 Against this background, the 
draft of the 1948 Havana Charter, which was designed to create the International Trade 
Organization (ITO), addressed international cartels and restrictive business practices that might 
frustrate market access.1122 The ITO was never ratified. While GATT survived, it did not contain 
competition rules.1123 The efforts to include competition rules probably failed due to the U.S. 
Congress’ concern about losing its regulatory sovereignty over competition policy.1124 In the 1950s 
and 1960s, due to the perception that cartels were no longer a major problem, and the fear of losing 
national policy autonomy in such a policy area, efforts to include provisions on restrictive business 
practice in GATT in 1954 and 1955 failed due to a lack of consensus on the substance.1125 In the 
1980s and 1990s, globalization and cross-border M&As progressed, as well as widespread 
privatization and deregulation. Consequently, there was risk that private restraints on trade, such 
as private monopolies or market dominance, might replace public restraints on trade after the 
                                                      
1121 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 2-4.  
1122 Chapter V of the Havana Charter devoted nine articles to the subject, listing six practices that were considered 
harmful to trade. See Articles 46-54 in Chapter V, Final Act and Related Documents, United Nations document E/Conf. 
2/78, United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, Havana, Cuba, from 21 Nov. 1947 to 24 Mar. 1948.  
1123 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, “International Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a 
conference titled One Year Later: The Antitrust Modernization Commission's Report and the Challenges that Await 
Antitrust, New York University, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 11 Apr. 2008. 
https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/international-competition-policy-and-wto 
1124 See Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 12-18. 
1125 Id., pp. 2-4 and 12-18.  
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liberalization of public/governmental restraints. At the end of Uruguay Round negotiations, 
proposals were made to include competition rules in the WTO. These proposals ran into opposition 
on the grounds of the diversity of competition policies among developed countries and the lack of 
competition policies in many developing countries, and of its being of less priority for developing 
countries compared to industrial or development policies, and of the incapacity of developing 
countries to implement competition policies out of a lack of resources. Therefore, the GATT 
system had not succeeded in dealing with competition policy issues in the Uruguay Round.  
 
Competition policies and investment issues are not new agenda items for the WTO. The Singapore 
Ministerial Conference in 1995 considered three issues, i.e., competition policies, investment 
issues and the trade facilitation issues. The Singapore Ministerial Conference established a 
working group (Working Group on Trade and Competition Policy, hereinafter as WGTCP) to 
study issues relating to the interaction between trade and competition policy.1126 The WGTCP 
Working Group actually compiled disagreement/divergence among Members regarding this issue, 
and ceased to be active after 2003.1127 During the course of the six years, WGTCP did work as 
follows: a) promoted cooperation between the WGTCP and other international organizations;1128 
b) clarified and summarized the issues and views of Members and prepared a checklist of issues 
for study;1129 c) examined the relevance of fundamental WTO principles to competition policy and 
vice versa; and d) considered approaches to promoting cooperation and communication among 
members.1130 The agenda in the WTO Doha Declaration launched in November 2001 addressed 
                                                      
1126 WTO Ministerial Conference Singapore, Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(96)/DEC, 18 Dec. 1996, 
para. 20; WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 17.  
1127 The Working Group on Trade and Competition ceased to be active in 2003. After 2003, the WTO Secretariat 
continues to respond to national requests for technical assistance. For more information as well as a policy debate, see 
the website: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/draft_text_gc_dg_31july04_e.htm#inves... 
1128 Other international organizations include, for instance, IMF, World Bank, OECD, and UNCTAD, all of which 
have observer status in the Working Group. See WTO, Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition Policy, Report (1997) to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/1, 28 Nov. 1997, para 3.  
1129 Issues include the relationship between the objectives, principles, concepts, scope and instruments of trade and 
competition policy; stocktaking and analysis of existing instruments regarding trade and competition policy, including 
of experience with their application at national, regional, bilateral and WTO level. See WTO, Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report (1997) to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/1, 28 Nov. 
1997, Annex. 
1130 It refers to principles such as national treatment, transparency and most-favored-nation treatment. See WTO, 
Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, 
WT/WGTCP/5, 28 Nov. 1997.  
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new issues such as competition policy.1131 Ultimately, the competition policy issue was dropped 
from the Doha negotiations not due to fierce disagreement on the competition issue itself, but 
because there was disagreement on the “modalities” of negotiations on competition, mostly due to 
the objections of developing countries. But it is rather other issues, like the negotiations on 
agriculture, market access, and non-agriculture that were most fiercely debated in the Doha 
negotiations. In an attempt to make Doha negotiation run more smoothly, the competition issue 
was removed from the list.1132  
 
In any event, opposition to negotiating on competition policy from developing members is 
reducing gradually. Many developing or small countries historically opposed such negotiations 
because: a) they did not have domestic competition laws or enforcement authorities of competition 
laws as a result of a lack of experience, capacity, and resources; and b) they wished to reserve their 
policy space.1133 Their position changed somewhat after 1948 at Havana, when they favored 
competition rules to discipline the behavior of U.S. and European industrial firms.1134 Nowadays, 
more and more members have domestic competition laws. Meanwhile, the opposition that may 
come from members with respect to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism covering competition 
rules, can be reduced if a certain degree of flexibility is employed in the new rules. For instance, 
members are more willing to be subject to competition policies of the OEDC, which doesn’t have 
as strong enforcement as compared to the WTO.1135 Solutions can be laid out so that any new 
competition rules at the WTO have a long transitional period, which is more attractive for some 
                                                      
1131 WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session Doha, 9-14 Nov. 2001, Ministerial Declaration, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 Nov. 2001, paras. 23-25.  
1132 Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, “International Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a 
conference titled One Year Later: The Antitrust Modernization Commission's Report and the Challenges that Await 
Antitrust, New York University, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 11 Apr. 2008. 
1133 For instance, they want to have policy space relating to industrial policies and investment screening techniques, 
nurture monopolistic practices in selected industries. See Stephen Woolcock, “International Competition Policy and 
the World Trade Organization,” Paper for the LSE Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, 
p. 35. 
1134 Hufbauer and Kim, supra note 1132. 
1135 Russia is in negotiations with OECD for accession to the OECD. Russia has to comply with OECD’s policies in 
order to get full and success accession to the OECD. Among many policies, the competition policy is one that Russia 
has made efforts to comply with and implement.  It is primarily due to the fact that the OECD competition policy 
requires legislature, rather than strong enforcement. See OECD, “Statement by the OECD regarding the Status of the 
Accession Process with Russia & Co-operation with Ukraine,” 13 Mar. 2014,  http://www.oecd.org/russia/statement-
by-the-oecd-regarding-the-status-of-the-accession-process-with-russia-and-co-operation-with-ukraine.htm ; OECD, 
“Competition Law and Policy in the Russia Federation 2013,” OECD Country Studies, 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/CompetitionLawandPolicyintheRussianFederation.pdf  
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members (Viet Nam) with an SOEs presence. China historically opposes including competition 
rules in the WTO because “competition policies were seen to be a threat” to SOEs.1136 This 
opposition can be reduced based on the balanced approach. Since the competition agency and trade 
agency are all in one department in China, namely the Department of Commerce, there should be 
less concern about competing administrative interests blocking progress.  
 
Developed members like the EU are supportive of including competition policies into the WTO 
and advocate exporting EU competition policy into the WTO.1137 Canada hopes that competition 
policy can replace CVDs and ADs, particularly in its relations with the U.S, and has included such 
provisions in its many BITs and FTAs 1138 Other developed members, like Japan, are willing to 
have competition policies in the WTO given that many BITs they entered have competition 
chapters. The U.S. historically opposes this: a) due to conflicts of interest among domestic 
administrative agencies. The competition issues and trade issues are in hands of different domestic 
administrative agencies. The U.S. Trade Representatives negotiates international agreements 
relating to trade issues, while it is the Justice Department which is in charge of competition issues, 
and is not willing to handle the issue to trade representatives to negotiate at the international level; 
b) due to the interest conflict between the Congress and the executive branch insofar as that the 
Congress is not willing to hand the power over competition issues to the executive branch in the 
context of international negotiations; c) due to opposition from private corporations, especially 
MNCs, against strict competition rules at the international level;1139 and d) the U.S. used to prefer 
its broader jurisdiction over competition issues for the purpose of enforcing its competition laws.   
The U.S. opposition has decreased to a great extent in the context of having competition rules in 
relation to SOEs receiving advantages. First, the U.S. has concluded many BITs and FTAs 
                                                      
1136 R Langhammer, “Changing Competition Policies in Developing Countries: from policies protecting companies 
against competition to policies protecting competition,” World Development Report Conference Berlin, Feb. 2002; 
Stephen Woolcock, supra note 1133.    
1137 Hufbauer and Kim, supra note 1132.  
1138 Similar efforts failed in the NAFTA, and the NAFTA Working Group on Trade and Competition does not seem 
to have moved any closer to this aim. Hence, Canada turned to the WTO forum. See Stephen Woolcock, supra note 
1133, pp. 18-26. 
1139 The Havana Charter of 1948 was informally rejected by the U.S. Senate partly because the leading U.S. business 
firms feared that limitations on restrictive business practices might be used as a club against their commercial interests. 
See Hufbauer and Kim, supra note 1132.  
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containing competition rules with developing countries in the past decades.1140 Since the beginning 
of this century, MNCs, particularly U.S. firms, have complained about SOEs’ presence and their 
receiving advantages, particularly the anti-competitive practices of SOEs from China, India, Brazil, 
and other important emerging countries. This motivates U.S. firms to give support in the Congress 
to efforts to include competition policies in the WTO.1141 Multinational corporations from the U.S. 
face enforcement of competition laws by developing countries, like China. U.S. MNCs have 
complained about the lack of transparency and due process, and that they are unfairly targeted by 
competition laws of other countries.1142 
 
The argument that the WTO has already embraced some competition elements can support the 
position that the WTO is capable of embracing competition rules. The literature has examined 
GATT articles such as Articles II, III and XI, and some WTO Agreements such as TRIPS, GATS, 
and TBT, and found that they contain elements of competition policy.1143 For instance, GATT 
Articles I and III:4 are concerned with the competitiveness between imported goods and domestic 
goods, rather than merely trade flows/trade effects/trade volume/market access.1144 Some scholars 
view that subsidy rules should be looked at mainly as competition rules. 1145 It is argued that 
“already under existing trade rules, national competition law and practice are not exempt from, but 
rather subject to, the application of the dispute settlement system.” 1146 However, most of the 
                                                      
1140 The U.S. has free trade agreement in force with 20 countries, see Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Trade 
Agreement”, available at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/bilateral-investment-treaties  https://ustr.gov/trade-
agreements/free-trade-agreements   
1141 Hufbauer and Kim, supra note 1132. 
1142 For instance, in one case regarding the prices of the patent held by Qualcomm, Qualcomm was fined by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China. The investigation process was complained by 
FOEs as uncertainty and non-transparency out of division of power among different administrative agencies. The 
NDRC is in charge of regulating prices while the Ministry of Commerce (MOC) is in charge of cases relating to 
M&As, and the State Administration for Industry & Commerce is in charge of cases relating to dominant market 
positions. Such division of jurisdiction may lead to uncertainty for companies. 
1143 For instance, Article 40 of the TRIPS allows competition authorities in WTO members to control certain licensing 
agreements on competition grounds; Article 31 of the TRIPS provides for compulsory licensing as a remedy in cases 
where anti-competitive practices have been based on intellectual property rights; The Understanding on Commitments 
in Financial Services requires monopoly rights to be listed and efforts to be made to reduce them; The Reference Paper 
on Basic Telecommunications negotiated in 1997 prohibits cross subsidization (of non-monopoly operations with 
monopoly services); Articles 3,4 and 8 of the TBT.  
1144 AB Report, Korea –Various Measures on Beef), WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, adopted 11 Dec. 2000.  
1145 Luca Rubini, The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective (Oxford 
University Press, 2009).  
1146 WTO, Report (2003) of The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/7, 17 July 2003, para. 89. 
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provisions are geared to serving specific narrow needs.1147 None of the existing WTO Agreements 
deal in a systematic way with competition issues.1148 Resorting to non-violation claims under 
GATT Article XXIII may address anti-competitive practices, for instance, that the benefits of 
market access for a WTO Member(s) are nullified by the absence of competition in a target market, 
and anti-competitive behavior that do not violate any part of the GATT. However, drawbacks exist 
that the nullification is very difficult to prove and succeed in practice.1149  Therefore, as to the 
question whether current trade rules in the WTO can be utilized to address competition issues in 
general, answers are unclear.1150 Therefore, as to the question whether the WTO is capable of 
having competition rules in relation to SOEs, the answer is probably yes partially due to the fact 
that competition elements have already been in the WTO. 
 
 
(3) Proposed Framework  
 
Technically speaking, it might be possible to have competition rules across all areas, including 
trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related investment. The reason for specific rules tailored 
to SOEs can lie in that domestic competition laws usually carve out SOEs for the purpose of social 
and political objectives. There is a possibility of abusive use of these carve outs and exceptions in 
a sense that SOEs may abuse their market dominant positions. In order to constrain such abuses, 
it is necessary to have competition rules tailored to advantages associated with SOEs at the 
international level. It needs to be admitted that having competition rules specifically tailored to 
SOEs, may cause some members to feel targeted. At least the new competition policies should 
apply to SOEs. The disagreement on the content of competition rules to be in the WTO includes 
many issues, such as core principles, transparency, non-discrimination and procedural fairness, 
                                                      
1147 Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 12-18; Gary Clyde Hufbauer and Jisun Kim, 
“International Competition Policy and the WTO”, Paper presented at a conference titled One Year Later: The Antitrust 
Modernization Commission's Report and the Challenges that Await Antitrust, New York University, Peterson Institute 
for International Economics, 11 April 2008. https://piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/international-competition-
policy-and-wto 
1148 WTO, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/5, 28 Nov. 1997, para. 18.  
1149 For example, the U.S. failed in clams based on Article XXIII nullification provisions. See Panel Report, Japan-
Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (Japan-Film), WT/DS44R, 31 Mar. 1998.  
1150 WTO, Report (1998) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/2, 8 Dec. 1998, para. 62.  
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provisions on hard core cartels, modalities for voluntary cooperation, and support for progressivity 
in developing countries.1151  Nevertheless, such disagreement is much reduced in the context of 
advantages associated with SOEs. It is not an effort of harmonization of national competition 
policies.1152  The proposal is only to incorporate competition rules in the WTO applicable to SOEs, 
rather than POEs. Hence, little opposition will come from privately-owned MNCs. 
 
Many members oppose competition rules in the WTO because many models exist worldwide, and 
no convergence exists as to which model is to be adopted. But I only use some competition laws 
elements specific to SOEs: no grants of advantages to SOEs solely due to state ownership; and 
SOEs shall not give advantages to others that alter competition relationship. It is possible to 
propose to increase competition in areas dominated by SOEs. Regulations of anti-competitive 
behavior shall include the followings, such as SOEs shall not be givers of non-commercial 
assistance, consolidation of SOEs shall not be assisted by governments, de-political decision 
making of SOEs; independence of SOEs; non-discriminatory behavior, commercial considerations 
based decision-making, transparency, etc.   Literature suggests that with respect to hard-core 
cartels for an example, countries vary as regard to what horizontal and vertical agreements reached 
by cartels are subject to disciplines, and the attitudes towards merges and acquisitions vary as some 
countries use their merger policy to advance industrial strategy by blocking foreign mergers and 
acquisitions in strategic sectors.1153 To that end, these fields are very difficult to reach consensus. 
However, disagreements may decrease to the extent that SOEs form cartels.  
 
                                                      
1151 WTO, Report (2002) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/6, 9 Dec. 2002; WTO Ministerial Conference Fourth Session Doha, 9-14 Nov. 2001, 
Ministerial Declaration, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 Nov. 2001, para. 25; WTO, Report (2001) of the Working Group 
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/5, 28 Nov. 1997, 
paras. 15. 18 and 59. 61. 
1152 Harmonization efforts encounter difficulties. See WTO, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Interaction 
between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/5, 28 Nov. 1997, para. 17.  
1153 WTO, Report (2003) of The Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/7, 17 July, 2003, paras. 45 and 47; Vertical agreements refer to those between suppliers 
at different levels of the production or distribution process. See Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy 
and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, 
p. 8. 
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Keeping in mind that no multilateral agreements can be made unless big compromises can be 
reached, 1154 flexibility can be displayed in the following dimensions. i) To have some exceptions 
provisions or specific sector exception; and ii) to have some technical assistance for capacity 
building, transitional periods for implementation or enforcement.  (See Table 26 below.) 
Table 26 Proposed Framework of the Competition Law Element Approach 
Areas: trade in goods; trade in services; trade-related investment; 
Disciplines on SOEs in balanced with the review of investment entry of SOEs;  
Cooperation among competition enforcement authorities; share information;  
Basic/core Principles: competition neutrality:  
Main obligations: 
• No grants of advantages to SOEs solely due to state ownership;  
• Requirement of making decisions solely based on commercial considerations: e.g., SOEs shall not give 
advantages to others; 
• Anti-competitive behavior regulation after receiving advantages:  
o No monopolistic behavior or abuse of dominant market position in so far as it may 
adversely affect competition in any market: including discrimination, cross-subsidization;  
o No horizontal restraints, including export restraints; 
o No vertical restraints; 
o Requirements of divestiture of competitive activities from monopolistic activities;  
• Making decisions independently from governments; 
• Domestic competition rules shall be applicable to SOEs;1155 
• No government-assisted or mandated mergers and acquisition of SOEs to the extent that it will lead to 
concentration and have anti-competitive effects; 
Flexibility  
• Exceptions/carve outs: specifically tailored to SOEs; Technical assistance, transitional periods. 
                                                      
1154 WTO, Report (2001) of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the 
General Council, WT/WGTCP/5, 28 Nov. 1997, para. 33; WTO, Report (2003) of The Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy to the General Council, WT/WGTCP/7, 17 July 2003, para. 67; 
Stephen Woolcock, International Competition Policy and the World Trade Organization, Paper for the LSE 
Commonwealth Business Council Trade Forum in South Africa, pp. 9-10 and 7-12.  
1155 It might be true that applying domestic competition rules to SOEs will have very different effects in different 
countries, such as depending on whether jurisdiction has only public or also private enforcement, the extraterritoriality 
issue, and so on.  I think such different effects do not matter since POEs also face the same domestic competition rules 
as that of SOEs in one jurisdiction, as long as there is no unfair competition between POEs and SOEs in one jurisdiction. 
It is the exemption of applying domestic competition rules to SOEs and hence to confer regulatory advantages to SOEs 
that I am targeting to address.  There is no need to set the standard rules on these issues (such as the availability of 





From WTO members’ political perspective, trade remedies approach proposals are less likely 
given that negotiating or amending, for instance, the definition of “public bodies” within the SCM 
Agreement encounters opposition, such as the argument that the balance will lose between 
substantive provisions regarding the grants of subsidies and the procedural provisions regarding 
the use of CVDs. The trade rules approach proposals are also less likely given that efforts of 
negotiating or amending current trade rules about monopolies in history were rare and members 
want to have policy space reserved for granting monopolies or exclusive rights.  
 
In contrast, the balanced competition rules approach proposals are more likely to be implemented. 
Keeping in mind the idea of trade-offs, in order to achieve the competition rules proposals 
regarding SOEs disciplines, there are many issues can be taken into account for trade-offs, such as 
market access issues investment issues, etc. I picked up the element of “investment review” in 
particular for the balance and trade-offs.  
 
In respect of China, although there are many complaints about China and pressure faced by China, 
such as the conflict of interest or competition between Chinese SOEs and SOEs from other 
countries, the pressure from the negotiations in the Government Procurement Agreement and the 
treatment towards Chinese enterprises, especially Chinese SOEs in the government procurement 
markets in some developed members, increasing trade remedies cases brought against China and 
other countries with significant presence of SOEs receiving various advantages, etc., there is much 
pressure coming from the investment area. More and more investment restrictions are imposed on 
SOEs by foreign governments with respect to mergers and acquisitions, and green field investment, 
through investment screening or security review for foreign investment. It makes the trade-offs 
possible for China between SOEs related disciplines and investment entry issues relating to SOE. 
As for other members, it is easier to accept partial range of investment issues to be governed by 
the WTO, as well as competition issues relating to SOEs.  
 
Lastly, I proposed the most likely potential framework for the competition rules approach.  
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6.4 Conclusion of Chapter 6 
 
The WTO is a more appropriate forum to implement proposals on SOEs than other fora. As a 
practical matter, WTO decisions are made by consensus. Although voting is possible and 
ministerial decisions may be attractive to Members, the WTO dispute settlement will not be 
available at all if there is only a stand-along ministerial decision implementing my proposals. To 
that end, amendment or negotiation new rules is necessary to implement my proposals. The 
political willingness of WTO Members has been laid out in accepting the competition rules 
proposals by negotiating a new agreement. The competition rules proposals are most likely to be 













Chapter 7: Conclusion  
 
This dissertation examines the problem of SOEs receiving various advantages within the WTO 
framework. Namely, whether current WTO rules are sufficient to address the problem of SOEs 
receiving various advantages. I conclude that they are not, and make recommendations to improve 
them. In chapter one, I examined the global presence of SOEs and various advantages they receive, 
and find that SOEs are still pervasive particularly in emerging country and SOEs receive typically 
three kinds of advantages, i.e., financial advantages, such as money transfer and provision of 
goods/services from governments; monopolies and exclusive rights, such as exclusive rights to 
produce, distribute, export and import; and regulatory advantages such as favored treatment by 
competition laws and selective enforcement. Then I explained that SOEs receiving advantages has 
been perceived as problematic historically and economically. I traced the history of SOEs in the 
world economy and explain how the grant of advantages to SOEs has been perceived as more 
problematic over time. I also examined historical efforts regionally and internationally to tackle 
the problems, including privatization waves, decreasing subsidies, and regulations developed in 
early GATT, the EU, the TPP Agreement and other FTAs negotiations recently. Economically, I 
demonstrate that grants of advantages to SOEs undermine gains from international trade to the 
extent that they reduce world welfare, and undermine international trade agreements, in light of 
SOEs’ objective to maximize revenue and expand scale, SOEs’ strong lobbying power, and SOEs’ 
tendency to engage in anti-competitive behavior and be influenced by governments.  
 
In chapter two, I used the empirical method to collect data and information about the problem in 
the context of Chinese SOEs, examined the extent, nature, and effect of advantages granted to 
Chinese SOEs, and why there is little incentive in China to deal with the problems. I found that 
Chinese SOEs get more financial advantages than POEs, in a less transparent way, and in more 
various forms, such as lower cost of capital, the right to use land, lower resources fees, and lighter 
tax burden. SOEs also act as givers of capital and inputs to others. SOEs are more likely to receive 
monopolies and exclusive rights, and afterwards, are more likely to engage in anti-competitive 
behavior and behavior influenced by governments. SOEs are more likely to receive regulatory 
advantages, such as having mergers and acquisitions assisted by the Chinese Government and 
exempted from competition laws. The impacts are different depending on the industry or sector 
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SOEs are in. There is little incentive to change current practices in China due to the common 
interest among SOEs, governments, and the communist party.  
 
In chapter three, I laid out the existing WTO rules that can discipline the three advantages granted 
to SOEs in the area of trade in goods, trade in services, and trade-related investment, and the special 
rules agreed to by China in its accession to the WTO with respect to advantages granted to SOEs. 
Then, I explained how the current WTO rules cannot cover some issues related to SOEs, and how 
the current rules are deficient even if they can be maximized to address issues related to SOEs 
receiving advantages in those three aspects. There are specific problems in respect of three kinds 
of advantages given to SOEs. For instance, with respect to financial advantages, I examined five 
issues, which are very much distinct from one another, such as the issue of SOEs as givers of 
advantages, the problem of upstream subsidies in the context of Chinese SOEs, the financial 
advantages Chinese SOEs receive prior to privatizations, especially in the case of partial 
privatizations with a transfer of control, etc. These issues are hardly caught by the SCM Agreement. 
With respect to monopolies and exclusive rights granted to SOEs, as well as regulatory advantages 
granted to SOEs, the issues are primarily divided into two types, i.e., one is about grants per se, 
and the other is about behavior after receiving monopolies, exclusive rights, or regulatory 
advantages. Historically, the WTO rules allow grants of monopolies or exclusive rights. WTO 
jurisprudence has somewhat limited the grants of exclusive rights or monopolies themselves. The 
current WTO rules to some degree discipline some behavior of SOEs after they receive advantages, 
but are not yet sufficient. Not all SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights are subject to behavior 
regulations and only some behavior is regulated, leaving much behavior of SOEs after receiving 
monopolies or exclusive rights undisciplined, such as discriminatory behavior against foreigners, 
and some anticompetitive behavior (abuse of dominant positions, cross-subsidization, collusion 
and exclusion behavior among giant SOEs, including export restraints). With respect to regulatory 
advantages given to SOEs, such as exemption from domestic competition laws, it is hard to 
regulate them under the SCM Agreement.  Second, overseeing the enforcement of domestic 
regulatory laws is largely outside the WTO’s jurisdiction. Hence, the selective enforcement of 




In chapter four, I relied on the comparative approach to put forth my suggestions by looking at the 
European Union rules and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement. I came up with three kinds of 
suggestions, one is the trade remedies approach, the second one is the trade rules approach, and 
the last one is the competition law elements approach.  They have some commonalities. The trade 
remedies approach proposes to treat as public bodies those SOEs who are under the government’s 
meaningful control and are given monopolies or exclusive rights or dominant positions due to 
regulatory advantages in a particular industry within the meaning of the SCM Agreement.  
 
With respect to trade rules approach, in regards to financial advantages, I proposed to expand the 
coverage of GATT Article XVII and make commercial considerations in GATT Article XVII:1(b) 
independent. With respect to SOEs with monopolies or exclusive rights, I proposed modify current 
trade rules, to expand the coverage of GATT Article XVII to all SOEs with all kinds of monopolies 
and exclusive rights, to embrace the national treatment obligation in Article XVII, to expand the 
coverage of the obligation of commercial considerations applicable to GATS as well, and to make 
the “commercial considerations” obligation an independent obligation.  
 
With respect to competition rules approach, in terms of financial advantages, I proposed to prohibit 
SOEs from giving financial advantages to others, particularly SOEs, to the extent that such 
behavior affect or distorts competition. With respect to monopolies or exclusive rights given to 
SOEs, I proposed to regulate the behavior of SOEs which receive monopolies or exclusive rights 
through competition rules. With respect to regulatory advantages given to SOEs, I proposed to 
prohibit government-assisted or mandated mergers and acquisitions of SOEs to the extent that it 
will lead to concentration and have anti-competitive effects.  
 
In chapter five, I assessed the proposals within the WTO. First, the WTO is a more appropriate 
form to implement the proposals due to its legitimacy in having competition elements rules 
disciplining SOEs. In contrast, other fora outside the WTO, such as BITs and FTAs, are not likely 
to succeed in addressing the problem of SOEs receiving various advantages due to political 
difficulties or the lack of participation by countries with many SOEs. Second, I examined the legal 
techniques that can be utilized within the WTO to implement these proposals. In practice, 
consensus is practiced for negotiation, amendment, ministerial conference decisions or general 
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council decisions. Theoretically, amendment requires consent from two-thirds of members, and 
Ministerial Conference decisions and General Council decisions can be made by a majority voting. 
The legal effects of Ministerial Conference decisions or General Council decisions are not clear if 
they are adopted by voting. Third, from WTO members’ political perspective, the balanced 
competition rules approach proposals are more likely to be implemented. Keeping in mind the idea 
of trade-offs, in order to achieve the competition rules proposals regarding SOEs disciplines, there 
are many issues can be taken into account for trade-offs, such as market access issue, investment 
issues, etc. In respect of China, more and more investment restrictions are imposed on SOEs by 
foreign governments with respect to mergers and acquisitions, and green field investment, through 
investment screening or investment security review for foreign investment. It makes the trade-offs 
possible for China between SOEs related disciplines and investment entry issues relating to SOEs. 
As for other members, it is easier to accept partial range of investment issues to be governed by 
the WTO, as well as competition issues relating to SOEs. Members nowadays are more likely to 
accept the competition law elements embodied in the WTO rules than decades ago. In the end, I 
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